The ambition of this project should not be underestimated. In this work, Robert Nichols attempts to bridge an account of freedom found in Heidegger with Foucault’s thoughts on conduct, thought, and praxis in order to propose a new method of social and political critique. In doing so, Nichols also contends with the likes of Descartes, Kant, Marx, Hegel, and multiple critical theorists. Nichols seems to be well aware of the complexity of his project, and goes to great length to track each step he takes while at the same time withholding the specifics of his conclusion until he has put every piece in place. While not without its flaws and problematic areas, this is a thoughtful, clear, and provocative work of scholarship and philosophy.

The text is broken into seven chapters, and works in three broad sections. First, Nichols sets the stage with a mostly expository account of Heidegger’s notion of freedom. He concludes this section by noting that, while Heidegger’s account of freedom is compelling, it does not lend itself to practical application or critique. The primary issue, as Nichols sees it, is that, since Heidegger seems to include freedom as a fundamental ontological element of our being, he seems to preclude any attempt to critique historical arrangements that hinder our freedom. In other words, if we are always already free just by virtue of being the kind of beings that we are, then no political arrangement can affect our freedom. Nichols notes that many have taken issue with this and have attempted to overcome this tension. Nichols concludes the first section with an account of Marcuse, who, early in his career, famously attempted to overcome this tension.

The second section is the most ambitious, and if fault is to be found with the work, it is here. Nichols’ stated goal is to utilize Foucault as a means to outline a new method of social critique that employs Heideggerian ontology (to some extent, at least). In order to do this, Nichols must demonstrate that Foucault’s thought can be made commensurable with Heidegger’s. Nichols admits that this is no easy feat, and begins the second portion of the work with an account of the ways in which Foucault has criticized Heidegger—either directly or indirectly. Foucault’s criticisms of Heidegger, phenomenology, and hermeneutics are outlined in a way that allows Nichols to introduce Foucault on his own terms and highlight the ways in which he stands apart from the Heideggerian tradition.

The next phase of this section is found in the chapter titled, “Foucault’s Autocritique” (129) and this is where the brunt of Nichols work lies. It is in this chapter that Nichols constructs a reading of Foucault that brings him into conversation with Heidegger and social critique. Nichols organizes this chapter in terms of the ways in which Foucault’s own thought developed and the ways in which he critiques himself over the span of his career. On the surface, this could be problematic since the text moves from Foucault’s critiques of other thinkers to critiques of himself, and along the way provides an account of the positive aspects of Foucault’s works. In other words, Nichols’ attempt to draw out positive aspects of Foucault’s thought through investigations of the negative aspects of it does at times become unwieldy.

However, Nichols does not shy away from or attempt to conceal the controversial moves he makes. This portion of the work is crucial to Nichols’ overall project, and whether his case is ultimately convincing is up to the reader to decide; the only critique that can be offered at this point is that this portion of the work is the most erratic. In order to navigate and propose the different elements of Foucault’s thoughts in a way that is commensurate to his project, he sometimes must leap from work to work, relying on interpretations provided by others and even on several occasions returning to the likes of Kant and Hegel in order to properly frame his thought. That is not to say that Nichols is unsuccessful, but rather to point out that the difficulty of his project is evident in the work he has produced.

In the final section (which unfortunately only consists of a single chapter), Nichols shifts focus briefly in order to resituate his project within the larger discussion of social critique. More specifically, he contends with other thinkers within the Marxist tradition. This section is illuminating, though brief. Nichols contends that the methodology that he thinks can be developed through Foucault and Heidegger can overcome the ambiguities and shortcomings of such thinkers as György Lucacs and Axel Honneth. As it was hinted at above, it seems that the largest issue with this section is its brevity. While Nichols’ focus has not made a drastic shift, he does turn to a group of thinkers who are not explicitly working within the same tradition of Heidegger or Foucault. Thus, while his accounts and critiques of them are fair, more bridging was perhaps necessary. Finally, (and this may be praise just as much as it is criticism), Nichols withholds explicating his conclusion until the final few pages, and once it is provided, the work quickly concludes. While it is clear that Nichols’ project is to provide us with a methodology rather than to actually employ this methodology, given the effort that he expends framing it while at the same time deferring an account of it until the final pages, the conclusion itself merits more than the few pages it is allotted. The conclusion, if accepted, raises further questions and demands further explication and development. This is praiseworthy, however, since it spurs and demands further considerations and work beyond what is found in the text.