INTRODUCTION
Sudan has endured civil war in its south for most of its post-independence history. After 21 years of nearly unbroken fighting, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed between the Khartoum government and the rebels of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), and came into effect in January 2005. The demilitarisation of the south, as envisioned by the CPA, was to be primarily through the application of Demobilisation, Disarmament, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR) programmes, and the separation or semi-integration of the opposition military forces, specifically the SPLA and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF).
However, this focus obscures both the prominent role played by ‘other armed groups’ in the civil war in the south, and their continued presence there during the transition to peace. The most significant ‘other armed group’ in the south is an amalgamation of militias loosely aligned under the umbrella of the South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF). Ethnically inspired factionalism, coupled to an overlay of political disputes and personal ambitions, fuelled the divisions amongst the southern rebels which inspired the formation of the SSDF. These ongoing disputes have been actively exploited by the government in Khartoum in pursuit of its own agenda. In fact, with the signing of the Khartoum Agreement in 1997, the SSDF militias became government allies and, in this capacity, were supported by Khartoum against fellow southern rebels, the SPLA. Significantly, the SSDF was not a partner to the CPA, which stipulated that all of the other armed groups in South Sudan were to be subsumed within the SPLA or SAF within one year of its signing.
The purpose of this article is to provide an empirical mapping of the SSDF through an analysis of its operational mode, motivations and interests, as well as its relationship to external actors. In particular, it seeks to understand what role and effect this apparently loose alliance of militias has had (and may have) on prospects for demilitarisation and sustainable peace in South Sudan. Given the complexities of research into militias, the article narrows its focus to a specific time period and SSDF units for consideration in order to draw out these dynamics and trends from the post-CPA experience of South Sudan, concentrating on the SSDF units in two states, Upper Nile and Jonglei, during the period from January to August 2006.Footnote 1
THE ORIGINS OF THE SSDF
The progression of the civil wars in Sudan and the relations of the armed groups that have fought them have been complicated and fractured. Sudan's second civil warFootnote 2 began in the late 1970s and was initiated by what was known as ‘Anyanya II’, a movement of veterans of the first civil war who were dissatisfied with Khartoum's abrogation of the 1972 peace agreement and its guarantees of southern autonomy. By 1983, Anyanya II was joined in revolt against the central government in Khartoum by the SPLA, which was led by a defecting SAF officer named John Garang. During the 1980s, relations between these two groups soured, and ultimately competition between them led to the defeat of Anyanya II by the SPLA, and either the incorporation of its forces into the latter or their splintering into militias supported by the Khartoum government.
In 1991, the SPLA itself underwent a major change when two of its senior commanders, Lam Akol and Riek Machar, defected from the leadership of John Garang over ideological differences concerning southern independence (O'Ballance Reference O'Ballance2000: 172). The two defecting leaders themselves separated in 1992, with Akol forming the SPLA-United and Machar eventually founding the South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM). Additionally, the early and mid-1990s saw a proliferation of new armed groups in the south, as smaller factions broke away from these larger organisations or formed in their own right. As the 1990s progressed, most of these non-SPLA armed groups sought and received support from the Government of Sudan (GoS), so that they might be better able to protect their tribal homelands and/or pursue their own grievances with Garang's forces.
The relationship between these varied forces and the GoS was consolidated in 1997, through the signing of a peace agreement known as the Khartoum Agreement, and an addendum to it known as the Fashoda Agreement. Overall, the Khartoum Agreement agreed that after an interim period of unspecified length, the south would be provided with a vote on self-determination, the long-held aspiration of those southerners in disagreement with Garang over the SPLA's insistence on a united Sudan. The Khartoum Agreement also formalised the amalgamation of non-SPLA militias into an umbrella organisation, the SSDF, led by Riek Machar. For their part, the Khartoum Agreement left the GoS with the new opportunity to exploit the oil fields of the northern part of South Sudan, namely those in Unity State, since they were under the control of the SSDF.
Even with its official standing as a partner in the Khartoum Agreement, the SSDF never had much internal coherence. The SSDF had little unity as its various component militias were largely autonomous from one another. This was primarily encouraged by the fact that SAF Military Intelligence supported individual commanders directly, which prevented the SSDF from forming a coherent, unified organisation (ISS 2004: 5). Furthermore, the fractured nature of the organisation also resulted from the often-conflicting individual aspirations of the leaders of its component militias, and the strong tribal and clan loyalties of the southern Sudanese (ISS 2004: 13). By 2002, Riek Machar had left the organisation, which then came under the political leadership of Gatlauk Deng and the military command of Major General Paulino Matip. It is notable that even as ‘Chief of Staff’, Matip served ‘largely as a figurehead beyond the area of his immediate control’ in his home area in Unity State (ISS 2004: 6).
Under the stipulations of the CPA, the SSDF was supposed to be subsumed within the SPLA or SAF by January 2006. The CPA mandated that there could be no ‘third army’ in South Sudan after this deadline, yet the exact mechanisms for ensuring this were left decidedly ambiguous in the text. On 8 January 2006, an agreement was reached between the president of South Sudan, Salva Kiir,Footnote 3 and Paulino Matip of the SSDF, entitled the Juba Declaration. Through the declaration, the majority of SSDF forces would come to join the SPLA, with Matip becoming the SPLA's deputy commander in chief. This was a major blow to the GoS, as the SSDF forces that had been securing the country's major oil fields in Unity State on its behalf, under the command of Matip, were now a part of the SPLA.
Nevertheless, following the Juba Declaration there was a reorganisation of the SSDF, which reformed under the leadership of Major General Gordon Kong. Although the SSDF lost its strongest position in the south, namely in Unity State, and the majority of its troop strength to the SPLA, the organisation maintained an armed presence in South Sudan, primarily in Jonglei and Upper Nile states but in other states as well. This was in contradiction to the dictates of the CPA.
The usage by the GoS of allies, or what might be termed southerner ‘proxies’, has been a common tactic. As Emeric Rogier (Reference Rogier2005: 12) has noted, ‘a fundamental principle of Sudanese politics [has been] that northerners … seek allies from “the other side” to fight their own-brother enemies, hence the formation of “cross-border” alliances’. The first such case in the second Sudanese civil war began in 1983, when some Anyanya II units aligned themselves as pro-government militias. Furthermore, within months of Garang's defection from SAF, it had supplied local tribal militias to fight the nascent SPLA. For instance, Murle militias were provided with weaponry to attack Dinka and Nuer communities from which the SPLA was drawing support (Johnson Reference Johnson2004: 68–9).
