This work is written at three levels. In reverse order to that in which they are presented in the book there is, first, a detailed account of the locally recruited men who served the British Persian Gulf Residency in the Bahrein agency during the nineteenth century. This section, which draws in part on an uncommon source, namely the private papers of some of the agents which were preserved by their descendants, contains much new material. Second is a study, based principally on the documents of the British Indian Government now deposited in the British Library, of what is termed the native agency system in the Gulf as a whole. It is the author's contention that the native agents played a far more important role than other writers have allowed. He argues that most writers have described the history of the nineteenth century Gulf as a triangle involving British political agents, rules and native agents; and he points out that there were far more native than British agents. The third level is that of imperial theory to which he claims to make three contributions: first that the empire, formal and informal, of the British Indian Raj was much larger than is generally supposed; second, that the role of indigenous collaborators was much larger and more significant than is sometimes believed; and third, that strategy was more important than economics in the Gulf.
The Bahrein section is essentially a case study of the operation of the native agency system and, beyond applauding the work involved and remarking that perhaps the author builds too much on this one case study, no further comment is required in this review. The concept of the native agency system (perhaps network would be a better term) does demand some comment, in particular concerning the supposed political function of the native agents. That they were useful newswriters, supplying the Resident with information about local affairs, is undoubted. Some of them also played a part in civil court proceedings, mediating on behalf of British protected persons. But the crucial question is whether they performed significant political functions. Onley tries hard to make the case that they did so but this reviewer was left unconvinced by the evidence he brings forward. Part of the problem is that one does not know what influence the agents exerted on the British residents by means of their control of information. There are examples of agents who did try to mislead or otherwise influence the Residents and there may well be many cases which never came to light. But once again one feels that the evidence does not justify the assured manner in which Onley sets out his conclusions.
At bottom the problem is that there just is not enough evidence about the activities of the native agents. Onley did well to find and use the Bahreini documents but they are only a drop in an anonymous ocean. He criticizes previous writers for ignoring the role of the native agents and giving undue attention to the role of British agents but this seems unfair. Previous writers were aware that native employees – agents, newswriters, bankers, brokers, secretaries and interpreters – played important parts in affairs, but too often their parts were hidden. Historians can only write about the past for which there is evidence: the concept of unwritten history is a very slippery one. And no-one has ever questioned that the British Raj could not have existed without enjoying the services of Indian soldiers, policemen, civil servants, and so on, right down to the humble punkah wallahs and dhobis. And the reasons for their employment were the same as those which Onley mentions in relation to the native agents in the Gulf: they were cheap, available, willing, effective, and stood the climate better.
Onley includes an interesting chapter on the decline of the native agency system in the Gulf, a phenomenon which he attributes principally to the spread of European rivalries to the area and the desire to substitute British for native agents, essentially because they were deemed more useful for political work. In the case of Bahrein he also stresses another factor, namely the breakdown of relations between the rule and the native agent, and seems to claim, somewhat confusingly, that the change to British agency would not have taken place without this quarrel. Perhaps one should emphasize the support of Lord Curzon, the single Governor General to assign first-rate political importance to the Gulf, for the change. At all events within a few years, from 1900 onwards, the native agents were reduced to being subordinate to British political agents, now stationed in the Gulf states where British representation had hitherto been left in native hands.
Finally, we may consider Onley's contribution to the theory of empire. His claim that the empire of the Raj was larger than usually supposed seems to rest on insecure foundations. To claim Ottoman Iraq, Iran and Siam for the Indian empire goes altogether too far and only very small parts of Arabia could reasonably be included. The word “empire” was always vague in meaning but it did connote some element of political authority which is here lacking. Influence is one thing but rule is another; and the concept of informal empire, although it can be useful if applied with great caution, can lead historians on a wild goose chase. As for the rival claims of economics and strategy (which are not exactly expressed in the contrast of Cain and Hopkins and Robinson and Gallagher) one doubts whether either was that important in the Gulf which was, for most of its history, a backwater.