Hostname: page-component-745bb68f8f-l4dxg Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-02-11T07:26:30.980Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

John Rawls: An Introduction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 February 2006

Brooke Ackerly
Brooke Ackerly
Affiliation:
Vandervilt University (brooke.ackerly@vanderbilt.edu)
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Imagine for a moment, that we—we in this liberal democracy—want to design the basic institutions of our economic and political interactions so that they are just. In order that just institutions be designed fairly, we will not be allowed to reason from our own particular circumstances. We are not to know our own race or religion, our own material resources, or even our own personal abilities and whether these abilities are valued by our society. Imagine that once this “veil of ignorance” about ourselves is lifted, we might discover that we are the person least advantaged by racist social norms or least advantaged by the relative value that our society places on skills (for example, that we have the skills of a seamstress, not of a professional basketball player). In this view of the bases for an agreement about first principles of justice, the things that we think of as “ours”—our innate skills and those we develop through education and commitment—do not entitle us to the benefits of deploying them in our political economy. Instead, our personal endowments and the value that society puts on them are morally arbitrary. From the moral view of this “original position”, choosing the principles used to guide the distribution of the benefits that accrue from exercising these should be a political decision that we make together. Yet, imagining that we might be a seamstress, a basketball player, or unemployable, each of us reasons the same way.Brooke Ackerly is Assistant Professor at Vandervilt University (brooke.ackerly@vanderbilt.edu). She is the author of Political Theory and Feminist Social Criticism (2000). Special thanks to W. James Booth, to the participants in the Vanderbilt interdisciplinary theory seminar Mark Brandon, John Goldberg, Steve Hetcher, Bob Talisse, and John Weymark and to Talisse, John Geer, and the anonymous reviewers of Perspectives on Politics.

Type
SYMPOSIUM
Information
Perspectives on Politics , Volume 4 , Issue 1 , March 2006 , pp. 75 - 80
Copyright
© 2006 American Political Science Association

The References for all articles in this Symposium have been compiled and begin on page 128. Authors' citations include the following abbreviations for works by John Rawls:

JAF (1985) “Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical”

JFR (2001) Justice as Fairness: A Restatement

LP (1999) The Law of Peoples

PL (1996) Political Liberalism

TJ (1999) A Theory of Justice

Imagine for a moment, that we—we in this liberal democracy—want to design the basic institutions of our economic and political interactions so that they are just. In order that just institutions be designed fairly, we will not be allowed to reason from our own particular circumstances. We are not to know our own race or religion, our own material resources, or even our own personal abilities and whether these abilities are valued by our society. Imagine that once this “veil of ignorance” about ourselves is lifted, we might discover that we are the person least advantaged by racist social norms or least advantaged by the relative value that our society places on skills (for example, that we have the skills of a seamstress, not of a professional basketball player). In this view of the bases for an agreement about first principles of justice, the things that we think of as “ours”—our innate skills and those we develop through education and commitment—do not entitle us to the benefits of deploying them in our political economy. Instead, our personal endowments and the value that society puts on them are morally arbitrary. From the moral view of this “original position”, choosing the principles used to guide the distribution of the benefits that accrue from exercising these should be a political decision that we make together. Yet, imagining that we might be a seamstress, a basketball player, or unemployable, each of us reasons the same way. Because of the empathy required in the original position, the original position describes a moral and political position. Since we reason the same way, we agree on principles that should guide the design of our basic institutions. The institutions that distribute political, social, and economic costs and benefits in our society will thereby be just and promote stability and continued social cooperation.1

For discussion of Rawls as continuing a Rousseauian tradition, see Chapman 1975, cf. Moon 2003. On stability in Rawls, see Barry 1995 and those cited in notes on social cooperation (notes 2, 6, 29), the overlapping consensus (notes 19, 21), and Rawlsian constructivism (note 11) below.

Imagining about what would be fair, we create the conditions for a just original social agreement and continued social cooperation, “justice as fairness”.

Through this device of the original position and other methods of philosophical argument, John Rawls stimulated our discussions about the foundations of social cooperation within liberal societies and among states.2

Rawls refers to “Peoples”. As Allan Buchanan (2000a) argues, his Peoples are very similar to contemporary states. On social cooperation within states, see Hardin 2003. On social cooperation between states, see Beitz 1999 [1979] and 2000, Pogge 2001b, and D. Miller 1995.

Consequently, when he passed away in 2002, he left legacies of inquiry and debate not only in philosophy but also in other disciplines in which the study of social cooperation is foundational, including economics, education, law, and political science.

In this symposium we ask to what extent is Rawlsian liberalism informed by, or potentially informative in thinking about, issues in democratic and international politics. Each of our authors has an answer. Simone Chambers finds Rawls too accommodating of real world economic inequalities. Iris Young finds Rawls's justice as fairness insufficiently attentive to real world processes that generate social inequalities. Russell Muirhead and Nancy Rosenblum argue that Rawls's political liberalism is instructive in thinking about political parties. Michael Doyle finds Rawls's account of international law and relations in one sense appropriate to contemporary challenges regarding global justice and in another sense disconnected from the reality of international politics. Peter Berkowitz argues that Rawls is insufficiently reflective on his own metaphysical foundations for his theoretical argument to have the universal appeal to which he aspires.

