During his impeachment in the parliament of October 1383, Bishop Henry Despenser was rebuked by the chancellor, Michael de la Pole, for having complained to ‘many lords’ that his arraignment before parliament ‘did not have the assent or knowledge of [the] peers of the realm’. Addressing the bishop on this point, de la Pole stated:
you and your words are greatly to be wondered at, since the matter had no bearing at all on your status as a peer, but simply on certain offences which you, as a soldier of the king, committed and perpetrated contrary to the form of your indentures and agreements drawn up with the king our lord.
These ‘offences’ amounted to four charges relating to the failure of Despenser's recent crusade to the Low Countries. After addressing the bishop, de la Pole proceeded to pass final judgement which was delivered, notably, ‘with the assent of the earls, barons and other lords temporal present in this parliament’.Footnote 1 Despite the chancellor having taken pains to establish that the bishop's status as a peer bore no relation to the manner of his impeachment, evidently there was a concern on the part of the crown to emphasise that the temporalities of Norwich diocese had been confiscated with the broad consent of the peers in parliament. What was the motivation behind Bishop Despenser's complaint relating to his status as a peer of the realm? Why did de la Pole seek to undermine Despenser's complaint, but also give its content tacit recognition when passing judgement against the bishop? And what does the case reveal about the episcopate's approach to royal justice and the jurisdictional competence of secular law in a parliamentary context?
These questions are fundamental to our understanding of Church-crown relations in England, as well as for how the episcopate sought to redefine this relationship during the late Middle Ages. The general picture to emerge from existing studies is that of an episcopate veering towards neutrality in times of political crisis, but increasingly pliant to royal demands throughout the fourteenth century.Footnote 2 Meanwhile, the principle of trial by peers in parliament and its development in medieval England has been explored by a number of works, but there has always remained some degree of ambiguity surrounding how the legal principle applied to the lords spiritual.Footnote 3 Both William Holdsworth and Colin Rhys Lovell suggested that the prelates did not share the privilege of trial by peers because they claimed benefit of clergy and denied the jurisdictional competence of any secular court to judge them,Footnote 4 whilst L. W. Vernon Harcourt highlighted the statute Articuli Cleri of 1316 which recognised that the clergy could claim exemption from lay jurisdiction when they stood accused of high crimes and misdemeanours involving the sentence of execution.Footnote 5 On the basis of the statute of 1316, the clergy could reject a trial by peers for more favourable avenues of justice, although there is some evidence that the legal principle was asserted by bishops in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries.Footnote 6 More broadly, discussion surrounding the principle of trial by peers in relation to bishops has been confined to the confrontation between Archbishop John Stratford and King Edward iii in 1341.Footnote 7 This conflict resulted in a statutory concession – revoked only a few months later – providing a guarantee that lords were entitled to a trial by their fellow peers in parliament.Footnote 8 What appears to have escaped the attention of historians, however, is that the clergy attempted to re-establish the legal principle of trial by peers for bishops in 1352.Footnote 9
This article demonstrates how, from the mid- to late fourteenth century, the English clergy pursued a sustained campaign to protect episcopal temporalities from royal seizure by asserting the right of bishops to be judged by their peers in parliament. The most important stage of this movement came in the parliament of January 1352 when the clergy made a case for episcopal exceptionalism in English law. This amounted to an assertion that whilst other clerics should be brought to justice in ecclesiastical courts, in cases serious enough to result in the confiscation of their temporalities, bishops should be subjected to the secular jurisdiction of parliament through a trial by their peers. The broader significance of this development is that the episcopate asserted their legal identity as tenants-in-chief of the crown at precisely the same time that anti-papal sentiment in parliament resulted in the Statute of Provisors. As such, the clergy moved away from a position promoting the jurisdictional claims of the papacy, and instead sought to resolve important legal disputes in the domestic venue of parliament before the scrutiny of the broader political community.
