With the rise of nuclear energy and global accessibility to nuclear weapons, Fuhrmann discusses the use of atomic peace programs by states to achieve foreign policy objectives and the potential risks and unintended consequences that may come with such programs. The book emphasizes the potential for nuclear proliferation as a result of peaceful nuclear assistance. Fuhrmann seeks to answer three questions: “Why do nuclear manufacturers provide peaceful nuclear assistance to other countries? Does peaceful nuclear assistance raise the likelihood of nuclear weapons proliferation? Have international institutions influenced the nuclear marketplace and effectively separated the peaceful and military uses of the atom?” (3). He uses statistical data from nuclear cooperation agreements to demonstrate that nuclear peace programs have gone wrong in the past when states seek to promote their own political and strategic interests when dealing with nuclear relationships. He argues that not all states receiving atomic aid intend to use it for other methods. However, circumstances can change over time as nuclear programs advance. He suggests that policymakers rethink their strategies regarding atomic peace programs to prevent proliferation. He concludes by offering six viable solutions, including enhancing inspections of facilities prior to nuclear assistance, narrowing the focus of the programs, and monitoring facilities with foreign assistance.