1. Introduction
States and armed non-state actors (ANSAs) around the world frequently conduct unfair trials against prisoners of war and civilians during armed conflicts. Serious infringements of judicial guarantees result in loss of liberty or life, including arbitrary detention and execution. In Ukraine, for instance, trials related to the war in Donbass are characterised by prolonged pre-trial detention, use of force to obtain confessions, and other procedural violations.Footnote 1 To give a further example, Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territory are often denied basic fair trial rights in the Israeli justice system.Footnote 2
Different sets of international rules safeguard the right to a fair trial during armed conflicts: international human rights law (IHRL), international humanitarian law (IHL), and international criminal law (ICL). ICL is the only regime that is capable of holding individuals, rather than states, accountable for these violations, establishing the war crimes of denying judicial guarantees. In international armed conflicts (IACs) the crime is referred to as the ‘war crime of denying a fair trial’ by the International Criminal Court (ICC) Elements of Crimes.Footnote 3 In non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) the offence is identified as the ‘war crime of sentencing or execution without due process’.Footnote 4 Although the two offences are differently delineated in IACs and NIACs (as reflected in the different denominations), they both fall within the category of the war crimes of denying judicial guarantees.
The provisions that regulate these two offences, however, present interpretative and practical issues. Most notably, the interpretation of the material element of each offence (namely, the wrongful act or omission) draws from different sources and raises a range of interpretative doubts. As a consequence, the application of such provisions is cumbersome, in both IACs and NIACs.
In addition, both practice and academia have largely overlooked the war crimes of denying judicial guarantees. This may be about to change with the Al Hassan trial, which began in front of the ICC on 14 July 2020. For the first time in the history of international criminal justice a defendant is being tried with the charge of the war crime of sentencing or execution without due process in the context of a NIAC. As underlined by the prosecution in the Al Hassan confirmation of charges proceedings, the war crime of sentencing or execution without due process raises ‘important legal issues which have not yet been considered in detail by international courts and tribunals’.Footnote 5 The initial stage of the case has already confirmed that the interpretation of the material element of the offence is a controversial point.
After presenting a brief overview of the history of the offences (Section 2), this article analyses the ICL provisions regulating the war crimes of denying judicial guarantees (Section 3) in both IACs (Section 3.1) and NIACs (Section 3.2). The objective is to identify the issues posed by the material elements of these war crimes, to warn of the pitfalls that the interpretation of the offences hides, and trigger the debate on the issues raised by the crimes.
2. The History of the War Crimes of Denying Judicial Guarantees: A Brief Overview
The idea that during armed conflicts certain categories of protected persons cannot be killed without a previous trial has its roots in the Lieber Code.Footnote 6 Subsequently, the 1907 Hague Regulation on Laws and Customs of War provided that spies should not be punished ‘without previous trial’.Footnote 7 Prisoners of war suspected of a crime were later afforded judicial guarantees by the 1929 Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.Footnote 8 However, the 1929 Convention did not prohibit – let alone criminalise – the denial of a fair trial as such.
After the Second World War (WWII) the Allies held numerous trials to prosecute and convict Axis members for the war crimes committed during the conflict. Some of these, for the first time, involved charges related to denial of a fair trial. The United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC) gave an account of and commented on several of these trials in the Law Reports of the Trials of War Criminals (UNWCC Law Reports).
Volume V, in particular, is presented as including most of the trials that share the following ‘common feature’: ‘they all deal with that type of war crime which can be rather roughly and summarily described as “the denial of a fair trial”’.Footnote 9 As the UNWCC Chairman observed:Footnote 10
[T]he customary law of war requires that before anyone, a combatant or non-combatant, should be executed or otherwise punished as for an offence against the laws of war, he should first be tried and sentenced by a court whose jurisdiction is recognized by international law.
Among these ‘denial of a fair trial’ cases, the defendants were found guilty of charges that differed considerably from each other. Two main groups can be identified.Footnote 11 The accused in the first group were tried for being involved, in varying degrees, in the unfair trials and executions of a small number of protected persons. The charges included, for example, having prosecuted, tried, sentenced (often to death) prisoners of war or civilians in violation of the laws and customs of war – namely, failing to afford them a fair trial. The accused were high-ranking military personnel who acted as judges or prosecutors, carried out unlawful orders, or had supervisory tasks over the military administration of justice. Most of these cases were conducted by Australian and US military courts or commissions against Japanese nationals. Two additional trials were held by national civilian courts in Norway.Footnote 12
The charges in the second group were of murder and the killing of prisoners of war and civilians. The trials were conducted mainly by British, as well as by Australian, French, Norwegian and Canadian military or civilian courts. The defendants were Japanese and German nationals who were tried for being variously involved in the execution of protected persons in their capacity of, for example, judges or military personnel in charge of detention camps.Footnote 13
The analysis of these cases shows that not all of the trials collected in Volume V deal with the war crime of denying a fair trial, contrary to the UNWCC claim for that volume. It is not even clear whether the crime of denying a fair trial was considered ‘as a separate positive crime’.Footnote 14 In some passages the Law Reports considered it a ‘possibility’;Footnote 15 in others denial of a fair trial was deemed to be a war crime.Footnote 16 This proves the difficulty posed by the interpretation of such trials. Reasoned judgments were in fact not always delivered.Footnote 17 In any case, denial of a fair trial as a possible ‘autonomous’ offence characterises exclusively the trials belonging to the first group. Only these cases can be considered as the first – somewhat rudimentary – precedents of the offence.
The trials in the second group were different. The accused were convicted of having committed the war crime of killing in that the act was not justified under the laws and customs of war. In one case the Judge Advocate stated that:Footnote 18
the accused would be entitled to an acquittal if it had been proved that ‘the deceased had a fair and reasonable trial, that such trial was of the kind directed by Japan and that the accused were authorized to take part in such trial and execution’.
To prove that a (fair) trial was established would have involved substantiating a defence plea according to which the killing was legitimate. In most other ‘second group’ cases it was not even acknowledged that no trial was held.Footnote 19
In Volume VI of the Law Reports the commentators seem to have grasped more neatly the diversity between the cases belonging to the two groups. One passage clarifies:Footnote 20
There are two alternative ways of regarding evidence of the denial of a fair trial. One could … deem such denial a war crime … in itself … . On the other hand it could be said that proof of a fair trial … constitutes a defence to a charge of causing death or other harm to a prisoner of war or inhabitant of occupied territory, and that proof of the denial of a fair trial nullified the operation of that defence.
