Hostname: page-component-745bb68f8f-s22k5 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-02-06T11:37:26.523Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

The War Crimes of Denying Judicial Guarantees and the Uncertainties Surrounding Their Material Elements

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 March 2021

Diletta Marchesi*
Affiliation:
PhD Fellow of the Research Foundation – Flanders (FWO) (fundamental research grant, fellowship no 11G152ON) at KU Leuven (Belgium); diletta.marchesi@kuleuven.be. This article is in part based on a draft article presented at the 14th Annual Minerva/ICRC Conference on International Humanitarian Law on ‘Military Justice and Armed Conflict: Old Problems, New Challenges’ at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 11–13 November 2019. The author is grateful to the participants at the Minerva Conference and to the anonymous reviewer(s) of the Israel Law Review for their insightful comments. Many thanks go to my PhD supervisor, Professor Michele Panzavolta, for always finding the time to read my drafts and give me constructive comments. Thank you also to Fabiana Maraffa and Ashlee Beazley for their support and for having gone through early drafts of this work.

Abstract

In July 2020 the International Criminal Court opened the trial in the Al Hassan case. For the first time in the history of international criminal justice a defendant is being tried with the charge of the war crime of sentencing or execution without due process in the context of a non-international armed conflict. Together with its equivalent in international armed conflicts – the war crime of denying a fair trial – this offence falls within the category of the war crimes of denying judicial guarantees. Although there are differences in their constitutive elements, both offences prohibit states and armed non-state actors from depriving prisoners of war and civilians of certain minimum judicial guarantees. The provisions that regulate these two crimes, however, present interpretative and practical issues which, so far, have not received sufficient consideration. Most notably, the material elements of the offences raise a range of interpretative doubts and are of cumbersome application. The objectives of the article are (i) to identify the issues posed by the material elements of the war crimes of denying judicial guarantees, (ii) to warn of the pitfalls hidden by the interpretation of the offences, and (iii) to trigger the debate on the issues that the crimes raise.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press in association with the Faculty of Law, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem

1. Introduction

States and armed non-state actors (ANSAs) around the world frequently conduct unfair trials against prisoners of war and civilians during armed conflicts. Serious infringements of judicial guarantees result in loss of liberty or life, including arbitrary detention and execution. In Ukraine, for instance, trials related to the war in Donbass are characterised by prolonged pre-trial detention, use of force to obtain confessions, and other procedural violations.Footnote 1 To give a further example, Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territory are often denied basic fair trial rights in the Israeli justice system.Footnote 2

Different sets of international rules safeguard the right to a fair trial during armed conflicts: international human rights law (IHRL), international humanitarian law (IHL), and international criminal law (ICL). ICL is the only regime that is capable of holding individuals, rather than states, accountable for these violations, establishing the war crimes of denying judicial guarantees. In international armed conflicts (IACs) the crime is referred to as the ‘war crime of denying a fair trial’ by the International Criminal Court (ICC) Elements of Crimes.Footnote 3 In non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) the offence is identified as the ‘war crime of sentencing or execution without due process’.Footnote 4 Although the two offences are differently delineated in IACs and NIACs (as reflected in the different denominations), they both fall within the category of the war crimes of denying judicial guarantees.

The provisions that regulate these two offences, however, present interpretative and practical issues. Most notably, the interpretation of the material element of each offence (namely, the wrongful act or omission) draws from different sources and raises a range of interpretative doubts. As a consequence, the application of such provisions is cumbersome, in both IACs and NIACs.

In addition, both practice and academia have largely overlooked the war crimes of denying judicial guarantees. This may be about to change with the Al Hassan trial, which began in front of the ICC on 14 July 2020. For the first time in the history of international criminal justice a defendant is being tried with the charge of the war crime of sentencing or execution without due process in the context of a NIAC. As underlined by the prosecution in the Al Hassan confirmation of charges proceedings, the war crime of sentencing or execution without due process raises ‘important legal issues which have not yet been considered in detail by international courts and tribunals’.Footnote 5 The initial stage of the case has already confirmed that the interpretation of the material element of the offence is a controversial point.

After presenting a brief overview of the history of the offences (Section 2), this article analyses the ICL provisions regulating the war crimes of denying judicial guarantees (Section 3) in both IACs (Section 3.1) and NIACs (Section 3.2). The objective is to identify the issues posed by the material elements of these war crimes, to warn of the pitfalls that the interpretation of the offences hides, and trigger the debate on the issues raised by the crimes.

2. The History of the War Crimes of Denying Judicial Guarantees: A Brief Overview

The idea that during armed conflicts certain categories of protected persons cannot be killed without a previous trial has its roots in the Lieber Code.Footnote 6 Subsequently, the 1907 Hague Regulation on Laws and Customs of War provided that spies should not be punished ‘without previous trial’.Footnote 7 Prisoners of war suspected of a crime were later afforded judicial guarantees by the 1929 Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.Footnote 8 However, the 1929 Convention did not prohibit – let alone criminalise – the denial of a fair trial as such.

After the Second World War (WWII) the Allies held numerous trials to prosecute and convict Axis members for the war crimes committed during the conflict. Some of these, for the first time, involved charges related to denial of a fair trial. The United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC) gave an account of and commented on several of these trials in the Law Reports of the Trials of War Criminals (UNWCC Law Reports).

Volume V, in particular, is presented as including most of the trials that share the following ‘common feature’: ‘they all deal with that type of war crime which can be rather roughly and summarily described as “the denial of a fair trial”’.Footnote 9 As the UNWCC Chairman observed:Footnote 10

[T]he customary law of war requires that before anyone, a combatant or non-combatant, should be executed or otherwise punished as for an offence against the laws of war, he should first be tried and sentenced by a court whose jurisdiction is recognized by international law.

Among these ‘denial of a fair trial’ cases, the defendants were found guilty of charges that differed considerably from each other. Two main groups can be identified.Footnote 11 The accused in the first group were tried for being involved, in varying degrees, in the unfair trials and executions of a small number of protected persons. The charges included, for example, having prosecuted, tried, sentenced (often to death) prisoners of war or civilians in violation of the laws and customs of war – namely, failing to afford them a fair trial. The accused were high-ranking military personnel who acted as judges or prosecutors, carried out unlawful orders, or had supervisory tasks over the military administration of justice. Most of these cases were conducted by Australian and US military courts or commissions against Japanese nationals. Two additional trials were held by national civilian courts in Norway.Footnote 12

The charges in the second group were of murder and the killing of prisoners of war and civilians. The trials were conducted mainly by British, as well as by Australian, French, Norwegian and Canadian military or civilian courts. The defendants were Japanese and German nationals who were tried for being variously involved in the execution of protected persons in their capacity of, for example, judges or military personnel in charge of detention camps.Footnote 13

The analysis of these cases shows that not all of the trials collected in Volume V deal with the war crime of denying a fair trial, contrary to the UNWCC claim for that volume. It is not even clear whether the crime of denying a fair trial was considered ‘as a separate positive crime’.Footnote 14 In some passages the Law Reports considered it a ‘possibility’;Footnote 15 in others denial of a fair trial was deemed to be a war crime.Footnote 16 This proves the difficulty posed by the interpretation of such trials. Reasoned judgments were in fact not always delivered.Footnote 17 In any case, denial of a fair trial as a possible ‘autonomous’ offence characterises exclusively the trials belonging to the first group. Only these cases can be considered as the first – somewhat rudimentary – precedents of the offence.

The trials in the second group were different. The accused were convicted of having committed the war crime of killing in that the act was not justified under the laws and customs of war. In one case the Judge Advocate stated that:Footnote 18

the accused would be entitled to an acquittal if it had been proved that ‘the deceased had a fair and reasonable trial, that such trial was of the kind directed by Japan and that the accused were authorized to take part in such trial and execution’.

To prove that a (fair) trial was established would have involved substantiating a defence plea according to which the killing was legitimate. In most other ‘second group’ cases it was not even acknowledged that no trial was held.Footnote 19

In Volume VI of the Law Reports the commentators seem to have grasped more neatly the diversity between the cases belonging to the two groups. One passage clarifies:Footnote 20

There are two alternative ways of regarding evidence of the denial of a fair trial. One could … deem such denial a war crime … in itself … . On the other hand it could be said that proof of a fair trial … constitutes a defence to a charge of causing death or other harm to a prisoner of war or inhabitant of occupied territory, and that proof of the denial of a fair trial nullified the operation of that defence.

A notable post-WWII case concerning the denial of a fair trial is the so-called Justice case.Footnote 21 In this trial the US Military Tribunal in Nuremberg convicted 16 defendants of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The convicted were either German judges and prosecutors or officials involved in the Nazi regime's administration of justice in Germany and the occupied territories. The Tribunal focused on the systemic criminality driven forward by ‘distortion and denial of judicial and penal process’, which culminated in the Nacht und Nebel scheme.Footnote 22 The crimes were considered not only violations of international conventions, laws and customs of war and domestic law, but also of ‘the general principles of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws of all civilised nations’.Footnote 23 Denial of fair trial was utilised by the executive ‘as a powerful weapon for the persecution and extermination of all opponents of the Nazi regime … and “races”’.Footnote 24 The Tribunal stated that ‘the dagger of the assassin was concealed beneath the robe of the jurist’.Footnote 25 Although ‘major stress’ was placed upon the murders, torture, illegal imprisonment and other crimes, the Law Reports state that ‘there is a strong suggestion that the Tribunal regarded the denial of a fair trial as itself a possible criminal act’.Footnote 26

The Justice case is unique of its kind. Under the spotlight there was the structure and functioning of the entire judicial system in place at the time, which systemically denied fair trials to the detriment of thousands of unidentified victims. This distinguished the Justice case from the other post-WWII cases. While the former case proved the unsuitability of the entire administration of justice system in delivering fair trials, the latter trials adopted a case-by-case approach with the aim of proving the unfairness of single proceedings held against a limited number of victims. From these two different scenarios, first the scholarshipFootnote 27 and then the case lawFootnote 28 inferred two possible ways of pleading and proving the war crime of denying a fair trial.

Moving from the experience of the post-WWII trials, the 1949 Geneva Conventions (GCs) prohibited for the first time the wilful deprivation ‘of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed’ in the GCs to prisoners of war and civilians in IACs as a grave breach of the Conventions.Footnote 29 These are the most serious violations of the GCs, as made clear by their Additional Protocol I (AP I), which expressly classifies them as war crimes.Footnote 30

The prohibition of denying judicial guarantees to persons who take no active part in the hostilities was also provided for NIACs by Article 3 common to the four GCs (Common Article 3), which forbids ‘the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples’.Footnote 31 The rule of customary IHL emerged according to which ‘no one may be convicted or sentenced, except pursuant to a fair trial affording all essential judicial guarantees’.Footnote 32 The violation of Common Article 3 nevertheless was not criminalised by IHL.

Today, ICL provides criminal protection for the customary rule referred to. The rationale behind the crimes is to prevent the use of criminal proceedings as a means to oppress protected persons who are suspected of having committed an offence related to an armed conflict. As underlined in the ICRC Commentary to GC IV, ‘summary’ trials are ‘too open to error’ and they add ‘too many further victims to all the other innocent victims of the conflict’.Footnote 33 A further underlining goal may be to ensure the proper administration of justice during armed conflicts.

The statutes and fundamental laws of international and hybrid criminal tribunals criminalise the denial of judicial guarantees to prisoners of war and civilians as a war crime in IACs,Footnote 34 NIACs,Footnote 35 or both.Footnote 36 The choice of providing the crime for one type of armed conflict or the other is based only on the tribunal's mandate. The offence is also provided for by the legislation of many states,Footnote 37 and is mostly applicable in both IACs and NIACs. However, in more than 70 years of international criminal justice, case law on the war crimes of denying judicial guarantees has been scant – the offences have gone virtually unnoticed.

