Drawing from statistical game theory and case studies analyses, Kemahlıoğlu examines the reasons elected officials or patrons in Argentina and Turkey choose to employ civilians through personal networking. She focuses on Argentina and Turkey because they are undergoing similar democratic transitions but differ in their political backgrounds and sociocultural histories. Starting from the 1980s, Kemahlıoğlu focuses on how economic changes in both countries produced a high demand for and large supply of patronage jobs. She explains how particularism (patronage) persists in these two developing democracies because there is little judicial oversight. The author also acknowledges that particularism is harmful to democracies, especially for Argentina and Turkey, which have tried to leave behind economic crises and military governments. Kemahlıoğlu details the ways in which public services continue to deteriorate because politicians hire citizens who may not be qualified for their jobs in exchange for votes. In addition, the author explores how particularism negatively affects public administration as politicians solely provide jobs in their parties in exchange for support in electoral campaigns and internal party elections, not as a means of serving the people. Kemahlıoğlu recognizes the limitations of trading votes for jobs and provides an alternative explanation for how elected officials could maintain their control in politics, demonstrating through game theory analysis the manner in which particularism tends to decrease or increase due to intra-party competition.