Rawls would welcome this line of engagement. With his method of philosophical inquiry, he sought to build coherence among our deeply held convictions and our familiar practices, yielding “reflective equilibrium” between our ideas and our ability to justify them to ourselves and to one another.

Not only do our considered judgments often differ from those of other persons, but our own judgments are sometimes in conflict with one another … Those who suppose their judgments are always consistent are unreflective or dogmatic … The question arises: how can we make our own considered judgments of political justice more consistent both within themselves and with the considered judgments of others without imposing on ourselves an external political authority? … The most reasonable political conception for us is the one that best fits all our considered convictions on reflection and organizes them in a coherent view. At any given time, we cannot do better than that.3

JFR, 30–31.

However, in putting forward his account, Rawls challenges us to do better, and the contributors to this symposium each suggest ways in which we might.

In order to set up the reader for the substantive essays to follow, I introduce the key concepts Rawls uses in developing his political thought and the principle political obstacles to social cooperation which were the political context in which he developed his account of liberalism.4

Other valuable introductions to Rawls include Daniels 1989b, Pogge 1989, Arneson 1989, Kukathas and Pettit 1990, Talisse 2001, Freeman 1999 and 2003, and Laden 2003.

Rawls's assumptions, his central concepts, his method of political theory, and his arguments have generated intense and often fertile controversy. My principal purpose is to introduce the terrain of Rawlsian inquiry. The contestation over the content and the boundaries of this terrain has been extensive and deep, a limited sampling of which can be found in the footnotes.5

The resigning of controversy to the footnotes is problematic for many theorists including myself (2000) and Berkowitz in this symposium. See also Bloom 1975. However, such marginalization must also be read in context. In 2002, Political Theory did a symposium, “What is Political Theory”, in which no representative of the Rawlsian perspective was included (though in the book version—White and Moon 2004—one was added). Further, as Pogge 1989 notes in Realizing Rawls (1, fn1) any attempt to provide reference to all of the secondary scholarship on Rawls will either be incomplete or render the text unreadable. For a rich collection of some of the secondary literature on Rawls, see Richardson and Weithman 1999.

In asking to what extent the Rawlsian project is informed by contemporary political problems, we might be inclined to think that where his work is responsive to politics, it is good and where it is seemingly oblivious to political obstacles, it is bad. However, it may be that we need political philosophers to challenge us to think past the limits within current politics. Thus, as we ask the first question, we should also ask: to what extent should a political theorist constrain his imagination by what has already been foreshadowed in political life and to what extent should we expect political philosophers to offer us normative reasons for thinking beyond the boundaries of present practices?

In “Justice as Fairness” (1958), Rawls wrestled with the foundational questions of U.S. liberal society, while the civil-rights movement brought these questions to our political attention. In A Theory of Justice (1971), Rawls developed a perspective from which to reason about justice—“the original position”—that would base liberal democracy on the capacity of individuals to reason about justice, empathizing with those least well-off in society and choosing principles of justice that would be considered just from the perspectives of the least well-off and everyone else in a society.6

The device of the original position is an attempt to create a social contract basis for social cooperation. The idea is introduced in “Justice as Fairness” (1958) and developed in A Theory of Justice. For an introduction and discussion, see Nagel 1989 [1973], Dworkin 1973, Fisk 1989, Kukathas and Pettit 1990, Habermas 2001, Shapiro 2003, Gauthier 1977, and Freeman 1990. Some argue that the social contract theory is an exclusionary basis for social cooperation; see Pateman 1988, Mills 1997, Foster 2004. Others argue that social conflict not social cooperation should be the starting point of democratic inquiry (R. Miller 1989 [1974], Shiffman 2002). Still others emphasize that liberal contractarianism, by fabricating a distinction between public and private power, belies the ways in which patterns of hierarchies in private lives reinforce and are reinforced by patterns of hierarchy in public life (Okin 1989a, 2004, Pateman 1988, Smiley 2004).

Using what he asserts are weak and few assumptions about human nature7

For discussions of Rawls's psychological assumptions, see Harsanyi 1975, Benhabib 1988, Okin 1989b.

—that individuals are mutually independent,8

Sandel 1982 criticizes Rawls for characterizing the individual as one whose most important characteristic is her ability to choose her ends. In addition to challenging Rawls's characterization of the individual, the implication of this criticism is that we must reexamine Rawls's characterization of the project of social justice: “Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought” ([1971] 1999: 3). Honig 1993 offers a critique of the Rawlsian self that is more attentive to power than either Rawls or Sandel. For their communitarian critiques and own theoretical proposals see also Rorty 1979 and 1983, MacIntyre 1981; Sandel 1984. See also Walzer 1983, which offers an account of liberal democracy that is sympathetic with certain aspects of the communitarian critique (cf. Larmore 1987). Walzer 1984 and 1990, Buchanan 1989, and Wallach 1987 offer important reviews of the liberal-communitarian terrain. Benhabib 1992 offers a different way of mapping and traversing this landscape.

that more is preferred to less,9

Rawls characterizes individuals as having different life plans, but each of these can be pursued more successfully with more rights, liberties, opportunities, income, wealth, and social basis of self-respect. According to Rawls, social institutions need to distribute these “social primary goods” fairly. Dworkin 1981a, 1981b argues that justice should be determined based on the distribution of resources whereas Sen 1990 argues that primary goods and resources are means to freedom, and that justice should be concerned with not these but with the extent freedoms. See also Phillips 2004. On Barber's reading, Rawls's definition of primary goods itself includes both ends and means 1975.

that individuals are risk averse10

On Rawls's assumption that parties in the original position will be extremely risk averse, see Arrow 1973, in which he reviews some of the work in economics on risk aversion. See also Sterba 1977.