It is only the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) that have dealt with one of the offences. They have delivered two judgments regarding the war crime of denying a fair trial in the context of an IAC – the Cambodian-Vietnamese War. The first case was against Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, former Chairman of the Khmer Rouge S-21 Detention Centre.Footnote 38 The most recent charge was against Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan – among the most influential of the Khmer Rouge leaders.Footnote 39 The defendants were convicted of having deprived of a fair trial hundreds of Vietnamese prisoners of war and civilians detained in the S-21 and Au Kanseng Security Centres. Victims were held in detention and then executed, without any trial whatsoever.

The war crimes of denying judicial guarantees seem recently to have attracted renewed attention at the ICC. On 30 September 2019 Pre-Trial Chamber I (PTC-I) confirmed the charges against Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag Mahmoud, an alleged member of the Islamist armed groups that took control of Timbuktu (Mali) in April 2012.Footnote 40 Among the numerous charges alleged against him is the war crime of sentencing or execution without due process. The reason for this charge is his alleged involvement, as a member of the Islamic Police, in the activities of the Islamic Tribunal. The Tribunal – established by the insurgent groups – is alleged to have been irregularly constituted, partial, and dependent on the executive organs of the armed groups. The allegations also claim that the Tribunal has convicted civilians without any process or after unfair trials which were manipulated to ensure respect for the new rules based on the ideology and religious vision of the armed groups.Footnote 41

Al Hassan may not be the only case concerning the war crimes of denying judicial guarantees that the ICC will try in the near future. For example, the most recent ‘Report on Preliminary Examination Activities’ published by the ICC Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) shows that the war crime of denying a fair trial in an IAC allegedly has been committed in the Ukraine and Palestine situations.Footnote 42

3. The ‘Tangle’ of Provisions Regulating the War Crimes of Denying Judicial Guarantees

In the analysis of the ICL sources regulating the war crimes of denying judicial guarantees, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute) will be considered as the main reference. There are manifold reasons for this choice. The ICC Statute was the first ICL source to criminalise the denying of judicial guarantees both in IACs and NIACs.Footnote 43 As with other ICL sources, it borrows the wording of the GCs.Footnote 44 When the ICC Statute deviates from the GCs, the more recent Kosovo Law on Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor's Office adopts the same approach.Footnote 45

Secondly, the ICC Elements of Crimes assist the Court in the interpretation and application of the ICC Statute.Footnote 46 They prove to be a fundamental tool in guiding analysis of the war crimes of denying judicial guarantees. Although the Elements of Crimes generally are not considered to be binding, the Court is required to apply them, unless they are not consistent with the Statute.Footnote 47

Thirdly, the ICC Statute regulates what is, today, the only permanent international criminal tribunal with potentially universal jurisdiction. How the offences are interpreted and applied is likely to provide a model that will contribute to the emergence and consolidation of customary international law.Footnote 48

Lastly, the ICC system is offering a relevant example of prosecution of the war crime of sentencing or execution without due process in a NIAC with the Al Hassan case.

3.1. Denying Judicial Guarantees in International Armed Conflicts: The War Crime of Denying a Fair Trial

With regard to IACs, Article 8(2)(a)(vi) of the ICC Statute borrows the wording of the GCsFootnote 49 and criminalises the act of ‘wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial’Footnote 50 as a grave breach of the GCs.

The ICC Elements of Crimes offer further clarification. They establish that the crime is materially satisfied when the perpetrator deprives one or more persons protected under one or more of the GCs of ‘a fair and regular trial by denying judicial guarantees as defined, in particular, in the third and the fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949’.Footnote 51

The Elements of Crimes first elucidate the necessity of resorting to the GCs to identify the categories of protected persons and infer the judicial guarantees of which violation is relevant for the offence. This seems a logical choice as the crime is derived from the GCs, which also establish the judicial guarantees to be afforded to protected persons during armed conflicts. As observed by Dörman, ‘at least the judicial guarantees mentioned in [GCs III and IV] are crucial for determining whether the trial was fair’.Footnote 52

However, the Elements of Crimes do not refer only to the guarantees included in the GCs. The formula used by the drafters (‘judicial guarantees as defined, in particular, in the third and the fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949’)Footnote 53 favours the inclusion in the material element of the crime of further judicial guarantees – notably, those contained in Article 75 of AP I.Footnote 54 To identify the violation of which guarantees is relevant to trigger the crime, it is therefore necessary to interpret the offence in light of the guarantees enshrined in external sources, namely GC III, GC IV and AP I. This interpretative manoeuvre is also warranted by Article 21(1)(b) of the ICC Statute, which authorises the application of ‘[i]n the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law, including the established principles of the international law of armed conflict’.

The second important issue that the ICC Elements of Crimes clarify is that the offence under consideration is materially satisfied when ‘a fair and regular trial’ is denied, and this is ‘by denying judicial guarantees’.Footnote 55 To comprehend this element, the definition of ‘judicial’ – meaning ‘relating to the administration of justice’ – should be underscored.Footnote 56 This entails that ‘judicial guarantees’ is a broader category than the ‘rights to fair trial’ stricto sensu – that is, those referring to the trial itself.Footnote 57 The category of ‘judicial guarantees’ comprises not only the rights to a fair trial (and the rights within a fair trial), but all those guarantees related to the criminal proceedings as a whole and their various stages. The Elements of Crimes thus suggest that ‘a fair and regular trial’ can potentially be denied, and the corresponding war crime committed, when a wide range of rights have been violated. The rationale behind this approach is that the criminal proceedings as a whole should be safeguarded to ensure their fairness for the accused (whether a suspect or a defendant).

This interpretation of ‘judicial guarantees’ – which can also be referred to as ‘fair proceedings rights’ or ‘fair proceedings guarantees’ – is consistent with the ordinary understanding of the category of ‘fair trial rights’. Contrary to what the label might suggest, the latter phrase is employed in the human rights language to include a wider category of rights than simply those that individuals enjoy at trial.Footnote 58 A similar approach is also adopted by AP I. Among ‘the generally recognized principles of regular judicial procedure’, AP I includes rights to be afforded during the entire proceedings, and ‘substantial law’ guarantees, such as the principle of individual criminal responsibility.Footnote 59

As mentioned, GC III, GC IV and AP I regulate the judicial guarantees to be afforded at the minimum to protected persons subject to criminal proceedings during IACs; they represent the starting point to give meaning to the war crime of denying a fair trial. Scattered among their various provisionsFootnote 60 the GCs provide a detailed list of numerous non-renounceableFootnote 61 guarantees that are considered to be part of customary international law.Footnote 62 These rights are granted to different categories of protected persons – they are the ‘protected persons’ to which also Article 8(2)(a)(vi) of the ICC Statute refers. Two broad categories can be identified.

First, GC III protects prisoners of war – namely combatants who have fallen into the power of the enemy, and past and present members of the armed forces who have been reinterned in the occupied territories.Footnote 63 Wounded, sick and shipwrecked persons – protected by GC I and GC II – who fall into the hands of the enemy are also considered prisoners of war.Footnote 64 Prisoners of war are afforded judicial guarantees in relation to crimes committed both before and after capture.Footnote 65

Second, GC IV, dedicated to the protection of ‘civilians’, safeguards a wider category of subjects, namely ‘those who at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict of the Occupying Power of which they are not nationals’ (hereafter, ‘civilians’).Footnote 66 By analogy, civilians in the territory of any party to the conflict are also protected.Footnote 67 The Convention states explicitly that judicial guarantees should be afforded also to internees who are in the national territory of the Detaining PowerFootnote 68 and persons detained in occupied territories as spies, saboteurs or otherwise suspected of conducting activities that are hostile to the security of the Occupying Power.Footnote 69 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has established that persons may be afforded protected status under GC IV even if they have the same nationality as their captors, as is the case for refugees or in ‘inter-ethnic’ conflicts.Footnote 70

The guarantees ensured by GCs III and IV are integrated by Article 75(4) of AP I. This provision is recognised today as part of customary international lawFootnote 71 and represents the ‘minimum contemporary yardstick’ for judicial procedure in IACs.Footnote 72 It provides a non-exhaustive listFootnote 73 of ‘fundamental guarantees’ and refers to those as ‘generally recognized principles of regular judicial procedure’. During the negotiation of Article 75(4) reference was made to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),Footnote 74 which is, in some cases, reproduced verbatim.Footnote 75

On the one hand, the list provided by Article 75 of AP I restates more systematically the safeguards recognised in the GCs. Rather than spelling out detailed rules as do the GCs, it sets out principles employing concise statements which potentially include multiple safeguards. Article 75(4), for example, refers to ‘all necessary rights and means of defence’.Footnote 76 On the other hand, it also affords rights that were previously not explicitly granted by the GCs, most notably, the presumption of innocence.Footnote 77

AP I represents a ‘residual clause’.Footnote 78 It grants protection to those persons suspected or convicted of a crime related to the IAC who are in the power of a party to the conflict and do not benefit from ‘more favourable treatment’.Footnote 79 For these reasons, Article 75(4) of AP I is crucial in the analysis of the violation of which judicial guarantees amounts to a war crime; it gives a ‘summary of the law’Footnote 80 in both its content and scope of application. However, since the Elements of Crimes state that the victims of the crime are those persons who are ‘protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949’,Footnote 81 it is not clear whether the denial of a fair trial to those who are protected by AP I only would be criminalised.

The intersection of different sources that safeguard diverse categories of person renders the resulting system difficult to navigate. Mainly as a result of the levelling effect of Article 75(4) of AP I – which grants a short but substantial list of rights to a broad category of protected persons – it is often (though not always) the case that all categories of protected persons are granted the same rights. However, the guarantees are variously delineated in scope by GC III and GC IV. Such lack of uniformity seems frequently to be devoid of underlying logic, thus creating complications.

Limitations on space for this article prevent presenting – let alone analysing – the judicial guarantees provided by IHL sources in detail. Suffice it to observe here that the judicial guarantees afforded to prisoners of war and civilians are numerous and of a different nature. They can be classified as follows: (i) substantive law requirements, such as the principle of legality; (ii) institutional requirements, such as the right to be tried by an independent, impartial and regularly constituted court; (iii) procedural law requirements, which include the rights and means of defence, and Protecting Power's (and prisoners’ representative) assistance-related rights;Footnote 82 and, finally (iv) penalty-related requirements – namely those guarantees related to the imposition of penalties, such as the right not to be subjected to collective punishment.

When dealing with the judicial guarantees afforded by IHL sources, the scholarship often limits its analysis to the most ‘classical’ examples, which are drawn largely from IHRL, such as the right to defence, the ne bis in idem principle, and the right to be tried by an independent, impartial and regularly constituted tribunal. These are referred to as the ‘main’ guarantees ‘generally recognized as indispensable’.Footnote 83 This approach, however, runs the risk of overlooking the importance of several other relevant rights that are to be afforded during armed conflicts, such as the Protecting Power's (and prisoner's representative) assistance-related rights. Such guarantees are not to be considered insignificant as they contribute to the realisation of the fairness of proceedings in IACs.

After having retraced the judicial guarantees that are relevant for the war crime of denying a fair trial in those provided by GC III, GC IV and AP I, some aspects of the material element of the offence have been clarified. It seems unequivocal that a denial of judicial guarantees that can deprive a protected person of a ‘fair and regular trial’ and thus trigger criminal responsibility can take place by an act or an omission. This has been confirmed by the case law of the ECCC.Footnote 84 The first occurs when, for example, a protected person is coerced into confessing the commission of an offence. The second is even more frequent and occurs, for example, when the defendant is not afforded the assistance of defence counsel or an interpreter. The commission of the war crime of denying a fair trial by omission par excellence is the denial of any trial. The ECCC case law offers examples of this form of the crime.Footnote 85 The only material act committed by the perpetrator in such cases is often the imposition of a punishment – most notably, the death penalty. One may thus question the relationship between this form of the war crime of denying a fair trial and other war crimes such as killing. This conundrum surfaced in the post-WWII cases.Footnote 86

Several further questions concerning the interpretation of the material element of the war crime of denying a fair trial nevertheless remain unanswered. Some of the most important aspects that remain ambiguous and need to be clarified are the following.