Before proceeding to examine these issues further, it is worth highlighting at the outset how the clergy's request for the privilege of trial by peers in 1352 was linked to the confiscation of episcopal temporalities by the crown. Unlike lay lords, who usually faced the confiscation of their temporalities only in cases of treason, bishops faced the prospect of having their temporalities confiscated for a range of jurisdictional, criminal and political causes. Charges of malfeasance whilst serving in royal office led to the confiscation of William Wykeham's temporalities of Winchester diocese in 1376,Footnote 10 and Henry Despenser suffered a similar fate in 1383.Footnote 11 Accusations of maladministration were also brought against Archbishop John Stratford in 1341, although in this case the political conflict escalated quickly and was resolved in parliament without the confiscation of the Canterbury temporalities ever taking place. Meanwhile, jurisdictional issues surrounding contempt of royal justice led to the confiscation of William Bateman's Norwich temporalities in 1346,Footnote 12 as well as the temporalities of Exeter diocese from John Grandisson in 1351,Footnote 13 whilst the temporalities of Thomas de Lisle were confiscated in 1355 owing to criminal misdemeanours committed by the bishop and his household.Footnote 14 Bishops were also vulnerable to politically motivated attacks from the crown. In the cases of both Stratford and Wykeham, legal proceedings were closely linked to broader political developments, and overtly partisan attacks from the crown also led to the confiscation of Adam Orleton's temporalities of Hereford in 1324,Footnote 15 William Airmyn's temporalities of Norwich in 1325Footnote 16 and the confiscation of Thomas Arundel's temporalities of Canterbury in 1397.Footnote 17 The control of parliament by the Lords Appellant in 1388 led to the confiscation of Alexander Neville's temporalities of York in 1388, and the archbishop's subsequent translation to the see of St Andrews which the prelate had no hope of occupying.Footnote 18 Clearly, only a small minority of bishops in fourteenth-century England actually suffered the seizure of their temporalities. Yet, it is evident from petitions concerning the over-exploitation of temporalities whilst in royal custody during episcopal vacancies, combined with the political pressure that could be exerted on the episcopate by the crown owing to threat of confiscation, that the clergy in England deemed the problem serious enough to pursue a juridical solution.Footnote 19
From the perspective of the English crown, the confiscation of episcopal temporalities, which bishops held of the crown as tenants-in-chief, was a political necessity in lieu of being able to bring wayward bishops to justice through the application of secular law.Footnote 20 During his conflict with Archbishop Stratford in 1341, Edward iii reputedly exclaimed that he would never again appoint a cleric as chancellor, nor to any other high office, but would fill such roles with men whom he could execute if they proved disloyal.Footnote 21 The royal position was expressed somewhat more delicately in the parliament of January 1352:
concerning the taking of bishops' temporalities into the king's hands, for contempt in a writ of quare non admisit or for any other reason; because the law has always been such and the bishops cannot otherwise be brought to justice, the king is advised that the law cannot be changed.Footnote 22
The problem for the crown related to the privilege known as ‘benefit of clergy’ which afforded clerics the opportunity to escape trial and punishment in secular courts when they stood accused of committing a felony.Footnote 23
An important development in this area came in 1341, when Archbishop Stratford offered to clear himself before parliament of charges relating to his term as chancellor. Although Stratford was clear that if the king's accusations amounted to a charge of treason no secular jurisdiction was competent to judge him, essentially the archbishop admitted the competence of his peers in parliament to pass judgement on his conduct whilst acting in the capacity of a royal official.Footnote 24 Stratford's approach was dictated by a considered calculation that parliament would provide a potent political tool to oppose the king's actions. The prelates could be counted on for support, and in parliament the king's actions could be exposed to the scrutiny of the broader political community.Footnote 25 Ultimately, Stratford's position paved the way for the episcopate to seek the protection of a parliamentary trial in other legal cases involving bishops. This article begins by exploring the clergy's opposition to the confiscation of episcopal temporalities in 1352, before proceeding to examine how this agenda was resurrected in 1377 in relation to the impeachment of William Wykeham, bishop of Winchester and in two further cases that arose during the reign of Richard ii involving Henry Despenser, bishop of Norwich, and Thomas Arundel, archbishop of Canterbury.