A notable post-WWII case concerning the denial of a fair trial is the so-called Justice case.Footnote 21 In this trial the US Military Tribunal in Nuremberg convicted 16 defendants of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The convicted were either German judges and prosecutors or officials involved in the Nazi regime's administration of justice in Germany and the occupied territories. The Tribunal focused on the systemic criminality driven forward by ‘distortion and denial of judicial and penal process’, which culminated in the Nacht und Nebel scheme.Footnote 22 The crimes were considered not only violations of international conventions, laws and customs of war and domestic law, but also of ‘the general principles of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws of all civilised nations’.Footnote 23 Denial of fair trial was utilised by the executive ‘as a powerful weapon for the persecution and extermination of all opponents of the Nazi regime … and “races”’.Footnote 24 The Tribunal stated that ‘the dagger of the assassin was concealed beneath the robe of the jurist’.Footnote 25 Although ‘major stress’ was placed upon the murders, torture, illegal imprisonment and other crimes, the Law Reports state that ‘there is a strong suggestion that the Tribunal regarded the denial of a fair trial as itself a possible criminal act’.Footnote 26
The Justice case is unique of its kind. Under the spotlight there was the structure and functioning of the entire judicial system in place at the time, which systemically denied fair trials to the detriment of thousands of unidentified victims. This distinguished the Justice case from the other post-WWII cases. While the former case proved the unsuitability of the entire administration of justice system in delivering fair trials, the latter trials adopted a case-by-case approach with the aim of proving the unfairness of single proceedings held against a limited number of victims. From these two different scenarios, first the scholarshipFootnote 27 and then the case lawFootnote 28 inferred two possible ways of pleading and proving the war crime of denying a fair trial.
Moving from the experience of the post-WWII trials, the 1949 Geneva Conventions (GCs) prohibited for the first time the wilful deprivation ‘of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed’ in the GCs to prisoners of war and civilians in IACs as a grave breach of the Conventions.Footnote 29 These are the most serious violations of the GCs, as made clear by their Additional Protocol I (AP I), which expressly classifies them as war crimes.Footnote 30
The prohibition of denying judicial guarantees to persons who take no active part in the hostilities was also provided for NIACs by Article 3 common to the four GCs (Common Article 3), which forbids ‘the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples’.Footnote 31 The rule of customary IHL emerged according to which ‘no one may be convicted or sentenced, except pursuant to a fair trial affording all essential judicial guarantees’.Footnote 32 The violation of Common Article 3 nevertheless was not criminalised by IHL.
Today, ICL provides criminal protection for the customary rule referred to. The rationale behind the crimes is to prevent the use of criminal proceedings as a means to oppress protected persons who are suspected of having committed an offence related to an armed conflict. As underlined in the ICRC Commentary to GC IV, ‘summary’ trials are ‘too open to error’ and they add ‘too many further victims to all the other innocent victims of the conflict’.Footnote 33 A further underlining goal may be to ensure the proper administration of justice during armed conflicts.
The statutes and fundamental laws of international and hybrid criminal tribunals criminalise the denial of judicial guarantees to prisoners of war and civilians as a war crime in IACs,Footnote 34 NIACs,Footnote 35 or both.Footnote 36 The choice of providing the crime for one type of armed conflict or the other is based only on the tribunal's mandate. The offence is also provided for by the legislation of many states,Footnote 37 and is mostly applicable in both IACs and NIACs. However, in more than 70 years of international criminal justice, case law on the war crimes of denying judicial guarantees has been scant – the offences have gone virtually unnoticed.
It is only the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) that have dealt with one of the offences. They have delivered two judgments regarding the war crime of denying a fair trial in the context of an IAC – the Cambodian-Vietnamese War. The first case was against Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, former Chairman of the Khmer Rouge S-21 Detention Centre.Footnote 38 The most recent charge was against Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan – among the most influential of the Khmer Rouge leaders.Footnote 39 The defendants were convicted of having deprived of a fair trial hundreds of Vietnamese prisoners of war and civilians detained in the S-21 and Au Kanseng Security Centres. Victims were held in detention and then executed, without any trial whatsoever.
The war crimes of denying judicial guarantees seem recently to have attracted renewed attention at the ICC. On 30 September 2019 Pre-Trial Chamber I (PTC-I) confirmed the charges against Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag Mahmoud, an alleged member of the Islamist armed groups that took control of Timbuktu (Mali) in April 2012.Footnote 40 Among the numerous charges alleged against him is the war crime of sentencing or execution without due process. The reason for this charge is his alleged involvement, as a member of the Islamic Police, in the activities of the Islamic Tribunal. The Tribunal – established by the insurgent groups – is alleged to have been irregularly constituted, partial, and dependent on the executive organs of the armed groups. The allegations also claim that the Tribunal has convicted civilians without any process or after unfair trials which were manipulated to ensure respect for the new rules based on the ideology and religious vision of the armed groups.Footnote 41
Al Hassan may not be the only case concerning the war crimes of denying judicial guarantees that the ICC will try in the near future. For example, the most recent ‘Report on Preliminary Examination Activities’ published by the ICC Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) shows that the war crime of denying a fair trial in an IAC allegedly has been committed in the Ukraine and Palestine situations.Footnote 42
3. The ‘Tangle’ of Provisions Regulating the War Crimes of Denying Judicial Guarantees
In the analysis of the ICL sources regulating the war crimes of denying judicial guarantees, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute) will be considered as the main reference. There are manifold reasons for this choice. The ICC Statute was the first ICL source to criminalise the denying of judicial guarantees both in IACs and NIACs.Footnote 43 As with other ICL sources, it borrows the wording of the GCs.Footnote 44 When the ICC Statute deviates from the GCs, the more recent Kosovo Law on Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor's Office adopts the same approach.Footnote 45
Secondly, the ICC Elements of Crimes assist the Court in the interpretation and application of the ICC Statute.Footnote 46 They prove to be a fundamental tool in guiding analysis of the war crimes of denying judicial guarantees. Although the Elements of Crimes generally are not considered to be binding, the Court is required to apply them, unless they are not consistent with the Statute.Footnote 47
Thirdly, the ICC Statute regulates what is, today, the only permanent international criminal tribunal with potentially universal jurisdiction. How the offences are interpreted and applied is likely to provide a model that will contribute to the emergence and consolidation of customary international law.Footnote 48
Lastly, the ICC system is offering a relevant example of prosecution of the war crime of sentencing or execution without due process in a NIAC with the Al Hassan case.
3.1. Denying Judicial Guarantees in International Armed Conflicts: The War Crime of Denying a Fair Trial
With regard to IACs, Article 8(2)(a)(vi) of the ICC Statute borrows the wording of the GCsFootnote 49 and criminalises the act of ‘wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial’Footnote 50 as a grave breach of the GCs.
The ICC Elements of Crimes offer further clarification. They establish that the crime is materially satisfied when the perpetrator deprives one or more persons protected under one or more of the GCs of ‘a fair and regular trial by denying judicial guarantees as defined, in particular, in the third and the fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949’.Footnote 51
The Elements of Crimes first elucidate the necessity of resorting to the GCs to identify the categories of protected persons and infer the judicial guarantees of which violation is relevant for the offence. This seems a logical choice as the crime is derived from the GCs, which also establish the judicial guarantees to be afforded to protected persons during armed conflicts. As observed by Dörman, ‘at least the judicial guarantees mentioned in [GCs III and IV] are crucial for determining whether the trial was fair’.Footnote 52
However, the Elements of Crimes do not refer only to the guarantees included in the GCs. The formula used by the drafters (‘judicial guarantees as defined, in particular, in the third and the fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949’)Footnote 53 favours the inclusion in the material element of the crime of further judicial guarantees – notably, those contained in Article 75 of AP I.Footnote 54 To identify the violation of which guarantees is relevant to trigger the crime, it is therefore necessary to interpret the offence in light of the guarantees enshrined in external sources, namely GC III, GC IV and AP I. This interpretative manoeuvre is also warranted by Article 21(1)(b) of the ICC Statute, which authorises the application of ‘[i]n the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law, including the established principles of the international law of armed conflict’.