  1. (1) How should the meaning and scope of IHL judicial guarantees be interpreted? What is the role of IHRL and the related jurisprudence in their interpretation?

Most of the IHL provisions that afford judicial guarantees do not clarify the meaning and scope of the rights they establish. For instance, the identity of ‘all necessary rights and means of defence’ to be included under the ‘umbrella requirement’Footnote 87 envisaged by AP I is not apparent;Footnote 88 nor how ‘the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality as generally recognised’ prescribed by GC III should be read.Footnote 89

Consideration of the meaning and scope of judicial guarantees is fundamental to understanding when a right is violated and, thus, when the war crime of denying a fair trial may be materially satisfied. If IHL guarantees are unclear, they will be variously interpreted. If IHL guarantees are variously interpreted, the material element of the war crime of denying a fair trial may acquire diverse possible extensions on a case-by-case basis, resulting in inequalities between defendants. The risk of potentially diverse results in the interpretation of fair proceedings rights is even more tangible considering that IHL and ICL are interpreted and applied in legal cultures that are extremely different from each other.

The scholarship has often underlined that the examination of the guarantees provided by IHL and IHRL – in particular, by Article 75 of AP I and Article 14 of the ICCPR – demonstrates that these are ‘nearly identical’Footnote 90 or ‘more or less equivalent’.Footnote 91 Moreover, although the relationship between IHL and IHRL has given rise to much debate, it is unanimously recognised today that IHRL continues to apply, to a certain extent, during armed conflicts.Footnote 92 Hence, IHL and IHRL are to be applied simultaneously.Footnote 93

Against this backdrop it is logical to wonder whether it is possible to use IHRL and the related jurisprudence of the human rights bodies to assist in the reading of IHL guarantees for the purpose of interpreting the war crime of denying a fair trial. Although the scholarship has encouraged this approach without bringing into question its validity,Footnote 94 it is nevertheless necessary first to answer the question whether – and, if so, how – the rights protected by IHL (devised for armed conflicts) are any different in their scope from those provided by IHRL (envisaged for peacetime).

Furthermore, in analysing the war crime of denying a fair trial, the answer to the previous question should be adapted to the purposes of substantive ICL. It should in fact be considered that the interpretation of the war crime of denying a fair trial relies on IHL sources. If the interpretation of the IHL guarantees is based on IHRL, substantive ICL would automatically incorporate such standards in the criminalisation of the denial of a fair trial. This approach may expand the material element of the war crime, in tension with the nullum crimen sine lege principle as protected under Article 22 of the ICC Statute. In addition, the incorporation of human rights standards developed at the regional level may also pose cultural concerns as a result of possible differences in the understanding of judicial guarantees,Footnote 95 thus undermining the universal aspiration of ICL.

The importance of answering the questions of how the meaning and scope of IHL's judicial guarantees should be interpreted, and what is the role of IHRL and the related jurisprudence in their interpretation is thus evident. Overlooking such queries may result in significant consequences for the interpretation and application of the war crime of denying a fair trial itself.

  1. (2) Can the violation of all the single judicial guarantees listed in the IHL sources amount to a war crime? If not, the violation of which guarantees triggers criminal responsibility? Is an analysis of the fairness of the proceedings as a whole necessary?

States are required to ensure all the judicial guarantees provided by IHL sources. No derogation or suspension is possible.Footnote 96 Violation of these guarantees exposes states to responsibility for internationally wrongful acts.Footnote 97 However, only serious violations of IHL trigger criminal responsibility under ICL.Footnote 98 One may wonder, therefore, whether the violation of any of the single judicial guarantees listed in the IHL sources, or only some of them, would satisfy the material element of the war crime of denying a fair trial. It is thus necessary to identify the violation of which guarantees triggers criminal responsibility, and whether an overall analysis of the fairness of the proceedings should be conducted.

On the war crime of sentencing or execution without due process in NIACs, the Elements of Crimes state that ‘the Court should consider whether, in the light of the all relevant circumstances, the cumulative effect of factors with respect to guarantees deprived the person or persons of a fair trial’.Footnote 99 However, the same clarification is not made explicitly for the war crime of denying a fair trial. The question is whether the ‘cumulative effect’ principle should apply also to the crime in IACs or whether, in this case, the violation of every guarantee identified by IHL provisions amounts to a war crime. The rationale of the absence of a cumulative effect requirement for the war crime of denying a fair trial might be that the crime is more serious in IACs, for two possible reasons. First, it constitutes a grave breach of the GCs. Second, it applies most notably within armed conflicts between states, which are structurally more suitable than ANSAs in respecting judicial guarantees. However, this omission might also be a mere oversight.

Analysis of the available case law shows that multiple violations were always accounted for. The elements that the post-WWII case law has contemplated to establish the denial of a fair trial, however, are difficult to identify as reasoned judgments were not always delivered.Footnote 100 When they were delivered, the ‘construction’ of the judgment often does not allow an understanding of what was regarded as ‘criminal’ and what as merely ‘evidence’.Footnote 101 The Law Reports themselves underline the difficulty in several passages, stating that ‘[i]t is impossible to draw up with certainty a complete catalogue of the aspects of the trial which were regarded … as contributing to its criminal character’.Footnote 102 Furthermore, the victims in the ECCC cases were held in detention and then executed, without any trial. Hence, the elements that are necessary to establish the war crime of denying a fair trial were not analysed separately as no trial was held at all.

This does not mean that the violation of certain single guarantees alone could not amount to a war crime. In the post-WWII Latza case, the holding of Judge Schei, sitting in the Supreme Court of Norway, seems to confirm this point by referring to a ‘hierarchy’ of rights. He stated that:Footnote 103

[the] decisive point [in the fulfilment of] those minimum demands which were to be regarded as indispensable for a proper trial [is] primarily whether an independent and impartial tribunal had reached its decisions after a thorough investigation of the guilt of the accused, or whether the outcome had been determined beforehand by directives given to the court.

Judge Berger, in the same case, similarly observed that the several ‘shortcomings’ that characterised the trial (including the violation of the right to be assisted by counsel) cast doubts ‘on the tenability of the trial as a whole’ but ‘individually or all of them together’ they were not ‘decisive in themselves’.Footnote 104 What he considered ‘decisive’ was ‘whether there had been a fair trial before independent judges who delivered their judgment according to their free conviction’.Footnote 105 These statements seem to suggest that the violation of the right to be tried by an independent and impartial tribunal can, in and of themselves, materially satisfy the war crime of denying a fair trial.

The UNWCC Law Reports commentator concluded that Latza confirmed that:Footnote 106

[the denial of any of the fair trial guarantees] would not necessarily amount to the denial of a fair trial, and the courts have had to decide in each instance whether a sufficient number of the rights which they have regarded as forming part of the general right to a fair trial were sufficiently violated to warrant the conclusion … that the offence of denial of a fair trial has been committed.

However, neither Latza nor any other precedent has examined this issue in more depth, leaving much room for uncertainty. For example, what is meant by the expression that courts should consider whether ‘a sufficient number of the rights which they have regarded as forming part of the general right to a fair trial were sufficiently violated’? Are independence and impartiality the only ‘decisive’ guarantees that, alone, would justify criminalisation? When can the deprivation of judicial guarantees be considered to be serious enough to bring about denial of a fair trial and amount to a war crime regardless of an overall analysis of the fairness of the proceedings?

This position of uncertainty exposes the war crime of denying a fair trial to problems of application and jeopardises foreseeability of its criminalisation. Hence, it is crucial to seek a model to establish: (i) the violation of which one of the judicial guarantees listed in the IHL sources is enough in itself to materially satisfy the material element of the war crime of denying a fair trial; (ii) when an analysis of the fairness of the proceedings as a whole is necessary; and (iii) on the basis of which overall standards it can be established whether denial of a fair and regular trial has occurred.

  1. (3) Is it possible to criminalise the violation of further judicial guarantees drawn, for instance, from IHRL?

The Elements of Crimes state that the war crime of denying a fair trial is materially satisfied when ‘[t]he perpetrator deprived one or more persons of a fair and regular trial by denying judicial guarantees as defined, in particular, in the third and fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949’.Footnote 107 The addition of ‘in particular’ can be interpreted as allowing the inclusion in the material element of the crime of further judicial guarantees provided – potentially – by any source of law, and not just by the GCs or AP I. The question that arises is thus whether is it possible to criminalise the violation of further judicial guarantees drawn, most notably, from IHRL.

To consider rights stemming from IHRL as relevant for the material element of the crime would follow the trend – popular among international criminal tribunals – of using IHRL to clarify and interpret the often ambiguous provisions of ICL.Footnote 108 While the phenomenon mainly concerned the accused's right to a fair trial,Footnote 109 the definitions of crimes have not been spared either.Footnote 110 This tendency can be explained considering that ICL and IHRL are highly interrelated.Footnote 111 At the dawn of ICL, Bassiouni recognised that ‘criminal proscription’ is the ‘ultima ratio modality of protection’ for human rights.Footnote 112 Most international crimes are (mass) violations of human rights protected by IHRL – primarily the rights to life and physical integrity.Footnote 113 The war crime of denying a fair trial also criminalises the infringement of a right: the right to a fair trial. However, this does not mean that the violation of every right protected by IHRL is or should be criminalised.

As mentioned with regard to the interpretation of IHL judicial guarantees in light of IHRL and related jurisprudence, this approach should in fact be examined in the light of the risks that it may pose for the principle of legality and the universal aspiration of ICL. As such risks might even be increased in the direct criminalisation of the violation of judicial guarantees protected only by IHRL, the possibility of considering fair trial rights that are not included in the IHL sources relevant for the interpretation of the material element of the war crime of denying should be well pondered.

  1. (4) Can the denial of a fair trial that does not end in a conviction or imposition of punishment amount to a war crime?

Eventually, a further point needs to be considered. What is the relevance of the outcome of the proceedings for the material element of the war crime of denying a fair trial? What if an unfair trial does not end in conviction or the imposition of punishment but in an acquittal, or if the proceedings are dismissed or halted? This might be a rare event, but it could nonetheless occur.

ICL provisions rule out the possibility of materially satisfying the offence in NIACs in that they require the ‘passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions’.Footnote 114 However, in IACs the wording of the ICC Statute seems to suggest that the violation of ‘the rights of fair and regular trial’ represents a war crime per se: there is no requirement for a sentence to be passed or a punishment to be imposed. Again, the rationale behind such an omission might be that the crime is more serious in IACs and states are required to satisfy higher standards of fairness. However, there are no elements to confirm that this was the reasoning and the issue remains unclear. Besides, all the available precedents concern cases in which victims were sentenced or punishment was imposed. Thus, the question remains to be answered.

