Can liberal institutions encourage peace and justice within and between states? And if so, should leaders promote the development of these institutions abroad? Proponents argue that institutions like democracy and the rule of law may solve a variety of problems like war, underdevelopment, and terrorism. Critics challenge these solutions on several grounds, including 1) questioning the practicality and effectiveness of implementing these practices in the real world and 2) arguing that doing so represents a form of liberal (and Western) imperialism.
These two books by Annette Förster and Paul Gowder contribute to this debate by attempting to tackle these challenges. Both authors develop clear definitions of concepts associated with the liberal tradition, with Förster focusing on the “decent peace thesis,” a variant of the democratic peace theory, and Gowder on the rule of law. Both books propose to operationalize and measure these concepts in the real world, and demonstrate how governments could implement these institutions. Förster argues that democratic states can realistically maintain peace, justice, and stability internationally by working with decent regimes under a Society of Peoples modeled on the European Union—a theory based on work by John Rawls (“The Law of Peoples,” Critical Inquiry 20 [Autumn 1993]: 36–68). Gowder argues that the rule of law, which are legal systems based on regularity, publicity, and generality (equality), can be developed and maintained when a critical mass of people exist with the power and commitment to defend the system—this is most likely to occur at the local level.
In attempting to establish the practicality of their arguments, the authors relax liberal assumptions that often lead to the second problem mentioned above: ethnocentrism. Förster modifies the democratic peace theory and argues, like Rawls, that peace can be maintained between liberal democracies and decent regimes, which are non-liberal states that allow some political participation, protect basic human rights, and are non-aggressive in their foreign policies (p. 41). Similarly, Gowder relaxes the assumption that the rule of law requires liberal, democratic institutions and argues that a weak version of the rule of law can be adopted under any institutional form, so long as the legal system is regular and public (p. 22). The implication of these arguments is that neither author requires states to adopt liberal, Western institutions in order for states to achieve a meaningful level of peace and stability. These books are therefore insightful in demonstrating how liberal theory might be modified in ways that make it more practical (if not fully liberal) while avoiding imperialism.
While the books discuss similar themes, the specific aims and approaches of the books differ. In Peace, Justice and International Order, Förster focuses on clarifying and extending Rawls’ controversial theory of international justice. Rawls developed the original theory that liberal and decent peoples can successfully establish international justice through a Society of Peoples. This argument was criticized by liberals for tolerating non-liberal regimes, as well as by the general community for using concepts many doubt exist in the real world, like decent peoples. Förster’s book recognizes the limitations of Rawls’ theory, but attempts to address these criticisms by highlighting the value of Rawls’ framework, filling gaps in the theory, and then applying the revised framework to international politics.
To address these objectives, the author relies primarily on a theoretical approach.
After introducing the book, the next four chapters analyze the main concepts Rawls used to build his theory. Though the explanations are useful, the strength of these chapters rests in Förster’s revisions to Rawls’ framework. This point is clearest in Chapter 3, where the author discusses some of the confusing terms used by Rawls: “peoples” and “states.” Förster clearly explains why Rawls believed it was important to differentiate people (conceived of as moral and rational actors) from states (immoral and irrational), but she also convincingly argues that doing so makes his potentially useful framework unnecessarily vague, confusing, and misleading (p. 20). Instead, Förster uses “state” or “regime,” standard terms in the literature, to refer to international actors and captures their different behavioral characteristics using Rawls’ regime classifications (i.e. liberal, decent, benevolent absolutistic, burdened, and outlaw). This makes Rawls’ original theory clearer and simpler, but does not undermine the core argument.
The majority of the book focuses largely on Rawls’ theory rather than engaging the broader literature on international cooperation, with the exception of Chapter 8 that discusses Förster’s decent peace thesis. Synthesizing Rawls’ framework with the democratic peace theory, the decent peace thesis states that if all states became aspiring liberal or decent states, then international peace, justice, and order may be maintained because these regimes tend not to wage war with one another (p. 127). To support this theory, Förster examines whether common explanations for the democratic peace like institutional, normative, and even realist explanations might also explain a decent peace. While this discussion does not provide support for or against the larger debate on the democratic peace, it does provide an interesting avenue for future discussions on regime type and cooperation.
