1. Solving Problems Without God

Given that God is all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good, it is reasonable to assume that such a being will be inclined to help humans in certain scenarios (even without reference to specific theological traditions).^{Footnote 21} Likewise, the Judeo-Christian God is explicitly one who intervenes in human activity to help humans (and ensure that his perfect plans for the universe come to fruition). While none of this commits the theist to the view that God always helps humans, it does mean that it is possible, if not likely, to occur at various times and places. Many theists believe that this consistently happens in the world despite disagreement over the degree of frequency that it occurs. On atheism, however, it is impossible for an individual to receive help from God. If atheism is true, then an individual is forced to solve problems without any assistance from God.^{Footnote 22} This could be beneficial for an individual’s character development. An individual who faces problems can develop a strong work ethic, determination, patience, and creativity in ways that would be impossible if she could receive help from God. Consider, for example, that if atheism is true, supernatural intervention is impossible in the face of adversity.^{Footnote 23}

Related to the claim that without God an individual is forced to solve problems on her own, is that she may be inclined to cooperate with others in ways she otherwise would not. Since God cannot be appealed to in order to help solve problems, only other humans can be appealed to in order to help. One might object that humans are inherently social beings, and this is the case whether or not there is a God. This is certainly true, but consider that any support networks in place to help people take actions and make decisions in life are more valuable on atheism than on theism. These human support networks are all one has to rely on if there is no God. Of course, it is mere psychological speculation to think that humans may be more willing to cooperate with one another in order to solve problems if God does not exist. The point is that social cooperation is more valuable on atheism, regardless of whether the quantity or quality that occurs is connected to God’s existence. Thus, the value of problem solving and social cooperation is higher on atheism than on theism.^{Footnote 24}

One important objection to this line of argument is that the existential status of God’s existence doesn’t impact the personal psychology of people whose epistemic stance about God doesn’t happen to line up with the ontological facts. In other words, there could be theists in the atheistic world who appeal to God in order to solve their problems. In this world, theists are mistaken and hence can’t actually receive help from God. But this doesn’t prevent them from appealing to God and perhaps even having the (misleading) experience of divine help. In order for the above argument to be true, it must be the case that the value of such appeals are not worth as much if they’re not in line with the actual ontological status of the world. ^{Footnote 25} More work must be done to show that (i) social cooperation is more valuable on atheism than on theism; and (ii) experience of a good is significantly less valuable than the experience of the good along with it actually obtaining (i.e., lining up with ontological facts of the world).^{Footnote 26}

2. Complete Responsibility for One’s Actions

If God does not exist, then the good of being completely responsible for one’s actions obtains. At first glance, this claim may appear to be counterintuitive. Many believe that if God exists, then there is going to be ultimate justice in the universe since that is what an all-good being would demand. Perhaps victims will receive just compensation for their suffering. Those who perpetrated evil on earth will be punished accordingly. Justice might not prevail in the here and now, but ultimately God will ensure that it does prevail. Likewise, the theology of heaven and hell found in certain branches of the monotheistic traditions is another example of the theistic idea of cosmic justice.^{Footnote 27} However, the idea that God will set everything right in the universe is, in fact, the very feature that makes it impossible for an individual to be completely responsible for her actions.

If God does not exist, God cannot intervene to fix my mistakes. Consider the immense damage that human activity has done, and is currently doing, to the environment. If God does not exist, then humans must take complete responsibility for their actions regarding the health of the planet. God cannot intervene to save the planet and fix the environmental damage caused by humans. This type of complete responsibility for one’s actions does not exist on theism. Likewise, without God, victims are not assured that they will receive compensation for their suffering. Evil doers will not be brought to justice without intervention from humans. If God does not exist, then one must face the complete consequences of one’s actions without a guarantee they will ultimately be made right. The sort of character development that can take place in having to deal with one’s own problems is impossible on theism.^{Footnote 28}

Consider that the major monotheistic religions all have paths to ‘salvation.’ These paths are a way to avoid the complete consequences of one’s actions. In the Christian tradition, for example, guilt is transferred from individuals to Jesus, who takes full and complete responsibility for the wrongs committed by those individuals. This is known as the Christian doctrine of ‘atonement.’^{Footnote 29} There are interesting questions here as to whether it is even possible for someone to take the moral blame for another person (even if both parties desire the transfer).^{Footnote 30} The point is that all of these claims are ways for an individual to avoid taking complete responsibility for her actions. Therefore, this counts as a negative consequence of theism, rather than a positive one.

