At first glance Douglas Stuart and Sarah-Jane Corke appear to provide complementary historical investigations of US national security and bureaucracy. The former focusses on the foundation and evolution of the National Security State while the latter concentrates on the murkier, although nonetheless important, world of covert warfare. No doubt influenced by the George W. Bush era, these histories seemingly offer lessons for contemporary foreign-policy bureaucracies in pursuing national interests and implementing strategy. This is straightforward diplomatic and political history so anyone looking for alternative paradigms would be best advised to look elsewhere.
Stuart tells the story of America's national security bureaucracy through its founding document, the 1947 National Security Act. Declaring it the most important piece of modern American legislation after the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Stuart suggests it is as significant as the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan and “X article” in “determining both the direction of American foreign policy and the future of American society” (2). Unlike other historical treatments, he charts the emergence of a national security ideology from the late 1930s and continues the inquiry up to 1960. The result is a fuller exploration of the antecedents and evolutions of the issue in Washington. In particular, Stuart cites the trauma and lessons of Pearl Harbor for shapers of the new system. A “vivid and universally understood image of the costs associated with letting down our guard,” he notes, “Whereas Munich became the default metaphor for American diplomats after World War II, Pearl Harbor became the default metaphor for the members of the national security bureaucracy” (42). The influence the Japanese attack had on debates and subsequent decisions created a “Pearl Harbor System” (3) that redefined the concept of America's global role, enacted a new bureaucracy, reformed functions like intelligence, shaped military–civilian coordination, and harnessed economic and scientific resources amid the preparedness cause.
Stuart's key focus is in outlining the bureaucratic turf wars surrounding national security. Intense political infighting within the executive branch is highlighted in thorough detail, with Stuart charting the battles involving prominent officials like Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Marshall, Acheson, Forrestal and Eberstadt, while unearthing the contribution of Professor Edward Pendleton Herring, a recurrent protagonist in the text who was one of the first to systematically articulate the concept of national security. Stuart also notes the intervention of interests groups and Congress in shaping the 1947 Act and its subsequent modifications. The conclusion is, somewhat inevitably, that national security was subject to compromise from the very beginning.
Stuart's research and analysis is largely persuasive and clearly presented. Unravelling bureaucratic clashes represents the strength of the text, although it will no doubt be dry for those not aficionados of bureaucratic politics. A few minor issues can be raised, however. Stuart often draws upon Forrestal's diary, edited by Walter Millis, in analysing the Department of Defense (187, 195, 240), which is useful as a primary source, but old (published in 1951). Furthermore, Stuart reiterates the marginalized role of the State Department, although he does not develop a significant point concerning State domination of the NSC in the late 1940s. This could have shed more light on an important, if understated, point regarding the CIA. He notes that covert ops were the agency's greatest contribution to national security and a key reason why the CIA survived the bureaucratic battles of the epoch (235–37 268–70, 280–81). Overlooking a broad literature, Stuart offers a brief and simplistic chronology of clandestine activities.
In contrast, Sarah-Jane Corke charts these debates in close detail. Arguing that covert operations during the Truman administration were ill-conceived and destined to fail, Corke plays down the importance of hasty planning and Soviet moles. Instead, she emphasizes the role of the executive branch in developing and executing covert warfare, while stressing that intense bureaucratic infighting compromised clandestine operations. Corke suggests historians have overlooked the importance of policy and strategy – “the two most important components of a successful covert operation” – and looks to address this gap. She states, “early American covert operations were compromised primarily by the persistent inability of the administration as a whole to reconcile policy and operations successfully and to agree on a consistent course of action for waging the Cold War” (4). From ambiguously defined national security policy, conflicting “strategic visions,” no strategic consensus, a maverick operational culture influenced by William “Wild Bill” Donovan, to the ineffectiveness of Truman and his national security staff, Corke outlines why the administration was unable to develop a coherent strategy.
