1

Let us start with the first premise of Grenberg’s argument.

This is obviously true of empirical facts. ‘When I encounter something in my empirical experience of objects’, Grenberg writes, ‘things are indeed given to me in this way: I cannot choose whether to perceive whatever happens to be in my range of sensible perception’ (2013: 193). The coffee cup I see on my desk, for example, is a fact in this sense. It appears to me in such a way that I cannot randomly decide its shape, colour, texture, and so forth. Moreover, I do not arrive at my knowledge of the coffee cup through a process of inferential or deductive reasoning. It presents itself to me, and in this respect it has a forceful character in my experience.

Of course when Kant introduces the fact of reason in the second Critique, he states that it ‘forces (aufdringt) itself upon us of itself as a synthetic a priori proposition’ (KpV 5: 31; emphasis added). Whatever this ‘fact’ is, then, we know that it is not an ordinary fact like the coffee cup I see on my desk. Since my cognition of the cup occurs in experience, it has an a posteriori status. Yet the fact of reason cannot belong to empirical experience in this way; it cannot be something I can grasp through sense perception. Aware of the risk of confusion here, Kant qualifies his remark by adding:

Grenberg is aware of this important qualification. The fact of reason, she writes, is a ‘synthetic a priori’ proposition, the source of which I can never apprehend through sense perception (2013: 193). Yet Grenberg still thinks that the forceful quality of empirical facts – the way they are given to consciousness – sheds light on the fact of reason. In particular, she claims, their forceful quality directs us to the only faculty that could make the moral law accessible to us.

This brings us to the second step of Grenberg’s argument:

This means a ‘forced fact has to be a felt fact’ (2013: 143; emphasis in original). As Grenberg puts it: ‘when we have something forced upon us, we are passive or receptive in relation to that which is doing the forcing. As such, explanation of how we take in this forced fact must involve some aspect of ourselves capable of being passive or receptive. But such a capacity is our capacity for sensibility’ (2013: 143; cf. 193). Now if step (2) is correct, the rest of Grenberg’s argument follows. Once we acknowledge (3), that the fact of reason ‘forces itself upon us’, we must admit that we are subject to something unavoidably given in our consciousness. We must admit (4), that our experience of categorical obligation is accessible to us only via feeling.

I do not think we must accept (4), though, since I do not think that (2) is true. Notice, first, that for the Affect of Reason interpretation to work, we must justify the claim that whatever is given to us – our perception of coffee cups, our experience of categorical demands – can only appear via sensibility. But this claim strikes me as false. I think Kant would say that many representations have a forceful quality without necessarily linking to our sensible faculty.Footnote ⁵ In the first Critique, for example, Kant uses language nearly identical to his characterization of the fact of reason when he explains how concepts like substance ‘force themselves’ upon us. Here too Kant says we can display the pure use of our cognitive faculty as a ‘fact’, and to illustrate this he has us perform the following thought experiment:

He then concludes:

Now if we accept Grenberg’s claim that forceful cognitions are accessible only through our receptive faculty, we would be led to conclude from this thought experiment that the ‘necessity’ attaching to the concept of substance is accessible to us only in sensibility. Yet there is no indication that Kant holds this view – nor is it clear this would make sense within the context of the first Critique.Footnote ⁶

To make progress here, consider again Kant’s warning in the second Critique: ‘in order to avoid misrepresentation in regarding this law as a given, it must be noted carefully that it is not an empirical fact’ (KpV 5: 31). Grenberg cites this passage, as we have seen, but she interprets Kant’s word of caution to mean only that the fact of reason does not ground ‘synthetic a posteriori knowledge claims’ (2013: 193). What Grenberg tries to preserve from the analogy to empirical facts, in turn, is the sense in which we receive them passively. Yet in light of what Kant says in the first Critique, it seems clear that by speaking of a ‘fact’ he means only to register the unique modal status of certain cognitions. On this reading, what we should take away from the analogy is not that empirical facts are received, but that they are actual. The point of Kant’s thought experiment is to show that, when we try to remove every quality from an object, we realize that we cannot remove the concept of substance (B6). We must then concede, as he says, that our consciousness of necessity must have come from a pure faculty of cognition, for no empirical faculty could have generated it within us.