—he argues that the principles chosen under such conditions would support liberalism: political liberty, equal opportunity, and an egalitarian economics defined by the “difference principle” according to which differences in distributions would be considered just only if they resulted in an improved condition of those least advantaged by the inequality.11

Some theorists dispute whether these are the right assumptions and others, whether these are the right conclusions to draw from these assumptions (e.g., Nozick 1974, Sandel 1982, Hardin 2003, Arrow 1973, Waldron 1993 [1986]). Still others challenge the construction of the liberal project itself for its understanding of the political subject (Brown 1995) or for its characterization of the privileged relationship between liberalism and democracy (Bell 2000, Dallmayr 2001, Ackerly 2005). On the structure, constructivism and method of Rawls's argument, see Nagel 1989 [1973], Dworkin 1973, McCarthy 1994, O'Neill 1996, Klosko 1997. On the priority of liberty and the relationship between the Rawlsian principles, see Scanlon 1989, Hart 1989 [1973], Daniels 1989a. On the priority of the right over the good, see Sandel 1982 and Kymlicka 1988.

According to the difference principle, some inequalities are not unjust. It is not unjust for basketball players to earn more than seamstresses. If basketball players get paid well to develop fan support for their team such that fans buy T-shirts, thereby increasing demand for seamstresses' skill, the difference in player and seamstress wages would not be unjust. The difference in wages could also be justified as necessary to encourage someone to go into a career where so few are successful. For these and possibly other reasons, some difference in wages is justified, but the difference principle also constrains how much inequality is just. We could increase the inequality in their wages only to the extent that the increase in inequality would make the seamstress better off.

While this example may be helpful for illustrating the concept of the difference principle, it is not the kind of question to which Rawls expects us to apply the difference principle in the original position. Instead, Rawls is interested in designing a just “basic structure”—the foundational institutions of government and economics.12

Rawls does imagine that decision makers in those institutions (specifically in the legislature) will often use the device of the original position to help them think through important distributive issues, but the facts of which a legislator is ignorant in such circumstances are limited.

Questions that focus our attention on the basic structure are: Would a proportional representation or quota system promote political equality? Is an income, property, or sales tax a more appropriate means for funding public expenditures for collective goods?13

Okin added that the family and the gendered structure of the workplace should also be of interest to the theorist of social justice (1989a, 1989b). The ambiguities of his response are explored in Okin 1994 and 2005. Arrow and others raise the concern that the difference principle, also known as the “maximin” principle because it maximizes the position of the least advantaged person, would create bizarre outcomes such as a preference for expensive medical procedures that would offer minimum additional benefit to a seriously ill person and that would reduce the standard of living of the rest of the population to poverty (Arrow 1973). Likewise we may find it difficult to assess whether the primary goods basis for determining the least advantaged enable us to make interpersonal comparisons—of the relative values that make up well-being (see the discussion of primary goods in footnote 9).

In the 1980s and 1990s the identity-defined movements for gay rights and for multicultural education and accommodation animated political and theoretical discussions about what was good for citizens and communities and drew political attention away from the distributive questions that animated Rawls's earlier inquiry.14

Those who have taken other routes to theorizing the implications for social justice of taking identity concerns seriously include Kymlicka 1989, Taylor 1994 [1992], Young 1990, Connolly 1991, and Fraser 1997.

In “Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical” (1985), Rawls argued that the principles guiding liberal understandings of liberty, opportunity, and just economic distributions should be understood as politically, not morally or metaphysically, justified.15

In a 1989 article, Hampton looks at Rawls's turn in “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical” (1985) and “The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus” (1987). See also Erin Kelly's “Editor's Forward” to Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001). Habermas (2001, 59) traces the turn to “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory” (1980).

Despite our holding differing metaphysical views about what is good for human beings and our community, we should agree that liberty, opportunity, and fair economic distributions are just. As he further developed it in Political Liberalism, Rawlsian liberalism should be understood as a political agreement achievable by those holding a range of incommensurable, but not unreasonable, metaphysically based views.16

Ackerman 1994 avers that the arguments for the veil of ignorance and the difference principle cannot be sustained using the arguments of Political Liberalism.

In Political Liberalism Rawls assumes that “a continuing shared understanding on one comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine [even if the doctrine is liberalism] can be maintained only by the oppressive use of state power”17

PL, 37.