3.2. Denying Judicial Guarantees in Non-International Armed Conflicts: The War Crime of Sentencing or Execution without Due Process

In NIACs, Article 8(2)(c)(iv) of the ICC Statute defines the war crime of sentencing or execution without due process as ‘[t]he passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all judicial guarantees which are generally recognized as indispensable’. The persons protected by the provision are, as explicitly mentioned, ‘persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause’.Footnote 115

The ICC Statute borrows the wording of Common Article 3 GCs to criminalise its serious violations.Footnote 116 In comparing the ICC Statute provision with Common Article 3, the former has eliminated reference to all the judicial guarantees which are recognised as indispensable ‘by civilized peoples’. The wording of the ICC Statute has been also adopted by the Kosovo Law on Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor's Office.Footnote 117

The war crime of sentencing or execution without due process reveals a ‘shift in emphasis’ when compared with the war crime of denying a fair trial in IACs, which more broadly criminalises the denial of a ‘fair and regular trial’.Footnote 118 The shift is most likely a consequence of the different wordings used in the GCs as the ICL provisions change such wordings only slightly.Footnote 119

Article 8(2)(c)(iv) of the ICC Statute is a wordy and complex provision that needs to be examined in all its elements. PTC-I in the Al Hassan case had to take on the hard task of being the first judicial body to address the interpretation of the war crime. As will be demonstrated, it left many questions unanswered.

For the war crime of sentencing or execution without due process to be materially satisfied, the first element required by Article 8(2)(c)(iv) of the ICC Statute is ‘[t]he passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions’.Footnote 120 Although the Statute uses the conjunction ‘and’, the Elements of Crimes clarify that the two elements should be considered as alternatives: ‘[t]he perpetrator passed sentence or executed one or more persons’.Footnote 121

Regarding the notion of ‘passing of sentences’, it is possible to borrow the interpretation that the recent ICRC Commentary to GC III gave to ‘sentence’ in Common Article 3, namely ‘[t]he judgement that a court formally pronounces after finding a criminal defendant guilty; the punishment imposed on a criminal wrongdoer’.Footnote 122 ‘Passing a sentence’ would thus mean, as confirmed by English legal dictionaries, ‘to announce a guilty person's punishment in a court of law’.Footnote 123 This meaning is also confirmed by the French version of the ICC Statute and Elements of Crimes, which refer, respectively, to ‘condamnations prononcées’ and ‘prononcé une condamnation’. As emphasised by PTC-I, the focus is on the fact that such a decision has been delivered – it does not matter whether orally or in writing or whether it was executed.Footnote 124 The passing of a sentence can also be inferred from the execution of the punishment when – taking into account the circumstances of the case, in particular the nature and context of the sentence passed and its execution modalities, if applicable – it can be ascertained that the execution was the result of the passing of the sentence, and was not used, for example, as a means of deterrence.Footnote 125

More controversial is ‘the carrying out of executions’ aspect. The Elements of Crimes suggest that one possibility for materially satisfying the offence is that one or more persons were ‘executed’,Footnote 126 thus apparently referring to death sentences. Similarly, the ICRC Commentary to GC II seems to interpret ‘executions’ in Common Article 3 as referring to death penalties.Footnote 127 The Al Hassan defence also supported this reading, arguing that Common Article 3 ‘was intended to provide a framework for penalising death sentences that would otherwise be lawful under international law and IHL’.Footnote 128 This interpretation, however, may have an illogical result. It would follow that while the passing of any sentence would suffice to satisfy the material element of the crime, only the execution of a death penalty (and not of any other punishment) would be criminalised.

An alternative interpretation considers the term ‘executions’ as referring to the execution of any sentence. Sivakumaran observed that the drafting history of Common Article 3 confirms this reading.Footnote 129 Furthermore, Article 75(4) of AP I and Article 6 of Additional Protocol II to the GCs (AP II),Footnote 130 drafted on the model of Common Article 3, explicitly refer to the execution of a ‘penalty’ in general. This may suggest that the drafters of the APs interpreted Common Article 3 as alluding to the execution of any penalty. This interpretation is not at odds with the ICC Statute, in which ‘the carrying out of executions’ can indeed refer to the execution of any sentence. However, it seems to be at odds with the Elements of Crimes.

In any case, in order to establish the crime, the Prosecutor must prove that there has been the passing of a sentence (in French, ‘condamnation’),Footnote 131 either explicit or implicit. PTC-I underscored that it is the passing of a sentence that allows this crime to be distinguished from other crimes, such as the crimes of torture, inhumane treatment and outrages upon personal dignity, which do not need the passing of a sentence.Footnote 132 A corollary is that there is no war crime of sentencing or execution without due process if an acquittal takes place or if the proceedings are halted. The Statute thus seems to resolve in NIACs a doubt that remains unresolved in IACs.

Article 8(2)(c)(iv) of the ICC Statute continues by stating that ‘[t]he passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions’ is performed ‘without previous judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all judicial guarantees which are generally recognized as indispensable’.

In an attempt to clarify the Statute, the Elements of Crimes state that:Footnote 133

[the offence is committed when] there was no previous judgement pronounced by a court, or the court that rendered judgement was not ‘regularly constituted’, that is, it did not afford the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality, or the court that rendered judgement did not afford all other judicial guarantees generally recognized as indispensable under international law.

The crime is thus committed if a sentence is passed or an execution is carried out (i) without a previous judgment pronounced by a court (this is what PTC-I refers to as ‘direct conviction’);Footnote 134 and (ii) where there is a previous judgment, but (a) the judgment was delivered by a court that is not ‘regularly constituted’, or (b) not affording the ‘judicial guarantees generally recognized as indispensable under international law’.Footnote 135

Against this backdrop several doubts remain, some of which will now be addressed.

  1. (1) When can a court be considered to be ‘regularly constituted’?

Article 8(2)(c)(iv) of the ICC Statute states that the war crime can be materially satisfied when there is no ‘previous judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court’. It is thus crucial to comprehend what is meant by ‘regularly constituted court’.

The issue is particularly sensitive in NIACs, where ANSAs can also be parties to the conflict. Although the administration of justice is traditionally a state prerogative, in practice ANSAs have often established courts and conducted trials.Footnote 136 ANSAs prosecute international crimes committed in relation to the armed conflict by its own members, civilians or opposing forces, and the participation in hostilities against the armed group.Footnote 137 The legitimacy of ANSA courts, however, has been long debated. The idea of ANSAs administering justice is often contrasted and judged negatively.Footnote 138 The scholarship now tends to agree that Common Article 3 and AP II do not require ANSAs to conduct trials and do not grant them a right to conduct trials, but they do not prevent them from doing so: they only prohibit unfair trials.Footnote 139

According to the doctrine of command responsibility – which today is considered to apply also to commanders of ANSAs in NIACsFootnote 140 – ANSA commanders have the obligation to take all necessary and reasonable measures within their powers to repress their subordinates (or to submit the matter to the competent authorities) if they knew or should have known they have committed war crimes. Otherwise, the commanders themselves will be criminally responsible.Footnote 141 Realistically, ANSAs are not willing to have state authorities try members of the group.Footnote 142 It is more reasonable to expect that an ANSA will try its own members. The ICC considered the availability of a judicial system to be an important element for the application of the doctrine of command responsibility.Footnote 143

The phrase ‘regularly constituted court’ has been borrowed from Common Article 3. As neither Common Article 3 nor the official records of the Geneva Conference shed light on its meaning,Footnote 144 the expression traditionally has been interpreted in different ways. A first popular approach refers to ‘regularly constituted court’ as meaning ‘established and organized in accordance with the laws and procedures already in force in a country’. This reading was suggested, most notably, by the ICRC study on customary IHL,Footnote 145 and consequently adopted in the Hamdan case.Footnote 146 However, the approach has been criticised precisely for preventing ANSAs from establishing their own courts.Footnote 147 ANSAs are unlikely to have the capacity, in terms of sufficient resources and trained personnel, to establish courts that are ‘regularly constituted’ under national law,Footnote 148 and their courts are unlikely to be in accordance with the rules in force in the country. It is only those groups that have control of territory that might be able to achieve this applying existing legislation, either relying on existing courts or setting up a parallel judicial system.Footnote 149

Another part of the scholarship has attempted to interpret the ‘regularly constituted court’ requirement in a manner that does not prevent a priori ANSAs from conducting trials, but only the conducting of unfair trials. If the requirement is construed too narrowly, it could clash with the inherent ‘ad hoc’ and ‘transient’ nature of ANSA courts.Footnote 150 The expression has thus been interpreted to mean, more generally, ‘established by law’.Footnote 151 In this case the requirement would not prevent ANSAs from establishing their own courts as it would include the ‘law’ of the ANSA.Footnote 152 It is in fact argued that in NIACs it is often the case that the national legislation of the state and the law of the ANSA coexist,Footnote 153 and both parties can conduct trials according to their own applicable laws.Footnote 154 This would be the case for those armed groups that are sufficiently organised to enact laws and establish courts accordingly. As underlined by the domestic case law, ‘the principle of sovereignty does not prevent a non-state actor from establishing a Court’.Footnote 155

The Elements of Crimes state that a court is not ‘regularly constituted’ when (‘that is’)Footnote 156 ‘it did not afford the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality’.Footnote 157 At the Preparatory Commission for the ICC, the Belgian proposal, which omitted reference to the requirements of independence and impartiality, was rejected.Footnote 158 PTC-I stated that the travaux préparatoires of the Elements of Crimes show the intention of the drafters to employ an objective criterion in establishing a link between a ‘regularly constituted court’ and the statutory guarantees.Footnote 159 In so doing, the Elements of Crimes follow the approach of AP II. AP II had already substituted the requirement of ‘regularly constituted’ courts provided by Common Article 3 with that of courts ‘offering the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality’,Footnote 160 borrowed from Article 84 of GC III.Footnote 161 The meaning of Common Article 3 has thus been loosenedFootnote 162 considering that the ‘regularly constituted court’ requirement could have posed difficulties for ANSAs.Footnote 163

The less ‘formalistic’ notion of ‘regularly constituted court’ adopted by the Elements of Crimes simplifies the establishment of courts for ANSAs,Footnote 164 taking into account ‘the reality’ of NIACs.Footnote 165 PTC-I underlined that the Elements of Crimes put the emphasis on the capacity of the tribunal to conduct a fair trial, more than on the manner in which the tribunal is established.Footnote 166 The ‘essential guarantees of independence and impartiality’ are thus considered the ‘touchstones’ of a regular constitution.Footnote 167 The Elements of Crimes created a form of hierarchy among judicial guarantees, with independence and impartiality at the top.Footnote 168

Notwithstanding the clarification provided by the Elements of Crimes, the definition of ‘regularly constituted court’ is still open to debate. Neither the Statute nor the Elements of Crimes define the notions of independence and impartiality. For this reason, PTC-I argued that independence and impartiality must be read in light of the interpretation given by human rights bodies, according to Article 21(3) of the ICC Statute.Footnote 169

This prompts two questions. One may wonder whether it is reasonable to borrow the notions of independence and impartiality from IHRL, which have been devised specifically with courts run by states during peacetime in mind.Footnote 170 The most recent ICRC Commentary on GC III seems to share this doubt in stating that the interpretation given to ‘independence’ and ‘impartiality’ by human rights bodies is ‘relevant in the context of common Article 3, at least for courts operated by State authorities’.Footnote 171 This statement seems to imply that they might not be relevant (or should at least be adapted) for courts operated by ANSAs. The second question is whether ANSA-run courts can genuinely be independent and impartial within the meaning of IHRL. These requirements can in fact be ‘challenging’ for ANSAs to respect.Footnote 172 This is the case not only when the groups establish courts to try government personnel and other ‘enemies’,Footnote 173 but also when they lack, for example, trained personnel who are independent of the executive. Moreover, distinctions between the different branches of ANSAs are not always clear.Footnote 174

The Al Hassan confirmation of charges proceedings show that the Elements of Crimes have not appeased the debate concerning the meaning of ‘regularly constituted court’. The OTP argued that the definition of ‘regularly constituted court’ must be a ‘functional rather than a formal one’, and ‘regularly constituted’ courts do not necessarily have to be an organ of the state; otherwise, it would be impossible for ANSAs to establish any court.Footnote 175 However, it also argued that when an ANSA tribunal does not respect the law already in force in the territory in which the group acts, the tribunal is not ‘regularly constituted’ and does not respect the guarantees of independence and impartiality.Footnote 176 The OTP considered the systematic application of the law that is duly promulgated in accordance with the constitution of the state and international law to be a fundamental characteristic of all independent and impartial judicial institutions and an essential aspect of their identity.Footnote 177 The only exceptions to the principle are possible when IHL authorises ANSAs not to abide by the laws in force, and the previous laws are less compatible with internationally recognised human rights than the new laws applied by the group.Footnote 178

PTC-I did not delve into the debate and only referred to the independence and impartiality requirements provided by the Elements of Crimes. In this way it seems to dismiss the arguments of the Prosecutor. However, as the issue is controversial both in light of the application of the war crime of sentencing or execution without due process in NIACs and for the interpretation of Common Article 3, it deserves more attention. Whether ANSAs are compelled to apply pre-existing national laws is a question that cannot be overlooked.

