Historians interested in China's maritime past are familiar with Lo Jung-pang's articles on the naval activities of the Song to Ming periods. These studies were published in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. It was also during this period that Lo supplied Joseph Needham with fresh ideas and manuscripts on China's maritime history. The essence of Lo's findings went into the relevant sections of Needham's famous Science and Civilisation series. There can be no doubt that, without Lo's steady support, these chapters might have been written differently. Evidently, Lo had also completed a major manuscript on the Song and Yuan periods, which was never printed separately, as a major monograph. Fortunately this work and other documents left by Lo have survived and Bruce A. Elleman edited the monograph in the form of the present book.
China as a Sea Power (dated 1957) contains a brief foreword by Elleman, with some biographical details on Lo Jung-pang, a preface by Lo himself, and a long introduction by Geoff Wade, known for his many studies on the relations between Ming China and South-East Asia. Interestingly, both Elleman and Wade tried to link Lo's discussion of the past to our own times. During different periods in history, China was the world's leading sea power; the question is, will Beijing acquire a similar position in the decades to come. At present the discussion of haiquan (sea power) and haiyang wenhua (maritime culture) is a hot topic in the PRC, but while local historians emphasize the peaceful nature of China's ambitions, Elleman and Wade look at such claims from a distance. This is in line with some of Lo Jung-pang's earlier arguments: by citing from a large stock of Chinese primary sources he suggests that, in terms of both military and commercial potential, medieval and early modern China was a heavyweight at the maritime frontier and did not always act peacefully. Innumerable naval battles were fought in Eastern waters, which underlines the fact that China was not just a land power, but also very active on rivers and seas – far more so than we sometimes believe. Whether one should apply the patterns of the past to the twenty-first century, however, is a matter of taste, viewpoint and political rhetoric – in China, the Anglophone world and elsewhere.
Using current academic standards to discuss a work written in 1957 requires a diplomatic approach. Modern Sinologists have moved way beyond the findings of Lo Jung-pang, yet one cannot but admire the synthetic nature of his survey, drafted at a time when few scholars understood the mechanics of China's past. Lo, one may say, was able to present a detailed picture from a bird's-eye view, mainly by linking macro-factors such as administrative, economic, demographic, cultural and other key constituents to the gradual emergence of various maritime elements, including naval warfare. It is regrettable indeed that no institution – on account of rivalries (?) – pushed the publication of these rich findings, which Lo had so brilliantly assembled to design a complex panorama.
But this may not be all. My impression after reading Lo Jung-pang's book is that he occasionally made use of certain sources in rather “impressionistic” ways. Although he offers statistical data and qualitative evidence in support of his excellent arguments, one rarely encounters discussions on the authenticity of the relevant materials, their editorial history, and the political implications associated with many texts. It seems that one of Lo's passions was simply to portray China as a major maritime player. Perhaps this passion had something to do with his biography and his visions of the future? Today, historians dealing with traditional Chinese shipbuilding, for instance, would be more careful with the interpretation of traditional data, the best example being the endless debate about the size of China's ocean-going vessels.
Another observation relates to the military side. As pointed out in the book, most naval clashes occurred on China's rivers and in coastal waters. It is also true that in Song and Yuan days huge fleets crossed the East and South China Seas to carry troops to Japan, Annam, Java and other locations – which is all admirably described by Lo – but battles on the high seas remained rare events. China had various firearms, even simple flame throwers, but the extent to which such weapons, including primitive artillery, were used on the oceans is unclear. The traces left by Song and Yuan sailors and migrants in different parts of South-East Asia and elsewhere are mostly the result of commerce.
Taiwan's past does not occupy a central place in Lo's book. In recent years, Fujianese and other historians have provided evidence that this island was in close touch with the Song and Yuan. However, readers themselves should find responses to such delicate questions. Another issue concerns the editing of the book. One ought to congratulate Elleman for his courage and enthusiasm, but unfortunately there are several incorrect transcriptions of Chinese words and the citation of some sources could be improved. My final observation is this: Lo's book should have come out a long time ago. It certainly is more profound in nature than the early account by Din Da-san, José and Francisco F. Olesa Muñido et al., El poder naval chino desde sus origines hasta la caida de la dinastia Ming (Barcelona, 1965), and it compares well with Jacques Dars' La marine chinoise du Xe siècle au XIVe siècle (Paris, 1992).