I
The issue of trial by peers was raised by the clergy in 1352 following the royal seizure of the temporalities of Exeter diocese. The Exeter temporalities had been confiscated in 1350 following Bishop John Grandisson's conviction before the court of King's Bench for having acted in contempt of royal justice.Footnote 26 The issues surrounding the confiscation were taken up in convocation during the summer of 1351, but by the time parliament had assembled again on 13 January 1352 John Grandisson had already received restitution by the ‘mere will’ of the king on 1 December 1351.Footnote 27 In this context, the presentation of clerical gravamina in parliament after the bishop of Exeter had already received restitution emphasises that the clergy raised the issue of trial by peers in 1352 as a matter of legal principle, rather than in search of remedy for a specific case.Footnote 28
The article of gravamina relating to the confiscation of the Exeter temporalities has been misconstrued in a number of works. For example, it has been asserted by W. R. Jones that the clergy ‘appealed to the king in Parliament for the privilege of making a reasonable fine instead of suffering the loss of their temporalities’, whilst F. Cheyette has suggested that Edward iii sought to ‘mollify’ the clergy by granting that episcopal temporalities ‘would no longer be taken into the king's hand, but only a reasonable fine’.Footnote 29 In fact, the clergy at no point requested the substitution of a reasonable fine in the place of confiscation. Although the resulting statute Pro Clero made provision for such fines, this concession appears to have been negotiated after the parliament had ended. Elsewhere, the clergy's request has been characterised as seeking a guarantee that contempt of royal justice would no longer serve as sufficient grounds for the confiscation of episcopal temporalities.Footnote 30 Yet, whilst this formed an important part of the clergy's complaint, in actual fact the clergy put forward a much broader request relating to trial by peers.
Before proceeding further, it is worth citing the clergy's petition in the parliament of 1352 in its entirety:
Also, whereas archbishops and bishops hold their temporalities of the king in chief, and are therefore peers of the land as are other earls and barons; that it may please you to grant to them that no justice, merely on account of contempt, may henceforth cause their temporalities to be taken into the hands of our said lord the king, no more than they shall cause the lands of an earl; as was recently done concerning the bishop of Exeter, without any deliberation being taken with the king's great council or the peers of the land.Footnote 31
Not only did the clergy begin by asserting the role of bishops as tenants-in-chief and equating their legal status to lay lords, but the main thrust of their complaint was that the temporalities of Exeter diocese had been seized without deliberation before the great council or peers of the land. This complaint has no parallel in the articles of clerical gravamina presented in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.Footnote 32 Indeed, the clergy's request in 1352 was in stark contrast to the general character of the gravamina, which sought to defend the liberties of the Church and, in particular, to preserve the integrity of ecclesiastical jurisdiction and oppose encroachments by the secular courts. Now, the episcopate willingly admitted the jurisdictional competence of their peers in the secular court of parliament to effect the confiscation of their temporalities. This went well beyond what Stratford had envisaged in 1341, and it seems somewhat hypocritical on the part of the clergy that another article of gravamina presented in 1352 complained about clerks being delivered to secular courts since ‘this was the first reason for which Saint Thomas died’.Footnote 33
It is interesting that the clergy did not explicitly assert the principle of ‘trial’ or ‘judgement’ by their peers, but rather sought the ‘deliberation’ of the great council and peers of the land. The ambiguity here perhaps suggests some reticence on the part of the clergy about accepting the arraignment of bishops before a secular court, but the assertion that bishops were peers in the same way as earls and barons provides clarity to what was perhaps intentionally kept opaque; the clergy now accepted that the episcopal temporalities could be confiscated by the ‘deliberation’ of the peers in parliament. This ran counter to benefit of clergy, and the episcopate's position in January 1352 cannot be traced to the liberties outlined in c. 1 of Magna Carta, which had already established a degree of clerical exceptionalism in English law.Footnote 34 What this broader legal context does suggest, however, is that the complexity of the Church's position within the English legal system afforded the episcopate a level of flexibility to adapt their position to suit their needs. In the words of B. C. Keeney, they sought ‘to have as well as eat their cake’.Footnote 35
In order to provide a fuller explanation for the clergy's position in 1352, it is worth briefly highlighting the fact that William Bateman, bishop of Norwich, had suffered the seizure of his temporalities in 1346. This raises an important question: why did the clergy wait for over a decade after Archbishop Stratford's confrontation with Edward iii to seek a royal guarantee that bishops should not suffer the seizure of their temporalities without the judgement of their peers?