The second important issue that the ICC Elements of Crimes clarify is that the offence under consideration is materially satisfied when ‘a fair and regular trial’ is denied, and this is ‘by denying judicial guarantees’.Footnote 55 To comprehend this element, the definition of ‘judicial’ – meaning ‘relating to the administration of justice’ – should be underscored.Footnote 56 This entails that ‘judicial guarantees’ is a broader category than the ‘rights to fair trial’ stricto sensu – that is, those referring to the trial itself.Footnote 57 The category of ‘judicial guarantees’ comprises not only the rights to a fair trial (and the rights within a fair trial), but all those guarantees related to the criminal proceedings as a whole and their various stages. The Elements of Crimes thus suggest that ‘a fair and regular trial’ can potentially be denied, and the corresponding war crime committed, when a wide range of rights have been violated. The rationale behind this approach is that the criminal proceedings as a whole should be safeguarded to ensure their fairness for the accused (whether a suspect or a defendant).
This interpretation of ‘judicial guarantees’ – which can also be referred to as ‘fair proceedings rights’ or ‘fair proceedings guarantees’ – is consistent with the ordinary understanding of the category of ‘fair trial rights’. Contrary to what the label might suggest, the latter phrase is employed in the human rights language to include a wider category of rights than simply those that individuals enjoy at trial.Footnote 58 A similar approach is also adopted by AP I. Among ‘the generally recognized principles of regular judicial procedure’, AP I includes rights to be afforded during the entire proceedings, and ‘substantial law’ guarantees, such as the principle of individual criminal responsibility.Footnote 59
As mentioned, GC III, GC IV and AP I regulate the judicial guarantees to be afforded at the minimum to protected persons subject to criminal proceedings during IACs; they represent the starting point to give meaning to the war crime of denying a fair trial. Scattered among their various provisionsFootnote 60 the GCs provide a detailed list of numerous non-renounceableFootnote 61 guarantees that are considered to be part of customary international law.Footnote 62 These rights are granted to different categories of protected persons – they are the ‘protected persons’ to which also Article 8(2)(a)(vi) of the ICC Statute refers. Two broad categories can be identified.
First, GC III protects prisoners of war – namely combatants who have fallen into the power of the enemy, and past and present members of the armed forces who have been reinterned in the occupied territories.Footnote 63 Wounded, sick and shipwrecked persons – protected by GC I and GC II – who fall into the hands of the enemy are also considered prisoners of war.Footnote 64 Prisoners of war are afforded judicial guarantees in relation to crimes committed both before and after capture.Footnote 65
Second, GC IV, dedicated to the protection of ‘civilians’, safeguards a wider category of subjects, namely ‘those who at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict of the Occupying Power of which they are not nationals’ (hereafter, ‘civilians’).Footnote 66 By analogy, civilians in the territory of any party to the conflict are also protected.Footnote 67 The Convention states explicitly that judicial guarantees should be afforded also to internees who are in the national territory of the Detaining PowerFootnote 68 and persons detained in occupied territories as spies, saboteurs or otherwise suspected of conducting activities that are hostile to the security of the Occupying Power.Footnote 69 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has established that persons may be afforded protected status under GC IV even if they have the same nationality as their captors, as is the case for refugees or in ‘inter-ethnic’ conflicts.Footnote 70
The guarantees ensured by GCs III and IV are integrated by Article 75(4) of AP I. This provision is recognised today as part of customary international lawFootnote 71 and represents the ‘minimum contemporary yardstick’ for judicial procedure in IACs.Footnote 72 It provides a non-exhaustive listFootnote 73 of ‘fundamental guarantees’ and refers to those as ‘generally recognized principles of regular judicial procedure’. During the negotiation of Article 75(4) reference was made to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),Footnote 74 which is, in some cases, reproduced verbatim.Footnote 75
On the one hand, the list provided by Article 75 of AP I restates more systematically the safeguards recognised in the GCs. Rather than spelling out detailed rules as do the GCs, it sets out principles employing concise statements which potentially include multiple safeguards. Article 75(4), for example, refers to ‘all necessary rights and means of defence’.Footnote 76 On the other hand, it also affords rights that were previously not explicitly granted by the GCs, most notably, the presumption of innocence.Footnote 77
AP I represents a ‘residual clause’.Footnote 78 It grants protection to those persons suspected or convicted of a crime related to the IAC who are in the power of a party to the conflict and do not benefit from ‘more favourable treatment’.Footnote 79 For these reasons, Article 75(4) of AP I is crucial in the analysis of the violation of which judicial guarantees amounts to a war crime; it gives a ‘summary of the law’Footnote 80 in both its content and scope of application. However, since the Elements of Crimes state that the victims of the crime are those persons who are ‘protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949’,Footnote 81 it is not clear whether the denial of a fair trial to those who are protected by AP I only would be criminalised.
The intersection of different sources that safeguard diverse categories of person renders the resulting system difficult to navigate. Mainly as a result of the levelling effect of Article 75(4) of AP I – which grants a short but substantial list of rights to a broad category of protected persons – it is often (though not always) the case that all categories of protected persons are granted the same rights. However, the guarantees are variously delineated in scope by GC III and GC IV. Such lack of uniformity seems frequently to be devoid of underlying logic, thus creating complications.
Limitations on space for this article prevent presenting – let alone analysing – the judicial guarantees provided by IHL sources in detail. Suffice it to observe here that the judicial guarantees afforded to prisoners of war and civilians are numerous and of a different nature. They can be classified as follows: (i) substantive law requirements, such as the principle of legality; (ii) institutional requirements, such as the right to be tried by an independent, impartial and regularly constituted court; (iii) procedural law requirements, which include the rights and means of defence, and Protecting Power's (and prisoners’ representative) assistance-related rights;Footnote 82 and, finally (iv) penalty-related requirements – namely those guarantees related to the imposition of penalties, such as the right not to be subjected to collective punishment.
When dealing with the judicial guarantees afforded by IHL sources, the scholarship often limits its analysis to the most ‘classical’ examples, which are drawn largely from IHRL, such as the right to defence, the ne bis in idem principle, and the right to be tried by an independent, impartial and regularly constituted tribunal. These are referred to as the ‘main’ guarantees ‘generally recognized as indispensable’.Footnote 83 This approach, however, runs the risk of overlooking the importance of several other relevant rights that are to be afforded during armed conflicts, such as the Protecting Power's (and prisoner's representative) assistance-related rights. Such guarantees are not to be considered insignificant as they contribute to the realisation of the fairness of proceedings in IACs.
After having retraced the judicial guarantees that are relevant for the war crime of denying a fair trial in those provided by GC III, GC IV and AP I, some aspects of the material element of the offence have been clarified. It seems unequivocal that a denial of judicial guarantees that can deprive a protected person of a ‘fair and regular trial’ and thus trigger criminal responsibility can take place by an act or an omission. This has been confirmed by the case law of the ECCC.Footnote 84 The first occurs when, for example, a protected person is coerced into confessing the commission of an offence. The second is even more frequent and occurs, for example, when the defendant is not afforded the assistance of defence counsel or an interpreter. The commission of the war crime of denying a fair trial by omission par excellence is the denial of any trial. The ECCC case law offers examples of this form of the crime.Footnote 85 The only material act committed by the perpetrator in such cases is often the imposition of a punishment – most notably, the death penalty. One may thus question the relationship between this form of the war crime of denying a fair trial and other war crimes such as killing. This conundrum surfaced in the post-WWII cases.Footnote 86
Several further questions concerning the interpretation of the material element of the war crime of denying a fair trial nevertheless remain unanswered. Some of the most important aspects that remain ambiguous and need to be clarified are the following.
