Further evidence for Atkinson's misrepresentation of Scott's orders

The previous paper (May Reference May2012) exposed three myths which have confused general understanding of Scott's last expedition. The first myth was that Lieutenant E.R.G.R. Evans’ scurvy in January 1912 was caused by either his physical exertions or by a general failure of the expedition to take precautions against scurvy. May's research indicated that Evans’ illness could have been caused by his refusal to eat the fresh seal meat recommended by medical officer Dr Edward Wilson as an anti-scorbutic, and that Evans’ scurvy was an anomaly in the context of the expedition.

The second myth was that Scott gave a verbal change of orders to Evans upon sending him back to base, belatedly instructing the dog teams to meet the polar party. This first appears in Roland Huntford's Scott and Amundsen/The last place on earth, first published in 1979 (Huntford Reference Huntford2002) but is an error: Huntford had misrepresented Scott's written orders from October 1911, given to the dog handler Meares before the start of the polar journey, as last-minute verbal orders delivered to Evans in January 1912, during the polar journey itself (May Reference May2012: 8).

For ease of reference we reproduce the relevant sections of Scott's orders here, starting with Scott's 20 October 1911 orders to Meares:

Scott's contemporaneous orders for Dr George C. Simpson, acting head of base, included the following:

In Scott's typewritten orders to Simpson is the following handwritten addendum:

When the Motor Party turned north on 24 November 1911, Scott sent with them a written amendment to his existing orders:

This amendment does not mean that Scott ‘had gone off without leaving final instructions’ (Huntford Reference Huntford2002: 519). He left standing written instructions at base, which were to be followed unless circumstances made this impossible. In developing circumstances a plan may be subject to amendment; however, at no point on the Southern Journey did Scott cancel his established orders.

The third myth was Atkinson's statement that ‘[s]trict injunctions had been given by Captain Scott that the dogs should not be risked in any way’ (Atkinson Reference Atkinson and Scott1913: 208). Atkinson claimed to have received these verbal orders from Scott in December 1911, and that they limited the use of the dog teams; however, by following the recorded orders for the dogs, May concluded that this instruction originated not with Scott but with Atkinson, possibly to prevent Cherry-Garrard from going further than was safe for a non-navigator; that Scott had delivered no order for the dogs ‘not to be risked’; and that on his return Scott expected to meet the dog teams in accordance with his original orders (May Reference May2012: 11–13).

Atkinson's word cannot be taken simply on trust when challenged by surrounding evidence: May's article showed that Atkinson's account of Scott's supposed verbal orders in December 1911 did not enter the record until 24–25 February 1912, after Atkinson selected Cherry-Garrard for the relief journey. In Scott's own written orders and journal entries, and Atkinson's written correspondence previous to 24–25 February 1912, there is not one mention of Scott wishing not to risk the dogs in anticipation of the 1912–1913 sledging season. Not until Cherry-Garrard was selected to lead the dog teams, over the more capable Wright, did the notion of preserving the dogs enter the record, and then only as transcribed by Cherry-Garrard from Atkinson's verbal orders to him.

Further documentary evidence indicates that Scott's original emphasis on the dog teams meeting the Polar Party, rather than simply reaching One Ton depot, was widely understood, and was not countermanded by Scott at any time.

1. 1. The journals of Dr George C. Simpson (Simpson Reference Simpson1911a; Simpson Reference Simpson1911b), acting head of base, contain no reference to Atkinson bringing a change or elaboration of orders from Scott upon the first returning party's arrival at base in January 1912. Simpson had recorded Scott's single (written) modification of the dog teams’ instructions (Scott Reference Scott1911; Simpson Reference Simpson1911b: 41–42), dated 24 November 1911, and delivered by the returning motor party on 21 December 1911. The lack of a corresponding update from Atkinson in January 1912 indicates that none was delivered at that time. When Simpson sent Cherry-Garrard to Hut Point on 23 February he thought Cherry-Garrard would meet the polar party, as per Scott's established plan. Simpson wrote that by 28 February 1912, ‘Cherry-Garrard + Demitri [Gerof] had already gone south with the dogs to meet Capt Scott’ (Simpson Reference Simpson1911b: 88).

2. 2. On 3 April 1912 a freshly-returned Evans stated, regarding the polar party's return to base: ‘The Southern Party . . . will return very easily . . . They will also be met and supported by two dog teams driven by Cherry Garrard and Demetrie [sic], who left the Discovery hut for that purpose on February 26.’ (The Scotsman (Edinburgh) 3 April 1912: 9).

3. 3. In his letter home on 3 January 1912, Lieutenant Henry Bowers, a member of the polar party, refers to the prospect of meeting the dogs on the return journey in accordance with Scott's original orders: ‘I am hoping that the dogs may meet us returning on the Barrier in which case they will run back with the news if we are too late to catch the ship. I shall be able to send you word & the remainder of my journal then’ (Bowers Reference Bowers1912).

4. 4. Cherry-Garrard's journal for 28 January 1912 states that dogs were intended to meet the polar party: ‘The dogs are very fit + the news for Atch with regard to going out to meet the Owner [Scott] is also cheery’ (Cherry-Garrard Reference Cherry–Garrard1911). Clearly at this point Atkinson had not mentioned to Cherry-Garrard any changes in Scott's plans which might have restricted the dog teams from meeting Scott's party.