Overall, ‘Khartoum's strategy of supplying southern militias and waging war by proxy’ began under the Nimeiri government and was continued ‘by all successive governments’ (Rogier Reference Rogier2005: 19). Considering that, the sad truth of the second Sudanese civil war in the south is that the war was largely fought between southerners.Footnote 4 Thus, the war has often been described as ‘civil wars within a civil war’, something that Khartoum governments have been adept at playing to their advantage. Khartoum's ability to manipulate actors in the country's periphery is proving a consistent trend. In the present conflict in Darfur, Alex De Waal (Reference De Waal2004) notes that Khartoum is once again resorting to ‘counterinsurgency on the cheap’ through its support for so-called ‘Janjawiid’ militias. According to De Waal, this tactic, tried and tested in the south, was used when Khartoum ‘sought out a local militia, provided it with supplies and armaments, and declared the area of operations an ethics-free zone’. As the conflict continues to rage in Darfur, it is no surprise to southerners that the roles of militias acting in tandem with Khartoum are at the centre of the country's present civil war.
SSDF'S OPERATIONAL MODE
‘Nobody can disarm us, we're another army.’ – SSDF soldier (24.7.2006int.)
The operational mode of the SSDF after the Juba Declaration has been severely constricted by the implementation of the CPA. This has been for several reasons. First, the SAF, the SSDF's near exclusive supplier of material support,Footnote 5 has itself seen its access limited in the south, as SAF forces have had to concentrate in CPA defined assembly points, and have also been required to begin to redeploy to the north. Second, the SPLA for its part has been able to strengthen its presence in areas where the SSDF was previously able to maintain a consistent presence. Third, and most important, the Juba Declaration did see the majority of SSDF forces join the SPLA, notably some of the largest SSDF units that had been concentrated in Unity State under the command of Matip. The end result was to isolate the SSDF in pockets of Jonglei and Upper Nile states, with each commander controlling a small area of land surrounding one or two militia camps in their home districts. The UN (UNMIS briefing 9.8.2006) estimated that in early and mid-2006, the major concentrations of SSDF forces in Upper Nile and Jonglei states were:
(1) Gordon Kong in Nasir, commanding the ‘Al Nasir Forces’ with about 85 men and in Adar with 300 to 400 men;
(2) Gabriel Tang in Pam Al Zaraf, commanding the ‘Pangak Peace Forces’ with about 1,000 men;
(3) Ismail Konyi in Pibor, commanding the ‘Pibor Defence Force’ with about 2,000 men; and
(4) Thomas Mabior in Dolieb Hill, commanding the ‘Peace Forces Dolieb Hill’ with about 250 men.
In addition to these pockets of SSDF forces, there were also concentrations in the Upper Nile's capital city of Malakal. These forces were a miscellany from the other units. For instance, there was a camp of at least 100 SSDF soldiers who resided near the town's airport, while others lived in the compounds of their commanders.Footnote 6 It is notable that many of the commanders of the SSDF forces found outside Malakal tended to reside themselves in Malakal, while most of the top commanders, such as Gordon Kong, resided near permanently in Khartoum (Nyawelo 11.8.2006int.).
In general, despite tensions between these pockets of SSDF forces and SPLA forces, there were relatively few violent clashes between them from January to August 2006. Fighting between SSDF forces and SPLA troops did take place in Longochuk County in north-eastern Upper Nile State on 16 April 2006, when the local SPLA attacked the local SSDF forces in retaliation for an assassination attempt the week before on a county commissioner who belonged to the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) (Kun 11.8.2006int.).Footnote 7 This attack killed a number of SSDF soldiers and forced the SSDF to retreat. Moreover, it was the first time that SPLA troops had attacked an SSDF force in Upper Nile State since the signing of the CPA. The only other significant confrontation was in mid-August in the Fangak area of western Upper Nile State, over disagreements surrounding the county commissioner's post allotment for Fangak County. The tensions eventually led to fighting between SSDF forces commanded by Gabriel Tang and the local SPLA forces.
A pressing concern of SPLA authorities was the fear that the SSDF was recruiting additional forces. They believed that this was being done for two main reasons (SPLA officer 3.8.2006int.). First there was the pragmatic need for individual commanders to acquire and maintain sufficiently large forces to achieve what one SPLA general termed ‘big man power’ (Lam 24.7.2006int.). In order to be recognised by the GoS and SAF, militia commanders needed to have enough armed men backing them. Second, SSDF commanders, it was argued by the SPLA, were recruiting so that they could try to acquire new areas of control, or at least be in the position to do so in the future. This was primarily so that they might influence future elections and increase their political sway. However, it was not evident to the author that the SSDF was actively trying to acquire new territories up to August 2006, despite SPLA allegations, and it was a consistent argument of the SSDF that it merely wanted to maintain the areas already under its control.
Even with recruitment allegedly taking place, the overall size of SSDF forces was in any case significantly smaller than that of the SPLA in the area, which numbered in the tens of thousands. In addition to raw numbers of troops, the SPLA also maintained a significant advantage in firepower, as it had tanks, artillery, and other heavy weaponry whereas the SSDF was largely confined to small arms and a limited number of mortars and heavy machineguns. However, the SSDF remained a significant threat to the SPLA and government of South Sudan (GoSS), not because of its present number of ‘active duty’ members but rather because of its ability to rapidly recruit afresh, as well as call up ‘reservists’ should conflict resume in the south (Nyawelo 11.8.2006int.).Footnote 8 Furthermore, while there were relatively few pockets of armed SSDF, its soldiers were very experienced veterans who were fairly well armed for infantrymen, even if they lacked heavier weapons. This level of experience and possession of suitable weaponry meant that the SSDF could not be dismissed as a fighting force (SSDF officers and soldiers 30.7.2006int.).