. Compared to the agreement on liberal principles possible behind the veil of ignorance in A Theory of Justice, the agreement in Political Liberalism is less comprehensive, the pluralism more challenging.18

For an account of comprehensive liberalism and engagement with Rawls on the subject, see Galston 2002. For discussions of the shifts between A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism, see Ackerman 1994, Barry 1995, and Wolin 1996.

The “fact” of “reasonable pluralism” is the central political concern challenging political liberalism.19

For a discussion of pluralism, public reason, and moral conflict in Rawlsian liberalism, Habermasian ethics, and democracy, see Bohman 1995. See also Moon 1993, Gaus 1999.

For Rawls, the fact that reasonable people may disagree about the metaphysical bases for principles of freedom, opportunity, and equality is not a platitude but rather, a challenge. In the words of Stephen White, pluralism is “a continual source of ferment in our lives, since engagement with this phenomenon will involve a richer, more complex experience … we are constrained to an ever deeper and more extensive engagement with pluralism”20

White 2002, 475.

However, Rawls puts boundaries on the political problem of difference with the qualifier “reasonable” and the expectation of “public reason”.21

On the importance of reasonableness to the political legitimacy of political liberalism, see Cohen 1996; and for a criticism of this importance, see Mouffe 2000. For a critical rereading, see Habermas 2001. One concern about the focus on reasonableness and public reasons is that it limits the role of faith and metaphysically-supported values from being part of public discourse (Wolterstorff 1997, Fish 1999, George 2001, Galston 2002, Weithman 2002, Talisse 2005). On public reason and political legitimacy, see also Nagel 1987, Raz 1990, Cohen 1993, Wenar 1995, Reidy 2000, and Christiano 2001.

Public reason is important to Political Liberalism but his statement of it in that book proves inadequate and he rearticulates in “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, which is reprinted in The Laws of Peoples, as the argument is essential to that work as well. Sections of “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” appear verbatim in JFR, discussed below.

The distinguishing feature of reasonable views is that they can exist alongside other views; they are not “aggressive”22

PL, 144.

; they do not require the defeat of incompatible views. Public reason requires more of us. It requires us to give reasons for our views of basic justice without making reference to our comprehensive religious or philosophical doctrines23

PL, 224–225.

. Rawls writes, “Our exercise of political power is proper only when we sincerely believe that the reasons we offer for our political action may reasonably be accepted by other citizens”24

PL, xlvi.

even though they hold different metaphysical views from our own. Following the theme of this symposium we might ask: what political problems—for example, debates about health care or the environment—are the result of people disagreeing over what constitutes a reasonable argument? We might wonder how Rawls might deal with social norms that influence the relative respect accorded to various speakers such that certain arguments become inaudible to some audiences. We might also ask whether in certain political debates—such as those over abortion or stem cell research—there is a political view that does not reflect a metaphysical commitment. Perhaps some political life is outside the bounds of Rawlsian reasonable pluralism.

Within these boundaries on how much difference we must engage politically, Rawls expects a lot of citizens. We must come to an “overlapping consensus” on principles of justice not as a way of getting along (not as a modus vivendi), but rather because our reasonable views themselves support the political conception of political liberalism.25

PL, 147. For a discussion of modus vivendi in the context of larger philosophical debates of which Rawls's work is a part, see Larmore 1987. See also Neal 1993 and Scheffler 1994.

The same demands that he makes on citizens in his work on justice within states are made of states themselves in his work on a law of peoples, and many of the same concepts—overlapping consensus, reasonable pluralism, and public reason—are essential to its exposition.

In The Law of Peoples (1999), the book-length treatment of his 1993 Oxford Amnesty essay on human rights, Rawls offers principles of international law that he argues can be politically agreed to by societies living under a range of political institutions and sustained by a range of cultural beliefs. Rawls argues that the fact of reasonable pluralism among peoples is addressed by liberal democratic states and human rights-respecting hierarchical states, using the idea of public reason to develop an overlapping consensus on principles of international relations. Written while the U.S. faced challenging human rights-related foreign policy questions regarding famines, conflicts, and genocides in Somalia, Brundi, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavian states, and while academics and policy-makers debated whether the post-communist era would usher in an age of democratization or a the clash of civilizations, Rawls identified principles of international law around which states that respected human rights—liberal or not—would form an overlapping consensus.

In Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001), Rawls rearticulates as a political theory (in the sense developed in Political Liberalism) the theory first set out in 1958. The restatement is interesting in part for the tone it takes when he recognizes that contemporary political agreement is not in support of the difference principle:

We should recognize, though, that the difference principle is not often expressly endorsed; indeed, it may prove to have little support in our public culture at the present time. Nevertheless, I believe it worth studying; it has many desirable features and formulates in a simple way an idea of reciprocity for a political conception of justice. I think that in some form this idea is essential to democratic equality once we view society as a fair system of social cooperation between free and equal citizens from one generation to the next.26

JFR, 132–133, emphasis added.

The political problem Rawls raises here is that “we” do not conceive of ourselves as engaged in social cooperation. Although his work has focused on the terms of cooperation among both citizens and states, he comes to realize the political obstacles to getting the members of a political collective to conceive of themselves as engaged in social cooperation.27

This is the concern originally raised by Chapman 1975 with references to TJ.