5. 5. On 25 February 1912, at Hut Point, Atkinson wrote a list of instructions to Wright detailing the disposal of scientific equipment (sold at Christie's in 2010: sale 7869, lot 143). 25 February was the day before Cherry-Garrard left for One Ton depot, relying on Atkinson's verbal orders. This clearly-dated note to Wright proves that Atkinson was perfectly capable of writing down instructions that day, yet did not do so for Cherry-Garrard despite the much higher stakes involved in the latter's mission. This raises the possibility that Atkinson was reluctant to make his instructions for Cherry-Garrard a matter of permanent written record. Even if Atkinson had an aversion to writing, as suggested in The worst journey in the world (Cherry-Garrard Reference Cherry–Garrard1994: 451), it is curious that the allocation of equipment should elicit written instructions from Atkinson, yet Cherry-Garrard's potentially life-saving mission, involving a 238-mile round trip on the Barrier and an absence of at least two weeks, should be left to mere verbal instructions.

6. 6. In a 1958 letter to The Times, Tryggve Gran remarked that ‘Had Scott, as planned, been met by a dog party at the foot of the Beardmore, Wilson, Oates, Bowers and himself would have got through in a relatively fine condition’ (The Times (London) 15 January 1958: 9).

7. 7. Fourteen new dogs were delivered when Terra Nova returned in 1912 (Cherry-Garrard Reference Cherry–Garrard1994: 423), as per Scott's orders: ‘Scott had arranged for this further transport to enable the expedition to explore the mountain range south of the Great Ice Barrier’ (Bruce Reference Bruce2012: 15).

These documents, corroborating Scott's original emphasis on the dogs meeting the polar party, with replacement dogs providing leeway in use of existing ones, further undermine Atkinson's assertion that in December 1911 ‘Scott had given particular instructions that the dogs were not to be risked in view of the sledging plans for next season’ (Cherry-Garrard Reference Cherry–Garrard1994: 430).

It must be emphasised that One Ton depot was only identified as a rendezvous point after Evans’ scurvy delayed the dog teams’ departure in February 1912. Scott had calculated for the two parties to meet around 1 March, but with the dog teams behind schedule the polar party would have made further northward progress. A series of calculations involving average rates of travel for returning parties, the condition and speed of the polar party when last seen, and the extent of the dogs’ delay, estimated that the polar party would have passed One Ton by the new projected rendezvous date (Cherry-Garrard Reference Cherry–Garrard1994: 429–430). If the dog party's ‘third journey’ aimed for One Ton, they could expect to intercept the polar party on the way, so it looked like a reasonable farthest point. There was no doubt that the object of this journey was to meet the polar party: the problem arose not from erasing the idea of meeting, but in the subtle change of emphasis in Atkinson's orders to Cherry-Garrard, in which the artificial range-limit of One Ton became more important than finding the polar party if they were not where they were expected to be.

It is evident that Atkinson was a good, well-intentioned man in a difficult situation: his decisions regarding the dog teams were not only made under duress but seemed prudent at the time, with the information he had. However, Atkinson's account of Scott's ‘verbal orders’ jars with Scott's habit of assiduous documentation, evinced by regular journals, memoranda, and hundreds of letters. Scott did not rely on verbal orders alone, and condemned others’ failure to leave a written record: on 22 February 1911, when Hut Point was found vacant, Scott commented that ‘Atkinson and Crean have departed, leaving no trace – not even a note. A very thoughtless proceeding’ (Jones, M. Reference Jones2008: 134–135, 460). None of Scott's written documents mention saving the dogs for the 1912–1913 sledging season, nor does any other expedition member mention such orders before Atkinson's instructions to Cherry-Garrard around 24–25 February 1912. Together with the polar party's hope on 27 February that the dogs would meet them on the Barrier (‘We are naturally always discussing possibility of meeting dogs, where & when, &c.’ (Scott Reference Scott1913: 400)) and Scott's disappointment on 9 March upon discovering that Mount Hooper depot had not been restocked (‘the dogs which would have been our salvation have evidently failed’ (Scott Reference Scott1913: 406)), a picture emerges of an expected course of action very different from what was carried out.

The tables above show the amount of confusion in the conventional narrative, compared with the facts as established by primary evidence (Table 1).

Table 1. A table showing the discrepancies between the conventional narrative and the factual narrative

As stated earlier, the absence of dog food at One Ton depot, discovered by Cherry-Garrard and Gerof on 4 March 1912, was an essential element in the dog teams failing to intercept the polar party. Dependent on their own supplies, and prohibited from killing dogs, any southward advance consequently had a limited range. The reason there was no dog food at One Ton will now be examined in detail.

Why was there no dog food at One Ton Depot?

Given Scott's orders for a second journey to restock One Ton with ‘[a]s much dog food as you can conveniently carry (for third journey)’, why did Cherry-Garrard and Gerof find none there? In her previous article, May admitted uncertainty. ‘Why was there no dog food at One Ton? There are two possible scenarios. Did Simpson not carry out Scott's instructions, failing to send out dog food with the man-hauling team, or did the man-hauling team mistakenly unload the dog food at an earlier depot? We do not know’ (May Reference May2012: 9).

