This monograph analyzes an extraordinary tale of public policy making in Ontario: the construction and management of an innovative toll highway now known as the 407/ETR (Express Toll Route).

Both authors were indirectly involved in the highway's development. One was chief of staff to a succession of NDP transportation ministers and later advisor to an unsuccessful bidder when the highway was “privatized.” The other served on the board of directors of the provincial Crown corporation (OTCC) responsible for building the highway. The authors describe themselves as “observers, because neither was a key decision-maker” (3). However, their most trenchant analysis is clearly derived from those “inside” experiences.

Highway 407 was built as a public-private partnership—one initiated by an NDP government, no less. By the early 1990s a controlled-access highway was crucial to the management of motor vehicle traffic in the Greater Toronto Area. The difficulty was that the Rae government was caught between the need for relatively quick action and an empty treasury. The solution was an innovative “strategic partnership” with the private sector and the acceptance of a user-pay philosophy, both apparently inconsistent with long-standing NDP principles and “a significant departure from [the] previous practice of the Ontario government or its agencies” (40). Mylvaganam and Borins provide an insightful analysis of the rationale for these apparent aberrations, even if the intricacies of the tendering system do not make for scintillating prose.

An electronic tolling system was indispensable to collecting revenue to finance the road, without hampering the smooth flow of high-volume traffic (the ultimate purpose of the road, after all). Ideally, developing successful information technology could lead to exportable, leading-edge expertise for Ontario-based companies. One of the authors' regrets is that this opportunity—and its potential applicability around the world—was ultimately sacrificed for short-term political advantage.

The tale takes an important twist after June 1995. The authors believe the Harris government's attitude towards Highway 407 “is a classic example of ideologically motivated thinking. Its advisers with private sector backgrounds … ignored the success of a public sector organization [the provincial Crown corporation OTCC] … and [were] convinced that government would ‘screw up’ any industrial venture” (131). This was not a matter for assessment or analysis. It was taken as fact.

The events leading up to “privatization” (actually, leasing the highway's revenue stream for 99 years) are chronicled through lenses that will leave most Ontario readers with a combination of disbelief, melancholy and rage.

The authors' personal perspectives permeate this section. “It is evident that many elements of the privatization were antithetical to the long-term public interest. The timing of the privatization was dictated by the government's political and electoral needs and was undoubtedly premature” (103). Within a few pages, words like “travesty” (87), “misrepresentation” (89) and “inconceivable” (100) appear in reference to a project exemplifying, up to that point, “good leadership and good management” (109).

The authors also take pains (informed, undoubtedly, by Mylvaganam's experiences) to distinguish between the way the Rae and Harris governments understood the role of cabinet and the public service. The former saw cabinet's “proper role” as that of making policy decisions, “entrusting public servants to make the specific decisions necessary to implement those policies.” An “(unstated) desire to insulate the government from the inevitable allegations of political influence was clearly in operation” (37). For the PCs, “the government retained the right to make all decisions. The civil servants would recommend to the cabinet, which would then decide. Their view was that since the government was responsible for the outcome, it also had to approve decisions leading to the outcome” (82).

Two episodes illustrate the contrast. The 1994 choice of a consortium to build the highway was effectively made by a committee of deputy ministers (36), but the selection of the bid to “privatize” the highway was made by a cabinet committee chaired by Ernie Eves (84). Although the identity of the bidders was masked and the deal was framed on ideological principles for party hardliners, the particular option, the authors suggest, can “only be explained by the desire of Eves, the Finance Minister, to obtain as much revenue as possible before the [1999] election” (85).

The 407/ETR story will have an influence on Ontario politics and public policy for many years to come—indeed, for nearly a century! A number of policy issues still remain on the table, including the extension of the highway to its logical eastern extremity and the already fractious question of the toll levels. The McGuinty Liberals (in the short term) and southern Ontario motorists (in the long, long term) are living with an unmistakable monument to ideological spin.

Despite its modest length, “If you build it …” is an important contribution to a comprehensive evaluation of the Harris government.