It may be that aspects of Rawls's theory are too reflective of contemporary social norms and power dynamics to challenge them.28

This was Allan Bloom's accusation (1975).

It may be that other aspects are too challenging of accepted social norms and power dynamics to be sustainable.29

On sustainable social cooperation, see note 2. On pluralism and social cohesion see Galston 1989.

As we reflect on this issue, we might ask ourselves to what extent we think that justice is about social cooperation. Rawls ask us to consider that it should be, and in so doing, rescues the liberal democratic tradition from the metaphysical claims of other liberals. He offers the world a version of liberal democracy seemingly disconnected from its historically and culturally Western roots.30

Of course, most political philosophers consider those roots; the structure of the argument is an attempt to disassociate from them.

In conferring on Rawls the National Humanities Medal, then-President Clinton said, “A Theory of Justice … placed our rights to liberty and justice upon a strong and brilliant new foundation of reason….[Rawls] has helped a whole generation of learned Americans revive their faith in democracy itself”.31

Rawls's theoretical development follows developments in contemporary and international politics. The authors of this symposium offer a snapshot of the contemporary political problems for which reflections on Rawls's insights (and shortcomings) may be stimulating. In 1975 the American Political Science Review published a collection of nine reviews of A Theory of Justice. While relating their arguments to politics, its authors focus on key philosophical moves in the Rawlsian project. In this symposium, we focus on the political moves of the Rawlsian project. Thirty years later, the contributors demonstrate that the theoretical ideas Rawls developed are useful for reflecting on political problems of contemporary relevance.