Further research has resolved this: the man-hauling party which took out the contingency load of ‘3 XS ration units’, in lieu of the delayed dog party, did not take any dog food because it simply was not feasible. Cherry-Garrard mentions this in The worst journey in the world (Cherry-Garrard Reference Cherry–Garrard1994: 426–427) though he does not elaborate; when we do the calculations, the picture becomes clear.

The maximum load for a man-hauling party, based on others’ experiences (Evans Reference Evans1949: 198), was about 185 pounds per man, so four men should pull around 740 pounds. The weight of the food and equipment necessary for four weeks puts the starting weight at 517–578 lbs. Three X.S. units, Scott's bare minimum for the ‘vital’ resupply, total just over 180 lbs. Added to the base weight, this brings the total to 697–758 lbs, around the maximum, leaving little or no room for dog food. This would not have been disobedience of Scott's contingency orders for the man-hauling team: these orders make no mention of dog food, but only that three X.S. rations must be brought. Additionally, at the time this party set out, there was the stated possibility that the dogs might later ‘be unfit for further work or non-existent’, so hauling dog food at this point might be wasted effort. (Food/equipment numbers are calculated from Cherry-Garrard Reference Cherry–Garrard1994: 359, 572 and Wilson Reference Wilson1911: 1–16; the fuel averages per week, from Taylor Reference Taylor and Scott1913: 152, 156.)

The orders from Scott which reduced the load from 5 to 3 X.S. rations did not eliminate the dog food from all plans. Though Scott's amendment in November 1911 meant the man haulers had to omit the dog food, later events demonstrate that Meares understood that the difference was to be made up after the dogs returned from the southern journey. The ‘second journey’ should have been carried out by Meares in January 1912; had it been, it would have brought One Ton depot up to its full quota of rations, fuel, and the dog food necessary for later dog teams to meet the polar party further south as planned. Had Scott wished this ‘second journey’ to be cancelled, he would have stated so; that he did not do so shows that the expectation still stood. Nevertheless, this ‘second journey’ did not happen.

The circumstances are laid out in Simpson's journal entry of 21 January 1912, which summarises events at Cape Evans dating back to 15 December 1911, and records Meares' original intention to set off for One Ton depot:

Scott had warned in his update of 24 November 1911 that ‘the [dog] teams may be late returning, unfit for further work or non existent’ (Scott Reference Scott1911b): this simply acknowledged the possible hazards in Antarctica, allowing Simpson to send out only man haulers in December 1911 if the dogs ran into trouble. This amendment did not automatically disqualify the dog teams from all future work, and Meares’ readiness to go on 17 January shows that Meares did not misconstrue Scott's words. However, something happened which changed Meares’ mind about departing. Simpson continues:

Though this was indeed Terra Nova, her imminent arrival at Cape Evans proved illusory: she sailed further up the coast, and did not return to base until 7 February.

Simpson, though an expedition diarist, did not update daily: usually he made a record on anything from a weekly to a monthly basis, chronicling the events of that period. Such a method of record-keeping can be subject to hindsight, and this is discernible in Simpson's write-up of the events of 17 January.

He begins by stating clearly that Meares intended to start south on the evening of 17 January. This was to have been the ‘second journey’, wherein the dog teams would make up what the man haulers could not carry. The need for more dog food was still imperative: Scott specified that this should only have been unfulfilled if the dogs were ‘unfit for further work or non existent’ (Scott Reference Scott1911b). The dogs, though late returning, were certainly present, ‘rested’ and fit: Meares standing by with packed sledges on 17 January testifies to the imminence of their journey. Use of the plural ‘sledges’ implies that Gerof would have accompanied him. Between them they could have taken the needed dog food to One Ton. But Meares did not go out and, after 17 January, the whole idea of the dog teams’ ‘second journey’ is dropped from discussion.

Simpson attempts to explain Meares’ decision to remain at base: ‘Naturally when the ship was seen Meares delayed his departure in the hope of being able to take home news with him.’ (Simpson Reference Simpson1911b: 56–57) The wording is clumsy, but implies that Meares was waiting for the ship so he could take news from home to the returning parties. If so, it was not a vital task, nor does it explain aborting the mission. Within 48 hours they could have determined that the ship was headed elsewhere, and Meares could have started south as intended. A wish to wait indefinitely for ‘news’ was not sufficient justification to put off the explicitly vital restocking of One Ton. Due to Meares’ refusal to leave, the depot remained unstocked.

In the next sections we shall examine Meares’ role in the southern journey, and his role in the depots’ depletion.

Meares on the southern journey

The main group of men and ponies undertook the southern journey on 1 November 1911, but Scott intended for the dogs to leave much later, as their speed would allow them to catch up with the ponies further south. As Wilson noted in his record of the plans, ‘the dog party being self-contained can move independent of the ponies from camp to camp’ (Wilson Reference Wilson1911: 7). Scott's orders to Meares of 20 October 1911 state: ‘I leave you to fix the date of your departure from Hut Point, observing that I would like you to join me at One Ton Camp, or very shortly after’ (Evans Reference Evans1949: 186).

From Hut Point to One Ton (79°29′S) was 119 miles, or fourteen days’ march with ponies. The ponies reached One Ton on 15 November 1911, two weeks after departing (Scott Reference Scott1913: 320). As dog teams could cover at least 20 miles a day, Meares should have delayed at least a week at Hut Point, to join the main party around 14–16 November. Instead, Meares and Gerof departed early enough to meet them on 7 November. Their extended presence would deplete the rations for longer than Scott had calculated, and Scott was displeased at their early arrival (‘Meares has played too much for safety in catching us so soon’ (Scott Reference Scott1913: 314)).