Relatedly, if theism is true, then it may lead to moral paralysis that would be avoided on atheism. If God exists, there is always the possibility that God will intervene to prevent an evil. There is also the possibility that God may compensate the victim of a moral wrong. This could prompt an individual to refrain from preventing a moral wrong.^{Footnote 31} This is because the victim may receive an outweighing good as compensation for the wrong if God exists. If God’s existence entails ultimate justice, one may be unmotivated to seek out complete justice in light of such guarantees. While these worries about moral paralysis do not necessarily arise if God exists, it is unlikely for them to arise if there is no God.^{Footnote 32} Again, this is connected to the ability to develop one’s character in particular ways if God does not exist.

Finally, it might be objected that even if all of this is so it must be weighed against the idea that there are problems that only God can solve. For instance, God might be able to intervene and prevent earthquakes from occurring.^{Footnote 33} But God is the ultimate (or first) cause of any problem in view here. Thus, while there might be problems, God is uniquely able to solve, God is also uniquely the cause of such problems. And this might detract from the value God is able to contribute to the world via problem solving.^{Footnote 34}

3. Privacy

If God exists, then the good of privacy cannot exist.^{Footnote 35} Since God is all-knowing, God knows the inner mental content of every human. Necessarily, then, an individual cannot have complete privacy if God exists.^{Footnote 36} The burden of proof is on the observer to possess permission (or an overriding reason) to violate an individual’s privacy. That is, one does not have to justify her entitlement to privacy. For example, parents ought not to read their daughter’s diary without her permission or an overriding justifying reason (e.g., they suspect she is suicidal).^{Footnote 37} If God exists, then humans are under God’s constant surveillance. Note that the way in which the information is used does not in any way impact whether privacy can be violated.^{Footnote 38}

4. Independence, Autonomy, and Dignity

Three additional goods associated with the non-existence of God are independence, autonomy, and dignity.^{Footnote 39} If God exists, then one is necessarily always subservient to God. One is also ultimately dependent on God for her existence. Subservience and dependence are an affront to one’s dignity.^{Footnote 40} In one of his objections to the Meaningful Life Argument, Penner suggests that “[w]hen looking at typical development over a human lifespan, one sees a progression from complete and total dependence on others to greater degrees of independence, and, relative to one’s particular end of life circumstances, a regression to further dependence on others.”^{Footnote 41} But Penner downplays the very important sense in which the good of independence cannot be realized if God exists. The degree of dependence one necessarily has on other humans is different than one has on a maximal being such as God. Such dependence on humans is only ever contingent; the dependency could have been different or must not have occurred. If God exists, then one’s existence is unavoidably dependent on God.

Closely related to independence is autonomy. Imagine living in a country with a king who spies on his citizens. He collects extensive metadata on everyone, including all internet activity, physical movement, and monetary transactions. Cameras are everywhere, including in private residences. The king uses this information to dole out justice as he sees fit. Indeed, when WikiLeaks released information that the National Security Agency (NSA) was conducting extensive spying (without following due process), many expressed outrage. One worry is that if the state spies on people, it can limit the ability of citizens to organize protests against the state. But would it matter if there was a guarantee that the NSA only ever acted benevolently? Would it matter if it turned out that the NSA used the information to foil numerous terrorist plots? No. Similarly, even a guarantee that the king is benevolent does not lessen the affront to dignity such spying causes. All else being equal, a society where such spying does not occur is to be preferred to one where it does occur. Finally, the thought that God is all-good does little to comfort individuals in the face of having their autonomy and privacy so severely violated.^{Footnote 42}

The most pressing worry here is that the good of dignity does not obtain in an important sense if God exists. This is because if God exists, then everyone is necessarily subservient to God. Penner writes:

Penner is probably correct to identify subordination as the most troubling consequence of theism. One way to understand this drawback is by reflecting on a recent related discussion on theism and dignity harms.^{Footnote 44} If we humans are ultimately created to fulfil God’s purposes, then this constitutes a dignity harm. For instance, humans can create children for the wrong reasons.^{Footnote 45} It is wrong for a couple have to a child solely for the purpose of having that child become a world-renowned musician or professional athlete. Thaddeaus Metz writes:

These ideas culminate in the following Creation Principle: “[I]t is disrespectful to create a person for any purpose other than to pursue its own purposes.”^{Footnote 47} Notice that this isn’t something that comes in degrees. The principle is either violated or it is not.