(1) How should the meaning and scope of IHL judicial guarantees be interpreted? What is the role of IHRL and the related jurisprudence in their interpretation?
Most of the IHL provisions that afford judicial guarantees do not clarify the meaning and scope of the rights they establish. For instance, the identity of ‘all necessary rights and means of defence’ to be included under the ‘umbrella requirement’Footnote 87 envisaged by AP I is not apparent;Footnote 88 nor how ‘the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality as generally recognised’ prescribed by GC III should be read.Footnote 89
Consideration of the meaning and scope of judicial guarantees is fundamental to understanding when a right is violated and, thus, when the war crime of denying a fair trial may be materially satisfied. If IHL guarantees are unclear, they will be variously interpreted. If IHL guarantees are variously interpreted, the material element of the war crime of denying a fair trial may acquire diverse possible extensions on a case-by-case basis, resulting in inequalities between defendants. The risk of potentially diverse results in the interpretation of fair proceedings rights is even more tangible considering that IHL and ICL are interpreted and applied in legal cultures that are extremely different from each other.
The scholarship has often underlined that the examination of the guarantees provided by IHL and IHRL – in particular, by Article 75 of AP I and Article 14 of the ICCPR – demonstrates that these are ‘nearly identical’Footnote 90 or ‘more or less equivalent’.Footnote 91 Moreover, although the relationship between IHL and IHRL has given rise to much debate, it is unanimously recognised today that IHRL continues to apply, to a certain extent, during armed conflicts.Footnote 92 Hence, IHL and IHRL are to be applied simultaneously.Footnote 93
Against this backdrop it is logical to wonder whether it is possible to use IHRL and the related jurisprudence of the human rights bodies to assist in the reading of IHL guarantees for the purpose of interpreting the war crime of denying a fair trial. Although the scholarship has encouraged this approach without bringing into question its validity,Footnote 94 it is nevertheless necessary first to answer the question whether – and, if so, how – the rights protected by IHL (devised for armed conflicts) are any different in their scope from those provided by IHRL (envisaged for peacetime).
Furthermore, in analysing the war crime of denying a fair trial, the answer to the previous question should be adapted to the purposes of substantive ICL. It should in fact be considered that the interpretation of the war crime of denying a fair trial relies on IHL sources. If the interpretation of the IHL guarantees is based on IHRL, substantive ICL would automatically incorporate such standards in the criminalisation of the denial of a fair trial. This approach may expand the material element of the war crime, in tension with the nullum crimen sine lege principle as protected under Article 22 of the ICC Statute. In addition, the incorporation of human rights standards developed at the regional level may also pose cultural concerns as a result of possible differences in the understanding of judicial guarantees,Footnote 95 thus undermining the universal aspiration of ICL.
The importance of answering the questions of how the meaning and scope of IHL's judicial guarantees should be interpreted, and what is the role of IHRL and the related jurisprudence in their interpretation is thus evident. Overlooking such queries may result in significant consequences for the interpretation and application of the war crime of denying a fair trial itself.
(2) Can the violation of all the single judicial guarantees listed in the IHL sources amount to a war crime? If not, the violation of which guarantees triggers criminal responsibility? Is an analysis of the fairness of the proceedings as a whole necessary?
States are required to ensure all the judicial guarantees provided by IHL sources. No derogation or suspension is possible.Footnote 96 Violation of these guarantees exposes states to responsibility for internationally wrongful acts.Footnote 97 However, only serious violations of IHL trigger criminal responsibility under ICL.Footnote 98 One may wonder, therefore, whether the violation of any of the single judicial guarantees listed in the IHL sources, or only some of them, would satisfy the material element of the war crime of denying a fair trial. It is thus necessary to identify the violation of which guarantees triggers criminal responsibility, and whether an overall analysis of the fairness of the proceedings should be conducted.
On the war crime of sentencing or execution without due process in NIACs, the Elements of Crimes state that ‘the Court should consider whether, in the light of the all relevant circumstances, the cumulative effect of factors with respect to guarantees deprived the person or persons of a fair trial’.Footnote 99 However, the same clarification is not made explicitly for the war crime of denying a fair trial. The question is whether the ‘cumulative effect’ principle should apply also to the crime in IACs or whether, in this case, the violation of every guarantee identified by IHL provisions amounts to a war crime. The rationale of the absence of a cumulative effect requirement for the war crime of denying a fair trial might be that the crime is more serious in IACs, for two possible reasons. First, it constitutes a grave breach of the GCs. Second, it applies most notably within armed conflicts between states, which are structurally more suitable than ANSAs in respecting judicial guarantees. However, this omission might also be a mere oversight.
Analysis of the available case law shows that multiple violations were always accounted for. The elements that the post-WWII case law has contemplated to establish the denial of a fair trial, however, are difficult to identify as reasoned judgments were not always delivered.Footnote 100 When they were delivered, the ‘construction’ of the judgment often does not allow an understanding of what was regarded as ‘criminal’ and what as merely ‘evidence’.Footnote 101 The Law Reports themselves underline the difficulty in several passages, stating that ‘[i]t is impossible to draw up with certainty a complete catalogue of the aspects of the trial which were regarded … as contributing to its criminal character’.Footnote 102 Furthermore, the victims in the ECCC cases were held in detention and then executed, without any trial. Hence, the elements that are necessary to establish the war crime of denying a fair trial were not analysed separately as no trial was held at all.
This does not mean that the violation of certain single guarantees alone could not amount to a war crime. In the post-WWII Latza case, the holding of Judge Schei, sitting in the Supreme Court of Norway, seems to confirm this point by referring to a ‘hierarchy’ of rights. He stated that:Footnote 103
[the] decisive point [in the fulfilment of] those minimum demands which were to be regarded as indispensable for a proper trial [is] primarily whether an independent and impartial tribunal had reached its decisions after a thorough investigation of the guilt of the accused, or whether the outcome had been determined beforehand by directives given to the court.
Judge Berger, in the same case, similarly observed that the several ‘shortcomings’ that characterised the trial (including the violation of the right to be assisted by counsel) cast doubts ‘on the tenability of the trial as a whole’ but ‘individually or all of them together’ they were not ‘decisive in themselves’.Footnote 104 What he considered ‘decisive’ was ‘whether there had been a fair trial before independent judges who delivered their judgment according to their free conviction’.Footnote 105 These statements seem to suggest that the violation of the right to be tried by an independent and impartial tribunal can, in and of themselves, materially satisfy the war crime of denying a fair trial.
The UNWCC Law Reports commentator concluded that Latza confirmed that:Footnote 106
[the denial of any of the fair trial guarantees] would not necessarily amount to the denial of a fair trial, and the courts have had to decide in each instance whether a sufficient number of the rights which they have regarded as forming part of the general right to a fair trial were sufficiently violated to warrant the conclusion … that the offence of denial of a fair trial has been committed.