Additionally, evidence suggests that Meares exceeded his dogs’ rations, leading to a dog food shortage which had to be remedied by the premature slaughter of ponies. On 15 November Bowers, the storemaster, recorded the circumstances explicitly:

A charge is sometimes brought against Scott that he should have known that bringing Meares, Gerof, and the dog teams farther than planned would deplete the depots and stretch supplies beyond what was feasible for the polar party's safe return. Scott's recorded surprise, on his return journey, that certain depots were short of food and fuel, has been cast against the argument that his own policy, often characterised as an unplanned last-minute move, created the deficiencies. In fact, Scott had not planned alone: his calculations were made with Bowers, as indicated by Bowers’ journal entry above, and Scott's journal entries for 1 and 10 September 1911 (Scott Reference Scott1913: 276, 277–278) describing days spent jointly formulating plans. Furthermore, before departing, Wilson recorded the plans in his sketchbook, which shows it had always been an option to extend the dogs’ run. One proposed scenario had ‘the dog teams taken beyond the calculated distance and fed on the remaining ponies. The dogs should be able to advance two extra days for every pony fed to them’ (Wilson Reference Wilson1911: 8). This estimate proved conservative: Bowers recorded on 24 November that ‘Meares + Demitri cut up Jehu + got 4 days dog food out of him – this is double the amount anticipated – + so is very satisfactory’ (Bowers Reference Bowers1911: 25). Thus we see that the dog teams going further south was no last-minute vacillation of Scott's, but an option which had been calculated by Scott and Bowers well before the start of the southern journey.

The man haulers were aware of the strain that Meares and Gerof put on man food, though, and contributed from their own rations to extend his. Cherry-Garrard noted:

Fourteen men relinquishing a biscuit a day for a week totalled 98 biscuits: if Meares and Gerof consumed 6 biscuits per day on their return (rather than the 8 biscuits demanded by man haulers), this would give them around 8 days’ biscuit ration apiece. With the dogs expected to travel 24 miles per day, 8 days’ journey would make 192 miles, so the 186 miles between Lower Glacier Depot and Mount Hooper was theoretically achievable. (These distances are taken from chief stoker William Lashly's mileage tables; Ellis Reference Ellis1969: 141.)

This was the extent of the strain placed on the party by the time of Meares’ turning back on 11 December. As Bowers wrote on 10 December, ‘Meares will help us with the 2 dog teams for half a day more . . . He must then turn back as his provision allowance will not admit of his staying longer’ (Bowers Reference Bowers1911: 47). When Meares headed north again, it was with his provisions calculated.

Unfortunately, estimates for the dogs’ daily mileage proved over-optimistic, and the first stages fell short of the expected 24 miles per day. In his journal Cherry-Garrard recorded the despairing notes Meares left at the depots on his return journey:

From turning north on 11 December to reaching Hut Point on 5 January, the dog teams covered 379 miles in 25 days; an average speed of 15.16 miles per day. Cherry-Garrard recorded Meares as having covered ‘35 miles per day’ in the later stretch between One Ton and Bluff Depot (Cherry-Garrard Reference Cherry–Garrard1911), so the early section was very slow going; Meares was understandably frightened about his rations, so took more food from Mount Hooper than allotted. In an account of the expedition printed in July 1913, Evans stated:

Meares and Gerof probably did go short, but Evans’ claim of their self-sacrifice is refuted in Wright's diary. On 10 January Wright, with the first returning party, arrived at Mount Hooper depot to find less food than expected:

The sledging rations included 16 ounces of biscuit per man per day alongside pemmican and other items (Cherry-Garrard Reference Cherry–Garrard1994: 359); these 16 ounces constituted 8 biscuits (Simpson Reference Simpson1911a: 74). Wright's anger stems from the fact that Meares took over six days’ worth of rations to cover himself and Gerof for three days, more than a man hauler's full share of food for this stage, for men expending less energy than the man hauling teams following behind. Cherry-Garrard confirms:

Two days later, Wright wrote in his journal, ‘All [of us] interested to know what grub is at One Ton and whether Meares has taken the lot’ (Bull and Wright Reference Bull and Wright1993: 237).

When the first returning party arrived at One Ton on 15 January, they found that Meares had not excessively depleted it. Of the X.S. rations, Cherry-Garrard noted in his journal that there were ‘3 of them instead of 5, since it had been brought out by a manhauling party: but to make up Meares has left quite a lot of extras’ (Cherry-Garrard Reference Cherry–Garrard1911). With regard to Meares’ declared plans, he wrote:

Thus Cherry-Garrard's journal unequivocally proves that when Meares arrived at One Ton during his return from the south, he knew exactly what was expected of him. Meares knew that the returning parties were dependent on further supplies being delivered to One Ton, and gave the deadline for replenishing the depot as the end of January 1912. Had he and Gerof left on 17 January as planned, they would probably have met this target.