The evidence suggests that, in 1346, Bateman elicited an apathetic response from the clergy. The bishop of Norwich had adopted a hard-line stance in his conflict with the abbey of Bury St Edmunds, and during this dispute the bishop had excommunicated a royal messenger.Footnote 36 Consequently, the clergy were reluctant to rally to Bateman's cause, rooted as it was in an instance of intra-Church conflict and the bishop's own intransigence. By contrast, the circumstances in which John Grandisson suffered the seizure of his temporalities were much more conducive to a sympathetic response from the clergy. By taking a stand against a writ of quare non admisit, John Grandisson was drawn into a conflict of a jurisdictional nature that was much closer to the concerns typically encapsulated in the gravamina – although, as we have seen, the resulting article of clerical grievance was not particularly steeped in precedent.
Moreover, there was a certain timeliness to Grandisson's case, which coincided with a legislative agenda pursued by the Commons which also sought to place restrictions on the exercise of royal justice. In 1348 the Commons had raised concerns over what constituted a charge of treason, and in the parliament of January 1352 they succeeded in gaining a clear definition from the crown provided in the Statute of Treasons.Footnote 37 Whilst the definition of treason was a separate issue to that raised by the clergy in their gravamina, there was a close overlap. Notably, the Statute of Treasons established that allegations of high treason were to take place before a full session of the lords in parliament.Footnote 38 Parliament became the recognised venue for important state trials.
Furthermore, parliament now became an attractive option for bishops as a safeguard against the seizure of their temporalities, owing to the fact that in 1344 the English crown had refused to acknowledge the clergy's assertion of papal jurisdictional supremacy in legal cases involving bishops. Following his conflict with Edward iii in 1341, Archbishop Stratford had sought royal confirmation that only the pope was competent to judge bishops accused of criminal acts.Footnote 39 However, the crown had been unwilling to accept this position, and the apparent futility of asserting papal jurisdictional supremacy led the episcopate to seek other avenues of justice to protect their temporalities. Set against the broader context of the legislative agenda pursued by the laity in 1352, it seems highly probably that clergy hoped to achieve a similar statutory outcome – recognition of parliament as the proper venue for certain legal cases to be brought to judgement – in response to their complaint relating to the bishop of Exeter.
The clergy's request in 1352 is given further legislative context by the fact that the previous parliament, held in February 1351, saw the enactment of the Statute of Provisors.Footnote 40 It is significant that at a time when legislation was passed against papal provisions for the first time in a ‘symbolic statement of the crown's claims to sovereignty over the English church’, the episcopate unreservedly asserted their bond to the English king as tenants-in-chief subject to the secular jurisdiction of parliament.Footnote 41 By giving up the ghost of Thomas Becket at such a key juncture in Anglo-papal relations, the clergy appear to have been promoting the formulation of a new legal identity for English bishops: hitherto they had been spiritual leaders holding land from the crown, but by the mid-fourteenth century the clergy conceded that bishops were temporal barons charged with episcopal duties subject to secular jurisdiction. Of course, the reality of the clergy's position was more complex and involved a good deal of pragmatism. This is demonstrated in other complaints raised in 1352 which sought to curb the indictment of the prelates and their officials before royal justices.Footnote 42 However, in essence, the clergy appear to have been arguing for episcopal exceptionalism in English law – the encroachments of secular jurisdiction should be firmly opposed except when a bishop was threatened with the confiscation of his temporalities, in which case he should be judged by his peers in parliament.