This outline demonstrates how far the meaning of the ‘regularly constituted court’ requirement is from being clear.

  1. (2) What are the ‘judicial guarantees generally recognized as indispensable under international law’?

Article 8(2)(c)(iv) of the ICC Statute establishes that the war crime of sentencing or execution without due process can be materially satisfied also when ‘[t]he passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions’ is performed ‘without … affording all judicial guarantees which are generally recognized as indispensable’.

It was mentioned that the Elements of Crimes clarify, in a footnote, that a cumulative approach is necessary:Footnote 179 ‘the Court should consider whether, in the light of all relevant circumstances, the cumulative effect of factors with respect to guarantees deprived the person or persons of a fair trial’. Hence, the proceedings as a whole should be considered.Footnote 180 Nevertheless, it is possible that, in the light of the circumstances of the case, the violation of one single guarantee is sufficient to establish the crime.Footnote 181 One guarantee can be crucial and its violation alone can taint the regularity of the procedure,Footnote 182 as it has been argued for the war crime of denying a fair trial in IACs.Footnote 183 PTC-I has deemed it appropriate first to assess independence and impartiality.Footnote 184 If a violation of these principles is established, it is not necessary to continue the evaluation: the tribunal is not in compliance with the ICC Statute.Footnote 185

Having said this, it is essential to comprehend what are the ‘judicial guarantees which are generally recognized as indispensable’. The wording employed by Article 8(2)(c)(iv) is substantially different from that used for IACs, where the reference is, more generally, to the ‘rights of fair and regular trial’. The provision seems to underline that only the violation of ‘indispensable’ judicial guarantees triggers criminal responsibility. This needs to be taken into account in interpreting the crime.

Neither the Statute nor the Elements of Crimes mention what these guarantees are. During the drafting of the Statute, a proposal submitted to include a detailed list of guarantees was rejected.Footnote 186 A group of states, for example, argued that the list could have been considered on the basis that every other right not in the list was not indispensable.Footnote 187 Another group feared that including a list would mean that the violation of one right contained in the list would necessarily constitute a war crime in itself.Footnote 188

Common Article 3, on which the wording of the Statute is based, does not offer a list of safeguards either. There was discussion at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference of whether to include a list or to make reference to the guarantees contained in the GCs,Footnote 189 but neither proposal met with success.Footnote 190 The IHL scholarship observes that there are three (alternative or cumulative) possible approaches on how to read Common Article 3.Footnote 191

First, it can be interpreted in light of Article 6 of AP II.Footnote 192 The ICRC delegate at the 1974–77 Diplomatic Conference made clear that Common Article 3 and Article 6 of AP II are to be read together.Footnote 193 Article 6(2) of AP II states that ‘no sentence shall be passed and no penalty shall be executed on a person found guilty of an offence except pursuant to a conviction pronounced by a court offering the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality’. The provision continues with a non-exhaustive list of the minimum judicial guarantees that ‘in particular’ need to be afforded during NIACs.Footnote 194 The guarantees recognised by Article 6 of AP II are also considered to be part of customary international law.Footnote 195 However, Article 6 applies only to states and those ANSAs that exercise control over part of a territory of a contracting party, so much so that they are able ‘to carry out sustained and concerted military operations’ and to implement the Protocol.Footnote 196 As a consequence, ANSAs in control of no territory are bound by Common Article 3 only, which, as mentioned, does not provide a list of minimum guarantees and sets an ambiguous standard.Footnote 197 IHL sources thus seem to provide for a ‘sliding scale of obligations’.Footnote 198

A second possible approach is to look also at the IHL sources to be applied in IACs, in particular AP I.Footnote 199 Article 75(4) of AP I is in fact deemed by part of the scholarship to be customary law applicable both in IACs and NIACs.Footnote 200 Although Article 6 of AP II largely overlaps with Article 75(4) of AP I, having both been inspired by the ICCPR,Footnote 201 AP I provides for three guarantees that are not found in AP II: (i) the right to examine, or have examined, witnesses against the defendants and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on their behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against them; (ii) the right to have the judgment pronounced publicly; and (iii) the ne bis in idem principle. Allegedly the first two were not included in AP II because some delegates wished to keep the list ‘as short as possible’.Footnote 202 However, it is not clear why it was decided to exclude (only) those two and not others. The ne bis in idem principle was not included because it ‘could not apply between the courts of the governments and the courts of the rebels’.Footnote 203 The most recent ICRC Commentary to GC III nevertheless clarifies that the first two guarantees should apply also in NIACs because they are essential for a fair trial and are present in the main human rights instruments.Footnote 204 Moreover, the ne bis in idem principle should apply within the same party, in the same way as the guarantee is provided by AP I.Footnote 205

The third possible approach is to move from the IHL domain and look at IHRL and related jurisprudence.Footnote 206

Although part of the scholarship has argued that the ‘content’ of AP II, AP I and IHRL cannot be ‘transported ipso facto’ to interpret Common Article 3,Footnote 207 PTC-I in the Al Hassan case seems to have embraced all of these approaches in interpreting the war crime of sentencing or execution without due process. It argued that Article 6(2) of AP II and Article 75 of AP I are to be taken into account pursuant to Article 21(1)(b) of the ICC Statute; and human rights instruments (including those of a regional nature) and related jurisprudence are to be considered according to Article 21(3) of the ICC Statute.Footnote 208 Hence, PTC-I refers to several rights as determinant factors in assessing the fairness of a trial. Among these, some are not included in AP II but do appear in AP I (such as the ne bis in idem principle) or are even only in IHRL (such as the right to be tried without excessive delay, the right to a public trial, and the right to a reasoned judgment).Footnote 209 In doing so, PTC-I places many different IHL and IHRL sources on the same level and confirms that judges are prone to consider guarantees stemming from IHRL as relevant for the material element of the war crimes of denying judicial guarantees.Footnote 210 After all, this approach was already supported by the scholarshipFootnote 211 and is considered to be justified in that it follows the approach adopted by the ICTY in defining, for example, the war crime of torture.Footnote 212

The modus operandi followed by PTC-I, however, raises doubts. One may wonder whether all of these sources are suitable for integrating into the material element of an international crime. Article 6 of AP II is applicable only to ANSAs in control of a territory. PTC-I did not argue that Article 6 was applicable in the Al Hassan case because the ANSAs active in Mali had control over the territory. The issue seems to have been disregarded. Moreover, nor has the application of Article 75(4) of AP I been justified. As Sivakumaran observed, the application in NIACs of IHL sources designed for IACs creates problems because they do not take into consideration the peculiarities of NIACs and ANSAs.Footnote 213 Moreover, the appropriateness of considering IHRL standards (including those of a regional nature) to be relevant in the interpretation of the material element of the war crime of denying a fair trial has already been put into question; the same applies for the war crime of sentencing or execution without due process. In brief, PTC-I assumes that IHRL and IHL standards conceived for states are equally applicable to ANSAs. The issue is even more thorny considering that it is controversial whether (and, if so, to what extent) ANSAs – especially those not in control of territory – are bound by human rights law.Footnote 214

All this considered, a list of ‘indispensable’ judicial guarantees the violation of which triggers criminal responsibility in NIACs should be considered. The list should take into account, first, that Article 8(2)(c)(iv) of the ICC Statute, in defining the war crime of sentencing or execution without due process, refers to ‘judicial guarantees which are generally recognized as indispensable’. Second, it should consider the peculiarities involved in the setting up of courts and the administration of justice by ANSAs, including those not in control of territory. If this process of identification is fundamental in IHL,Footnote 215 it is even more so in substantive ICL.

  1. (3) How should the meaning and scope of IHL judicial guarantees be interpreted? What is the role of IHRL and the related jurisprudence in their interpretation?

As in IACs, the interpretation of some of the judicial guarantees provided by IHL sources is not straightforward. The problems referred to above in respect of the war crime of denying a fair trial in IACsFootnote 216 apply also to the war crime of sentencing or execution without due process in NIACs. Cultural concerns, in particular, have already emerged in the Al Hassan case.

In her opening statement in the Al Hassan trial, the Prosecutor felt the need to emphasise that the case is not directed against any religion or system of law or thought – it is just a criminal case concerning serious crimes.Footnote 217 However, at the pre-trial stage, the Prosecutor deemed ta'azirs to be arbitrary and thus in violation of the nulla poena sine lege principle.Footnote 218 In the Sharia, ta'azirs are those criminal violations for which penalties are not set by the Quran and are thus left to the discretion of a judge, who decides on the basis of ‘Islamic and community standards’.Footnote 219 Scholars have objected that strict interpretations of the nulla poena sine lege principle – which require, for example, specifications of the penalties in tariffs provided by the written law – are not necessarily part of the customary international law interpretation of the principle of legality.Footnote 220

This issue was disregarded in the PTC-I decision; the Chamber only explicitly rejected the defence argument according to which ta'azirs do not satisfy the ‘severity threshold’ that should characterise international crimes.Footnote 221 In order to meet this requirement, the defence argued that the ICC Statute is called upon to punish conduct that all the principal legal systems of the world consider sufficiently serious to amount to an international crime.Footnote 222 However, gravity is not the only issue here; cultural concerns weigh just as much.

If the judicial guarantees provided in IHL sources are not interpreted in a strict fashion – for the purpose of the application of the war crimes of denying judicial guarantees – some features of the criminal law systems of certain legal cultures may always satisfy the material element of the crimes. As emphasised by the defence, the Sharia cannot be ‘synonymous with the commission of [international] crimes … this premise will inveigle the ICC into a clash of civilizations, which will undermine any prospect of advancing the universalisation of the Rome Statute’.Footnote 223

Finally, a further difficulty needs to be taken into account in interpreting the war crime of sentencing or execution without due process in NIACs. As already mentioned, given the possible involvement of ANSAs in the administration of justice, it may be that the judicial guarantees to be applied in NIACs are to be interpreted differently from those in IACs in order to take into account the features that characterise NIACs and ANSAs.

4. Conclusion

ICL presents numerous interpretative doubts and gaps which require more than the inevitable interpretation that any other normative framework would need. This is also true for the definition of several international crimes. The statutes and fundamental laws of international and hybrid criminal tribunals often describe the offences in a vague and ambiguous manner. As Mettraux observed with regard to the ad hoc tribunals, ‘[s]tatutes … contain not much more than the skeletons of the crimes that are within their jurisdictions’.Footnote 224 The war crimes of denying judicial guarantees are certainly a good example, as they suffer from many deficits which cannot easily be resolved through interpretation.

The war crimes of denying judicial guarantees are a set of under-prosecuted and under-researched provisions. As demonstrated, in interpreting these offences we are navigating troubled waters. On the one hand, it is essential to remember that we are dealing with substantive ICL. Although ICL is a ‘hybrid creature’, it is primarily a criminal law regime. As such, it is governed by specific fundamental principles, above all the criminalisation of the most serious violations of concern of the international community and the nullum crimen sine lege principle. On the other hand, we are dealing with a crime that is by nature ‘soaked’ with human rights.