The most significant chapter, however, is Chapter 7, where Förster provides the most comprehensive measurement of decent regimes to date. To do so, Förster identifies a list of core characteristics drawn from Rawls’ conception of the decent regime (political participation and basic protection of human rights), analyzes nine years of data from governmental and non-governmental sources, and considers regimes from all regions of the world. Despite only identifying three decent regimes (Qatar, Singapore, and Oman), this work is significant for two reasons. First, Förster provides us with a clear, theoretically justified, and systematic method for identifying and studying decent regimes in other years. Second, identifying these regimes provides a serious counterargument to critics who claimed Rawls’ failure to identify examples of decent peoples demonstrated that his theory was, at best, unrealistic and, at worst, a cover for imposing liberal institutions on other states (p. 111).
Despite these strengths, there are two limitations in this book. The first chapters are challenging to read because the author does not define terms like peoples, decent regimes, and duty of assistance, among others. This problem is mitigated in later chapters when the author expands on these concepts. Förster’s discussion of the Society of Peoples is also less developed compared to other arguments. She suggests that the Society of Peoples, which would be modeled on the EU, would operate alongside the United Nations to assist underdeveloped (burdened) states, manage outlaw states, and ensure fair trade. This arrangement raises important, but unaddressed questions. Would the decisions of the Society of Peoples, especially on issues of intervention, trump those of the UN? If so, in what ways might this arrangement stimulate conflict and violence between members of the Society of People and outlaw states?
In comparison to Förster, The Rule of Law in the Real World is broader in scope and methodology. Rather than focusing on one author, Gowder integrates insights from philosophy, political science, economics, legal, and development studies into his conceptualization of the rule of law. He then conducts historical analyses of the case of Athens and Britain to demonstrate the value of this conceptualization. The following chapter then develops his theory of commitment and the maintenance of the rule of law using strategic modeling tools. The book concludes with suggestions for policy approaches; a new, empirical measurement for the rule of law; and a particularly relevant discussion on the United States and police brutality.
Gowder’s conceptualization of the rule of law is notable for its nuance and concreteness. Rather than characterizing the rule of law as dichotomous, Gowder argues legal systems should be ranked on a continuum from weak (countries with regular, public systems) to strong (egalitarian) versions of the rule of law. More importantly, Gowder is particularly effective at delineating this continuum. The clearest example is his characterization of generality (equality). While the literature commonly identifies legal systems as equal if they meet the standard of “like cases being treated alike,” Gowder argues it is easier to differentiate systems using a standard of relevant distinction (p. 29). Gowder gives the example that, unlike the concept of relevant distinction, the standard of “like cases” does not clarify why a general system would allow governments to reserve seats for the handicapped at the front of the bus, but make it illegal to require racial minorities to sit at the back of the bus. Race is irrelevant to seating arrangements, but physical disability is not.
Similar to Förster, Gowder develops a new measurement for the rule of law in Chapter 8. Gowder clearly describes how he used item response theory and the World Justice Project’s data to constructed a unidimensional, hierarchical scale for the rule of law. The discussion suggests the new measure may be superior in avoiding problems of weighting, as well as weeding out irrelevant factors traditional rule of law variables capture (like crime control rates).
Although the discussion of measurement in Chapter 8 is useful to researchers, the discussion on rule of law promotion is less practical. Gowder focuses on suggesting policy approaches since he is not a practitioner. The problem with these suggestions is that they are overly broad. For instance, Gowder suggests practitioners develop the egalitarian component of the rule of law by “…eliminating legalized discrimination by gender, race, religion, class, sexual orientation, and other group identities” (p. 172). While this guideline is valuable, it is unclear how development practitioners would do so, outside of recommending a local approach.
Both books offer significant, if different, insights into debates on peace, justice, and order. Förster adds to the debate on regime type and international order by reinvigorating a framework that was largely criticized or ignored by the academic community. The Rule of Law in the Real World contributes significantly to discussions on measuring and studying the rule of law, particularly the value of using interdisciplinary tools. Together, these books suggest strategies for promoting institutions that encourage peace and order, while avoiding ethnocentricism.