However, neither Latza nor any other precedent has examined this issue in more depth, leaving much room for uncertainty. For example, what is meant by the expression that courts should consider whether ‘a sufficient number of the rights which they have regarded as forming part of the general right to a fair trial were sufficiently violated’? Are independence and impartiality the only ‘decisive’ guarantees that, alone, would justify criminalisation? When can the deprivation of judicial guarantees be considered to be serious enough to bring about denial of a fair trial and amount to a war crime regardless of an overall analysis of the fairness of the proceedings?
This position of uncertainty exposes the war crime of denying a fair trial to problems of application and jeopardises foreseeability of its criminalisation. Hence, it is crucial to seek a model to establish: (i) the violation of which one of the judicial guarantees listed in the IHL sources is enough in itself to materially satisfy the material element of the war crime of denying a fair trial; (ii) when an analysis of the fairness of the proceedings as a whole is necessary; and (iii) on the basis of which overall standards it can be established whether denial of a fair and regular trial has occurred.
(3) Is it possible to criminalise the violation of further judicial guarantees drawn, for instance, from IHRL?
The Elements of Crimes state that the war crime of denying a fair trial is materially satisfied when ‘[t]he perpetrator deprived one or more persons of a fair and regular trial by denying judicial guarantees as defined, in particular, in the third and fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949’.Footnote 107 The addition of ‘in particular’ can be interpreted as allowing the inclusion in the material element of the crime of further judicial guarantees provided – potentially – by any source of law, and not just by the GCs or AP I. The question that arises is thus whether is it possible to criminalise the violation of further judicial guarantees drawn, most notably, from IHRL.
To consider rights stemming from IHRL as relevant for the material element of the crime would follow the trend – popular among international criminal tribunals – of using IHRL to clarify and interpret the often ambiguous provisions of ICL.Footnote 108 While the phenomenon mainly concerned the accused's right to a fair trial,Footnote 109 the definitions of crimes have not been spared either.Footnote 110 This tendency can be explained considering that ICL and IHRL are highly interrelated.Footnote 111 At the dawn of ICL, Bassiouni recognised that ‘criminal proscription’ is the ‘ultima ratio modality of protection’ for human rights.Footnote 112 Most international crimes are (mass) violations of human rights protected by IHRL – primarily the rights to life and physical integrity.Footnote 113 The war crime of denying a fair trial also criminalises the infringement of a right: the right to a fair trial. However, this does not mean that the violation of every right protected by IHRL is or should be criminalised.
As mentioned with regard to the interpretation of IHL judicial guarantees in light of IHRL and related jurisprudence, this approach should in fact be examined in the light of the risks that it may pose for the principle of legality and the universal aspiration of ICL. As such risks might even be increased in the direct criminalisation of the violation of judicial guarantees protected only by IHRL, the possibility of considering fair trial rights that are not included in the IHL sources relevant for the interpretation of the material element of the war crime of denying should be well pondered.
(4) Can the denial of a fair trial that does not end in a conviction or imposition of punishment amount to a war crime?
Eventually, a further point needs to be considered. What is the relevance of the outcome of the proceedings for the material element of the war crime of denying a fair trial? What if an unfair trial does not end in conviction or the imposition of punishment but in an acquittal, or if the proceedings are dismissed or halted? This might be a rare event, but it could nonetheless occur.
ICL provisions rule out the possibility of materially satisfying the offence in NIACs in that they require the ‘passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions’.Footnote 114 However, in IACs the wording of the ICC Statute seems to suggest that the violation of ‘the rights of fair and regular trial’ represents a war crime per se: there is no requirement for a sentence to be passed or a punishment to be imposed. Again, the rationale behind such an omission might be that the crime is more serious in IACs and states are required to satisfy higher standards of fairness. However, there are no elements to confirm that this was the reasoning and the issue remains unclear. Besides, all the available precedents concern cases in which victims were sentenced or punishment was imposed. Thus, the question remains to be answered.
3.2. Denying Judicial Guarantees in Non-International Armed Conflicts: The War Crime of Sentencing or Execution without Due Process
In NIACs, Article 8(2)(c)(iv) of the ICC Statute defines the war crime of sentencing or execution without due process as ‘[t]he passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all judicial guarantees which are generally recognized as indispensable’. The persons protected by the provision are, as explicitly mentioned, ‘persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause’.Footnote 115
The ICC Statute borrows the wording of Common Article 3 GCs to criminalise its serious violations.Footnote 116 In comparing the ICC Statute provision with Common Article 3, the former has eliminated reference to all the judicial guarantees which are recognised as indispensable ‘by civilized peoples’. The wording of the ICC Statute has been also adopted by the Kosovo Law on Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor's Office.Footnote 117
The war crime of sentencing or execution without due process reveals a ‘shift in emphasis’ when compared with the war crime of denying a fair trial in IACs, which more broadly criminalises the denial of a ‘fair and regular trial’.Footnote 118 The shift is most likely a consequence of the different wordings used in the GCs as the ICL provisions change such wordings only slightly.Footnote 119
Article 8(2)(c)(iv) of the ICC Statute is a wordy and complex provision that needs to be examined in all its elements. PTC-I in the Al Hassan case had to take on the hard task of being the first judicial body to address the interpretation of the war crime. As will be demonstrated, it left many questions unanswered.
For the war crime of sentencing or execution without due process to be materially satisfied, the first element required by Article 8(2)(c)(iv) of the ICC Statute is ‘[t]he passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions’.Footnote 120 Although the Statute uses the conjunction ‘and’, the Elements of Crimes clarify that the two elements should be considered as alternatives: ‘[t]he perpetrator passed sentence or executed one or more persons’.Footnote 121
Regarding the notion of ‘passing of sentences’, it is possible to borrow the interpretation that the recent ICRC Commentary to GC III gave to ‘sentence’ in Common Article 3, namely ‘[t]he judgement that a court formally pronounces after finding a criminal defendant guilty; the punishment imposed on a criminal wrongdoer’.Footnote 122 ‘Passing a sentence’ would thus mean, as confirmed by English legal dictionaries, ‘to announce a guilty person's punishment in a court of law’.Footnote 123 This meaning is also confirmed by the French version of the ICC Statute and Elements of Crimes, which refer, respectively, to ‘condamnations prononcées’ and ‘prononcé une condamnation’. As emphasised by PTC-I, the focus is on the fact that such a decision has been delivered – it does not matter whether orally or in writing or whether it was executed.Footnote 124 The passing of a sentence can also be inferred from the execution of the punishment when – taking into account the circumstances of the case, in particular the nature and context of the sentence passed and its execution modalities, if applicable – it can be ascertained that the execution was the result of the passing of the sentence, and was not used, for example, as a means of deterrence.Footnote 125
More controversial is ‘the carrying out of executions’ aspect. The Elements of Crimes suggest that one possibility for materially satisfying the offence is that one or more persons were ‘executed’,Footnote 126 thus apparently referring to death sentences. Similarly, the ICRC Commentary to GC II seems to interpret ‘executions’ in Common Article 3 as referring to death penalties.Footnote 127 The Al Hassan defence also supported this reading, arguing that Common Article 3 ‘was intended to provide a framework for penalising death sentences that would otherwise be lawful under international law and IHL’.Footnote 128 This interpretation, however, may have an illogical result. It would follow that while the passing of any sentence would suffice to satisfy the material element of the crime, only the execution of a death penalty (and not of any other punishment) would be criminalised.