The synergic interplay between IHRL, IHL and ICL – keeping in mind the nature and pivotal principles of ICL – is therefore necessary to interpret the war crimes of denying judicial guarantees. In so doing, it is also crucial to strike the right balance between safeguarding protected persons from unfair trials and setting standards that are possible for all the parties of the armed conflict to respect, including ANSAs.

References

1 United Nations (UN), Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine: 16 February to 15 May 2019 (13 June 2019), UN Doc A/HRC/41/CRP.2, paras 10, 56–65.

2 UN, Human Rights Council, Human Rights Situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem: Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (21 February 2018), UN Doc No A/HRC/37/42, paras 27–32.

3 ICC, Elements of Crimes, ICC Assembly of States Parties, 1st session, 3–10 September 2002, ICC-ASP/1/3 (Elements of Crimes), art 8(2)(a)(vi).

4 ibid art 8(2)(c)(iv).

5 ICC, Prosecutor v Al Hassan, Transcript, ICC-01/12-01/18, Pre-Trial Chamber, 9 July 2019 (Al Hassan, Transcript, Confirmation of Charges Hearing), 25–26 (with reference to the interpretation of the notion of ‘regularly constituted court’).

6 Francis Lieber, ‘General Orders No 100: Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, 24 April 1863 (Lieber Code), art 148.

7 Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (entered into force 26 January 1910) Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser 3) 461, art 30.

8 Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (entered into force 19 June 1931) 118 LNTS 343, Ch 3, s V, pt III.

9 UNWCC, Law Reports of the Trials of War Criminals, vol V (UNWCC 1948) viii (UNWCC Law Reports V).

10 ibid.

11 Ghadiri, Shannon, ‘Criminalising the Denial of a Fair Trial as a Crime against Humanity’ in Ambach, Philipp and others (eds), The Protection of Non-Combatants during Armed Conflicts and Safeguarding the Rights of Victims in Post-Conflict Society: Essays in Honour of the Life and Work of Joakin Dungel (Martinus Nijhoff 2015) 201Google Scholar (also recognising this distinction, but the classification of the cases within the two categories is not identical).

12 Trials in the first group are: US Military Commission, Trial of Lieutenant-General Shigeru Sawada and Three Others, 27 February–15 April 1946, UNWCC Law Reports V (n 9) 1; Australian Military Court, Trial of Captain Eitaro Shinohara and Two Others, 30 March–1 April 1946, UNWCC Law Reports V (n 9) 32; US Military Commission, Trial of General Tanaka Hisakasu and Five Others, 13 August–3 September 1946, UNWCC Law Reports V (n 9) 66; US Military Commission, Trial of Lieutenant General Harukei Isayama and Seven Others, 1–25 July 1946, UNWCC Law Reports V (n 9) 60; Eidsivating Lagmannsrett (Court of Appeal) and Supreme Court of Norway, Trial of Hans Paul Helmuth Latza and Two Others, 18 February 1947–3 December 1948, in UNWCC, Law Reports of the Trials of War Criminals, vol XIV (UNWCC 1949) 49 (UNWCC Law Reports XIV); Frostating Lagmannsrett and Supreme Court of Norway, Trial of Gerhard Friedrich Ernst Flesch, SS Obe Sturmbannführer, Oberregierungsratm, November–December 1946 and February 1948, in UNWCC, Law Reports of the Trials of War Criminals, vol VI (UNWCC 1948) 111 (UNWCC Law Reports VI).

13 Trials in the second group are: Australian Military Court, Trial of Sergeant-Major Shigeru Ohashi and Six Others, 20–23 March 1946, UNWCC Law Reports V (n 9) 25; Australian Military Court, Trial of Captain Eikichi Kato, 7 May 1946, UNWCC Law Reports V (n 9) 37; British Military Court, Trial of Karl Buck and Ten Others, 6–10 May 1946, UNWCC Law Reports V (n 9) 39; British Military Court, Trial of Karl Adam Golkel and Thirteen Others, 15–21 May 1946, UNWCC Law Reports V (n 9) 45; British Military Court, Trial of Werner Rohde and Eight Others, 29 May–1 June 1946, UNWCC Law Reports V (n 9) 54; Eidsivating Lagmannstrett and Supreme Court of Norway, Trial of Hauptsturmführer Oscar Hans, January and August 1947, UNWCC Law Reports V (n 9) 82; Permanent Military Tribunal at Strasbourg and Court of Appeal, Trial of Robert Wagner, Gauleiter and Head of the Civil Government of Alsace during the Occupation, and Six Others, in UNWCC, Law Reports of the Trials of War Criminals, vol III (1948) 23 (UNWCC Law Reports III); Canadian Military Court, The Abbaye Ardenne Case – Trial of SS Brigadeführer Kurt Meyer, 10–28 December 1945, in UNWCC, Law Reports of the Trials of War Criminals, vol IV (UNWCC 1948) 97 (UNWCC Law Reports IV).

14 UNWCC, Law Reports of the Trials of War Criminals, vol XV (UNWCC 1949) 99.

15 ibid.

16 ibid ix–x. Also UNWCC Law Reports V (n 9) viii (refers to ‘war crime’).

17 ibid x–xi.

18 Trial of Sergeant-Major Shigeru Ohashi and Six Others (n 13) 30. See also the same case (ibid 31) where it is stated that ‘the executioners would be entitled to the defence of justifiable homicide if it had been shown that each was a “proper officer executing a criminal in conformity with his sentence”’.

19 In Trial of Captain Eikichi Kato ((n 13) 38) Captain Kato was found guilty of the murder of civilians; the victims were not granted the right to a fair trial before being shot as ‘[a] mere discussion between officers as to the merits of a case, based upon reports of interrogations, would not in fact constitute a trial’. In Trial of Karl Adam Golkel and Thirteen Others ((n 13) 51) the defendants were convicted of the killing of prisoners of war without any legal justification or trial; the defence did not even claim that a trial of the victims was held.

20 UNWCC Law Reports VI (n 12) 102 (emphasis removed).

21 US Military Tribunal, The Justice Trial – Trial of Josef Altstötter and Others (17 February–4 December 1947) in ibid (Justice case).

22 ibid 3. Nacht und Nebel (Night and Fog) was the code name of a decree issued by Adolf Hitler in 1941, which enabled German authorities to abduct those suspected of having endangered German security and made them ‘disappear’.

23 ibid 4.

24 ibid 3.

25 ibid v.

26 ibid 102. Ghadiri ((n 11) 201, 206) considers the Justice case among the ‘second group’ of cases but then argues that it ‘suggests that by 1949 the denial of a fair trial was recognised as a crime in and of itself’.

27 DePiazza, Jennifer, ‘Denial of Fair Trial as an International Crime: Precedent for Pleading and Proving It under the Rome Statute’ (2017) 15 Journal of International Criminal Justice 257, 259CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

28 ICC, Prosecutor v Al Hassan, Rectificatif à la Décision relative à la confirmation des charges portées contre Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag Mahmoud – Version publique expurgée, ICC-01/12-01/18, Pre-Trial Chamber, 13 November 2019 (Al Hassan, Confirmation of Charges Decision), paras 372–73.

29 Geneva Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 135 (GC III), art 130; Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 287, art 147.

30 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 3 (AP I), art 85(5).

31 Common art 3(1)(d) in Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armed Forces in the Field (entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 31 (GC I); Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armed Forces at Sea (entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 85 (GC II); GC III (n 29); GC IV (n 29).

32 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol 1: Rules (International Committee of the Red Cross and Cambridge University Press 2005, revised 2009) (ICRC Study) rr 100, 352. The rule applies in both IACs and NIACs.

33 Jean Pictet (ed), Commentary: IV Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War (ICRC 1958) (Commentary GC IV (1958)) 39.

34 Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (adopted 27 October 2004) NS/RKM/1004/006 (ECCC Law), art 6; Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (adopted by UNSC Res 827 (25 May 1993) as amended), UN Doc S/25704, 36, Annex and UN Doc S/25704/Add.1 (ICTY Statute), art 2(f).

35 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (entered into force 12 April 2002) 2178 UNTS 139, art 3(1)(g); Statute of the International Criminal Court for Rwanda, annexed to UNSC Res 955 (8 November 1994), UN Doc S/RES/955 (ICTR Statute), art 4(1)(g).

36 Law on Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor's Office (adopted 3 August 2005), Law No 05/L-053 (Kosovo's Law), arts 14(1)(a)(vi) and 14(1)(c)(iv); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90 (ICC Statute), arts 8(2)(a)(vi) and8(2)(c)(iv). Only the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon does not criminalise the offence, as it applies the Lebanese Criminal Code.

37 See ICRC Study (n 32) 353 fn 333 for a non-exhaustive list of states.

38 ECCC, Prosecutor v Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, Judgment, ECCC 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, 26 July 2010 (ECCC, Case 001).

39 ECCC, Prosecutor v Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan, Judgement, ECCC 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC, 16 November 2018 (ECCC, Case 002/02).

40 Al Hassan, Confirmation of Charges Decision (n 28).

41 ICC, Prosecutor v Al Hassan, Version publique expurgée de la ‘Version amendée et corrigée du document contenant les charges contre M Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag Mahmoud’, ICC-01/12-01/18-335-Conf-Corr, 11 mai 2019, ICC-01/12-01/18, 2 July 2019 (Al Hassan, Document including the Charges against Al Hassan), paras 421, 426–28.

42 ICC OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2020, 14 December 2020, paras 221, 278.

43 ICC Statute (n 36) arts 8(2)(a)(vi), 8(2)(c)(iv).

44 GC III (n 29) art 130; GC IV (n 29) art 147.

45 Kosovo's Law (n 36) arts 14(1)(a)(vi), 14(1)(c)(iv).

46 ICC Statute (n 36) art 9(1); Elements of Crimes (n 3) General Introduction, r 1.

47 ICC Statute (n 36) art 9(3). According to art 21(1)(a), they are a primary source of law. On the discussion of the nature of the Elements of Crimes see, eg, William A Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute, Vol I (Oxford University Press 2016) 258ff, 516.

48 Julia Gebhard, Necessity or Nuisance? Recourse to Human Rights in Substantive International Criminal Law, Vol 9 (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co KG 2018) 60.

49 GC III (n 29) art 130; GC IV (n 29) art 147.

50 While the English version refers to ‘the rights of fair and regular trial’, the French version refers to the ‘droit d’être jugé régulièrement et impartialement’ (the right to be regularly and impartially tried).

51 Elements of Crimes (n 3) art 8(2)(a)(vi) Elements 1, 2. Although the ICC Elements of Crimes are not expressly referred to, the ECCC mentions these elements and lists some of the guarantees safeguarded by the GCs in Case 001 (n 38) para 459 and Case 002/02 (n 39) para 770.

52 Knut Dörmann, Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Sources and Commentary (Cambridge University Press 2003) 105.

53 Elements of Crimes (n 3) art 8(2)(a)(vi) Element 2 (emphasis added).

54 See, inter alia, Dörmann (n 52) 100.

55 Elements of Crimes (n 3) art 8(2)(a)(vi), Elements 1, 2.

56 This is one of the possible meanings that the Merriam-Webster Dictionary gives to the adjective: Merriam-Webster, ‘judicial’, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/judicial?src=search-dict-box. The same definition is endorsed by the Oxford Dictionary: ‘of, by, or appropriate to a law court or judge; relating to the administration of justice’: ‘judicial, adj. and n.’, OED Online, September 2020, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/101916?redirectedFrom=judicial.