References

Ackerly, Brooke. 2000. Political theory and feminist social criticism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ackerly, Brooke. 2005. Is liberal democracy the only way? Confucianism and democracy. Political Theory 33 (4): 547–76.Google Scholar
Ackerman, Bruce. 1994. Political liberalisms. Journal of Philosophy 19 (7): 364–86.Google Scholar
Aldrich, John H. 1995. Why parties: The origin and transformation of political parties in America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Amdur, Robert. 1977. Rawls' theory of justice: Domestic and international perspectives. World Politics 29 (3): 438–61.Google Scholar
Anderson, Elizabeth. 1999. What is the point of equality? Ethics 109 (2): 287–337Google Scholar
Arneson, Richard J. 1989. Introduction. Ethics 99 (4): 695–710.Google Scholar
Arneson, Richard J. 1993. Equality. In A companion to contemporary political philosophy, eds. Robert Goodin and Philip Pettit. Oxford: Blackwell.
Arneson, Richard J. 1999. Introduction: Symposium on Rawlsian Theory of Justice: Recent Developments. Ethics 99 (4): 695–710.Google Scholar
Arrow, Kenneth J. 1973. Some ordinalist-utilitarian notes on Rawls's theory of justice. Journal of Philosophy 70 (9): 245–63.Google Scholar
Barber, Benjamin. 1975. Justifying justice: Problems of psychology, measurement, and politics in Rawls. American Political Science Review 62 (2): 663–74.Google Scholar
Barry, Brian. 1982. Humanity and justice in global perspective. In Ethics, economics and the law: Nomos Xxiv, eds. J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman. New York: New York University Press.
Barry, Brian. 1995. John Rawls and the search for stability. Ethics 105 (4): 874–915.Google Scholar
Barry, Brian. 1998. International society from a cosmopolitan perspective. In International society: Diverse ethical perspectives, eds. David R. Mapel and Terry Nardin. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Barry, Brian. 2001a. Culture and equality. Cambridge: Policy Press.
Barry, Brian. 2001b. Equality. In Encyclopedia of ethics. New York: Routledge.
Beitz, Charles. 1975. Justice and international relations. Philosophy and Public Affairs 4 (4): 282–311.Google Scholar
Beitz, Charles. 1999 [1979]. Political theory and international relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Beitz, Charles. 1994. Cosmopolitan liberalism and the states system. In Political restructuring in Europe: Ethical perspectives, ed. Chris Brown. Routledge: London.
Beitz, Charles. 2000. Rawls's Law of Peoples. Ethics 110 (July): 669–96.Google Scholar
Bell, Daniel. 2000. East meets west: Human rights and democracy in East Asia. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Benhabib, Seyla. 1988. The generalized and the concrete other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan controversy and feminist theory. In Feminism as critique: On the politics of gender, eds. Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Benhabib, Seyla. 1992. Situating the self: Gender, community, and postmodernism in contemporary ethics. New York: Routledge.
Benhabib, Seyla. 1995. Cultural complexity, moral interdependence and the global dialogical community. In Women, culture and development, eds. Martha Nussbaum and Jonathan Glover. New York: Oxford University Press.
Benhabib, Seyla. 2002. The claims of culture. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Benhabib, Seyla. 2004. The law of peoples, distributive justice, and migration. Fordham Law Review 72 (5): 1761–87.Google Scholar
Berkowitz, Peter. 1995. Communitarian criticisms and liberal lessons. Responsive Community (Fall): 54–64.Google Scholar
Berkowitz, Peter. 1996. The debating society. New Republic. Nov. 25.
Berkowitz, Peter. 2003. The demagoguery of democratic theory. Critical Review 15 (1–2).Google Scholar
Berlin, Isaiah. 1969. Four essays on liberty. New York: Oxford University Press.
Blake, Michael. 2001. Distributive justice, state coercion, and autonomy. Philosophy and Public Affairs 30 (3): 257–96.Google Scholar
Bloom, Allan. 1975. Justice: John Rawls vs. the tradition of political philosophy. American Political Science Review 69 (2): 648–62.Google Scholar
Bohman, James. 1995. Public reason and cultural pluralism: Political liberalism and the problem of moral pluralism. Political Theory 23 (2): 253–79.Google Scholar
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1984. Distinction: A social critique of the judgement of taste. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Brewin, Christopher. 1978. Justice in international relations. In The reason of states, ed. Michael Donelan. London: George Allen and Unwin.
Brown, Michael et al., eds. 1996. Debating the democratic peace. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Brown, Wendy. 1995. State's of injury: Power and freedom in late modernity. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Buchanan, Allen. 1989. Assessing the communitarian critique of liberalism. Ethics 99 (4): 852–82.Google Scholar
Buchanan, Allen. 1999. Recognitional legitimacy and the state system. Philosophy and Public Affairs 28 (1): 46–78.Google Scholar
Buchanan, Allen. 2000a. Rawls's Law of Peoples: Rules for a vanished Westphalian world. Ethics 110 (4): 697–721.Google Scholar
Buchanan, Allen. 2000b. Justice, legitimacy and human rights. In The idea of a political liberalism: Essays on Rawls, eds. Victoria Davion and Clark Wolf. Rowan and Littlefield: London.
Butler, Judith. 1990. Gender trouble. New York: Routledge.
Byman, Daniel L., and Jerrold D. Green. 1999. The enigma of stability in the Persian Gulf monarchies. Middle East Review of International Affairs 3 (3): 20–37.Google Scholar
Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. 1960. The American voter. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Caney, Simon. 2002. Cosmopolitan and the law of peoples. Journal of Political Philosophy 10 (1): 95–123.Google Scholar
Carens, Joseph. 1989. Membership and morality. In Immigration and the politics of citizenship in Europe and North America, ed. William Brubaker. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
Central Intelligence Agency. 1999. CIA World Fact Book, http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps35389/1999/9.htm
Chapman, John W. 1975. Rawls's Theory of Justice. American Political Science Review 69 (2): 588–93.Google Scholar
Christiano, Thomas. 2001. Is there any basis for Rawls' duty of civility? Modern Schoolman 78 (January/March): 151–61.Google Scholar
Clayton, Mathew, and Andrew Williams. 1999. Egalitarian justice and interpersonal comparison. European Journal of Political Research 35 (4): 445–64.Google Scholar
Clinton, William J. 1999. Remarks by the President at the Presentation of The National Medal of the Arts and The National Humanities Medal. Press release, Wednesday, September 29. http://clinton4.nara.gov/textonly/WH/New/html/19990929.html
Cohen, G. A. 1997. Where the action is: On the site of distributive justice. Philosophy and Public Affairs 26: 3–30.Google Scholar