The stance of the episcopate also represents a reaction to an ongoing process whereby the English parliamentary peerage emerged by the end of the fourteenth century as an elite group marked off from the rest of the landholding class by their right to receive individual summonses to parliament.Footnote 43 Whilst the episcopate appears to have been aware in 1352 that the peerage was moving towards a more rigid definition, evidently their own case for peerage rested on the basis of their role as tenants-in-chief rather than their individual summonses to parliament. Nevertheless, a more rigidly defined peerage had important connotations for later medieval interpretations of c. 29 of Magna Carta (1225), and by asserting their status as peers the bishops sought to ensure that they would be entitled to the full privileges of peerage.Footnote 44
It should be clear from the preceding discussion that more was at stake in 1352 than the clergy merely seeking to remedy abuses surrounding the writ of quare non admisit. Yet, the response provided by the crown refused to acknowledge that any agenda broader than the jurisdictional issue surrounding the writ had been raised.Footnote 45 On both the parliament roll and the resulting statute, Pro Clero, the crown successfully avoided making any concession on trial by peers.Footnote 46 Curiously, the royal grant acknowledged that bishops were ‘peers of the realm’ as part of the justification for allowing the confiscation of episcopal temporalities to be replaced by the payment of a fine, but this still avoided any debate over the principle of trial by peers in parliament. In short, the royal concession fell well short of addressing the primary concern of the clergy's original complaint.
Although in 1352 the clergy had failed to secure the right of bishops to a trial by peers, it is significant that Edward iii did face opposition from his clerical ministers three years later when he ordered the confiscation of the temporalities of the diocese of Ely. Following a plea for royal support from Lady Wake, Edward iii had ordered the seizure of the Ely temporalities shortly after the end of parliament on 30 November 1355.Footnote 47 However, the royal chancellor, John Thoresby, archbishop of York, and the treasurer, William Edington, bishop of Winchester, refused to execute the king's orders. This elicited an indignant letter from Edward iii asking how confiscation could be enacted ‘without offence to the law’, and complaining that ‘if the matter had touched a great peer of the realm other than the bishop you would have made an altogether different execution’.Footnote 48 Aside from registering annoyance at perceived clerical camaraderie, this letter hints at the king's impatience in relation to his bishops’ recent attempts to establish a more favourable relationship vis-à-vis royal jurisdiction.
A verdict provided by the king's council exonerated the ministers’ refusal to act in accordance with royal wishes, citing a statute that had been passed in 1340, which ordained that the temporalities of lords should not be seized without a valid legal judgement.Footnote 49 Yet, given the complaint of the clergy in parliament three years previously, it may have been a conscious decision on the part of Thoresby and Edington to raise the issue of trial by peers once again. According to a contemporary biographical account, Thomas de Lisle, bishop of Ely, had sought a trial by peers in parliament when he appeared before the King's Bench in the Hilary term of 1356, but his request was denied.Footnote 50 Whilst this account contradicts the official record of the King's Bench, where it is documented that de Lisle claimed benefit of clergy, it is possible that the bishop asked for trial by peers first and, after this was rejected, fell back on claiming exemption from lay jurisdiction.Footnote 51 What is clear from the de Lisle case is that despite the clergy's efforts in 1352, trial by peers could be readily ignored by the crown and the only legal obstacle to the seizure of episcopal temporalities was the statute of 1340. What little protection the statute did provide, Edward iii wilfully tried to disregard in 1355.
II
An informative comparison with the clergy's complaint in 1352 is provided by an article of gravamina presented in the parliament of January 1377 relating to the seizure of the temporalities of the diocese of Winchester. The proceedings against William Wykeham in this parliament have been outlined elsewhere.Footnote 52 The focus here is the clerical gravamina, and it is notable that the clergy made a much more tentative complaint in 1377 than they had in 1352. Rather than complaining that the bishop of Winchester had been denied a trial by peers, the clergy stated that the decision to confiscate the Winchester temporalities had been taken ‘without sufficient consent and assent from those to whom it belongs in this matter’.Footnote 53 There was no repetition of legal principles here, and it appears that the complaint predominantly concerned the prevailing political situation surrounding the inertia of the king, as well as suspicions over the usurpation of royal authority by John of Gaunt, duke of Lancaster.