Meares’ appropriation of others’ rations at Mount Hooper depot means he knew the importance of food on the Barrier. Because he left the depot understocked, he knew that the ‘second journey’ to restock One Ton was urgent: should the polar party arrive at Mount Hooper (61 miles south of One Ton) to find it short of food, the dog teams needed to intercept them there, or further south. Meares’ momentary ‘panic’ during his return journey is understandable, but in taking extra food from Mount Hooper he was obliged to make good on that deficit. Even if he could not reach Mount Hooper himself in the time available, he could at least stock One Ton with the dog food necessary for the ‘third journey’ to meet the polar party. Despite knowing all this, Meares abandoned the crucial ‘second journey.’

In the next section we shall examine his refusal to depart; why his superior, Simpson, did not force him to go; and later obfuscations of the depot laying issue.

Meares after his return to base

In ‘Could Captain Scott have been saved?’ May suggested that a naval officer should have been in charge of Cape Evans, rather than the civilian Simpson:

Furthermore, an officer could have used naval authority to ensure the orders left by Scott were executed in full. The problem appears to have been that Simpson misunderstood the arrangements to restock the depots and did not challenge Meares’ failure to carry out his mission. Had a naval officer remained at base, he would not have considered Scott's standing orders negotiable, and would not have been fobbed off with Meares’ prevarications.

Here, the personalities of the men were key. Evans and Bowers, both forceful personalities, could have matched Meares in argument. They could also have used the weight of naval authority to threaten to inform the British government of his disobedience. Meares had served in the Boer War in 1901–1902, and later divulged his service as an ‘observer’ (intelligence agent) there, in the 1900 Boxer rebellion, and in the 1904–05 Russo-Japanese conflict (Crane Reference Crane2006: 433). A charge of neglect of duty could have damaged his future employment prospects. Had Evans or Bowers been present, Meares might have conceded and restocked the depot as required.

Unfortunately, command was in the hands not of a trained naval officer but of the mild-mannered meteorologist Simpson, who was not only acting head of base but also head of the scientific programme in Wilson's absence. Simpson had a professional background within the esteemed Anglo-Indian governmental system; Scott even wrote in a 1908 letter to Simpson, ‘It's a pity that some of your Indian efficiency cannot be imported into the London office’ (Thomson Reference Thomson1977: 149). Tryggve Gran described Simpson as ‘living in a separate world of science’ (Hattersley-Smith Reference Hattersley–Smith1984: 88), implying a certain remoteness from everyday events, but during his time in charge Simpson kept a clear written record of Scott's orders and how they had been followed. The question becomes one of intent: did Simpson genuinely misunderstand the supply arrangements, or was he complicit in excusing Meares’ refusal to leave for One Ton?

Evidence collected by Cherry-Garrard in 1948 suggests that Simpson was genuinely confused rather than complicit. When presented with Meares’ about-face, he apparently had not protested or questioned the other man's motivation. This concession arguably contributed to the final tragedy: Simpson's normalisation of Meares’ reversal in his journal (with the word ‘Naturally’) masked an important detail in understanding the disaster.

After 17 January, obfuscations of the fact that Meares had neglected Scott's orders begin to appear in the written record, apparently originating from Meares himself. The first possible smokescreen is the idea, recorded in Simpson's journal, that Meares’ sledges carried ‘luxuries like Irish Stew, Marmalade and Tinned Fruits’ (Simpson Reference Simpson1911b: 53), casting the journey as a favour and non-essential. Scott never ordered this; also, Meares would not have filled two sledges exclusively with treats when he had already promised, in his written note left at the depot, to bring the remainder of needed rations to One Ton. Trivializing the cargo makes sense, however, if Meares wished to downplay the necessity of the mission.

The second obfuscation is recorded in Cherry-Garrard's journal on 28 January 1912, when the latter's party returned to base:

Here Meares presents himself as having initially wished to go out again, but having been dissuaded or overruled by ‘others’ at base. Among the men at Cape Evans were those who had restocked One Ton with 3 X.S. rations in December 1911, so they would have known it was understocked. Even if they had told Meares that between their efforts and the final journey ‘there would be plenty for all parties’, the packed sledges and intended departure on 17 January demonstrate that this opinion had no real power to sway. Set against Simpson's written record of Meares’ about-face after sighting Terra Nova, Meares’ statement here looks like retroactive justification and abdication of responsibility.

Cherry-Garrard's Reference Cherry–Garrard1922 memoir The worst journey in the world holds the third obfuscation: ‘I note in my diary [on 31 January 1912], after we had reached the hut, that Scott was to have sent back instructions for the dog party with us, but these have, it would seem, been forgotten’ (Cherry-Garrard Reference Cherry–Garrard1994: 425). At the back of his journal for November 1912, in a section titled ‘Written on the Barrier after finding the Remains of the Southern Party’, Cherry-Garrard elaborates: ‘I heard that Meares was told that further instructions as to the dogs would be sent back by the 1st Return Party. These however were not sent’ (Cherry-Garrard Reference Cherry–Garrard1912c).

It appears that the idea of returning parties bringing orders for the dog teams originated with Meares. We have only hearsay that Meares expected such orders in late January 1912 and that their absence left him at a loss; however, surviving documents indicate that Meares understood precisely what he had to do. Scott's standing orders to Meares from October 1911 give clear instructions for the dogs after their return to base; the note Meares left at One Ton, summarised in Cherry-Garrard's journal, proves Meares originally intended to act upon these orders by delivering two further X.S. rations to One Ton by the end of January; Simpson's journal records Meares as ready to start this trip on 17 January; finally, neither Scott nor any member of the first returning party make any mention of the need for further orders. Thus Meares’ claim on 31 January that he was waiting for orders from Scott is belied by his own behaviour two weeks earlier: when he had the sledges stocked and ready to leave on 17 January, he was demonstrating that he knew full well what Scott expected of him.