One issue of crucial importance to the dynamics of post-CPA South Sudan is the continued presence and movement of arms and ammunition. While the SSDF found itself increasingly isolated in pockets, it allegedly still received arms and ammunition from SAF, as it had for years (Nyawelo 14.8.2006 int.).Footnote 9 If proven true (even SSDF commanders have admitted that SAF was their major source of supplies), it would be a serious violation of the CPA by the GoS (SSDF officer 23.7.2006int.). In addition, SSDF members also noted that they had significant stockpiles acquired from past battles, and that in both the past and present it had been possible to buy ammunition from soldiers and officers in the SPLA sympathetic to them or just plain corrupt (SSDF officers 29.7.2006int.). The primary means of transporting arms and ammunition was through the major SAF base in Malakal. Malakal was a convenient transshipment centre because of the SAF base, the presence of many SSDF militiamen (notably commanders), river transport along the Nile and Sobat rivers, and access to roads to the more rural areas of Upper Nile State (SPLM official 3.8.2006int.). There were also consistent reports of SAF using a white helicopter to deliver supplies to the SSDF pockets.Footnote 10
SSDF MOTIVATIONS
The SSDF demanded four major concessions when it was negotiating the Juba Declaration (Gatkouth 23.7.2006 int.). The primary political demand was that the SSDF be assured ‘full political participation’ in the GoSS as well as in the Government of National Unity, which consists of a union of the SPLM and the ruling party in Khartoum, the National Congress Party (NCP), as per CPA stipulations. This demand practically meant that SSDF leaders would be accorded key positions at all levels of governance. The remaining three demands all concerned military concessions. First, it was requested that all SSDF soldiers and officers be allowed to join the SPLA at the same rank as they held within the SSDF. Second, the post-Juba Declaration's ‘new SPLA’ had to be non-partisan and not controlled by the SPLM political party. This meant that it must be under the civilian control of the GoSS itself. Third, after the referendum authorised by the CPA for 2011 and assuming it to be for independence, the SPLA must then change its name to the ‘South Sudan Army’.
While the SSDF has long been dismissed by its opponents in the SPLA as mercenaries for the GoS, there are actually a number of thoughtful political objectives that are consistently adhered to by its members.Footnote 11 Central to this is the long-held demand for southern self-determination, specifically leading to independence for the south, which goes back to the SSDF's origins in Anyanya II. It has often bewildered foreign observers of Sudanese politics that the SPLA was officially fighting against the GoS even though it advocated a unified Sudan, while the Khartoum-allied SSDF was the southern military force conversely fighting for complete independence. This conundrum has long defined tensions between the SSDF and the SPLA, and continues to provoke a contentious political atmosphere before the CPA referendum on self-determination is held in 2011.Footnote 12
At the Juba Declaration negotiations, an understanding was reached on the issue of self-determination, because the SPLM/A assured the SSDF negotiators that the referendum would take place no matter what obstacles were faced. Many ex-SSDF members who came over after the Juba Declaration note that the CPA is in most ways very similar to the Khartoum Agreement of 1997, most significantly in that it guarantees the south a vote on self-determination. Crucially, the CPA both sets a timeframe for the referendum and is recognised by the international community, attributes that the Khartoum Agreement lacked and which ultimately made the CPA the more viable of the two.
Apart from ideological issues surrounding self-determination, the demand for a replacement of the ‘SPLA’ with a ‘South Sudan Army’ was perhaps the most divisive one. At previous rounds of ‘south-south’ reconciliation meetings it had proved the stumbling block, and it is notable that Garang had consistently refused to compromise on this issue (SSDF officer 4.7.2006int.). As a result of Garang's intransigence, SSDF leaders saw his untimely death as an opportunity to begin reconciliation efforts anew (Gatkouth 23.7.2006 int.).Footnote 13 And indeed, through the Juba Declaration a compromise was reached that satisfied the CPA requirements placed upon the SPLM/A, which stipulated that the SPLA be the army of the autonomous South Sudan in the interim period before the 2011 referendum, while also assuring the SSDF that if independence were to be selected in the referendum, the SPLA would cease to exist and would be replaced by a new entity known as the ‘South Sudan Army’.
The political part of the Juba Declaration was considered a success by the SSDF members, who agreed to it because they got a significant degree of political participation in the GoSS (Gatkouth 23.7.2006 int.).Footnote 14 The military part seems more problematic. The successes, as far as the SSDF negotiators were concerned, were that its members did officially transfer to the SPLA with the same ranks; the SPLA is no longer solely under the control of the SPLM political party but rather under the organs of the GoSS (though the degree of actual control is still ambiguous); and there was a formal integration procedure for incorporating the SSDF forces into the SPLA (Gatkouth 23.7.2006 int.).Footnote 15
The integration procedure was coordinated by an ‘old SPLA’ general and an ex-SSDF general (who could be considered ‘new SPLA’), who respectively chaired and co-chaired a Military Technical Committee. This committee submitted an integration report in late July 2006, reporting that formal integration had occurred but that challenges had been faced. The chair of the committee told the press at the time of the report's submission that the primary obstacles to SSDF-SPLA integration had been ‘tribal clashes … including a lot of man-made destruction organised by the Sudan Armed Forces who sent southern traitors’ to sabotage efforts by the SPLA to disarm armed civilians in Upper Nile and Jonglei states (Juba Post 20-27.7.2006).Footnote 16 The so-called ‘southern traitors’ were SSDF forces who did not follow the Juba Declaration, a topic to be covered later in this paper. As part of the integration efforts, ex-SSDF soldiers were given US$300, five months worth of food, and free accommodation during the integration procedure. With the submission of the final integration report, ex-SSDF soldiers receive a regular salary as normal SPLA soldiers.Footnote 17
Post-Juba Declaration motivations of ‘hold out’ SSDF
‘Disarmament is not a solution. Anybody who tries to disarm us will destroy the peace.’ SSDF soldier (27.7.2006int.)
