This is a well argued, analytically incisive, informative and important book. Hanley here addresses the theme of love, broadly construed, in four Enlightenment thinkers (Hume, Rousseau, Smith, and Kant) and he explores the strengths and weaknesses of each of those conceptions with attention to how those conceptions come to terms with the need to temper the tendency to self-love in the modern era with concern for others.
The argument is placed within a broader and useful historical frame briefly sketched at the outset of the work that notes the power of early articulations of the force and power of love in the forms of eros, philia, and agape (with all three depicted as triangulating among love of self, love of others, and love of the divine) but also of their problematic status in the modern era. The rejection in modernity of any recourse to commonly shared conceptions of transcendent truths in philosophical or theological form means that those earlier conceptions of love can no longer ground common or public commitments to others. In the face of this, the Enlightenment thinkers considered here took up the challenge of seeking a new basis on which the power and motivational force of other-directedness might be construed. In many instances, they looked to the nature and force of sentiment, generated from within individuals and extending concern beyond the self towards others in the form of benevolence, sympathy, and good will. Hanley addresses each of his chosen thinkers in turn, exploring the specific ways in which they sought to address the challenge. He astutely and concisely articulates the features of their moral philosophy regarding other-directed motivations and conceptions.
The broad thrust of his analysis demonstrates that none of his chosen thinkers has an optimal solution, although of the four presented he leans toward Kant as providing the most appealing solution. For Hume the solution resided first in the invocation of sympathy. However, given the weakness of sympathy as a principle of other-directedness given its possible inconsistencies (in that we are often brought to sympathize more with those near to us and who are like us), Hume came to acknowledge the superiority of humanity as a principle. Defined as our preference for the well-being of others, humanity can work through the imagination rather than contiguity and it thereby offers greater potential for overcoming the narrowness of self-love. Still, as a cool preference for the well-being of others, in the final assessment humanity as a principle invoked by Hume and as judged by Hanley cannot offer the emotional strength and motivational force required to overcome the strength of egoism.
Rousseau's invocation of pity is analyzed as his solution to the challenge of how to ground other-directedness in the modern era. Hanley suggests that Rousseauian pity has two iterations: a natural prereflexive pity of the state of nature, and a developed, more cognitive sentiment that can function in a modern context. The suggestion is that this second form of pity, as more fully accounted for in book 4 of Emile, can be understood as an extension of amour-propre for Rousseau. The implication is that while this gives this form of other-directedness a sure foundation, it may not be sufficient to allow for the type of transcendence of self that is required of it.
Hanley's third theorist is Smith, who is depicted as coming to champion the idea of sympathy through an intellectual trajectory considering other, more demanding alternatives. For Hanley and Smith the attraction of sympathy is that it works effectively against the forces of self-love and serves to meet basic human needs for loving and being loved. However, sympathy's reach is limited, and while it serves to keep established social bonds intact, it appears to do little to enhance or strengthen them.
The final focus of Hanley's analysis is Kant, who is regarded as having a stronger theoretical conception of other-directed motivation because of its appeal to duty and principle and will, ensuring both its consistency as well as its universality. In addition, its alliance with principles of basic dignity (as made most explicit in Kant's later writing) ensures that the motivation of other-directedness is not mired in paternalism or egoism by stealth. The latter moment also ensures that possible tendencies to inequality in love are tempered by the ongoing maxim of respect.
However, Hanley in the end finds Kant's iteration lacking, less for reasons of its internal theoretical consistency or strength than for the question of its veracity as an account of love. Hanley clearly finds something very compelling and convincing in the intensity associated with accounts of transcendence that characterized the classical and medieval versions of love. Yet he also accepts the verdict that such accounts can no longer stand as definitive articulations for the modern era.
The usefulness of this book lies in its conceptual clarity that allows the reader to identify and assess competing understandings of other-directedness in Enlightenment thought. It also sheds light on the philosophical systems and intellectual development of the various theorists identified. It is helpful in coming to terms with a debate in the history of ideas and in shedding light on a more persistent challenge of the current era, the challenge of extreme individualism and egoism that threatens to tear the social fabric of a liberal society as well as undermine (as Tocqueville will judge later) democratic regimes.
Still, the author appears to hold the assumption that the salve to contemporary anomie must be a singular conception of love that not only overcomes the various weaknesses associated with previous versions, but also speaks to the intensity of transcendence found in the previous premodern articulations. But what if social and political fragmentation can only be met with a multiplicity of ideas and approaches, involving some of the features of sympathy and will articulated in the Enlightenment, among others? It is worth asking whether in the modern era a singular and sophisticated conception of love that offered a powerful invitation to self-transcendence along with a plan for social cohesion was something to be sought or something to be wary of. Hannah Arendt offered a cautionary account of the invocation of compassion and love in political life, citing the dangers of the French Revolution and recognizing how a sense of service to the whole and pity for masses can lead to the worse kinds of mass politics. While it is certainly worth asking how the relative fragmentation of contemporary social and political life, and the social isolation, predatory practices, and unhappiness that accompany it, can be overcome, it may be equally important to ask whether a singular and uniform conception of social and political motivation can be the answer to those challenges. Can we as political theorists in the contemporary era still invoke intuitions about love as gained from highly particular and personal experience as a guide to what we need from a theory about love in the public realm and as applied to citizenship? Still, Hanley's account provides a useful and insightful background from which to debate the ongoing relevance of love for politics in the contemporary era.