Corke rightly points out that the absence of a strategic vision severely hampered covert efforts, especially in Eastern Europe. Were activities behind the Iron Curtain intended to contain Soviet power, roll it back, or develop independent communist entities like Marshal Tito in Yugoslavia? The problem is that she offers a blow-by-blow account of meeting minutes, reports and policy drafts, which does not lend itself to “an innovative and provocative argument” of American national security (9). This slim monograph (162 pages, yet containing a plethora of notes totalling fifty-eight pages) clearly evidences plenty of work in archival records, albeit exclusively American ones. However, the narrative is too often a chronological rendition of the documentary record. When not focussing on the intricate details of bureaucratic battles, Corke rehashes familiar tales about the early Cold War (i.e. chapter 2). She is also highly critical of George Kennan for failing to outline a coherent grand vision (54–63, 75–81). Kennan's significance to the issue of covert operations has indeed been overlooked, yet concurrently his contribution to US strategy has been grossly exaggerated. Far from the most important figure in the Truman administration, was Kennan supposed to produce a crystal-clear Cold War strategy? Corke laments his inability to reconcile the operations–policy divide, although she neglects to mention that by 1949, when he did, Kennan was marginalized by an administration that did not subscribe to his strategic vision of an independent Europe anchored on a unified Germany.
The book also suffers from countless presentation problems. These range from spelling mistakes (Adlai “Stephenson” (7); Sumner “Wells” (14); Walter “Beddle” Smith (26); “SANNAC” (28); “Sydney” Souers (58, 62); Douglas “McArthur” (115 and index); “George Caffrey” (176 n. 38)) to formatting problems (“1984” (27); “Marshal” Plan (38–39 and throughout notes); book and article citation in notes), to factual errors (Forrestal was Secretary of War, not Defense, in 1946 (28); the CIA Survey Group was to review the agency's functions and not “‘check up’ on the agency from time to time” (57)).
In many respects, the books do complement one another. Stuart and Corke provide detailed accounts of how bureaucratic infighting compromised organization and the planning and implementation of overt and covert policies. Yet a core problematic emerges when one considers the “international dimension” to foreign policy. Stuart's incorrect identification of the Truman Doctrine speech on 17 March 1948 (instead of 12 March 1947) could be attributed to an inadvertent editorial slip-up (186–87), although it also points to a deeper conceptual problem, namely that focussing on the US story leaves no space for others. As such, Truman's speech comes in the context of the national security debate and not as a plea for economic – and ultimately military – aid to Greece and Turkey in the (veiled) name of fighting communism. The issue is particularly acute with Corke, who from the outset claims that “international events” are not crucial to understanding why the Truman administration did not produce a coherent strategy. Instead, she states “that internal factors – ideology, partisan politics, personality and bureaucratic politics – took precedence over geopolitical considerations” (8). However, can a story about covert operations ignore the local contexts in which these actions took place? The question is all the more pressing when such operations relied on foreign nationals to do the actual fighting.
Discussing early political warfare operations in France and Italy, Corke's narrative is full of anachronistic mistakes and inaccuracies. The Marshall Plan had not been announced in 1946 for French communists (PCF) to protest French involvement, while the Italian government could not utilize Marshall funds before the April 1948 election since such monies had not yet been consigned (25–27, 50–51). The view that Italy was merely a “strategic liability” was presented by the CIA and not by the administration as a whole, the communist–socialist alliance was for regional elections and did not constitute a permanent “People's Bloc,” while US ambassador James Dunn did not instruct Prime Minister Alcide “de Gasperie” to kick out the left from government in 1947 (47–48). Yet the problem is again broader. “Early American psychological operations in France eventually succeeded in undermining communist strength in the country,” asserts Corke (26). Might French anticommunist political, social and civilian leaders have not had a greater impact in countering PCF popularity? Corke also admits that “international events,” namely Italy, forced the covert operations question “to the forefront of the administration's agenda in late 1947” (47), which poses important questions for the author's central thesis.
It is all well and good to recount the details of bureaucratic battles and reasons for compromised policies. However, such an approach ignores the fact that events abroad are more often than not out of US control and detached from bureaucratic skirmishes inside the Washington beltway. The importance of indigenous politics, cultures and ideologies is not so much lost, as never present.