One of the most oft stated rationales of SSDF members for not following Matip after the Juba Declaration was paranoia either that the referendum would not occur, or that it would be corrupted by the SPLM/A, which it was feared really would take the ‘making unity attractive’ clause of the CPA very literally and push for a no vote in the 2011 referendum.Footnote 18 One SSDF officer interviewed explained that it was necessary to maintain a military relationship with SAF, despite what reservations were held about continuing to ally with Khartoum, because it was felt an ‘insurance policy’ was required (SSDF officer 6.7.2006int.). This meant keeping the SSDF as a standing armed force until the 2011 referendum's outcomes were known. How much of this was rhetoric, defending their continued existence in violation of the CPA and after the Juba Declaration, rather than sincere ideological belief, is difficult to ascertain. Nevertheless, SSDF members consistently argued that maintaining the SSDF as a fighting force would be necessary until independence was assured, preferably through the 2011 referendum but in the longer term if necessary (SSDF officer 6.7.2006int.). In this regard, it was argued that if the 2011 referendum were indeed for southern independence, then the SSDF would gladly cease to exist as it would have achieved its primary objective.
Another common argument articulated against agreeing to the Juba Declaration was the more pragmatic one that there were simply not enough GoSS positions to share amongst SSDF leaders, so they simply did not feel impelled to join (SSDF officer 18.7.2006int.).Footnote 19 The Juba Declaration agreed on the precise number of positions to be provided to SSDF members in the GoSS. This in itself caused much resentment amongst older SPLM/A members, as it obviously meant that they would be losing out on positions to make way for the concessions to the SSDF. There was likely also much tension created within the SSDF at the time over who would be given which positions and who would be left out. A demand frequently cited by the SSDF hold-outs was that if further reconciliation were to occur between the SSDF and SPLM/A, then additional positions would need to be shared in the GoSS by the SPLM/A. If this were to happen, then it would show that the ‘SPLA wants to share power, [and] then everything would be okay’ (SSDF officer 18.7.2006int.). Furthermore, the availability of governmental positions probably played a key role in the individual rationales of SSDF leaders at the time, with those holding out weighing their options of acquiring a GoSS position in future rounds of south-south reconciliation talks.
The SSDF leaders who decided not to follow Matip into the SPLA after the Juba Declaration cited their unwillingness to concede on the issue of forming a ‘South Sudan Army’ to replace the SPLA as a primary motivation. They continued to demand that for the SSDF to reach a final reconciliation with the SPLA, a new southern army must be created, incorporating both the SPLA and SSDF forces, even before the 2011 referendum (SSDF officer 4.7.2006int.). The GoSS cannot concede this because it would be a violation of the CPA, which stipulates that the SPLA is the army of the autonomous state of South Sudan prior to the referendum.
Additionally, the unwillingness of hold-out SSDF members to join the SPLA was driven by the reality that the SSDF was still in physical control of certain parts of South Sudan and maintained armed forces. In relation to this, many SSDF members still regarded the Khartoum Agreement as a legitimate agreement, recognising the SSDF as the armed forces of the south,Footnote 20 i.e. they were in fact a government power of sorts (SSDF officer 23.7.2006int.).Footnote 21 This was considered to be true at least by SSDF members for the areas under their control and hence, the rhetorical question was asked concerning its subsuming into the SPLA: ‘So how can it give up its guns to another government?’ (SSDF officer 18.7.2006int.). In parallel to its continued political hopes that it indeed be treated as ‘another government’ in the south, the SSDF was intent to keep the areas that it had under its control when the CPA was signed. Qualifying this intent was the expressed desire not to go on the offensive before the 2011 referendum, but still to resist any encroachment into its areas by the SPLA (SSDF officer 18.7.2006 int.).Footnote 22
Given the SSDF's insistence both to maintain itself as an armed group in control of the land it occupied at the time of the CPA's signing, and not to be an offensive organisation, there were two main causes its members believed could provoke a return to war in the south (SSDF officer 4.7.2006 int.). The first potential cause would be if the SPLA tried to forcefully disarm the SSDF. A speech by GoSS President Salva Kiir in July 2006 vowed to disarm the militias in an unspecified timeframe if they did not join the SPLA or SAF as stipulated by the CPA (Southern Eye 16–21.7.2006).Footnote 23 There appeared to be genuine belief amongst SSDF rank-and-file soldiers that the CPA entitled the SSDF to continue to exist as an armed organisation. One SSDF soldier, speaking on behalf of a group of his comrades, explained this sentiment: ‘The CPA says the SSDF and SPLA should stay in their own areas and not attack anybody until the referendum, but now the SPLA is expanding everywhere’ (SSDF soldier 31.7.2006int.).
Another SSDF soldier expanded on the general theme, and argued that while they have some sense of being part of one country (i.e. ‘southerners’), they felt that the SPLA mistreated some southerners, namely that it unfairly targeted the SSDF. In his words, ‘the children of the one house are supposed to sit together’ (SSDF soldier 19.7.2006int.). The sincerity behind this belief of normal SSDF soldiers was quite plausible, considering there had been no broad, public campaign by the GoSS or the UN to disperse copies of the CPA to the general population, or to target SSDF soldiers with public awareness campaigns (UNMIS official 17.7.2006int.).Footnote 24 Thus, it is likely that SSDF officers, who could be expected to understand the CPA, misinformed their soldiers of the CPA's provisions, namely that the SSDF was recognised and allowed to remain armed and in control of territory.
The second primary concern of the SSDF that would provoke them to war is if the SPLA tried to relocate SSDF forces to the north. The issue is complicated by the fact that many SSDF officers hold formal commissions in SAF.Footnote 25 The primary benefit of joining SAF was to receive a steady salary. While official commissions may have been provided, these SSDF officers still considered themselves to be SSDF rather than SAF, and were fearful of being re-deployed to the north since the CPA stipulates the SAF must do so by around 2008. Given that, SSDF members who are part of SAF sought to be part of the Joint Integrated Units (JIU) stipulated by the CPA, which allows them to both stay in the south and still receive a SAF salary.Footnote 26
A last major motivation for SSDF members was their strong personal dislike of the SPLA's long-time leader, John Garang. Two issues seem to have especially incensed SSDF opinions about Garang. First, many SSDF members cited the origins of their armed resistance to the Khartoum governments as going back to the Anyanya II movement in the mid-1970s, and thus considered themselves to be originators of the southerners' armed struggle of the second civil war. Accordingly, it was all the more galling to them that Garang, who was originally an officer in SAF, formed the SPLA to fight both SAF and ‘secessionists’ from the south, namely Anyanya II. This led to a feeling that Garang personally corrupted the spirit of the original rebellion through his insistence that the SPLA seek a unified Sudan. Second, many SSDF members still bore grudges over the infighting that occurred both within the SPLA and between the SPLA and Anyanya II in the 1980s. During this time many of their friends and relatives were allegedly killed by Garang for opposing his iron grip over the SPLA (Murle SSDF officer 19.7.2006int.).Footnote 27 The forceful, divisive control that Garang allegedly exercised over the SPLA in the 1980s until it split in 1991, left SSDF members – many of whom were in the SPLA at the time – bitter towards him on a personal level and subsequently for the organisation he was so influential in shaping.