The clergy's complaint in January 1377 helps to make sense of a seemingly irreconcilable discrepancy provided in the accounts of the Anonimalle Chronicle and Thomas Walsingham. Whereas Walsingham recorded that Wykeham had been found guilty by John of Gaunt ‘without trial’, and that the duke subsequently enforced the confiscation of episcopal temporalities ‘with the authority of the king’, the Anonimalle chronicler documented in detail the accusations brought against Wykeham before the great council, as well as the bishop of Winchester's defence against these accusations.Footnote 54 The version of events provided by Walsingham is supported by Wykeham's own claim that he had been denied judgement of his peers,Footnote 55 whilst the account provided by the Anonimalle chronicler is supported by letters close dated 25 August 1377 which refer to accusations against the bishop being laid before ‘the lords of England and others of the great council specially appointed and sitting judicially’.Footnote 56 On the one hand we have a version of events whereby John of Gaunt acted arbitrarily against Wykeham, whilst on the other hand we have a version of events whereby the bishop of Winchester was tried before the great council.
These apparently contradictory accounts are explained, and to some extent reconciled, by the evidence from the clerical gravamina. In the first instance, it is notable that in their gravamina the clergy did not pursue Wykeham's allegation that he had been denied trial by peers. Rather, somewhat ambiguously, they suggested that confiscation had taken place without ‘sufficient consent’ of those to whom it pertained. Even if they felt – as Wykeham himself evidently did – that the bishop of Winchester had not been afforded a fair trial, the clergy appear to have implicitly accepted that the bishop had been tried before a conciliar body sufficiently composed for its judicial purpose. The complaint of the clergy, then, was not about the process of arraignment, but rather the manner in which the sentence had been processed. The implication was that John of Gaunt had acted unilaterally and ordered the confiscation of the Winchester temporalities without the consent of the conciliar body before which the case was brought. Whilst this undermines Walsingham's assertion that Wykeham had been denied a trial, it does salvage the chronicler from the accusation of merely propagating anti-Lancastrian propaganda. Indeed, evidence from the gravamina indicates that John of Gaunt was exercising royal authority without proper consent, no doubt adding to the rumours then circulating that the duke harboured designs upon the crown.Footnote 57
Although there were evident differences between the clergy's complaints relating to trial by peers in 1352 and 1377, the gravamina presented in 1377 concerning the confiscation of the Winchester temporalities demonstrate continuing clerical pressure on the crown. It is interesting that, by challenging the manner in which the sentence was passed, rather than the trial itself, the clergy also appear to have tacitly acknowledged that the process of impeachment in parliament fulfilled the preconditions of a trial by peers. Although no further list of gravamina was recorded on the rolls of parliament after 1377, owing to the clergy's failure to establish a lasting link between the supply of taxation and the redress of grievances, on the basis of the clergy's complaint relating to the impeachment of Wykeham it seems likely that they would have found little to challenge in the process of impeachment brought against Bishop Despenser in 1383.
III
Despite their failure to gain statutory assurance that episcopal temporalities would not be confiscated without the judgement of the peers in parliament, the endeavours of the clergy appear to have placed pressure on the crown to act against bishops in accordance with a rough approximation of the legal principle. We return, now, to the impeachment of Henry Despenser, bishop of Norwich, in the parliament of October 1383, following the failure of his crusade to the Low Countries. The details of Despenser's impeachment and the related military fiasco have been explored in detail by Margaret Aston.Footnote 58 However, whilst the bishop's crusade and the subsequent charges brought against him in parliament are well documented, it has been noted that there is little evidence to illuminate the political machinations that may have been going on behind the scenes.Footnote 59
A close reading of the parliament roll hints at an attempt by Despenser to derail proceedings. Having requested the opportunity ‘to lend him audience, ear, time and opportunity, that he might excuse himself in this parliament’, the bishop failed to exonerate his conduct as a military leader but was granted a second hearing after registering a complaint that his defence had been ‘disturbed and interrupted’ by ‘carping comments aimed at him’.Footnote 60 The bishop's second arraignment was no more successful than his first, but it is interesting that during this second process the chancellor, Michael de la Pole, justified the confiscation of the bishop's temporalities with reference to his status as a peer of the realm. The evidence here provides insight into the elusive backroom discussions that took place during the impeachment process. In particular, the record on the parliament roll suggests that Bishop Despenser had attempted to rally support among the lords in a similar manner to Archbishop John Stratford in 1341.