Applying this new analogy to the fact of reason is rather straightforward.Footnote ⁷ After Kant explains that our consciousness of freedom comes from the moral law, he turns to ask the next logical question: ‘But how is consciousness of that moral law possible?’ (KpV 5: 30). In reply, he writes:

Reading this passage alongside the thought experiment in the first Critique is illuminating. In the theoretical sphere, Kant is saying, we can show that our faculty of cognition has a pure use by attending to the necessity of concepts such as ‘substance’. Our actual consciousness of this necessity is sufficient to show that our cognitive faculty is not empirically conditioned all the way down. In the passage at KpV 5: 30, Kant is saying we can show that our faculty of desire has a pure use in the same way, i.e. by attending to the necessity of moral laws. Our consciousness of this necessity is also something actual – a ‘fact’ – and that is sufficient to show that our faculty of desire too is not completely empirical.

Interestingly, Grenberg cites the remark from KpV 5: 30 twice:

Curiously, the ellipses in these passages hide Kant’s comparison to the theoretical sphere, where he says we can become aware of pure practical laws ‘just as we are aware of pure theoretical principles’ (KpV 5: 30).Footnote ⁸ Without this comparison, the idea that Kant wants us to reflect attentively on a felt experience looks plausible. But once we bring this comparison to light the passage from KpV 5: 30 takes on a different meaning. I understand Kant’s point to be that moral laws, like pure theoretical principles, have a unique modal status (they express strict necessity), and in both cases we are actually conscious of their necessity. In the practical sphere, he is saying, we are actually conscious of the necessity of moral laws, and that is sufficient to show that pure reason is practical within us.

To sum up: when Kant says that our consciousness of the moral law ‘forces itself’ upon us, we need not take him to mean this consciousness is felt. Nor must we assume that our consciousness of the moral law operates via sensibility because it is something ‘given’. If we follow the parallel Kant wants us to draw to the theoretical sphere, it is clear that the givenness of moral consciousness refers to its modal status. At least this is an interpretative possibility that Grenberg has not closed off. We can take Kant to mean that we are actually conscious of necessity in moral laws, in the same way that we are actually conscious of necessity in pure theoretical principles. Calling these cognitions ‘facts’ means only that they are real, not that our grasp of them operates via feeling, as Grenberg supposes.

2

What other support might we find for the Affect of Reason interpretation? There is one passage from the second Critique that I think deserves special attention. Kant writes that the ‘justification of moral principles as principles of a pure reason could also be carried out very well and with sufficient certainty by a mere appeal to the judgement of common human understanding’ (KpV 5: 90). To explain this he adds the following remark:

Grenberg cites this passage by way of criticizing scholars – like Henry Allison (Reference Allison1990) – who ‘find feeling important for making sense of the incentive or interest we have to act in accordance with moral principles’ but maintain that ‘proof of the authority that those principles have over us must be accomplished entirely independently of appeal to feeling’ (2013: 140). It seems clear from what Kant says that the moral law’s validity is only revealed to us in a felt experience of conflict between empirical and rational grounds of choice, making Kant’s analysis of ‘respect’ central to his project of justification in the second Critique. This is what I am calling the Feeling Thesis.

As Grenberg notes, however, the text just prior to KpV 5: 91–2 is open to interpretation. Here Kant reflects on the organization of topics in the Analytic, observing that they proceed from ‘practical principles a priori’ (chapter I), to ‘concepts of simply good and evil’ (chapter II), and finally to ‘the relation of pure practical reason to sensibility’ (chapter III) (KpV 5: 90). He repeats this observation a few sentences later (in a passage that Grenberg does not cite), writing that:

Having these two passages in view, we now find ourselves in a familiar interpretative quandary. There is textual evidence supporting Grenberg’s view that the fact of reason and the feeling of respect are identical.Footnote ⁹ But there is also textual evidence supporting the opposite view – upheld by Allison – that the two are distinct. How then should we decide between them?