Cohen, G. A. 2000. If you're an egalitarian, how come you're so rich? Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Cohen, Joshua. 1989. Democratic equality. Ethics 99 (4): 727–51.Google Scholar
Cohen, Joshua. 1993. Moral pluralism and political consensus. In The Idea of democracy, eds. Davide Copp, John Roemer, and Jean Hampton. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cohen, Joshua. 1996. Procedure and substance in deliberative democracy. In Democracy and difference: Changing boundaries of the political, ed. Seyla Benhabib. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Cohen, Joshua. 2002. The pursuit of fairness. Boston Globe, Dec. 1.
Connolly, William. 1991. Identity/difference: Democratic negotiations of political paradox. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Dallmayr, Fred R. 2001. Achieving our world: Toward a global plural democracy. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Daniels, Norman. 1989a. Equal liberty and unequal worth of Liberty. In Reading Rawls: Critical studies on Rawls' A Theory of Justice, ed. Norman Daniels. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Daniels, Norman. 1989b. Reading Rawls: Critical studies on Rawls' A Theory of Justice. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Daniels, Norman. 2003. Democratic Equality: Rawls's complex egalitarianism. In The Cambridge Companion to Rawls, ed, Samuel Scheffler. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Davis, D. W., and B. D. Silver. 2004. Civil liberties vs. security: Public opinion in the context of the terrorist attacks on America. American Journal of Political Science 48 (1): 28–46.Google Scholar
Davis, James A., Tom W. Smith, and Peter V. Marsden. 2003. General Social Surveys, 1972–2002: [cumulative file] [computer file]. 2nd ICPSR version. Chicago, IL: National Opinion Research Center [producer]. Storrs, CT: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut/Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributors].
DiQuatrro, Arthur. 1983. “Rawls and left criticism.” Political Theory 11 (Feb.): 53–78.Google Scholar
Doyle, Michael 1983a. Kant, liberal legacies and foreign affairs. Part I. Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (3): 205–35.Google Scholar
Doyle, Michael 1983b. Kant, liberal legacies and foreign affairs. Part II. Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (4): 323–53.Google Scholar
Doyle, Michael 1997. Ways of war and peace. New York: W.W. Norton.
Duverger, Maurice. 1963. Political parties: Their organization and activity in the modern state. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Dworkin, Ronald. [1973] 1989. The original position. In Reading Rawls: Critical studies on Rawls' A Theory of Justice. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Dworkin, Ronald. [1973] 1981a. What is equality? Part 1: Equality of welfare. Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (3): 185–246.Google Scholar
Dworkin, Ronald. [1973] 1981b. What is equality? Part 2: Equality of resources. Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (4): 283–345.Google Scholar
Estlund, David. 1988. Debate: Liberalism, equality, and fraternity in Cohen's critique of Rawls. Journal of Political Philosophy 6 (1): 99–112.Google Scholar
Feldman, S., and M.R. Steenbergen. 2001. The humanitarian foundation of support for social welfare. American Journal of Political Science 45 (3): 658–77.Google Scholar
Fish, Stanley. 1999. The trouble with principle. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Fisk, Milton. 1989. History and reason in Rawls' moral theory. In Reading Rawls: Critical studies on Rawls' A Theory of Justice. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Fiss, Owen. 2002. Groups and the equal protection clause. Issues in Legal Scholarship. The Berkeley Electronic Press, www.bepress.com.
Foster, Sheila. 2004. Rawls, race, and reason. Fordham Law Review 72:1715.Google Scholar
Foucault, Michel, 1979. Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison. New York: Vintage Books.
Fraser, Nancy. 1997. Justice interruptus: Critical reflections on the “postsocialist” condition. New York: Routledge.
Fraser, Nancy. 2003. Social justice in the age of identity politics: Redistribution, recognition, and participation. In Redistribution or recognition? A political philosophical exchange, eds. Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth. New York: Verso.
Freedom House. 2003. Freedom House Country Reports, 2003, http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/countries.html.
Freedom House. 2004. Freedom in the world, 2004. http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15&year=2004.
Freeman, Samuel. 1990. Reason and agreement in social contract views. Philosophy and public affairs 19 (2): 122–57.Google Scholar
Freeman, Samuel. 1999. Editor's Preface. In John Rawls: Collected papers. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Freeman, Samuel. 2000. Deliberative democracy: A sympathetic comment. Philosophy and Public Affairs 29 (4): 371–418.Google Scholar
Freeman, Samuel. 2003. Introduction. Cambridge companion to Rawls, ed. Samuel Freeman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Freeman, Samuel. 2005. The Law of Peoples, social cooperation, human rights, and distributive justice. Manuscript, University of Pennsylvania.
Galbraith, James K. 2002. A perfect crime: Inequality in the age of globalization. Daedalus 131 (1): 11–25.Google Scholar
Galston, William A. 1989. Pluralism and social unity. Ethics 99 (4): 711–26.Google Scholar
Galston, William A. 2002. Liberal pluralism: The implications of value pluralism for political theory and practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gaus, Gerald. 1999. Reasonable pluralism and the domain of the political. Inquiry 42 (2): 259–84.Google Scholar
Gauthier, David. 1977. The social contract as ideology. Philosophy & Public Affairs 6 (2): 130–64.Google Scholar
George, Robert P. 2001. The clash of orthodoxies: Law, religion, and morality in crisis. Wilmington: ISI Books.
Green, Donald, Bradley Palmquist, and Eric Schickler. 2002. Partisan hearts and minds: Political parties and the social identities of voters. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Gudridge, Patrick. 2001. The Law of Peoples. American Journal of International Law 95 (3): 714–20.Google Scholar
Gutmann, Amy, and Dennis Thompson. 1996. Democracy and disagreement: Why moral conflict cannot be avoided in politics and what to do about it. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Habermas, Jürgen. 2001. The inclusion of other: Studies in political theory. Eds. Ciaran Cronin and Pablo De Greiff. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Hampshire, Stuart. 1993. Liberalism: The new twist. New York Review of Books, August 12, 43–47.
Hampton, Jean. 1989. Should political philosophy be done without metaphysics? Ethics 99 (4): 791–814.Google Scholar