Evidence for Bishop Despenser's scheme in this regard is drawn entirely from the words of the chancellor. There is no indication in the bishop's own defence that any formal complaint about the manner of his arraignment before parliament was ever registered. Indeed, the bishop had willingly subjected himself to the process of impeachment, and whilst it is true that he asked for a second hearing after an initial judgement had been passed against him, his complaint here related to disparaging comments made against him which had disrupted his first hearing. There is therefore no direct indication that Despenser felt that his arraignment before parliament was not fit for judicial purpose in light of his status as a spiritual peer. Yet, the evidence provided in de la Pole's speech suggests that the bishop had been sowing the seeds of discord in an attempt to escalate the conflict into a confrontation between the lords and the crown over broader principles. Having failed to exonerate himself during his first hearing before parliament, it seems likely that when the bishop realised that parliament was looking to blame the debacle on his leadership, Despenser tried, and failed, to adopt a new legal strategy.
Despenser's apparent attempt to gain support by touting the principle of trial by peers can be placed within the context of a longstanding campaign by the clergy in the fourteenth century to oppose the confiscation of episcopal temporalities without a trial by peers in parliament. Given that the clergy appear to have recognised the jurisdictional competence of the process of impeachment in parliament, Despenser's complaint was largely an act of desperation and it was unlikely to unite the clergy against the crown, never mind the broader political community. However, although Despenser was unsuccessful, his political manoeuvre evidently elicited some concern on the part of the crown. When the Norwich temporalities were confiscated care was taken – as demonstrated in the wording of de la Pole's sentence against the bishop – to emphasise that the legal action had been taken with the consent of the peers in parliament. To some extent the hostile mood in parliament against Despenser appears to have neutralised such concerns, and the crown was content to confiscate the Norwich temporalities without the consent of the spiritual peers who were conspicuous by their absence from de la Pole's sentence. This forms a contrast with the much more controversial legal process brought against Thomas Arundel, archbishop of Canterbury in 1397.
In the Revenge Parliament of September 1397 Richard ii facilitated the downfall of the chief political agitators who had opposed his rule in 1386.Footnote 61 For his role in these events, Thomas Arundel was adjudged a traitor and denied the opportunity to defend himself at the assembly. An attempt by the prelates to raise a protest against these proceedings was overturned, and the lords spiritual were forced to elect Sir Thomas Percy as a clerical proctor for the duration of the trial. When Arundel was judged guilty of treason on 25 September, the sentence was passed by the king alongside ‘all the lords temporal, and Sir Thomas Percy having sufficient power from the prelates and clergy of the kingdom’.Footnote 62 In their appointment of a clerical proctor, Adam Usk reported that the prelates had been threatened with the loss of their temporalities if they did not acquiesce.Footnote 63 This hardly indicates a genuine concern on the part of the crown for respecting the clergy's position on the confiscation of temporalities and trial by peers. Yet, it is significant that the clergy had been coerced into providing consent in the first place. They had, after all, been ignored in 1383 during the impeachment of Henry Despenser. Certainly the stakes were higher in 1397, but it is clear, nevertheless, that Richard ii was concerned with the outward appearance of his action, and even if it provided only a thin veneer over the exercise of royal will, judgement was passed against the archbishop in parliament and with the orchestrated consent of the lords spiritual.
In terms of legal channels and procedure, Richard ii's conduct in 1397 is in marked contrast to the case of Thomas de Lisle earlier in the century. Clearly these cases do not merit a direct comparison – de Lisle was condemned on criminal charges isolated from broader political events, whilst the case of Arundel was related to a dramatic upheaval in the Ricardian court. Yet the measures adopted in response to these cases are significant. Edward iii demonstrated few reservations when ordering the confiscation of de Lisle's temporalities without legal judgement, even despite recent clerical pressure in favour of trial by peers in parliament. By contrast, the steps taken by Richard ii to validate his action demonstrate a very different approach, and a discernible concern to secure the consent of the peers in parliament – including the prelates – when proceeding against bishops. It is likely that a large part of the explanation for this change can be attributed to recognition of parliament in the second half of the fourteenth century as the appropriate venue for state trials, as well as the emergence of the process of impeachment. However, given the importance that appears to have been attached by Richard ii to procuring the prelates' consent in 1397, it seems likely that half a century of clerical pressure over the principle of trial by peers also played an influential part.