An alternative interpretation considers the term ‘executions’ as referring to the execution of any sentence. Sivakumaran observed that the drafting history of Common Article 3 confirms this reading.Footnote 129 Furthermore, Article 75(4) of AP I and Article 6 of Additional Protocol II to the GCs (AP II),Footnote 130 drafted on the model of Common Article 3, explicitly refer to the execution of a ‘penalty’ in general. This may suggest that the drafters of the APs interpreted Common Article 3 as alluding to the execution of any penalty. This interpretation is not at odds with the ICC Statute, in which ‘the carrying out of executions’ can indeed refer to the execution of any sentence. However, it seems to be at odds with the Elements of Crimes.
In any case, in order to establish the crime, the Prosecutor must prove that there has been the passing of a sentence (in French, ‘condamnation’),Footnote 131 either explicit or implicit. PTC-I underscored that it is the passing of a sentence that allows this crime to be distinguished from other crimes, such as the crimes of torture, inhumane treatment and outrages upon personal dignity, which do not need the passing of a sentence.Footnote 132 A corollary is that there is no war crime of sentencing or execution without due process if an acquittal takes place or if the proceedings are halted. The Statute thus seems to resolve in NIACs a doubt that remains unresolved in IACs.
Article 8(2)(c)(iv) of the ICC Statute continues by stating that ‘[t]he passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions’ is performed ‘without previous judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all judicial guarantees which are generally recognized as indispensable’.
In an attempt to clarify the Statute, the Elements of Crimes state that:Footnote 133
[the offence is committed when] there was no previous judgement pronounced by a court, or the court that rendered judgement was not ‘regularly constituted’, that is, it did not afford the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality, or the court that rendered judgement did not afford all other judicial guarantees generally recognized as indispensable under international law.
The crime is thus committed if a sentence is passed or an execution is carried out (i) without a previous judgment pronounced by a court (this is what PTC-I refers to as ‘direct conviction’);Footnote 134 and (ii) where there is a previous judgment, but (a) the judgment was delivered by a court that is not ‘regularly constituted’, or (b) not affording the ‘judicial guarantees generally recognized as indispensable under international law’.Footnote 135
Against this backdrop several doubts remain, some of which will now be addressed.
(1) When can a court be considered to be ‘regularly constituted’?
Article 8(2)(c)(iv) of the ICC Statute states that the war crime can be materially satisfied when there is no ‘previous judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court’. It is thus crucial to comprehend what is meant by ‘regularly constituted court’.
The issue is particularly sensitive in NIACs, where ANSAs can also be parties to the conflict. Although the administration of justice is traditionally a state prerogative, in practice ANSAs have often established courts and conducted trials.Footnote 136 ANSAs prosecute international crimes committed in relation to the armed conflict by its own members, civilians or opposing forces, and the participation in hostilities against the armed group.Footnote 137 The legitimacy of ANSA courts, however, has been long debated. The idea of ANSAs administering justice is often contrasted and judged negatively.Footnote 138 The scholarship now tends to agree that Common Article 3 and AP II do not require ANSAs to conduct trials and do not grant them a right to conduct trials, but they do not prevent them from doing so: they only prohibit unfair trials.Footnote 139
According to the doctrine of command responsibility – which today is considered to apply also to commanders of ANSAs in NIACsFootnote 140 – ANSA commanders have the obligation to take all necessary and reasonable measures within their powers to repress their subordinates (or to submit the matter to the competent authorities) if they knew or should have known they have committed war crimes. Otherwise, the commanders themselves will be criminally responsible.Footnote 141 Realistically, ANSAs are not willing to have state authorities try members of the group.Footnote 142 It is more reasonable to expect that an ANSA will try its own members. The ICC considered the availability of a judicial system to be an important element for the application of the doctrine of command responsibility.Footnote 143
The phrase ‘regularly constituted court’ has been borrowed from Common Article 3. As neither Common Article 3 nor the official records of the Geneva Conference shed light on its meaning,Footnote 144 the expression traditionally has been interpreted in different ways. A first popular approach refers to ‘regularly constituted court’ as meaning ‘established and organized in accordance with the laws and procedures already in force in a country’. This reading was suggested, most notably, by the ICRC study on customary IHL,Footnote 145 and consequently adopted in the Hamdan case.Footnote 146 However, the approach has been criticised precisely for preventing ANSAs from establishing their own courts.Footnote 147 ANSAs are unlikely to have the capacity, in terms of sufficient resources and trained personnel, to establish courts that are ‘regularly constituted’ under national law,Footnote 148 and their courts are unlikely to be in accordance with the rules in force in the country. It is only those groups that have control of territory that might be able to achieve this applying existing legislation, either relying on existing courts or setting up a parallel judicial system.Footnote 149
Another part of the scholarship has attempted to interpret the ‘regularly constituted court’ requirement in a manner that does not prevent a priori ANSAs from conducting trials, but only the conducting of unfair trials. If the requirement is construed too narrowly, it could clash with the inherent ‘ad hoc’ and ‘transient’ nature of ANSA courts.Footnote 150 The expression has thus been interpreted to mean, more generally, ‘established by law’.Footnote 151 In this case the requirement would not prevent ANSAs from establishing their own courts as it would include the ‘law’ of the ANSA.Footnote 152 It is in fact argued that in NIACs it is often the case that the national legislation of the state and the law of the ANSA coexist,Footnote 153 and both parties can conduct trials according to their own applicable laws.Footnote 154 This would be the case for those armed groups that are sufficiently organised to enact laws and establish courts accordingly. As underlined by the domestic case law, ‘the principle of sovereignty does not prevent a non-state actor from establishing a Court’.Footnote 155
The Elements of Crimes state that a court is not ‘regularly constituted’ when (‘that is’)Footnote 156 ‘it did not afford the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality’.Footnote 157 At the Preparatory Commission for the ICC, the Belgian proposal, which omitted reference to the requirements of independence and impartiality, was rejected.Footnote 158 PTC-I stated that the travaux préparatoires of the Elements of Crimes show the intention of the drafters to employ an objective criterion in establishing a link between a ‘regularly constituted court’ and the statutory guarantees.Footnote 159 In so doing, the Elements of Crimes follow the approach of AP II. AP II had already substituted the requirement of ‘regularly constituted’ courts provided by Common Article 3 with that of courts ‘offering the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality’,Footnote 160 borrowed from Article 84 of GC III.Footnote 161 The meaning of Common Article 3 has thus been loosenedFootnote 162 considering that the ‘regularly constituted court’ requirement could have posed difficulties for ANSAs.Footnote 163
The less ‘formalistic’ notion of ‘regularly constituted court’ adopted by the Elements of Crimes simplifies the establishment of courts for ANSAs,Footnote 164 taking into account ‘the reality’ of NIACs.Footnote 165 PTC-I underlined that the Elements of Crimes put the emphasis on the capacity of the tribunal to conduct a fair trial, more than on the manner in which the tribunal is established.Footnote 166 The ‘essential guarantees of independence and impartiality’ are thus considered the ‘touchstones’ of a regular constitution.Footnote 167 The Elements of Crimes created a form of hierarchy among judicial guarantees, with independence and impartiality at the top.Footnote 168