57 What is intended here with ‘trial’ is that part of the criminal proceedings consisting of hearings where issues of fact and law are disputed by the parties in front of the deciding authority to assess the guilt of the accused.

58 eg, Shah Sangeeta, ‘Detention and Trial’ in Daniel Moeckli and others (eds), International Human Rights Law (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2018) 252, 263–64 (includes rights related to judicial proceedings and their organisation).

59 AP I (n 30) art 75(4).

60 GC III (n 29) arts 82, 84–88, 99–107; GC IV (n 29) arts 31, 33, 54, 64–75.

61 GC III (n 29) art 7; GC IV (n 29) art 8.

62 The customary character of GCs is confirmed by the ICJ and the majority of scholars; see, eg, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion [1996] ICJ Rep 1996, [79]; and Jean-Marie Henckaerts, ‘The Grave Breaches Regime as Customary International Law’ (2009) 7 Journal of International Criminal Justice 683, 686–89.

63 See GC III (n 29) art 4 for the full list.

64 ICRC, Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (ICRC and Cambridge University Press 2021 forthcoming), https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/full/GCIII-commentary (Commentary GC III (2020)), art 4, para 948. On the definition of ‘wounded, sick and shipwrecked persons’, see GC I (n 31) art 13 and GC II (n 31) art 13.

65 GC III (n 29) art 85.

66 GC IV (n 29) art 4; see also arts 13 and 20.

67 Commentary GC IV (1958) (n 33) 353.

68 GC IV (n 29) art 126 (referring to the guarantees provided by arts 71–76).

69 ibid art 5(3); see art 4(2)–(3) for the exclusions.

70 ICTY, Prosecutor v Tadić, Judgment, IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999, paras 164–66, 168.

71 In the scholarship see, eg, Payam Akhavan, ‘Judicial Guarantees’ in Andrew Clapham, Paola Gaeta and Marco Sassòli (eds), The 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Commentary (Oxford University Press 2015) 1217. In the case law see, most notably, Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 548 US 557 (29 June 2006), Opinion of Justice Stevens, 70 (arguing that ‘[m]any of [the trial protections that have been recognised by customary international law] are described in Article 75 of Protocol I’ and that, even though the US had not ratified AP I, the US government had no objections to art 75, which establishes minimum requirements).

72 Akhavan (n 71) 1215, 1216. Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmermann (eds), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (ICRC and Martinus Nijhoff 1987) (Commentary Additional Protocols (1987)), paras 3006, 3092 (emphasising that AP I is ‘an important step forward in humanitarian law by laying down several minimum rules of protection, … whereas in such circumstances provisions of human rights law are subject to possible derogations’).

73 The non-exhaustive character is suggested by the wording of AP I (n 30) art 75(4) (‘the generally recognized principles … include the following’ (emphasis added)).

74 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR), art 14.

75 Commentary Additional Protocols (1987) (n 72) para 3005.

76 AP I (n 30) art 75(4)(a).

77 ibid art 75(4)(d).

78 Akhavan (n 71) 1217, fn 13. See also Commentary Additional Protocols (1987) (n 72) para 3001 (‘When it presented the draft article, the ICRC expressed its concern that a minimum of protection should be granted in time of armed conflict to any person who was, for one reason or another, unable to claim a particular status, such as that of prisoner of war, civilian internee in accordance with the fourth Convention, wounded, sick or shipwrecked’).

79 AP I (n 30) art 75(1).

80 Commentary Additional Protocols (1987) (n 72) para 3007.

81 Elements of Crimes (n 3) art 8(2)(a)(vi), Element 2.

82 Protecting Power's (and prisoners’ representative) assistance-related rights mainly translate into obligations on the Detaining or Occupying Power to disclose certain information to the Protecting Power and allow it to monitor proceedings.

83 This approach is followed by Commentary GC III (2020) (n 64) art 130, paras 5281–82, and Dörmann (n 52) 101–02. The latter also clarifies that there are ‘further procedural and legal requirements in relation to judicial proceedings’.

84 ECCC Case 002/02 (n 39) para 770.

85 Both ECCC Case 001 (n 38) paras 462–63 and ECCC Case 002/02 (n 39) para 2630 fall within this category.

86 See Section 2.

87 Akhavan (n 71) 1225.

88 AP I (n 30) art 75(4)(a).

89 GC III (n 29) art 84.

90 Jelena Pejic, ‘The Protective Scope of Common Article 3: More than Meets the Eye’ (2011) 93 International Review of the Red Cross 189, 213.

91 Commentary Additional Protocols (1987) (n 72) para 3092.

92 See UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 29, States of Emergency (Article 4), 31 August 2001, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, para 3 and, for the right to fair trial specifically, para 16.

93 The literature on the issue is abundant; see, eg, Andrew Clapham, ‘The Complex Relationship Between the Geneva Conventions and International Human Rights Law’ in Clapham, Gaeta and Sassòli (n 71) 731; and Orna Ben-Naftali (ed), International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law: Pas de Deux (Oxford University Press 2011).

94 Dörmann (n 52) 101–02; DePiazza (n 27) 278 (who has also argued that the ICC OTP ‘will … find rich guidance in the ECtHR's jurisprudence on the content and scope of individual judicial guarantees’ in the prosecution of the war crime of denying a fair trial).

95 On this see Section 3.2.

96 According to GC IV (n 29) art 5, regulating derogations, also persons detained in occupied territories as spies, saboteurs or otherwise suspected of conducting activities that are hostile to the security of the Occupying Power ‘shall not be deprived of the rights of fair and regular trial’. On AP I, art 75, see Commentary Additional Protocols (1987) (n 72) para 3092: ‘Article 75 is not subject to any possibility of derogation or suspension and consequently it is these provisions which will play a decisive role in the case of armed conflict’. See also Akhavan (n 71) 1219.

97 Akhavan (n 71) 1235.

98 eg, ICRC Study on Customary IHL (n 32) rr 156, 568. ICC Statute (n 36) art 8(2)(b) also defines war crimes as ‘serious violations’ of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts.

99 Elements of Crimes (n 3) art 8(2)(c)(iv), Element 4, fn 59.

100 UNWCC Law Reports XV (n 14) x–xi.

101 ibid 165, fn 3.

102 Trial of Lieutenant-General Shigeru Sawada and Three Others (n 12) 12.

103 Trial of Hans Paul Helmuth Latza and Two Others (n 12) 63 (Supreme Court judgment).

104 ibid 82.

105 ibid.

106 ibid 84–85; UNWCC Law Reports XV (n 14) 165. This conclusion is also confirmed by Commentary GC III (2020) (n 64) art 130, para 5284.

107 Elements of Crimes (n 3) art 8(2)(a)(vi), Element 1 (emphasis added).

108 This is explicitly stated in, eg, ICTY, Prosecutor v Kunarac, Kovać and Vuković, Judgment, IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1-T, Trial Chamber, 22 February 2001, para 467. On this topic see also, eg, Alexandre Skander Galand, ‘The Systemic Effect of International Human Rights Law on International Criminal Law’ in Martin Scheinin (ed), Human Rights Norms in ‘Other’ International Courts (Cambridge University Press 2019) 87.

109 The scholarship is abundant; see, eg, Collins Mbuayang, The Right to a Fair Trial in International Criminal Proceedings (Eleven International 2018); Yvonne McDermott Rees, Fairness in International Criminal Trials (Oxford University Press 2016); Salvatore Zappalà, Human Rights in International Criminal Proceedings (Oxford University Press 2003).

110 This is the case, eg, of the crimes of torture and rape. On torture see, eg, Elena Maculan, ‘Judicial Definition of Torture as a Paradigm of Cross-Fertilisation: Combining Harmonisation and Expansion’ (2015) 84 Nordic Journal of International Law 456. On rape see, eg, Galand (n 108) 129 (referring to ICTR, Prosecutor v Akayesu, Judgment, ICTR-96-4-A, 23 November 2001). On the phenomenon in general see Gebhard (n 48).

111 See, eg, Gebhard (n 48) 20.

112 Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni, ‘The Proscribing Function of International Criminal Law in the Process of International Protection of Human Rights’ (1982) 9 Yale Journal of World Public Order 193, 193.

113 eg, Gebhard (n 48) 29, 46; Juan Pablo Pérez-León Acevedo, ‘The Close Relationship between Serious Human Rights Violations and Crimes Against Humanity: International Criminalization of Serious Abuses’ (2017) XVII Aquaria Mexicano de Derecho Internacional 145, 151.

114 ICC Statute (n 36) art 8(2)(c)(iv). See also Elements of Crimes (n 3) art 8(2)(c)(iv), Element 1.

115 ICC Statute (n 36) art 8(2)(c).

116 GCs I and II (n 31) common art 3 refers to ‘the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples’.

117 Kosovo's Law (n 36) art 14(1)(c)(iv).

118 DePiazza (n 27) 261.

119 ibid fn 10.

120 In the French text, ‘les condamnations prononcées et les exécutions effectuées’.

121 Elements of Crimes (n 3) art 8(2)(c)(iv), Element 1 (emphasis added).

122 Commentary GC III (2020) (n 64) art 3, para 712 (quoting Bryan A Garner (ed), Black's Law Dictionary (11th edn, Thomson Reuters 2019) 1636).

123 Merriam-Webster, definition of pass/pronounce sentence, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/pass%2Fpronounce%20sentence.

124 Al Hassan, Confirmation of Charges Decision (n 28) paras 364–65. The same approach was supported by the Prosecutor in Document including the Charges against Al Hassan (n 41) paras 480–81.

125 Al Hassan, Confirmation of Charges Decision (n 28) paras 366–67.

126 Elements of Crimes (n 3) art 8(2)(c)(iv), Element 1.

127 ICRC, Commentary on the Second Geneva Convention: Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (ICRC and Cambridge University Press 2017) (Commentary GC II (2017)), para 699.

128 See, eg, ICC, Prosecutor v Al Hassan, Public Redacted Version of the Defence's Final Submissions regarding the Confirmation of Charges, ICC-01/12-01/18, 31 July 2019 (Al Hassan, Defence Final Submissions for the Confirmation of Charges), paras 96–100.

129 Sandesh Sivakumaran, ‘Courts of Armed Opposition Groups: Fair Trials or Summary Justice?’ (2009) 7 Journal of International Criminal Justice 489, 496 (referring to the Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949 (Federal Political Department 1951) vol 1, 113; vol III, 97; and vol II-A, 779).

130 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 609 (AP II), art 6.

131 Al Hassan, Confirmation of Charges Decision (n 28) paras 359–60.

132 ibid para 360.

133 Elements of Crimes (n 3) art 8(2)(c)(iv), Element 4.

134 In French ‘condamnation directe’. Al Hassan, Confirmation of Charges Decision (n 28) paras 358–59; for the PTC-I analysis of direct convictions see ibid paras 362–68.

135 ibid paras 358–59.

136 Geneva Call, ‘Administration of Justice by Armed Non-State Actors: Report from the 2017 Garance Talks’, The Garance Series: Issue 2, August 2018, 7.

137 Jonathan Somer, ‘Jungle Justice: Passing Sentence on the Equality of Belligerents in Non-International Armed Conflict’ (2007) 89 International Review of the Red Cross 655, 682–83.

138 eg, ibid 660, 667–68; UN, OHCHR-Nepal, Human Rights Abuses by the CPN-M: Summary of Concerns (September 2006), 8 (trials by ANSAs even against members of the group ‘cannot substitute for … prosecutions carried out in a state court’).

139 See, eg, Sivakumaran (n 129) 498 (also quoting Anne-Marie La Rosa, ‘Sanctions as a Means of Obtaining Greater Respect for Humanitarian Law: A Review of their Effectiveness’ (2008) 90 International Review of the Red Cross 221, 236), and Somer (n 137) 670. The argument is also recalled by the ICC, Prosecutor v Al Hassan, Public Redacted Version of ‘Submissions for the Confirmation of Charges’, ICC-01/12-01/18, 4 July 2019 (Al Hassan, Defence Submissions for the Confirmation of Charges), para 254.

