For a very long time, the scholarship on Middle Eastern politics has suffered from scarce use of the analytical tools provided by the field of comparative politics. The result has too often been descriptive research in the anthropological style. Such studies lacked the rigour necessary for providing cumulative knowledge and theoretical insight. In recent years, however, an increasing number of scholars have been recognizing the value of complementing their in-depth knowledge of the region with appropriate social science theories. New theoretically oriented scholarship—produced by Mark Tessler (Area Study and Social Science, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), Carrie Wickham Rosefsky (Mobilizing Islam, New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), Quintan Wikorowitcz (Islamic Activism, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), Eva Bellin (Stalled Democracy, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), Lisa Anderson (Transition to Democracy, New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), and a few others—filled such a need that, as a result of their publication, knowledge of Middle Eastern politics has taken a great leap forward since the early 2000s.

Lust-Okar's book is a valuable addition to this recent development. Simply put, this study applies good social science techniques to explain real-world politics and makes good use of real-world politics to offer generalizable theoretical insights. The author brings in the rational choice brand of the new institutionalism approach to show how governing echelons can manipulate their political opposition through the formulation of suitable rules and how opposition movements are guided by strategic considerations rather than mere altruism, as is too frequently assumed. This is an innovative perspective given that, conventionally, students of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and elsewhere tend to dismiss formal rules as irrelevant, focusing instead on the informal ways of doing politics in the region.

The study deals with one of the main puzzles occupying observers of the Middle East: How have authoritarian regimes in the region managed to sustain their rule despite the genuine grievances of the bulk of the population? In particular, economic crises are typically perceived as creating political opportunities for opponents to mobilize disenchanted constituents who are adversely affected by economic instability. Indeed, in the 1990s, it was widely held that the economic crises associated with International Monetary Fund (IMF) reform would engender more open regimes that would eventually get swept by democracy's third wave.

And yet, opposition groups have been inconsistent in capitalizing on the increasing opportunities created by initial political liberalization coupled by mass readiness to mobilize. In Morocco and Egypt in the 1990s, for example, incumbent regimes permitted some oppositional activity. And yet, partial liberalization did not result in further demands for more political reform. Using formal modelling, Lust-Okar demonstrates that it is not just a question of capabilities, but also an issue of willingness or interest on the part of opposition groups that explains variation in their behaviour. This is not to say that popular dissatisfaction does not increase the prospects of protest mobilization and demands for reform. Nonetheless, Morocco and Egypt present us with examples where, despite the ongoing economic crisis and popular discontent, the main political opposition movements were less willing to engage in mass mobilization.

What largely influences the choices made by opposition leaders are the formal rules devised by the regime regarding who is and is not allowed to participate in politics. Lust-Okar argues that ruling elites develop “Structures of Contestation” (SoCs). She distinguishes between two types of SoCs. In a divided SoC, the regime makes it legal for some opposition groups to participate in formal politics, but not for others. In a unified SoC, participation is permitted to all opposition groups. According to Lust-Okar, in a unified SoC, the regime is more likely to encourage the growth of moderate, rather than radical, opposition. In a divided SoC, counterintuitively, the governing apparatus is likely to balance the strengths of moderates and radicals, even if the latter are excluded. “The existence of radical opposition groups, and the threat that they may take advantage of political unrest to demand their own policies, serves to repress included opposition groups” (6). Her comparative study of Morocco, Egypt and Jordan demonstrates that in unified SoCs, widespread public frustration and a weakened state remove obstacles for mobilization and increase the chances for success, thus providing incentives for opposition activism. In divided SoCs, however, strategic calculations of included opposition leaders can yield different outcomes. Groups that are already allowed to participate in formal politics may fear that further loosening of regime control will permit the participation of other, previously excluded opposition groups, which in turn creates a competitive opposition environment. Furthermore, the new participants are likely to promote their own distinct agenda. Thus, included opposition groups are in danger of losing their privileged status as well as their monopoly over opposition activism. As a consequence, they are likely to press for greater political freedom only if they are persuaded that they will benefit from such reforms.

The cases of Jordan, Morocco and Egypt are generally well argued and exhibit variations in outcome that are useful for verifying the author's hypotheses. Particularly compelling is the Egyptian case where, since the late 1980s, President Mubarak fostered a divided SoC, yet the legal opposition, fearing the popularity and threat of Islamist militants, refrained from pressing for greater reform. Given Jordan's transition during the late 1980s toward an inclusive, unified SoC, the analysis of the case would have benefited from a clearer explanation of what appears, at least on the surface, like cooperative behaviour of opposition groups in the period preceding King Hussein's reforms.

In the final analysis, Lust-Okar presents a solid model, coupled by impressive, in-depth knowledge of the region, to demonstrate how opposition activism is not simply a function of group resources or political space. Rather, it is affected by the formal rules created by the regime. I am certain that this book will make it on to many syllabi of upper-level courses on the politics of the Middle East.