Notwithstanding the clarification provided by the Elements of Crimes, the definition of ‘regularly constituted court’ is still open to debate. Neither the Statute nor the Elements of Crimes define the notions of independence and impartiality. For this reason, PTC-I argued that independence and impartiality must be read in light of the interpretation given by human rights bodies, according to Article 21(3) of the ICC Statute.Footnote 169
This prompts two questions. One may wonder whether it is reasonable to borrow the notions of independence and impartiality from IHRL, which have been devised specifically with courts run by states during peacetime in mind.Footnote 170 The most recent ICRC Commentary on GC III seems to share this doubt in stating that the interpretation given to ‘independence’ and ‘impartiality’ by human rights bodies is ‘relevant in the context of common Article 3, at least for courts operated by State authorities’.Footnote 171 This statement seems to imply that they might not be relevant (or should at least be adapted) for courts operated by ANSAs. The second question is whether ANSA-run courts can genuinely be independent and impartial within the meaning of IHRL. These requirements can in fact be ‘challenging’ for ANSAs to respect.Footnote 172 This is the case not only when the groups establish courts to try government personnel and other ‘enemies’,Footnote 173 but also when they lack, for example, trained personnel who are independent of the executive. Moreover, distinctions between the different branches of ANSAs are not always clear.Footnote 174
The Al Hassan confirmation of charges proceedings show that the Elements of Crimes have not appeased the debate concerning the meaning of ‘regularly constituted court’. The OTP argued that the definition of ‘regularly constituted court’ must be a ‘functional rather than a formal one’, and ‘regularly constituted’ courts do not necessarily have to be an organ of the state; otherwise, it would be impossible for ANSAs to establish any court.Footnote 175 However, it also argued that when an ANSA tribunal does not respect the law already in force in the territory in which the group acts, the tribunal is not ‘regularly constituted’ and does not respect the guarantees of independence and impartiality.Footnote 176 The OTP considered the systematic application of the law that is duly promulgated in accordance with the constitution of the state and international law to be a fundamental characteristic of all independent and impartial judicial institutions and an essential aspect of their identity.Footnote 177 The only exceptions to the principle are possible when IHL authorises ANSAs not to abide by the laws in force, and the previous laws are less compatible with internationally recognised human rights than the new laws applied by the group.Footnote 178
PTC-I did not delve into the debate and only referred to the independence and impartiality requirements provided by the Elements of Crimes. In this way it seems to dismiss the arguments of the Prosecutor. However, as the issue is controversial both in light of the application of the war crime of sentencing or execution without due process in NIACs and for the interpretation of Common Article 3, it deserves more attention. Whether ANSAs are compelled to apply pre-existing national laws is a question that cannot be overlooked.
This outline demonstrates how far the meaning of the ‘regularly constituted court’ requirement is from being clear.
(2) What are the ‘judicial guarantees generally recognized as indispensable under international law’?
Article 8(2)(c)(iv) of the ICC Statute establishes that the war crime of sentencing or execution without due process can be materially satisfied also when ‘[t]he passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions’ is performed ‘without … affording all judicial guarantees which are generally recognized as indispensable’.
It was mentioned that the Elements of Crimes clarify, in a footnote, that a cumulative approach is necessary:Footnote 179 ‘the Court should consider whether, in the light of all relevant circumstances, the cumulative effect of factors with respect to guarantees deprived the person or persons of a fair trial’. Hence, the proceedings as a whole should be considered.Footnote 180 Nevertheless, it is possible that, in the light of the circumstances of the case, the violation of one single guarantee is sufficient to establish the crime.Footnote 181 One guarantee can be crucial and its violation alone can taint the regularity of the procedure,Footnote 182 as it has been argued for the war crime of denying a fair trial in IACs.Footnote 183 PTC-I has deemed it appropriate first to assess independence and impartiality.Footnote 184 If a violation of these principles is established, it is not necessary to continue the evaluation: the tribunal is not in compliance with the ICC Statute.Footnote 185
Having said this, it is essential to comprehend what are the ‘judicial guarantees which are generally recognized as indispensable’. The wording employed by Article 8(2)(c)(iv) is substantially different from that used for IACs, where the reference is, more generally, to the ‘rights of fair and regular trial’. The provision seems to underline that only the violation of ‘indispensable’ judicial guarantees triggers criminal responsibility. This needs to be taken into account in interpreting the crime.
Neither the Statute nor the Elements of Crimes mention what these guarantees are. During the drafting of the Statute, a proposal submitted to include a detailed list of guarantees was rejected.Footnote 186 A group of states, for example, argued that the list could have been considered on the basis that every other right not in the list was not indispensable.Footnote 187 Another group feared that including a list would mean that the violation of one right contained in the list would necessarily constitute a war crime in itself.Footnote 188
Common Article 3, on which the wording of the Statute is based, does not offer a list of safeguards either. There was discussion at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference of whether to include a list or to make reference to the guarantees contained in the GCs,Footnote 189 but neither proposal met with success.Footnote 190 The IHL scholarship observes that there are three (alternative or cumulative) possible approaches on how to read Common Article 3.Footnote 191
First, it can be interpreted in light of Article 6 of AP II.Footnote 192 The ICRC delegate at the 1974–77 Diplomatic Conference made clear that Common Article 3 and Article 6 of AP II are to be read together.Footnote 193 Article 6(2) of AP II states that ‘no sentence shall be passed and no penalty shall be executed on a person found guilty of an offence except pursuant to a conviction pronounced by a court offering the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality’. The provision continues with a non-exhaustive list of the minimum judicial guarantees that ‘in particular’ need to be afforded during NIACs.Footnote 194 The guarantees recognised by Article 6 of AP II are also considered to be part of customary international law.Footnote 195 However, Article 6 applies only to states and those ANSAs that exercise control over part of a territory of a contracting party, so much so that they are able ‘to carry out sustained and concerted military operations’ and to implement the Protocol.Footnote 196 As a consequence, ANSAs in control of no territory are bound by Common Article 3 only, which, as mentioned, does not provide a list of minimum guarantees and sets an ambiguous standard.Footnote 197 IHL sources thus seem to provide for a ‘sliding scale of obligations’.Footnote 198
A second possible approach is to look also at the IHL sources to be applied in IACs, in particular AP I.Footnote 199 Article 75(4) of AP I is in fact deemed by part of the scholarship to be customary law applicable both in IACs and NIACs.Footnote 200 Although Article 6 of AP II largely overlaps with Article 75(4) of AP I, having both been inspired by the ICCPR,Footnote 201 AP I provides for three guarantees that are not found in AP II: (i) the right to examine, or have examined, witnesses against the defendants and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on their behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against them; (ii) the right to have the judgment pronounced publicly; and (iii) the ne bis in idem principle. Allegedly the first two were not included in AP II because some delegates wished to keep the list ‘as short as possible’.Footnote 202 However, it is not clear why it was decided to exclude (only) those two and not others. The ne bis in idem principle was not included because it ‘could not apply between the courts of the governments and the courts of the rebels’.Footnote 203 The most recent ICRC Commentary to GC III nevertheless clarifies that the first two guarantees should apply also in NIACs because they are essential for a fair trial and are present in the main human rights instruments.Footnote 204 Moreover, the ne bis in idem principle should apply within the same party, in the same way as the guarantee is provided by AP I.Footnote 205
