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EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 July 2013

Michiru Nagatsu
Michiru Nagatsu*
Affiliation:
University of Helsinki, Finland, Tallinn University of Technology, Estoniamichiru.nagatsu@helsinki.fi
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Abstract

This article is a prelude to an experimental study of the preference concept in economics. I argue that a new empirical approach called experimental philosophy of science is a promising approach to advance the philosophy of economics. In particular, I discuss two debates in the field, the neuroeconomics controversy and the commonsensible realism debate, and suggest how experimental and survey techniques can generate data that will inform these debates. Some of the likely objections from philosophers and economists are addressed, and possible ways of operationalizing different preference concepts are illustrated.

Type
Articles
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 29 , Issue 2: Experiments in economics and philosophy , July 2013 , pp. 263 - 276
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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