5. Bravery

If God does not exist, then individuals can exercise bravery in a way that would otherwise be impossible. The existence of God provides many with great psychological comfort. It can provide a person with the comfort that she is not alone in the universe. The universe is not random, chaotic, and ultimately indifferent to her. While this psychological comfort can exist if God does not exist (i.e., people could mistakenly believe that there is a God), there is a good that obtains without it. Namely, the good of bravery does not obtain in a certain way if God exists. Without God an individual is forced to accept that she is alone in the universe, and cannot rely on the idea of God for psychological comfort. But one could mistakenly believe that she is alone even if God does exist. Therefore, this good (or at least the experience of it) is possible on atheism. Again, it would have to be shown that the actual obtaining of it, as opposed to the merely (mistaken) experience of it is more valuable in order for the ideas about bravery presented here to defend anti-theism.

There is also uncertainty about an afterlife, which is not the case for the monotheistic religions. There is, perhaps, uncertainty about life’s deeper existential questions. Without God the answer to such questions is less than clear. Paradoxically, not having meaning fixed by God may be a great source of existential angst, thus allowing one to exhibit a kind of bravery that would otherwise be impossible. This turns the Meaningful Life Argument on its head. The problem is not that for some people their lives would lose meaning if it turns out that God exists. Rather, the problem is that the world might lose value if God exists and is the source of meaning. The bravery of facing life if there is no meaning does not obtain if God exists (and hence confers meaning on life). This claim runs contrary to Penner’s Meaningful Life Argument because it claims that without God there cannot be objective meaning in life.^{Footnote 48}

Perhaps there is a genuine distinction between objective and subjective meaning. If God does not exist, then there is no objective meaning and one can exemplify the good of bravery in light of this fact. But this does not preclude the possibility of one’s life being subjectively meaningful. Penner’s recent explication of the Meaningful Life Argument focuses only on subjective goods.^{Footnote 49} If this is the case, then the good of bravery can obtain in the way described here, while also preserving the version of the Meaningful Life Argument that relies on subjective goods. Finally, note that for bravery to be a good in the way I have described means taking a stand on whether God is connected to (objective) meaning, which is something I have tried to avoid throughout this paper.

1. Many of the Atheistic Goods Still Obtain on Theism

Solving problems on one’s own, cooperation, and immediate responsibility can all obtain frequently on theism. That is, a pro-theist could object that I have overstated how much God (assuming there is one) intervenes in the world. Consider that many theists believe that God only infrequently answers prayers. Or, they claim that it is at least not evident that God frequently answers prayers. Even if God exists, one still must often solve problems on one’s own. Likewise, since God only infrequently intervenes, humans must still cooperate with one another in order to solve problems. Finally, if there is no God, then God cannot correct people’s mistakes. But many theists believe that God rarely does this anyway.^{Footnote 53} Therefore, many of the aforementioned goods all exist on theism anyway. The anti-theist must make the stronger, and more controversial claim, that asking God for help detracts from goodness, not the mere possibility of receiving help (since such help is rarely received even if God exists).

Notice that the success of this claim depends on how much one thinks God intervenes in the world. The pro-theist raising this objection holds something like the following:

If Infrequent Divine Intervention is true, then this objection succeeds. The goods in question will still obtain to a high degree even if theism is true. But the way in which I stated the initial argument assumes a different amount of divine intervention if God exists. Consider:

Admittedly, the precise boundaries of what constitutes ‘infrequent’ and ‘frequent’ divine intervention are inevitably vague. Even so, Infrequent Divine Intervention and Frequent Divine Intervention cannot both be true. The success of this objection, then, depends on adjudicating between these two claims. Doing so, however, highlights important connections between the axiology of theism and divine hiddenness. Discussing this further, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.^{Footnote 54} But it is important not to lose sight of the general point I’m making: it isn’t obvious that atheistic goods obtain on theism. This is something that the proponent of wide impersonal pro-theism must defend.

2. The Impossibility of Gratuitous Evil

One upside of theism that possibly swamps all of the goods I have mentioned in connection to atheism is the impossibility of gratuitous evil.^{Footnote 55} Kraay and Dragos explain:

In sum, the good of the impossibility of gratuitous evil on theism will always outweigh any goods associated with atheism. Interestingly, this could include compensation for the loss of atheistic goods like privacy and independence. If this is right, then it would be impossible for the loss of atheistic goods to ever outweigh the overall balance of theistic goods.^{Footnote 57}

It might be tempting to think that this resolves the question of whether a theistic world is better overall than an atheistic world. But again, the question of the possible coexistence of gratuitous evil and God has been problematized. I won’t outline the details here, but it’s worth noting that two prominent (theist) philosophers of religion—William Hasker and Peter van Inwagen—believe that the existence of God and gratuitous evil are compatible.^{Footnote 58} Indeed, if humans are libertarian free, then gratuitous evil might be an unavoidable consequence of that freedom. Even if humans are guaranteed compensation for suffering (freely) caused by other humans, it is still gratuitous in the sense that it need not have occurred and indeed the world would have been better had it not occurred. Finally, theists like Michael Almeida who endorse modal realism seem to deny that there is a problem of evil at all since God necessarily exists in every possible universe and every possible universe is actual.^{Footnote 59} But, then, if this ontological picture is correct, it’s difficult to see what value God would add to each universe. Again, I take no stand on any of these issues here. My point is that it’s easy to problematize the idea that God and gratuitous evil cannot coexist, but it’s not an undisputed claim.