The SSDF's commercial and financial interests
The commercial and financial interests of the post-Juba Declaration SSDF can be considered on three levels: first, as commercial motivations for the entire organisation, and second and third in the personal financial rationales of soldiers and officers. It is necessary to consider these motivations on separate levels as there are substantive differences between them.
The principal commercial interests of the SSDF as an organisation lie in the exploitation of the oil development opportunities in Upper Nile and Jonglei states. With the Juba Declaration, the SSDF lost control of Unity State, where the major oil fields of South Sudan are located. However, with SSDF forces still spread around parts of Upper Nile and Jonglei states, the SSDF continued to maintain a presence in the second largest oil producing area of the south, known as the Melut Basin.
In June 2006, the SSDF petitioned the GoS to recognise the contracts that the SSDF authorities had signed with a foreign oil exploration and management company, Jarch Management Group (SSDF officer 23.7.2006int.).Footnote 28 The GoS did not accept this petition, as to do so would have been a major violation of the CPA. However, the intention behind it was quite clear regarding some of the broader commercial motivations of the SSDF. Namely, it wanted the ability to sign contracts and exploit oil resources for the areas under its control. Clause 1 of the petition stated:
The Government of Sudan hereby recognizes the right of self-determination by South Sudan Defence Forces. As such, the GoS will recognize any and all contracts and agreements signed and executed by the appropriate authorities of the SSDF for the areas of Southern Sudan that the SSDF exercises control.
The second clause further explains the SSDF's purported legal basis: ‘These rights of the SSDF are expressly stated in the peace agreements signed between the GoS and SSDF, namely the Khartoum and Fashoda Peace Agreements of 1997.’
This attempt by the SSDF to induce the GoS to renew its commitment to the 1997 agreements built upon earlier threats to oil companies, specifically White Nile Oil and Total, barring them from exploring and drilling for oil in a concession area known as Block B1.Footnote 29 A SSDF press release dated 5 March 2006 encouraged oil companies to voluntarily leave Block B1 as ‘failure to comply with this notice could have serious consequences similar to the current situation in the oil rich Delta region of Nigeria’ (SSDF 5.3.2006). This represents both an actual threat – in the Nigerian case, disruption of the oil industry by militias came to threaten the country's whole economy – and an interesting case of ‘learning’ from other militias.Footnote 30 The same SSDF press release also argued that Jarch Management Group and the SSDF had signed contracts guaranteeing that the SSDF would ‘secure the territories to allow the company to operate in a safe and secure environment’. This would include ‘protecting the area from outside forces, including the SPLA and GoS forces, and other foreign companies that do not have agreements with the SSDF’.
The SSDF's aggressive public attempts to assert some ‘sovereign rights’ over territories that it ostensibly controlled, and its relationships with foreign oil interests, indicate its broader two-pronged strategy which combined commercial interests with political ones. The first part of this strategy was that as a military force it claimed the right to exclude the GoS and the GoSS from encroaching onto its territories. The second prong of the strategy, political in nature, was to continue to publicly claim the sanctity of the Khartoum Agreement as legitimising its continued existence as a political and governmental entity in South Sudan with the legal right to sign and manage oil contracts, despite the provisions of the CPA which forbid such third parties from doing so.
Financial interests
It was common for SSDF members to assert that their support from SAF was not monetary in form. This seems, publicly at least, to be a matter of pride, since to accept cash would imply that they were mercenaries for SAF (SSDF officer 19.7.2006int.).Footnote 31 Nonetheless, it was widely known that SSDF officers, notably commanders, did receive cash payments from SAF (Gatkouth 23.7.2006 int.).Footnote 32 Ex-SSDF officers have explained that they consistently received cash payments while allied with SAF. It was up to them to use this money to support the soldiers under their command. In addition to cash, other forms of payment for continued support were maintained for officers, notably the provision of houses and cars to senior SSDF commanders in Khartoum, and to a lesser extent in the major towns in the south such as Malakal.Footnote 33
That SSDF commanders received financial payments directly from SAF also seems to have helped convince some of the hold-out SSDF officers to remain behind after the Juba Declaration (SPLM official 2.8.2006int.). When the Juba Declaration was announced, there was some mutinying amongst SSDF forces as parts of units refused to join the SPLA, and rallied behind previously secondary commanders to remain as SSDF units (UNMIS official 9.8.2006int.). The rationale of these secondary officers, newly promoted to commanders after their predecessors joined the SPLA, was that they would then be in the position to directly receive payments from SAF.Footnote 34
Overall, those SSDF commanders who have been able to maintain consistent relations with SAF, and hence receive a steady cash income of their own, have achieved the most prominence because of it (Aduok 16.7.2006int.). A good example of this was the Murle SSDF commander Ismail Konyi, who has had a very long-term relationship with SAF going back to the 1980s. Konyi had a very loyal following among his soldiers, mainly because he was consistently able to support them (UNMIS official 17.7.2006int.; Murle civilians 23.8.2006int.). However, the Murle soldiers of the SSDF appear to be the exception, and while other SSDF commanders do receive cash payments from SAF, their soldiers do not appear to have received regular cash payments themselves (SSDF officers 23–24.7.2006int.; SPLA officer 3.8.2006int.).Footnote 35
THE SSDF AND THE ROLE OF IDENTITY POLITICS
South Sudan has a very diverse population dominated by the two largest tribes, the Nuer and the Dinka. These are followed in size by a range of other tribes including the Fertit, Murle, Anuak, Maban, Shilluk, and a large number of even smaller tribes loosely grouped together as ‘Equatorians’. It is beyond the scope of this article to detail the role that ethnicity has played in national and regional politics, but it is important to note a few crucial aspects of identity politics as they specifically relate to the SSDF.
