The global nonproliferation regime concerning weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has been under immense strain in the past few years. The diplomatic efforts to limit Iran’s development of a nuclear energy program raised worrying questions about the country’s capacity to transform the program into a nuclear weapons capability. The increasingly assertive and at times antagonistic behavior of the North Korean leadership has likewise drawn attention to the failure to prevent nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula. The global debate about chemical weapons has also intensified after their use against civilians in the Syrian civil war.
A common theme linking all of these problems is the perception that the global nonproliferation regime is weakening, placed under immense stress in the post-9/11 era. This regime is traditionally considered to consist of a series of treaties, including the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). These stressors include rogue regimes violating international norms, terrorist organizations attempting to acquire WMDs, and, importantly for nuclear issues, the growing divide between the nuclear weapons states and the non-nuclear weapons states. Jeffrey Knopf and the contributors to this volume acknowledge the fragile state of the international regime, while highlighting the vast array of cooperative and coercive efforts at nonproliferation that occur outside the traditional treaty structure (p. 3). This is an important and timely contribution to nonproliferation studies, as it identifies the weaknesses of the existing treaty frameworks, while assessing a range of more flexible and ad hoc processes that have done much to prevent the most destructive weapons from spreading across the globe. As Knopf concludes in the final chapter, these processes have been difficult to assess because they are often cumulative and gradual in nature (p. 297).
Perhaps the most important aspect of International Cooperation on WMD Nonproliferation, however, is the methodological approach, which identifies the shift in the world of nonproliferation from agreements that often required coordination of states toward similar policy goals—say, the reduction in numbers of nuclear weapons—to a more collaborative approach between different actors (p. 10). Knopf’s introductory chapter offers a comprehensive survey of the literature on international cooperation and identifies the distinctions along the cooperation/coordination continuum. This is a significant insight, as it moves debate away from the simplistic binary of cooperation versus noncooperation. Too often when nonproliferation efforts are examined, success or failure is judged using this binary, with the result that the more flexible and adaptive approaches are overlooked. Knopf outlines the key factors that can contribute to the success or failure of international cooperation, and each contributor offers a case study that examines which factors were present and how effective the actors involved were in achieving their aims.
The case studies illustrate the diverse range of nonproliferation initiatives outside the treaty framework. Chapters 2 to 9 offer an initial look at a spectrum of nonproliferation efforts. These global efforts experienced varying degrees of success, flourishing where there was substantive collaboration within informal networks, and often failing when key states, such as the Russia or the United States, resisted or failed to provide leadership. This particular problem is explored by Wyn Q. Bowen and Alan Heyes in their analysis of the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of WMD in Chapter 5 (pp. 97–115). The aim of the initiative was to secure and reduce the threat posed by vulnerable fissile, chemical, and biological materials. This desire became acute in the aftermath of September 11. Bowen and Heyes regard the program as largely successful, yet they identify several weaknesses inherent in an informal agreement. Over time, the costs associated with the program have become a burden to some states, perhaps exacerbated by the global financial crisis (p. 112). Russia played an important role in driving the program forward, yet the chapter highlights the extent to which the successful aspects of the program were also the ones that aligned with the Russian government’s own interests. Conversely, the areas that were less successful were the ones that Russia resisted (pp. 112–13). The lesson here, and certainly one that is applicable to the other case studies, is the extent to which key states can act as blockers or drivers in ensuring that informal efforts succeed.
This lesson is repeated in Scott A. Jones’s assessment of the development of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and other multilateral export-control regimes (pp. 23–45) and in Emma Belcher’s chapter on the Proliferation Security Initiative (pp. 116–39). Both chapters reinforce that it was the nonbinding and informal nature of the agreement that was in many ways responsible for its success. Belcher argues that this allowed norms to develop in response to changing needs that would have been hampered by a rigid, legally binding structure (p. 134). Yet both authors emphasize the continued role of states’ self-interest in determining the extent to which involvement in such efforts is pursued or not (p. 127).
The chapters focusing on regional case studies also highlighted the problematic role of self-interest, and indeed the role of coercion, in whether nonproliferation efforts work effectively. David Santoro’s chapter on the Iranian nuclear program and the E3+3/P5+1 diplomatic negotiations offers an important examination of this very problem. While the chapter concludes in 2013 with the election of President Hassan Rouhani, he rightly concludes that the diplomatic efforts had already achieved a degree of success, in that they upheld a multilateral commitment to international norms and rules (p. 289). However, it is important not to overlook the degree to which the self-interest of the various actors, and the decidedly coercive nature of the process, have resulted in an agreement that is deeply precarious and vulnerable to disruption. It is currently in Iran’s national self-interest to cooperate, but domestic and international factors may change that calculation at any time. This highlights perhaps the greatest weakness in all of the cooperative measures explored in the volume, namely, that context and conditions change, and thus cooperative nonproliferation agreements are far more fragile than formal, legally binding ones.
In an atmosphere of decided pessimism over the future strength of the NPT and the norms prohibiting the use of chemical and biological weapons, the volume draws attention to the many successes of the informal and ad hoc, regional, and global nonproliferation efforts that help raise awareness about what happens beyond the treaty system. As Knopf argues in the conclusion, the nexus between formal and informal nonproliferation agreements deserves much greater attention (p. 310), and moving the field beyond a simple binary of cooperative versus noncooperative perspectives goes a long way toward deepening our understanding.