From an exegetical point of view, I think that the burden of proof lands on Grenberg’s side. I say this for two reasons. First, scholars like Allison only have to deal with one passage from the second Critique that seems to oppose their view, the passage where Kant links the justification of moral principles to the feeling of respect (at KpV 5: 90–1). Scholars like Grenberg, on the other hand, are forced to adopt a revisionary interpretation of the entire Analytic, questioning Kant’s division between the justification of moral principles in chapter I and the analysis of moral feeling in chapter III.Footnote ¹⁰ Second, for her reading to work Grenberg needs to show that our access to the moral law is limited to a felt experience, but on closer inspection all that the passage from KpV 5: 91–2 states is that the ‘dissimilarity’ between empirical and rational grounds of action is revealed to us by ‘respect’. This does not decisively show that Kant considers the fact of reason to be an affect.Footnote ¹¹

Now Grenberg is aware of the passages that conflict with her view. Referring to KpV 5: 90, for instance, she says it is ‘surprising’ that Kant claims ‘he has accessed “the possibility of practical principles a priori” without appeal to sensibility’ (2013: 143). But when Grenberg turns to support her alternative, she does not refer us to additional textual evidence. Instead, on p. 143, she retreats to what I have called step (2), the claim that ‘a forced fact has to be a felt fact’, and she concludes this paragraph by saying: ‘we must appeal to our capacity for receptivity in the sensible form of feeling when making sense of how finite rational beings access the Fact of Reason; there seems no other capacity by which sensibly affected beings could take something in as given’ (2013: 143). Yet, as we have seen, Grenberg provides us with no further argument as to why the forcefulness of a cognition entails that our access to it is limited to sensibility. Without this claim I see no other way to support the Affect of Reason interpretation – and that is the substance of my worry here, since I am not convinced that step (2) is true.

3

The question I now want to raise is this. If we reject the Feeling Thesis, must we return to a position like Allison’s, which denies that feeling plays any role in Kant’s project of justification? Grenberg assumes that there is no way of giving feeling its due in Kant’s ethics if we separate the fact of reason (as our consciousness of the moral law’s authority) from the feeling of respect (as the effect this consciousness has on our sensibility). Yet I am not convinced that this assumption is founded. It seems open to us, as an interpretative possibility, to follow Allison in separating the ‘fact’ (Faktum) from ‘respect’ (Achtung) without endorsing his specific view of their relationship. Allison, for instance, claims that Kant’s analysis of moral feeling in the second Critique carries no justificatory weight: in his view, it ‘brackets’ the moral law’s validity (1990: 121). But it seems we can reject this specific claim without having to collapse the distinction between moral consciousness and moral feeling. We can appreciate the justificatory weight of respect, in other words, without making it identical to the fact of reason.

One advantage of this reading is that it makes sense of Kant’s organization of topics in the Analytic. After showing that there is only one fundamental law of pure practical reason, and that we are actually conscious of this law (chapter I), Kant has two further tasks before him. He must show how the moral law can operate via our faculty of judgement (chapter II), and he must show how the moral law can operate via our faculty of feeling (chapter III). Here we can distinguish the fact of reason (as our consciousness of the moral law’s authority) and the feeling of respect (as the effect this consciousness has on our sensibility), yet maintain that Kant’s analysis of respect is central to his project of justification. On this reading, chapter III seeks to show how our consciousness of the moral law can exert an appropriate effect on sensibility, one that does not reduce to a pathological feeling of pleasure or pain. Further, this analysis is necessary to show how we can be moved to take up the moral law as our own maxim or principle of choice. On this interpretation, then, we can say that chapter III completes Kant’s project of justification in the second Critique: it does so by showing how pure reason can be ‘subjectively practical’, i.e. an incentive for living one’s life by its precepts.Footnote ¹²

My main complaint is that the Feeling Thesis ends up trivializing this motivational account, since it already assumes what Kant is trying to show in chapter III: namely, that pure practical reason has a necessary connection to sensibility. If we read the second Critique as I am suggesting here, then every chapter of the Analytic has a justificatory role to play, and this coheres well with Kant’s own description of the Analytic as a ‘syllogism’, proceeding from a major premise, to a minor premise, to a conclusion (KpV 5: 90). What this means, to return to my initial question, is that separating the fact of reason from the feeling of respect does not force us to reject Grenberg’s claim that feeling plays a positive role in Kant’s ethics. We can separate the ‘fact’ from ‘respect’, with Allison, yet still argue that chapter III of the second Critique is essential to Kant’s larger project. Despite my criticisms, then, I believe that Grenberg and I agree on what is perhaps the most important point: her view that moral life has just as much to do with sensibility as it does with reason. This is, I think, where Grenberg and I are of one mind.Footnote ¹³