The first dynamic of note is the perception held by members of the SSDF of the alleged Dinka bias within the SPLA. There has long been tension between the Dinka and Nuer, whose historical relationships were largely defined by each raiding the other's cattle. The tension between them has translated into the post-independence politics of the south. The SPLA has been led largely by Dinkas, while the SSDF has had mostly Nuer leadership.Footnote 36 The perception exists, despite the fact that Dinka and Nuer are present in significant numbers in both organisations, that each has its ethnic base in either one of the tribes. One of the most common sentiments heard from SSDF members was that they objected to the ‘Dinkanisation’ of the south, and believed the SPLA to be a partisan ‘tribal militia’ serving the purposes of the Dinka (SSDF officer 3.7.2006int.).Footnote 37
The strong ethnic divide between the SPLA, which does have a predominantly Dinka senior officer corps, and the SSDF, which has a primarily Nuer base, was widely known. This ethnic rivalry between the two organisations also carried political overtones as to which tribe should ‘naturally’ lead the south. Many Nuer SSDF members claimed that the notion that the Dinka are the largest tribe in the south, and hence have a claim to southern leadership, is a conspiratorial lie. This insistence on the Nuer being sidelined by a Dinka conspiracy was a common, and seemingly increasing, refrain of the SSDF's many Nuer members. This can be seen in the SSDF's press releases claiming that the ‘Nuer nation’ was being exploited, especially since its territory is where the oil fields are located, yet it arguably doesn't share in the oil revenues sufficiently (SSDF 16.4.2006).Footnote 38
The second identity dynamic that is crucial for the SSDF relates to the notion of being ‘southerners’. It was very upsetting to SSDF members that they are considered ‘southern sell-outs’ by the SPLA. The argument that they are simple proxy militias for the GoS is especially offensive because of its connotations that they are subservient to the GoS and hence working towards its goals. Despite their partnership with the GoS through the Khartoum Agreement, the SSDF members saw themselves as being ‘true southerners’, as they were seeking full independence for the south, while conversely arguing that the SPLA was the actual ‘sell-out’ to southerners because it had long fought for a unified Sudan. Especially embittering to many SSDF was to be called ‘Arabs’ by their southern opponents. As one SSDF soldier remarked: ‘the SPLA tries to discredit us by calling us “Arabs”’ (SSDF soldier 31.7.2006int.). The question of who was more of a ‘southerner’ versus an ‘Arab’ was one of heartfelt emotion and subsequently of strong political value.
In addition to the driving nature of the Dinka–Nuer relationship, due to their relative populations in South Sudan, there are other important issues of identity politics. Other smaller tribes have felt the need to protect themselves from the dominance and aggression of the more numerous Dinka and Nuer. An example of this was the formation of the Equatorian Defence Force (EDF) in 1995, which was largely to protect Equatorians against abuses committed by the SPLA. Furthermore, the Murle have long sought to isolate and protect themselves from their larger neighbours. Their tribal militia, the Pibor Defence Force (PDF) of Ismail Konyi, had a strong identity centred on notions of defending the Murle people. It is interesting to note that while members of the PDF consider Ismail Konyi to be a SSDF general (as well as in SAF), he was most importantly a commander of the Murle (Murle SSDF officers 19.7.2006 int.). Overall, identity politics plays a very significant role in the internal relations of the SSDF, as well as in its relations with other actors in South Sudan's complex politics.Footnote 39
SSDF RELATIONSHIPS WITH EXTERNAL ACTORS
This section details the relationships of the SSDF with external actors, by which are meant those that come from or functionally operate outside South Sudan.
Government of Sudan (GoS)
The GoS has a long history of ‘divide and rule’ tactics for fighting its civil war in the south through allied militias. Even prior to the Khartoum Agreement, the GoS reached out to non-SPLA armed forces, such as the individual tribal militias before they united under the SSDF umbrella, by supplying them with arms, ammunition, and other logistical needs. With the signing of the CPA, and even with the subsequent defection of the majority of the SSDF to the SPLA after the Juba Declaration, the GoS was still widely accused of continuing its support for the SSDF (UNMIS Mediation Notes).Footnote 40 For instance, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Jan Pronk, in reference to SAF support for the SSDF, said: ‘Nobody has the freedom to continue as a third army. If they continue fighting then they are just warlords … I understand some forces are still giving them assistance and I made an appeal to them not to do so anymore’ (Sudan Mirror 14–27.8.2006).
The post-CPA support from the GoS to the SSDF came in the form of cash payments to individual commanders, transfers of arms and ammunition, and provision of transportation resources and basic foodstuffs. SAF also maintained a barracks for the SSDF in Khartoum called Lokondo, for which it paid the rent and provided food (SSDF officer 30.7.2006int.). The GoS, through SAF Military Intelligence (MI), had never wanted the SSDF to coalesce into a cohesive organisation where it might more easily turn into a threat to the GoS, and thus purposefully kept it as a loose umbrella organisation with little real command and control over its component militias (ISS 2004: 5). For example, while the SSDF ostensibly had a unified command, Khartoum always bypassed this to liaise and interact with individual SSDF commanders and units in the south, and hence fragmented the SSDF by maintaining individual logistical and financial arrangements (SSDF officer 4.7.2006int.).
As the SSDF's militias are largely scattered in pockets around South Sudan, supplying their logistical needs was much harder to accomplish after the signing of the CPA, because of the increased SPLA presence. SAF never entirely denied that it maintained logistical support for SSDF militias (UNMIS official 6.8.2006int.). However, it did deny that it provided arms and ammunition, and insisted instead that it only provided foodstuffs because it was in the process of integrating SSDF forces into the SAF or waiting for them to be demobilised by the GoSS.
