This is an unusual book. The central thesis is that we are duty-bound to attempt to ensure the survival of the human race. Religions are decreasing in significance, and it is adherence and loyalty to the rule of law that are most likely to ensure our survival. The role of lawyers is therefore critical. The book has many positive elements: it covers an extraordinary range of topics, and reflects Wood's diverse and impressive range of interests. It is written in an engaging and energetic style. It is extremely reasonably priced.
As a work, it is difficult to characterise. At times, it reads more like a series of talks than a monograph. It makes use of sources unusual in a law book: chapter 2, entitled “The Purpose of Morality and Law”, makes reference to only one mainstream legal philosopher (H.L.A. Hart), but contains a number of colour images. A wide range of topics is considered, including the rule of law, different types of religions, the range of secular law, the reach and essential characteristics of the “families” of law. It is not clear that all of these elements are necessary for Wood to make out his argument.
The informal style, whilst making the book pleasingly readable, does not make it easily comprehensible at all times. Contentious statements are made, without setting them in the context of a debate or indeed adequately justifying them. We are told that “the rule of law is largely identified with … human rights” (p. 56). This is a defensible position, but it requires defending from the attacks of theorists such as Raz. We are told that the Koran “reads like another version of the religion”, the religion being Judeo-Christian (p. 69). This is surely controversial. Wood refers to Abraham being “pushed out of Ur by local tribal fighting” (p. 70). There is no source given for this, which differs from the account in Genesis 12. Page 82 sees Christ's famous command concerning the things of Caesar and of God explained “[T]he things that were Caesar's were irrelevant”. There is no reference to the amount of ink spilled on this aspect of New Testament theology. We are told that religions do not generally require us to be courageous or work hard (p. 263). This would seem to ignore the Israelites being told in Joshua 1 to be courageous and the apostle Paul's instructions regarding work in Colossians 3:23.
Wood downplays the role of religion in legal culture. At times, Wood's view appears to be that religion can be seen as having an influence on law only if that influence occurs in a direct way, such as where priests are legislating, legislators have in mind religious aims or actual laws from religious texts are being applied. There is little consideration of how moral values from religious learning may have affected the background legal and moral climate: that is, Wood little considers how much of twenty-first-century liberal secular thinking has a religious origin.
This downplaying may be due to Wood's attempting to fit pre-twenty first century concepts into a twenty first century structure where this is not appropriate. For example, Wood appears to proceed on the basis of a dichotomy between the religious and the secular in a way that makes more sense from a secular starting point than in a society suffused with religion. Wood proceeds on the basis that the Commandment dealing with the Sabbath is religious, rather than secular (p. 75). It is doubtful that this distinction would have conformed to the views of the Israelites or the Jews or, indeed, that it would have made sense for much of the history of Christendom.
By contrast, Wood overplays the inherent moral content of the law. He states: “[m]y view is that the law is by far the most developed and mature of our moral orders, leagues ahead of anything else” (p. 204). However, the moral force of law depends upon its content. There is the possibility of legal propositions with doubtful moral content. It may be that Wood's view is that law has an inherent moral content, following on from theorists such as Fuller. However, the content ascribed to such inherent morality is usually minimal. It may be that Wood's view is rather that some legal systems coincide with current Western moral thinking; however, this ignores the fact that the content of those legal systems is liable to change.
Wood also overplays the inevitable moral role, even the permissible moral role, of lawyers. Readers are told that lawyers acting on commercial deals are “constantly endeavouring to arrive at what is reasonable and fair” (p. 232). Reasonableness and fairness may be the result when two legally represented parties of equal bargaining positions hammer out a deal, but it is not the aim of the parties’ lawyers. The lawyers' aim, as required by their ethical code, is to achieve the best legitimate result for their client. Likewise, Wood states that lawyers “should lead and set the moral agenda” (p. 240). It is not made clear how they are to do so when they are acting in the best interests of their clients, in accordance with their clients' instructions.
The West has undoubtedly seen a reduction in the significance of religion in private and public life. There are a variety of views as to whether this is good: much comes down to whether the historical and factual claims made by a particular religion are actually true. Wood does not engage in detail with this question – perhaps surprisingly, given the otherwise enormous scope of this work. Most would agree that it is important for the survival of the human race that we coordinate our functions. Law helps us achieve this, through matters ranging from which side of the road we should drive on, to basic laws concerning the personal security and property rights. However, the coordination of functions depends not only on a widespread (and somewhat nebulous) commitment to the rule of law, but also upon the content of the law.
There are some editorial slips in the text. For instance, the cryptic sentence “There is much commonality but little commonality” (p. 248) is, presumably, unintentional. At one point, the presentation of the illustrations obscures the meaning of the text. In a tour through the various families of the law helpfully illustrated by world maps (chapter 8), what look to be headings for the various families of law sit under the maps to which they relate as captions. This, however, means that they are not placed at the start of the relevant section of text dealing with a particular family of law, and there is no other form of heading for the sections. As a result, it is unclear what family of law is being considered. There is also a legal error. The statement that “[a] crime requires a deliberate intent to commit it, whereas a civil wrong can be just negligent or even without any kind of recklessness or intention” suggests that intention is required for criminal liability, ignoring offences for which recklessness is sufficient mens rea, let alone strict liability offences.
Wood's book raises important questions, and includes interesting insight and information. The breadth of learning revealed is significant. The force of the argument is, however, undermined by a certain lack of rigour in its expression. Readers are likely to react differently to it, perhaps especially depending on their religious viewpoints. There may be few who would agree with everything Wood has written here. But then, this is an unusual book.