3. The Infinite Value of a Maximal Being

The last upside of theism that might be appealed to in defence of wide impersonal pro-theism that I will problematize is based on the infinite value of God. The idea is that since God is an infinitely good being, then any world in which God exists is infinitely valuable. Since God exists necessarily and is an infinitely good being, then every possible world necessarily has the same (infinitely good) axiological value. This upside of theism is similar to that of the impossibility of gratuitous evil in that it makes it difficult to see how any combination of the upsides of atheism could ever outweigh it.

But there are at least two problems with appealing to this upside of theism. First, it appears to be highly counterintuitive to say that every epistemically possible world has the same value even if theism is true. Imagine a world with one fewer genocides occurring than in the actual world. Even if theism is true, it appears that the latter world has a greater value than the former actual world. Some might argue that God would only actualize a world that meets a certain minimum threshold.^{Footnote 60} Perhaps it is only these ‘good enough’ worlds that all have the same value. But this response doesn’t avoid the intuition behind the initial worry. Likewise, it also wreaks havoc on our most basic common sense modal intuitions that things could have been otherwise, including a lot worse than they are in the actual world.^{Footnote 61}

Second, another worry with this upside of theism is that it isn’t clear what it precisely means to say that God is ‘infinite.’ There are, after all, competing interpretations of the concept of infinity.^{Footnote 62} In particular, does God represent the existence of an actual infinity? How is a numerical value representative of God’s power, knowledge, and goodness? Or is the appeal to infinity supposed to be metaphorical? I don’t raise these worries as decisive objections to ascribing the concept of infinity to God. I’m simply pointing out that it is not an uncontroversial upside of theism.

4. World Commensurability

I close this section by discussing world incommensurability. One assumption I have relied on throughout this paper is that the axiological value of epistemically possible worlds can be compared with one another. Implicit in this assumption is that the value of the goods associated with atheism and theism can be weighed against one another. On the surface, this might be understood as the idea that the goods contribute to a numerical value of the world in which they obtain. We can then compare the numerical value of the worlds to one another. But perhaps this is rather naïve. It could be that there is no sensible way to compare different goods with one another. Goods might be fundamentally incommensurate with one another. In this case it wouldn’t matter whether one world had more goods than another since we don’t know the relative worth of the individual goods in each world, at least in comparison to one another. There is, after all, debate in the literature about whether possible worlds are fundamentally incommensurate with one another.^{Footnote 63}

This discussion need not imply that we ought to be sceptics about what is a good, or sceptics about the claim that the instantiation of a good adds value to a world. Likewise, individuals need not refrain from making value judgements about what are particular goods for them. An individual might have her own reasons for highly valuing privacy. However, when it comes to the larger issue of how much privacy makes the world better overall, and whether privacy is more valuable than a good associated with theism, we simply might be asking a question for which there is no answer. Likewise, even if goods aren’t fundamentally incommensurable with one another, the vast disagreement about them indicates that we don’t currently have the tools to make such comparisons. To reiterate one last time: this doesn’t show that wide impersonal pro-theism can’t be defended; it points to yet another issue that must be addressed in such a defence.

Despite these worries, one might argue that wide impersonal pro-theism is still easier to defend than wide impersonal anti-theism. In attempting to problematize different upsides associated with theism, I have really just clarified a number of issues that the pro-theist must take a specific stance on in order to defend her position coherently. For instance, in order to defend wide impersonal pro-theism, certain positions on divine hiddenness, gratuitous evil, infinity, and world commensurability must be held. I don’t deny that this is the case, but then this must be explicitly stated in defences of wide impersonal pro-theism. Likewise, it means that certain upsides of theism aren’t available to certain people who may want to defend pro-theism. For example, Hasker and van Inwagen can’t consistently appeal to the impossibility of gratuitous evil as an upside of theism. Defending wide impersonal pro-theism may indeed be easier than defending wide impersonal anti-theism. But the devil is in the details. And the details aren’t going to be the same for every devil.^{Footnote 64}