To some extent this was plausible, given that there were multiple pockets of SSDF forces maintaining individual relations with SAF MI. For instance, SSDF forces interviewed in Ketbek, Upper Nile State noted, somewhat bitterly, that SAF was not presently providing them with arms and ammunition (SSDF officers and soldiers 30.7.2006int.).Footnote 41 However, other SSDF units, such as those of Gabriel Tang in Fangak, Thomas Mabior in Dolieb Hill, or the SSDF units in Adar likely did still receive significant arms and ammunition supplies from SAF.Footnote 42 As mentioned previously, the SSDF unit best supported by SAF was the Pibor Defence Force (PDF) of Ismail Konyi (Murle leaders 23.8.2006 int.).Footnote 43 Frequent official complaints were made by the SPLA to this effect, and SAF officially and consistently denied the allegations but did concede that Ismail Konyi, the PDF commander, received orders and maintained an intensive relationship with SAF commanders based in Juba (UNMIS Mediation Briefs).
That the SSDF had no significant source of support other than through SAF was widely acknowledged. The SSDF admitted as much itself (SSDF officer 23.7.2006int.).Footnote 44 Compared with armed groups in some other African countries, the SSDF had no access to natural resources – such as diamonds, lumber or gold – that could be sold to raise money. Sometimes individual soldiers sold cattle to buy arms or ammunition, but this was not enough to sustain the SSDF more broadly. The SSDF had a longer-term interest in oil production, but as of August 2006 no actual source of income from oil exploitation. As one local political commentator noted, the pockets of SSDF units truly were ‘satellites of SAF … [and] would collapse without SAF support’ (Aduok 16.7.2006int.).
The rationale for the GoS, through SAF, to support the SSDF was twofold. First, it wanted to create general instability in the south, so there was little to no development to use as a political argument and leverage against the SPLM. Second, the GoS wanted to create instability so that it could argue to delay the redeployment of SAF forces out of the south. And indeed, SAF, as of 9 July 2006, was supposed to have withdrawn half of its forces to the north, but had only withdrawn 35% (UNMIS official 9.8.2006int.). It officially explained that it was behind schedule because it was worried about the continued presence of ‘other armed groups’, namely SSDF units, in the south, and felt its presence was needed (conveniently) for security reasons. It is notable that amongst some SSDF troops there was a feeling that SAF was giving them barely enough support to maintain themselves, essentially at a subsistence level, in the belief that if a war were to start again in the south, the remnant SSDF forces could quickly be expanded to fight the SPLA. In the meantime, the political and financial costs of this support would be mitigated.
Oil companies
As mentioned previously, the SSDF had already signed a contract with one foreign company in 2004 to explore for and manage oil in SSDF-controlled areas. Through its press releases the SSDF notified concerned parties that it would permit only SSDF approved companies to develop oil resources in SSDF-controlled areas. A lot of this can be dismissed as pure rhetoric, since the SSDF controlled only small isolated pockets of territory, not areas comprising entire ‘blocks’ of oil concessions. Exceptionally, however, there was a significant presence of SSDF forces around the major oil producing town of Adar, which pumps out of the Melut Basin of northern Upper Nile State.Footnote 45
GoSS officials there accused the resident oil company, Petrodar, of being supported by the local SSDF forces surrounding Adar (SPLM official 11.8.2006int.). There was no formal relationship between the SSDF and Petrodar, such as it had with Jarch Management Group (apparently only an informal, local ‘understanding’), but the mere presence of the SSDF forces prevented the SPLM county commissioner from maintaining a GoSS presence. Officials of the ruling party in Khartoum, the NCP, liaised directly with the oil company, bypassing the GoSS/SPLM officials completely. The overall significance of the Adar SSDF was that it was still in control of an actual oil processing area, compared with other pockets of SSDF that did not directly control major oil pumping areas. Adar was also a CPA-sanctified assembly point for SAF, so it was easy for them to re-supply and maintain SSDF forces there. SAF could also easily send SSDF forces that had previously been based in Khartoum to Adar, since it is near the north–south border.
RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER DOMESTIC ACTORS
Intra-SSDF relations
Even with official consolidation through the Khartoum Agreement, the SSDF never had much internal coherence, because of SAF manipulation and the fractured nature of southern politics. As a result, SSDF units had little day-to-day contact with one another. This was especially the case after the signing of the CPA and the conclusion of the Juba Declaration, as the leftover SSDF units had been isolated into pockets of localised control. What interaction did occur between units was mostly between very senior officers in the larger cities, notably Malakal and Khartoum. The exception to this was the SSDF soldiers within Malakal. Many units from around Upper Nile and Jonglei states had sent groups of troops to Malakal periodically in the past, since Malakal was an SAF garrison town during the civil war. After the war, and with subsequent new arrivals from the field, there were a good number of soldiers from the various SSDF militias in the town. Even in Malakal, however, the relationship was largely fraternal and friendly rather than regimented. Individual soldiers were under the direct control of their respective commanders and did not respond to an overarching ‘SSDF chain of command’ or interact with other units in a notably coordinated manner.
White Army vis-à-vis SSDF units
The relationship between the SSDF and White Army militias, which are village-level militias formed in Upper Nile and Jonglei states during the course of the war, can be considered to have been informal and largely tactical. Both White Army militiamen and SSDF members interviewed noted that there were some kinship affiliations, but that the SSDF and White Army militias have never had any systematic, regimented relationship (ex-White Army militiamen 22.8.2006int.; SSDF soldier 29.7.2006int.).
However, during the confrontations between the SPLA and White Army militias in early to mid-2006, when the SPLA undertook disarmament exercises for civilians, there was a limited presence of SSDF commanders agitating the armed youth who form the bulk of White Army militias to resist disarmament (UNMIS official 19.7.2006int.).Footnote 46 Although the SSDF did not participate as organised units with the White Army militias, the presence of smaller groups of experienced SSDF soldiers led by a few notable SSDF commanders seems to have had a major impact on the level of resistance (UNMAC Brief).Footnote 47 Of crucial importance was the role that these SSDF commanders played in briefly uniting the disparate militias of the White Army to fight what was perceived as their common enemy, the SPLA (SSDF soldier 29.7.2006int.).Footnote 48
The SPLA
The SPLA and SSDF have long been adversaries, with the SPLA accusing the SSDF of being simple proxies of SAF. This overarching viewpoint of the SPLA concerning the SSDF was articulated in an internal SPLA communiqué from early 2006, which noted that the GoS's ruling party, the NCP, had changed from ‘confronting us directly into [confronting us through] a proxy war’ (SPLA 4.2.2006). The communiqué further stated:
Our partnersFootnote 49 are still holding the other armed groups and using them to fight the Government of South Sudan (GoSS). And the main aim in this is to make the South ungovernable … Their hopes and whims are to make the Government of South Sudan failed in administering the Southerners, so that at the end of the day, the CPA get destroyed before the six years interim period.