Meares’ excuses, after his failure to leave as scheduled, are self-contradictory and unconvincing. He simultaneously states that he was left uninformed of what was required, and that his mission of 17 January required him to transport luxuries. He goes too far when he claims that he wished to go but was talked out of it (Simpson's account shows otherwise), and that the existing depots provided ‘plenty’ of food ‘for all parties’. From Wright's account we know the depots were depleted, and that Meares had played a role in their depletion. Meares knew first-hand that the ‘second journey’ was needed to restock the depots, yet he chose not to go.

Additional misinformation may have been laid afterwards. A legend in popular history (Smith Reference Smith2002: 186; Fiennes Reference Fiennes2004: 340; Rees Reference Rees2006: 85; Mills Reference Mills2008: 157, 168), erroneously repeated by May in her 2012 article (May Reference May2012: 10), has Meares’ premature departure excused by the need to return home in 1912 upon receiving news of his father's death. The earliest reference we can find to Meares’ father having died before 1912 dates from 1978: ‘[Meares’] experiences and the news of his father's death decided him to return home, in the “Terra Nova”’ (Jones, A.G.E. Reference Jones1978: 65, Reference Jones1992: 272). However, genealogical research shows that Meares’ father, Henry John Meares of ‘Acharra’, Colinton, Edinburgh, actually died on 12 June 1919, seven years after Cecil Meares’ return from Antarctica (Figs 1a, 1b).

Fig. 1 (a) Death record for Henry John Meares of Acharra, Colinton, 12 June 1919. (b) Marriage record for Cecil Henry Meares, indicating paternity by Henry John and residence at Acharra, Colinton.

Simpson's journal states, ‘as far as I know, no losses of near relations are reported’ in the mail received from the ship (Simpson Reference Simpson1911b: 63). Therefore Meares cannot have told Simpson this story at Cape Evans in February 1912: either it was invented by a third party (perhaps elaborating on the hint in The worst journey in the world that Meares ‘was recalled by family affairs’ (Cherry-Garrard Reference Cherry–Garrard1994: 444)), or Meares himself at some point offered his father's death as retroactive justification for his departure.

On 28 January 1912 Cherry-Garrard registered his private doubt of the depots’ ‘plenty.’ By 25 February, however, he had apparently been persuaded otherwise, as he wrote to Reginald Smith on that date: ‘Luckily Scott was not dependant [sic] on the dog teams - he has lots of extra food even without them’ (Cherry-Garrard Reference Cherry–Garrard1912b). Unless this was simply an optimistic gloss for the home audience, it is difficult to understand how Cherry-Garrard could have changed his mind about the known food supply, given his previous doubts. Perhaps this was easier to accept than the possibility that Meares abandoned the requisite ‘second journey’ despite knowing that returning parties could have been left dangerously underprovisioned.

One might cast Meares as spiteful to have shirked his duty in these circumstances: however, his behaviour is plausible as a blinkered desire to let nothing interfere with returning home. Scott was aware Meares might wish to catch the ship: in his October 1911 instructions to Lieutenant Harry Pennell, the commanding officer of Terra Nova on her return to McMurdo Sound, Scott mentions that ‘Meares may possibly return; it depends on letters from home’ (Evans Reference Evans1949: 178). Nevertheless, had Meares undertaken the ‘second journey’ on 17 January as planned, he could have caught the ship before she departed on 4 March (Cherry-Garrard Reference Cherry–Garrard1994: 437). Unfortunately, Meares left no records of his own to explain his actions. With the exceptions of a provincial tour of Ponting's lectures in early 1914 (Jones, M. Reference Jones2004: 184) and his visit to Oates’ bereaved mother Caroline, telling her of ‘rows’ and ‘great trouble and unhappiness’ on the expedition (Huntford Reference Huntford2002: 542), he was silent on the subject until his death in 1937. Fiction and drama have presented their theories and have slanted perception of his character (most notably in the television series The last place on earth (Griffiths Reference Griffiths1986)), but fictionalisations cannot be trusted as reputable sources of information.

The dearth of Meares material makes it difficult to ascertain his reasoning and motivations, but one episode sheds light on his general character. On 21 February 1911, returning from the initial depot-laying journey, two dog teams ran into a crevassed part of the Barrier. Scott and Meares’ team broke through a crevasse lid, losing two dogs which landed on a shelf 65 feet down. Scott ordered Meares lowered to retrieve them, but despite his responsibility for the dogs, his reputation as an expert adventurer, and the direct order from his superior, Meares refused. Cherry-Garrard described the incident:

Scott retrieved the dogs because he knew the importance of preserving transport animals for the polar journey in October: on 9 January 1911 he had noted, after a dog's death, ‘We can't afford to lose animals of any sort’ (Scott Reference Scott1913: 75). Despite the convivial atmosphere after the crevasse incident (Cherry-Garrard Reference Cherry–Garrard1994: 130), the goodwill only went so far; the following day Scott wrote in his journal, in an entry posthumously edited for 1913 publication:

Scott was relying on Meares’ experience again during the polar party's return journey in early 1912, and again Meares refused to follow through. Can Scott be blamed for this? Evidence that Meares was planning to return home when the ship returned in 1912 can be found in a letter from Captain Lawrence Oates to his mother, dated 24 October 1911: ‘Meares goes home in the ship. . . he told Scott he was going to clear out whatever happened. I don't think there is much love lost between them’ (Oates Reference Oates1911; Mills Reference Mills2008: 157). With hindsight, this ‘whatever happened’ suggests Meares was unconcerned about the consequences of his early departure. Whatever Meares’ personal reasons may have been, what ultimately matters is that there is no objective justification for his deliberately shirking clearly-outlined duties on which the lives of other men depended. A clear line of causality links Meares’ negligence with the deaths of at least three men, and no amount of retrospective psychology can excuse him from shouldering his portion of the blame.

Why no one implicated Meares in the polar party's demise at the time is a complicated mixture of the obfuscations starting in January 1912 and the expedition's closing ranks upon returning to civilisation. Many contributing factors of the tragedy were downplayed to avoid scandal. In 1912, when ignorant of the polar party's fate, Evans had stated publicly that they were to be ‘met and supported by two dog teams’ (The Scotsman (Edinburgh) 3 April 1912: 9), but after news of the tragedy broke in February 1913 he claimed that ‘Captain Scott left instructions that no search parties should leave the base to look for him’ and that ‘it was humanly impossible for the base party to save Scott and his comrades’ (Fiennes Reference Fiennes2004: 389). In their analysis, the media chose to focus on Cherry-Garrard's futile and limited ‘third journey’ to One Ton depot in February-March 1912; in making Cherry-Garrard a scapegoat, the significance of lost relief opportunities was overlooked. The climate of shock and damage control made it indecorous to ask difficult questions or challenge official narratives.

Cherry-Garrard wrote to Meares asking for a copy of his exact orders from Scott (there is no record of a reply from Meares), and in 1918 he and Atkinson privately discussed the possibility that Meares had ‘disobeyed orders’ (Wheeler Reference Wheeler2002: 202). His evolving thoughts and observations are written in bound transcripts of his 1910–1913 expedition diaries, alongside the relevant entries. A turning-point in his understanding came in December 1937, following The Nottingham Journal's review of The worst journey in the world, in which the reviewer accused Cherry-Garrard of concealing the fact that Scott's orders for the dogs were not obeyed:

This reviewer confused Meares’ ‘second journey’ (to restock the depot) with the ‘third journey’ (to meet the polar party). The accusation of deliberate concealment evidently jolted Cherry-Garrard into reconsidering Meares’ failure to restock One Ton, and to track down what had really happened, because on 4 March 1938 Cherry-Garrard met with Simpson to discuss the matter:

From this, Cherry-Garrard concluded:

Chief of these ‘sacrifices’ had been Cherry-Garrard himself. Meares had worked for British intelligence and, according to Meares’ biographer Leif Mills, had come with an Admiralty recommendation for Scott's expedition (Mills Reference Mills2008: 134). While we may never know whether the establishment knew of Meares’ role in the Scott tragedy, Meares had been an intelligence agent and could not be publicly ‘outed.’ The civilian Cherry-Garrard was more convenient for public scrutiny.

In ‘late 1948’, Cherry-Garrard met Simpson again and ascertained Simpson's understanding of matters in January 1912:

This confirms that Simpson made two important errors on 17 January 1912: he had a flawed understanding of Scott's requirements, and believed Meares was telling the truth. In Cherry-Garrard's notes on their 1948 meeting, Simpson explicitly denies ever having a copy of Scott's orders to Meares, though we know from Scott's orders to Simpson that the latter had ‘seen’ the orders to various parties and was understood by Scott to be ‘fully aware’ of these. In addition, Scott's October 1911 orders to Pennell state that ‘Simpson will inform you of the plan on which the Southern Journey is being worked’ (Evans Reference Evans1949:171), another indication that Scott expected Simpson to possess a thorough understanding of affairs. However, Simpson cannot be judged as culpable as Meares, who unquestionably knew his orders, and whose recent experience on the Barrier would have informed him of the importance of restocking the depots.

In his journal entry for 10 March 1912 (later posthumously edited for 1913 publication), Scott recorded his disappointment upon finding that Mount Hooper depot had not been restocked: ‘Shortage on our allowance all round. I don't know that anyone is to blame, but generosity and thoughtfulness have not been abundant. The dogs that would have been our salvation have evidently failed. Meares had a bad trip home I suppose’ (Scott Reference Scott1913: 406; Jones, M. Reference Jones2008: 471)

Scott appears charitable in his refusal to apportion specific blame or identify a culprit: perhaps he could not envisage Meares’ deliberately refusing his orders. Sadly, Scott's leniency has worked against him. Had he stated more clearly here that Meares was supposed to have restocked the depots, his statement that the dog driver must have had ‘a bad trip home’ (with its implication that circumstances beyond his control prevented him from returning) would not have excused Meares from subsequent scrutiny, and Meares’ culpability would not have taken so long to surface.

In the next section we shall examine what might have happened had Meares restocked the depot and Wright been sent out instead of Cherry-Garrard.