140 Most recently, see, inter alia, Alessandra Spadaro, ‘Punish and Be Punished? The Paradox of Command Responsibility in Armed Groups’ (2020) 18 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1, 2, 4ff.

141 This is what is provided by the ICC Statute (n 36) art 28(a). On the issue see, eg, Commentary GC III (2020) (n 64) art 3, para 726 (referring to ICC, Prosecutor v Bemba, Decision pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, Pre-Trial Chamber, 15 June 2009, para 501, and ICC, Prosecutor v Bemba, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ICC-01/05-01/08-3343, Trial Chamber, 21 March 2016 (Bemba Trial Judgment), paras 205–09). See also Stockholm District Court, Prosecutor v Haisam Omar Sakhanh, Judgment, Case B 3787-16, 16 February 2017, paras 29 and 31, in ‘On the Establishment of Courts in Non-International Armed Conflict by Non-State Actors: Stockholm District Court Judgment of 16 February 2017’ (2018) 16 Journal of International Criminal Justice 403 (which states that non-state actors ‘can establish tribunals to (1) maintain discipline among the group's own armed units and (2) to maintain law and order in a given territory which the group controls’). The argument is also recalled in Al Hassan, Defence Submissions for the Confirmation of Charges (n 139) para 254.

142 For further details on the issue see, eg, Sivakumaran (n 129) 498, 510ff. Also, the solutions suggested by Amnesty International (in ICC, Prosecutor v Bemba, Amicus Curiae Observations on Superior Responsibility submitted pursuant to Rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ICC-01-/05-01/08, Pre-Trial Chamber, 20 April 2009, para 20) to refer the case to the authorities of other states or to international authorities are deemed ‘unpracticable’ by part of the scholarship: see Spadaro (n 140).

143 See, eg, Bemba, Trial Judgment (n 141) paras 205–09.

144 Somer (n 137) 677.

145 ICRC Study (n 32) 355.

146 Hamdan v Rumsfeld (n 71) 7.

147 See, eg, Sivakumaran (n 129) 498–99; Somer (n 137) 687–89.

148 Commentary Additional Protocols (1987) (n 72) para 4600; Akhavan (n 71) 1223, 1235.

149 Somer (n 137) 657, 686.

150 Sivakumaran (n 129) 498; Somer (n 137) 689; James E Bond, ‘Application of the Law of War to Internal Conflicts’ (1973) 3 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 345, 372.

151 At times the requirement is considered equivalent to ‘competent’, meaning that ‘the tribunal has been established by law to decide cases relating to certain subject matters’: Louise Doswald-Beck, ‘Judicial Guarantees under Common Article 3’ in Clapham, Gaeta and Sassòli (n 71) 469, 470.

152 Sivakumaran (n 129) 499–500; Commentary GC II (2017) (n 127) para 714; Somer (n 137) 687–90. This line of interpretation is supported in Al Hassan, Defence Submissions for the Confirmation of Charges (n 139) para 254.

153 See, eg, Michael Bothe, Karl Joseph Partsch and Waldemara A Solf, New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts: Commentary on the Two 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Martinus Nijhoff 2013) 746. There is no legal basis to argue that when ANSAs exercise factual power they are forbidden to change the existing legal order.

154 See also FMLN Secretariat for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, ‘The Legitimacy of Our Methods of Struggle’ (Inkworth Press on behalf of FMLN 1988).

155 Prosecutor v Haisam Omar Sakhanh (n 141). Hannes Jöbstl, ‘Bridging the Accountability Gap: Armed Non-state Actors and the Investigation and Prosecution of War Crimes’ (2020) 18 Journal of International Criminal Justice 567, 572 (referring to this case as the only domestic case ‘where an ANSA court was explicitly measured against the criteria of [Common Article 3]’).

156 In French, ‘en ce sens que’.

157 Elements of Crimes (n 3) art 8(2)(c)(iv), Element 4 (emphasis added). Similarly, Justice Stevens in the Hamdan case observed that the requirement is ‘[i]nextricably intertwined’ with the indispensable judicial guarantees: Hamdan v Rumsfeld (n 71) Opinion of Justice Stevens, 70.

158 Preparatory Commission for the ICC, Working Group on Elements of Crimes, Proposal by Belgium concerning Article 8, paragraph 2(c)(iv) of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, PCNICC/1999/WGEC/DP.13, 28 July 1999.

159 Al Hassan, Confirmation of Charges Decision (n 28) para 376.

160 AP II (n 130) art 6(2).

161 See, eg, Commentary GC III (2020) (n 64) art 3, para 714.

162 Somer (n 137) 655, 670–71. On the relationship between common art 3 GCs and art 6 AP II see the detailed analysis of Jöbstl (n 155) 572–75.

163 eg, Commentary GC III (2020) (n 64) art 3, para 729.

164 Akhavan (n 71) 1223. See also Commentary Additional Protocols (1987) (n 72) para 4600.

165 Commentary GC II (2017) (n 127) para 700; Commentary GC III (2020) (n 64) art 3, para 714; Al Hassan, Confirmation of Charges Decision (n 28) para 376.

166 Al Hassan, Confirmation of Charges Decision (n 28) para 376. See also Commentary GC II (2017) (n 127) para 700; Commentary GC III (2020) (n 64) art 3, para 714.

167 Commentary GC II (2017) (n 127) para 700; Commentary GC III (2020) (n 64) art 3, para 714.

168 DePiazza (n 27) 275.

169 Al Hassan, Confirmation of Charges Decision (n 28) para 378, fns 1029–34.

170 Somer (n 137) 688 (rightly observing that ‘human rights law was scripted only with states in mind’).

171 Commentary GC III (2020) (n 64) art 3, para 715 (emphasis added).

172 Geneva Call (n 136) 9.

173 Doswald-Beck (n 151) 490–91.

174 Geneva Call (n 136) 9. As underlined by Jöbstl (n 155) 578, ‘[i]t is likely that only a well-established group would be able to provide such a clear-cut separation of powers’. See this last source for examples of how the structures of ANSA courts differ from each other.

175 Al Hassan, Transcript, Confirmation of Charges Hearing (n 5) 42; ibid 43.

176 ibid 42; Al Hassan, Document including the Charges against Al Hassan (n 41) para 486.

177 Al Hassan, Document including the Charges against Al Hassan (n 41) para 486 (referring, eg, to ECtHR, Ilaşcu and Others v Moldova and Russia, App no 48787/99, 8 July 2004, para 460, and ECtHR, Cyprus v Turkey, App no 25781/94, 10 May 2001, paras 231, 236–37).

178 ibid fn 1190.

179 Elements of Crimes (n 3) art 8(2)(c)(iv), Element 4, fn 59.

180 Al Hassan, Confirmation of Charges Decision (n 28) paras 382, 385.

181 ibid; Dörmann (n 52) 409.

182 Al Hassan, Confirmation of Charges Decision (n 28) paras 382, 385.

183 See Section 3.1.

184 Al Hassan, Confirmation of Charges Decision (n 28) para 381.

185 ibid.

186 Preparatory Commission for the ICC, Proposal submitted by Costa Rica, Hungary and Switzerland on Article 8, paragraph 2(c) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, PCNICC/1999/WGEC/Dp.10, 19 July 1999, 3. The list was more substantial than the list provided by AP II (n 130).

187 Preparatory Commission for the ICC, Proposal submitted by Colombia: Comments on the Proposal submitted by Costa Rica, Hungary and Switzerland on Article 8, paragraph 2(c) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (PCNICC/1999/WGEC/DP.10), PCNICC/1999/WGEC/DP.15, 29 July 1999. Colombia anticipated ‘future progress’, which could lead to the ‘development of additional guarantees’.

188 Dörmann (n 52) 409.

189 Commentary GC III (2020) (n 64) art 3, para 719. See, eg, Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference (n 129) vol II-B78, 84 (delegate of France); 49 and 84 (delegate of Italy); 83 (delegate of the United States); these delegates were in favour of adding a list.

190 ibid (referring to the Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference (n 129) vol II-B, 83–84).

191 Sivakumaran (n 129) 503ff.

192 Commentary GC III (2020) (n 64) art 3, para 720.

193 Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts (1974–1977) (Federal Political Department 1978) vol 8, 357 (delegate of the ICRC). See also Commentary Additional Protocols (1987) (n 72) para 4597.

194 Commentary GC III (2020) (n 64) art 3, para 710. See also Commentary Additional Protocols (1987) (n 72) para 4601 (which states that it enumerates only ‘universally recognized standards’).

195 ibid (referring to ICRC Study (n 32)).

196 AP II (n 130) art 1(1); Commentary Additional Protocols (1987) (n 72) paras 4457, 4464–67.

197 Liesbeth Zegveld, The Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2002) 69 (stating that common art 3 ‘does not make clear what specifically is expected from armed opposition groups’).

198 See, eg, Marco Sassòli, ‘Introducing a Sliding-Scale of Obligations to Address the Fundamental Inequality between Armed Groups and States?’ in Sassòli, Marco and Shany, Yuval, ‘Debate: Should the Obligations of States and Armed Groups under International Humanitarian Law Really be Equal?’ (2011) 93 International Review of the Red Cross 425, 426, 430CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sassòli, Marco, ‘Taking Armed Groups Seriously: Ways to Improve their Compliance with International Humanitarian Law’ (2010) 1 Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies 5, 20CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

199 Hamdan v Rumsfeld (n 71) Opinion of Justice Stevens, 70; Commentary GC III (2020) (n 64) art 3, para 722.

200 Doswald-Beck (n 151) 474.

201 Commentary GC III (2020) (n 64) art 3, para 722.

202 ibid para 723 (referring to Bothe, Partsch and Solf (n 153) 745).

203 ibid.

204 ibid. Similarly, Commentary GC II (2017) (n 127) para 709.

205 ibid.

206 See, eg, Dörmann (n 52) 409–38.

207 Sivakumaran (n 129) 503.

208 Al Hassan, Confirmation of Charges Decision (n 28) para 383.

209 ibid.

210 See Section 3.2.

211 Dörmann (n 52) 409–38.

212 ibid 412 (referring to ICTY cases).

213 Sivakumaran (n 129) 503.

214 On the issue see, eg, ibid 666ff; Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Cornelius Wiesener, ‘Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Armed Groups: An Assessment Based on Recent Practice’ in Ezequiel Heffes, Marcos D Kotlik and Manuel J Ventura (eds), International Humanitarian Law and Non-State Actors: Debates, Law and Practice (TMC Asser Press 2020); Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford University Press 2006).

215 Commentary Additional Protocols (1987) (n 72) paras 4457, 4464–67; Doswald-Beck (n 151) 489.

216 See Section 3.1.

217 ICC OTP, Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, at the Opening of the Trial in the Case against Mr Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag Mahmoud, 14 July 2020, https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=200714-otp-statement-al-hassan.

218 Al Hassan, Document including the Charges against Al Hassan (n 41) para 446.

219 For further details see Gallant, Kenneth S, The Principle of Legality in International and Comparative Criminal Law (Cambridge University Press 2008) 52CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

220 ibid 378–79, 383–89.

221 Al Hassan, Confirmation of Charges Decision (n 28) para 340, fn 994 (referring to Al Hassan, Defence Submissions for the Confirmation of Charges (n 139) para 201).

222 Al Hassan, Defence Submissions for the Confirmation of Charges (n 139) paras 4–5, 32.

223 ibid para 5.

224 Mettraux, Guénaël, International Crimes and the Ad Hoc Tribunals (Oxford University Press 2006) 5CrossRefGoogle Scholar.