Given the SPLA's concern over the NCP's intention to foster instability in the south through its continued support of the SSDF, it implemented a three-pronged strategy for dealing with instability relating to the SSDF. The emphasis of this strategy was on isolating and minimising the SSDF's presence in the south.
The first facet of the SPLA's post-CPA security strategy was to begin to rationalise the SPLA and broaden its inclusiveness. The most important aspect of this was the Juba Declaration, which brought the bulk of the SSDF into the SPLA starting in January 2006. It is the foundation of the GoSS's overall security strategy to absorb as much of the SSDF as possible into the SPLA, and then rationalise the entire force into a modern, professional army, rather than as a force composed of what are still essentially localised, segregated militias employing guerrilla tactics.
The second facet of the SPLA's post-CPA strategy was to isolate the SSDF into small pockets but otherwise to avoid direct military confrontations. It is notable that up to August 2006, there were relatively few open battles between the SPLA and the SSDF.Footnote 50 The SPLA maintained that it did not have the authority or mandate to forcefully disarm the SSDF, which it claimed should be done peacefully by the GoSS's DDRR Commission, which had been very slow to form (Lam 24.7.2006int.).Footnote 51 Given this, the SPLA apparently had no plans to forcefully disarm the SSDF (Southern Eye 16–21.7.2006).Footnote 52
Overall, the SPLA seemed to be resisting the temptation to militarily engage the SSDF pockets, because it was not worth the tensions it would provoke within the SPLA with ex-SSDF members (namely Matip) and subsequent frictions with Khartoum over the CPA's implementation. Most importantly, there were options other than military force available to the SPLA for confronting the continued presence of the SSDF. The rhetoric of the SPLA did, however, come with the caveat that it might eventually act with force if the SSDF continued to resist joining the SPLA or SAF, or refused the GoSS DDRR Commission's programming once it was established and running (Sudan Mirror 31.7–13.8.2006).
Rather than confront them militarily, the SPLA strategy was to induce individual SSDF commanders to defect. The SPLA had been active in reaching out to specific commanders in order to ‘poach’ them for the SPLA. An example of this was the SPLA's attempts to recruit the PDF commander Ismail Konyi, who was offered a seat in the GoSS parliament on an SPLM ticket, but by August 2006 had yet to decide whether to join the SPLM (Sudan Mirror 31.7–13.8.2006). While there were some successes, mostly more junior officers, the vast bulk of SSDF soldiers resisted SPLA overtures after the Juba Declaration. Furthermore, the SPLA also sought to avoid direct military confrontations but still hinder the SSDF by attempting to close down their supply lines from SAF. One of the major hopes of the SPLA was that when SAF is forced through the CPA provisions to withdraw its forces to the north (other than its share of the JIUs), the SSDF units would disappear because they are so dependent on SAF. This was a key reason why the SPLA avoided direct military confrontations with SSDF units.
The third facet of the SPLA's post-CPA strategy was to disarm major concentrations of heavily armed civilians in the south, notably the village militias of the so-called White Army in Upper Nile and Jonglei states, and major disarmament exercises were undertaken in early and mid-2006 (Arnold et al. Reference Arnold and Alden2007). The goal of this effort was to prevent the SSDF from agitating more broadly against the GoSS, for instance by using the White Army militias as proxies. A major worry of the SPLA during the disarmament exercises was the ability of White Army militias to acquire ammunition, either from their informal, fraternal relationships with individual SSDF commanders supplied by SAF, or by going to Ethiopia to buy ammunition from Ethiopian rebels or well-armed communities (SPLM official 22.8.2006int.). As mentioned previously, another major challenge was the catalysing role that some SSDF members played in encouraging White Army militias to resist the SPLA's disarmament exercises.
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The empirical mapping of the SSDF from January to August 2006 has highlighted key traits and dynamics of a militia outside the formal peace process in Sudan. Following the CPA, and catalysed by the Juba Declaration, the SSDF was left isolated in small pockets in the south, notably in Jonglei and Upper Nile states. Despite this, it remained a significant armed group and consistently maintained its intent to stay as a fighting force until southern independence was assured, preferably through the 2011 referendum but in the longer term if necessary. The unwillingness of hold-out SSDF members to join the SPLA was driven largely by the reality that the SSDF was still in physical control of certain parts of South Sudan, albeit small and isolated, centred on individual commanders with strong, long-felt animosities towards the SPLA.
With SAF's continued military and logistical support, the SSDF retained a belligerent attitude towards the SPLA and the GoSS more broadly. In response, the SPLA implemented a multifaceted approach to counter the SSDF. The initial focus had been to reach out to the SSDF to integrate it into the SPLA, as stipulated by the CPA. This was done successfully to a large extent through the Juba Declaration. Second was the attempt to further isolate the SSDF into small pockets, but otherwise to try to avoid direct military confrontations. The SPLA attempted to do this by blocking supplies to the pockets as well as trying to induce individual commanders to defect, thereby gradually eroding the SSDF controlled areas in the south.
These demilitarisation strategies employed by the GoSS proved to be reasonably successful in the initial post-CPA era. However, as the implementation of the CPA continues, the SSDF has the potential, still largely unrealised, to play the role of major ‘spoiler’ to peace and reconstruction in the south. The most outstanding threat posed by the SSDF is that if relations were to deteriorate between the SPLA and SAF, the remnant SSDF forces could be quickly expanded to agitate against or even fight the SPLA. Considering that, a major challenge in the future will be whether the disparate units of the SSDF can be incorporated into the political and economic normalisation of the south. Unless SSDF forces can be mainstreamed into either the SPLA forces or those of SAF, or completely dissolved through demobilisation programmes, the potential for infighting within post-CPA South Sudan continues to be a real possibility.