Could Captain Scott have been saved? An alternative scenario

Now that we know the importance of the ‘second journey’, we must re-examine the possible scenario had the dog food been depoted as Scott intended. If the dog food necessary for further travel had been available at One Ton, Atkinson would have had a stronger basis on which to send Wright rather than Cherry-Garrard, in defiance of Simpson's wishes. Because the depot had not been laid, whoever was sent could not go further south without killing some dogs to feed the remainder. Judging from his previous successful navigation, Wright was capable of pushing south, but with the depot unlaid it is unsurprising that Atkinson limited the ‘third journey’ by instructing Cherry-Garrard that the dogs ‘should not be risked’.

In ‘Could Captain Scott have been saved?’, 13 March was suggested as the date an effective navigator could have met the polar party (May Reference May2012: 13). However, we would like to revisit the visibility conditions in more detail. Scott's journals to 7 March state that conditions were generally clear and bright; Bowers’ meteorological reports for 8 and 9 March record a Force 2 wind and ‘calm’ (Force 0), respectively (Simpson Reference Simpson1923: 462). From the afternoon of 10 March there is a marked change: Scott recorded poor conditions with strong winds and poor visibility, losing tracks, and once being confined to the tent. Thus a hypothesis which posits a late departure southwards from One Ton, on 10 March, is flawed: had Wright and Gerof departed so late, they might not have spotted the polar party in such poor conditions.

Cherry-Garrard's journals state that the dogs required rest on 24 February after the dash to Corner Camp to rescue Evans, and on 25 February visibility was poor, so the ‘third journey’ could not embark from Hut Point until 2 a.m. on 26 February (Cherry-Garrard Reference Cherry–Garrard1912a). However, the selection of Wright could still have made a significant difference, because the day after Cherry-Garrard arrived at One Ton (at 5.30 p.m. on 3 March) he wrote in his journal: ‘There is no sign of Scott here, and so perhaps he will get in soon and all will be well. I have decided to wait 2 days and then settle what we will do. I think he must be in in 2 or 3 days’ (Cherry-Garrard Reference Cherry–Garrard1912a).

Given his undeveloped navigation skills, and Atkinson's orders not to risk the dogs, Cherry-Garrard's instinct on 4 March was to wait and see. After blizzards on 5 and 6 March, the clear but intensely cold weather, coupled with Gerof's complaints of ill health, settled Cherry-Garrard's decision to stay put.

Gerof's illness at One Ton in Cherry-Garrard's company, and his swift recovery upon returning to Hut Point, led Cherry-Garrard and Atkinson to believe he had been feigning illness. On 17 March, the day after their return, Cherry-Garrard noted in his journal, ‘Demetri is quite well. It is sad that he has really been shamming ill’ (Cherry-Garrard Reference Cherry–Garrard1912a). If this were in fact the case, and Gerof's malingering had been intended to prevent Cherry-Garrard's advance beyond the depot (a move which would have endangered them both), there is no reason to expect he would have feigned incapacity, or achieved such success, with the strong-willed and practised navigator Wright in charge.

Had Wright been in Cherry-Garrard's place, Wright would have had no reason to remain at One Ton for a week. With sufficient dog food at hand, aware of the imperative to meet the polar party, and without orders preventing the killing of dogs, Wright and Gerof could have started south from One Ton late on 3 March or early on 4 March. We can estimate the dog teams could travel between 20 and 30 miles a day: by 29 February Cherry-Garrard had travelled nearly 90 miles in 4 days, including weather delays (Cherry-Garrard Reference Cherry–Garrard1994: 432); on 26 February, he logged 30 miles ‘in thick weather’ (Cherry-Garrard Reference Cherry–Garrard1912a). With this rate of progress, Wright and Gerof could have met the polar party 80–120 miles south of One Ton around 7–9 March 1912.

Had the depot not been restocked by Meares’ ‘second journey,’ this team would have had movement south of One Ton limited, but not fatally so. 7–8 days’ worth of dog food could have got them from Hut Point to One Ton, leaving them 4–5 days further southbound travel before being forced to head back. Four days’ worth of dog food would theoretically have been sufficient to meet the polar party 80–120 miles south of One Ton depot.

Even allowing for severe conditions and a reluctance to slaughter dogs, with 4–5 days’ dog food Wright and Gerof could have reached a point between 40 and 60 miles south of One Ton and there depoted food and fuel for the returning polar party. Would Scott and his party have spotted a new cairn on their route, given the intermittent visibility from 10 March onwards? If this extra food and fuel had given the three remaining members of the polar party the strength to reach One Ton, would the supplies there have given them sufficient strength to cover the remaining 119 miles back to safety? One cannot be certain of either scenario: however, had Atkinson sent the proactive Wright instead of the apprehensive Cherry-Garrard, the polar party's prospects would have improved.

Table 2, the historical timeline juxtaposed with the ‘best case scenario,’ shows there was time and opportunity for Meares and Gerof to have made a ‘second journey’ to restock One Ton depot, and that, had Meares done so, subsequent events might have played out rather differently. Could Captain Scott have been saved? Scott's, Wilson's, Bowers’, and Oates’ chances of rescue in March 1912 would have been greater had Meares followed Scott's orders.

Table 2. The second and third dog journeys, 1912: what happened, and what should have happened