IV
To conclude. In 1352 the clergy outlined a case for episcopal exceptionalism in English law. This essentially represented a pragmatic approach to the dual role of bishops in medieval England and sought to establish that in legal cases whereby bishops were threatened with the confiscation of their temporalities they should be judged by their peers in parliament. Although the clergy's request in 1352 related specifically to cases involving contempt of royal justice, their acknowledgement that the peers in parliament could effect the confiscation of episcopal temporalities holds broader significance. The legal identify of a bishop underwent a seismic shift and it was conceded that in certain cases a bishop should be defined in English law by his temporalities rather than his spiritual office. Whereas in the early fourteenth century bishops had claimed benefit of clergy to escape royal justice, in the late fourteenth century both Henry Despenser and William Wykeham were arraigned before a judicial body in parliament without an appeal to papal jurisdictional supremacy. Complaints surrounding the manner of arraignment in these cases revolved around whether judicial action had been taken in accordance with a trial by peers, rather than relating to benefit of clergy and papal jurisdiction. Although the clergy were ultimately unsuccessful in gaining a royal guarantee, by the end of the fourteenth century the crown appears to have acknowledged the clergy's position. In 1397, this recognition was turned to royal advantage when Thomas Arundel was adjudged a traitor and the consent of lords spiritual in parliament was forcibly obtained. Nevertheless, it is evident that clerical pressure at least had the effect of giving the crown pause for thought when proceeding against bishops in the last quarter of the fourteenth century.
More broadly, the clerical campaign for trial by peers in the mid- to late fourteenth century has a clear bearing on the relationship between the clergy, parliament and the crown. Archbishop Stratford fully appreciated the importance of parliament as a political tool against the king in 1341, and the clergy recognised that a trial by peers in parliament was the best safeguard against confiscation of episcopal temporalities. When taken alongside the repeated attempts by the clergy to present their gravamina in parliament, the evidence suggests that by the mid-fourteenth century the clergy indicated a preference for fuller integration in parliament in both a political and a juridical sense. However, although the clergy were able to maintain the legacy of Stratford's confrontation with the king for just over a decade, they were unable to mirror the success of the Commons in establishing a lasting link between the supply of taxation and the redress of grievances, and after 1352 their ability to negotiate statutory concessions from the crown was drastically impaired.Footnote 64 As a political force in parliament, the clergy experienced a sharp rise and fall between 1341 and 1352.
Finally, the clerical pressure for bishops to be afforded the same privilege as barons when their temporalities were threatened has some bearing on the twenty-six bishops who sit in the House of Lords in twenty-first-century Britain. The privilege of trial by peers was abolished in 1948,Footnote 65 yet the historic exclusion of the bishops from the privilege has raised questions over whether they should be recognised as ‘peers’. It has been highlighted that trial by peers came to be singled out in law as the test of peerage and, as such, bishops did not share ‘what had come to be the distinctive mark of peerage’.Footnote 66 In 1692 the House of Lords formally disclaimed any jurisdiction over the prelates, and for this reason the bishops were recognised as ‘lords in parliament’ rather than peers.Footnote 67 However, whilst it has been believed hitherto that this was the legacy of the bishops’ refusal to be tried before a secular court, this article has demonstrated that by the mid-fourteenth century the clergy were ready to accept the principle of trial by peers in parliament and its application to bishops. As such, it was the refusal of the crown to acquiesce in such demands that led to the bishops being excluded from the full status of peerage. Had the clergy been successful in 1352 when they demanded trial by peers for bishops, the lords spiritual sitting in the House of Lords might have been recognised in subsequent periods of history as ‘peers’ rather than as ‘lords’ in parliament.
