Ever since the biblical image of Satan as the one who rebels against God, the demonic as a way to explain evil has served to exorcise humanity from the ultimate responsibility of its existence (that of evil).
In her book, Simona Forti invites us to reflect on the problem of evil and its moral agency. She rescues the concept of evil as an element necessary for guidance in political reflection. Her motivation departs from the realization that, if you observe the history of the execution of power, the latter cannot be dissociated from an ethical consideration, and because of that the question about evil cannot be ignored.
What does she mean by ‘evil’? She means: the production and reproduction of suffering.
The problem lies in the fact that, conceptually speaking, ‘evil’ has been delegitimized in the eyes of contemporary political theory and therefore it is no longer considered important. According to Forti, continental philosophy is divided regarding the issue: first, there is a strong resurgence (religious and post-Kantian) of the concept of ‘radical evil’ and second, there are those who, from a postmodern perspective, consider power to be “beyond good and evil” (2). Forti overcomes both perspectives by finding an answer to the questions: how can we apply the concept of ‘evil’ today? How can we reconsider the concept keeping in mind all the criticism that it has received with respect to its theological and metaphysical use?
In Forti’s genealogical reconstruction, the starting point is Kant. The German philosopher turned the classic question about the origin of evil into a question of ethical, anthropological and historical dimensions, which can be summarized as “why do we commit evil deeds?” (21) The crucial point for Forti is that Kant accepts that moral evil is an act linked to freedom, but at the same time considers the relationship between freedom and evil to be inscrutable since the idea that evil is sought after as something desirable in itself would be unacceptable, not befitting a human but rather a demonic spirit.
According to Forti, in the 19th and 20th centuries, various concepts arose, such as nihilism, will to death, the death instinct, etc. A synthesis of this set of concepts can be found in what she refers to as the Dostoevsky paradigm. In her view, the Russian author considers the problem of evil as a pathology of power, a kind of disease of power that surpasses all limits and can lead to power of oppression and domination. According to Forti, the Dostoevsky paradigm is based on the demonic and Manichean interpretation of evil, which, founded in nihilism, is present in his works. His characters embody ‘Absolute Demons.’ The latter are the ones that, making use of their power, subjugate innocent victims. Their motivation is exactly what Kant dismisses as impossible, namely ‘evil for evil’s sake.’ This paradigm of “the very bad who oppress the disempowered” have saturated both the theory and common understanding of evil (189). According to Forti, this point of view should be overcome in order to account for the conditions that allow the emergence of evil, not as something extraordinary, but as a part of normality.
An absent persona in The New Demons is John Milton. The English author is one of the first who, as Goethe pointed out, saw an act of freedom as a symbol of the annulment of the distinction ruler/ruled in Satan’s transgression. Forti assigns this transgressive classification to the evil that is exposed in the work of Dostoevsky: it would entail a breakdown of order.
What does Forti propose as a substitution for the Dostoevsky paradigm? Forti invites the reader to deconstruct and analyze the relationship between power and evil by transmuting the point of view: to see the staging of evil from the perspective of trying to give life a purpose at all costs and to lift life beyond its own limits, both biologically and in its possibilities.
In the last part of the book, following Foucault, Forti understands power as a ubiquitous reality in the social world and its relationships, which creates individuals and makes them exist and grow. In that sense, for her, we are all vehicles of power. These vehicles of power, in a society of rights that generates protection and security, take the form of inaction, of letting things happen in utter indifference. The important thing is the continuation and development of life. This is the ‘Mediocre Demon.’
For Forti, ‘Absolute Demons’ represent unusual moments in history. By contrast, mediocre demons, in the modern world, have taken the form of an individual who reflects the very normality of everyday life. Moreover, this suggests that the absolute demon, in order to exist, requires the prior existence of the mediocre demon.
To fight these mediocre demons, Forti refers to the dissent against totalitarianism found in Eastern Europe, especially the Czech case, in which she links the idea by Czech philosopher, Jan Patočka, of ‘care of the soul’ with Foucault’s idea of ‘counter-conduct.’ In both concepts, the virtue of cynics is present, which in Foucault takes the particular form of telling the powerful the truth (Pahrresia). In that sense, for her, dissent from communist dictatorships has been a practical test of bringing the cynic virtue of truth-telling to life.
One question that remains is how far the moral attitude that Forti defined as contrary to the mediocre demons is not a condition already present in the idea of the citizen’s contestation of rulers, the rules and its power, present in the republican tradition, at least the one we have inherited from Machiavelli to the present.
Forti's work is well worth reading and will leave no one indifferent. I am sure the book will attract the attention of philosophers, sociologists and political theorists, among many others.