The third possible approach is to move from the IHL domain and look at IHRL and related jurisprudence.Footnote 206
Although part of the scholarship has argued that the ‘content’ of AP II, AP I and IHRL cannot be ‘transported ipso facto’ to interpret Common Article 3,Footnote 207 PTC-I in the Al Hassan case seems to have embraced all of these approaches in interpreting the war crime of sentencing or execution without due process. It argued that Article 6(2) of AP II and Article 75 of AP I are to be taken into account pursuant to Article 21(1)(b) of the ICC Statute; and human rights instruments (including those of a regional nature) and related jurisprudence are to be considered according to Article 21(3) of the ICC Statute.Footnote 208 Hence, PTC-I refers to several rights as determinant factors in assessing the fairness of a trial. Among these, some are not included in AP II but do appear in AP I (such as the ne bis in idem principle) or are even only in IHRL (such as the right to be tried without excessive delay, the right to a public trial, and the right to a reasoned judgment).Footnote 209 In doing so, PTC-I places many different IHL and IHRL sources on the same level and confirms that judges are prone to consider guarantees stemming from IHRL as relevant for the material element of the war crimes of denying judicial guarantees.Footnote 210 After all, this approach was already supported by the scholarshipFootnote 211 and is considered to be justified in that it follows the approach adopted by the ICTY in defining, for example, the war crime of torture.Footnote 212
The modus operandi followed by PTC-I, however, raises doubts. One may wonder whether all of these sources are suitable for integrating into the material element of an international crime. Article 6 of AP II is applicable only to ANSAs in control of a territory. PTC-I did not argue that Article 6 was applicable in the Al Hassan case because the ANSAs active in Mali had control over the territory. The issue seems to have been disregarded. Moreover, nor has the application of Article 75(4) of AP I been justified. As Sivakumaran observed, the application in NIACs of IHL sources designed for IACs creates problems because they do not take into consideration the peculiarities of NIACs and ANSAs.Footnote 213 Moreover, the appropriateness of considering IHRL standards (including those of a regional nature) to be relevant in the interpretation of the material element of the war crime of denying a fair trial has already been put into question; the same applies for the war crime of sentencing or execution without due process. In brief, PTC-I assumes that IHRL and IHL standards conceived for states are equally applicable to ANSAs. The issue is even more thorny considering that it is controversial whether (and, if so, to what extent) ANSAs – especially those not in control of territory – are bound by human rights law.Footnote 214
All this considered, a list of ‘indispensable’ judicial guarantees the violation of which triggers criminal responsibility in NIACs should be considered. The list should take into account, first, that Article 8(2)(c)(iv) of the ICC Statute, in defining the war crime of sentencing or execution without due process, refers to ‘judicial guarantees which are generally recognized as indispensable’. Second, it should consider the peculiarities involved in the setting up of courts and the administration of justice by ANSAs, including those not in control of territory. If this process of identification is fundamental in IHL,Footnote 215 it is even more so in substantive ICL.
(3) How should the meaning and scope of IHL judicial guarantees be interpreted? What is the role of IHRL and the related jurisprudence in their interpretation?
As in IACs, the interpretation of some of the judicial guarantees provided by IHL sources is not straightforward. The problems referred to above in respect of the war crime of denying a fair trial in IACsFootnote 216 apply also to the war crime of sentencing or execution without due process in NIACs. Cultural concerns, in particular, have already emerged in the Al Hassan case.
In her opening statement in the Al Hassan trial, the Prosecutor felt the need to emphasise that the case is not directed against any religion or system of law or thought – it is just a criminal case concerning serious crimes.Footnote 217 However, at the pre-trial stage, the Prosecutor deemed ta'azirs to be arbitrary and thus in violation of the nulla poena sine lege principle.Footnote 218 In the Sharia, ta'azirs are those criminal violations for which penalties are not set by the Quran and are thus left to the discretion of a judge, who decides on the basis of ‘Islamic and community standards’.Footnote 219 Scholars have objected that strict interpretations of the nulla poena sine lege principle – which require, for example, specifications of the penalties in tariffs provided by the written law – are not necessarily part of the customary international law interpretation of the principle of legality.Footnote 220
This issue was disregarded in the PTC-I decision; the Chamber only explicitly rejected the defence argument according to which ta'azirs do not satisfy the ‘severity threshold’ that should characterise international crimes.Footnote 221 In order to meet this requirement, the defence argued that the ICC Statute is called upon to punish conduct that all the principal legal systems of the world consider sufficiently serious to amount to an international crime.Footnote 222 However, gravity is not the only issue here; cultural concerns weigh just as much.
If the judicial guarantees provided in IHL sources are not interpreted in a strict fashion – for the purpose of the application of the war crimes of denying judicial guarantees – some features of the criminal law systems of certain legal cultures may always satisfy the material element of the crimes. As emphasised by the defence, the Sharia cannot be ‘synonymous with the commission of [international] crimes … this premise will inveigle the ICC into a clash of civilizations, which will undermine any prospect of advancing the universalisation of the Rome Statute’.Footnote 223
Finally, a further difficulty needs to be taken into account in interpreting the war crime of sentencing or execution without due process in NIACs. As already mentioned, given the possible involvement of ANSAs in the administration of justice, it may be that the judicial guarantees to be applied in NIACs are to be interpreted differently from those in IACs in order to take into account the features that characterise NIACs and ANSAs.
4. Conclusion
ICL presents numerous interpretative doubts and gaps which require more than the inevitable interpretation that any other normative framework would need. This is also true for the definition of several international crimes. The statutes and fundamental laws of international and hybrid criminal tribunals often describe the offences in a vague and ambiguous manner. As Mettraux observed with regard to the ad hoc tribunals, ‘[s]tatutes … contain not much more than the skeletons of the crimes that are within their jurisdictions’.Footnote 224 The war crimes of denying judicial guarantees are certainly a good example, as they suffer from many deficits which cannot easily be resolved through interpretation.
The war crimes of denying judicial guarantees are a set of under-prosecuted and under-researched provisions. As demonstrated, in interpreting these offences we are navigating troubled waters. On the one hand, it is essential to remember that we are dealing with substantive ICL. Although ICL is a ‘hybrid creature’, it is primarily a criminal law regime. As such, it is governed by specific fundamental principles, above all the criminalisation of the most serious violations of concern of the international community and the nullum crimen sine lege principle. On the other hand, we are dealing with a crime that is by nature ‘soaked’ with human rights.
The synergic interplay between IHRL, IHL and ICL – keeping in mind the nature and pivotal principles of ICL – is therefore necessary to interpret the war crimes of denying judicial guarantees. In so doing, it is also crucial to strike the right balance between safeguarding protected persons from unfair trials and setting standards that are possible for all the parties of the armed conflict to respect, including ANSAs.