Hardin, Russell. 2003. Indeterminacy and society. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Harsanyi, John C. 1975. Can the maximin principle serve as a basis for morality? A critique of John Rawls's theory. American Political Science Review 69 (2): 594–606.Google Scholar
Hart, H.L.A. 1989 [1973]. Rawls on liberty and its priority. In Reading Rawls: Critical studies on Rawls' A Theory of Justice. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Hauptmann, Emily. 2004. A local history of ‘The Political’. Political Theory 32 (1): 34–60.Google Scholar
Hochschild, Jennifer. 1981. What's fair? American beliefs about distributive justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Hofstadter, Richard. 1969. The idea of a party system: The rise of legitimate opposition in the United States, 1780–1840. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Honig, Bonnie. 1993. Political theory and the displacement of politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Hume, David. 1985 [1777]. Of Parties in General. In Essays moral, political, and literary, ed. Eugene F. Miller. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
Ivison, Duncan. 2002. Postcolonial liberalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jones, Peter. 1996. International human rights: Philosophical and political. In National rights, international obligations, eds. Simon Caney, David George, and Peter Jones. Boulder, CO: Westview Press:.
Kant, Immanuel. 1970. Perpetual Peace. In Kant's Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Katzman, Kenneth. 2003. The Persian Gulf: Issues for U.S. policy, 2003. Report for Congress: February 3. U.S. Congressional Research Service.
Kelly, Erin. 2001. Editor's Foreword. In Justice as fairness: A restatement. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Kittay, Eva Feder. 1999. Love's labor: Essays on women, equality, and dependency. New York: Routledge.
Kittay, Eva Feder, and Ellen Feder. 2003. The subject of care. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
Klosko, George. 1997. Political constructivism in Rawls's Political Liberalism. American Political Science Review 91 (3): 635–46.Google Scholar
Krause, Sharon. 2005. Desiring justice: Motivation and justification in Rawls and Habermas. Contemporary Political Theory 4 (4): 363–85.Google Scholar
Kreide, Regina. 2002. Book reviews of Law of Peoples by John Rawls and Collected Papers by John Rawls. Constellations 9 (4): 599–605.Google Scholar
Krouse, Richard, and Michael McPherson. 1988. Capitalism, property-owning democracy, and the welfare state. In Democracy and the welfare state, ed. Amy Gutmann. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Kukathas, Chandran, and Philip Pettit. 1990. Rawls: A Theory of Justice and its critics. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Kuper, Andrew. 2000. Rawlsian global justice: Beyond the law of peoples to a cosmopolitan law of persons. Political Theory 28 (5): 640–74.Google Scholar
Kymlicka, Will. 1988. Rawls on teleology and deontology. Philosophy and Public Affairs 17 (3): 173–90.Google Scholar
Kymlicka, Will. 1989. Liberalism, community, and culture. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kymlicka, Will. 1995. Multicultural citizenship. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kymlicka, Will. 2002. Contemporary political philosophy: An introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Laden, Anthony. 2003. The house that Jack built: Thirty years of reading Rawls. Ethics 113 (2): 367–90.Google Scholar
Lane, R. E. 1962. Political ideology: Why the American common man believes what he does. New York: The Free Press.
Larmore, Charles. 1987. Patterns of moral complexity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Macedo, Stephen. 2004. What self-governing peoples owe to one another: Universalism, diversity, and the law of the peoples. Fordham Law Review 72: 101–17.Google Scholar
MacIntyre, Alasdair. 1981. After virtue. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Manin, Bernard. 1997. The principles of representative government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Marx, Karl. 1972. Critique of the Gotha Program. In Selected Works of Marx and Engels. New York: International Publishers.
McCarthy, Thomas. 1994. Kantian constructivism and reconstructivism: Rawls and Habermas in dialogue. Ethics 105 (1): 44–63.Google Scholar
McClosky, H., and J. Zaller. 1984. The American ethos: Public attitudes toward capitalism and democracy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Meade, James. 1964. Efficiency, equality, and the ownership of property. London: Allen and Unwin.
Mill, John Stuart. 1977 [1859]. On liberty. In Essays on Politics and Society, ed. J. M. Robson. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Miller, Richard. 1989 [1974]. Rawls and Marxism. In Reading Rawls: Critical studies on Rawls' A Theory of Justice. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Miller, David. 1995. On nationality. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Miller, David. 1998. The limits of cosmopolitan justice. In International society: diverse ethical perspectives, eds. David R. Mapel and Terry Nardin. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Miller, David. 1999. Principles of social justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Mills, Charles. 1997. The racial contract. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Moellendorf, Darrel. 1996. Constructing the law of peoples. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly: 132–54.Google Scholar
Moon, Donald. 2003. The current state of political theory: Pluralism and reconciliation. In What is political theory, eds. Stephen K. White and J. Donald Moon. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
Moon, J. Donald. 1993. Constructing community: Moral pluralism and tragic conflict. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Mouffe, Chantal. 2000. The democratic paradox. New York: Verso.
Murphy, Liam B. 1998. Institutions and the demands of justice. Philosophy and Public Affairs 27 (4): 251–91.Google Scholar
Murphy, Liam B. 2000. Moral demands in nonideal theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nagel, Thomas. 1989 [1973]. Rawls on Justice. In Reading Rawls: Critical studies on Rawls' A Theory of Justice. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Nagel, Thomas. 1987. Moral conflict and political legitimacy. Philosophy and Public Affairs 16 (3): 215–40.Google Scholar
Nagel, Thomas. 1991. Equality and partiality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nagel, Thomas. 2005. The Problem of global justice. Philosophy and Public Affairs 33 (2): 113–47.Google Scholar
Neal, Patrick. 1993. Vulgar liberalism. Political Theory 21 (4): 623–42.Google Scholar
Nozick, Robert. 1974. Anarchy, state and utopia. New York: Basic Books.
O'Neill, Onora. 1975. Lifeboat earth. Philosophy and Public Affairs 4 (3): 273–92.Google Scholar
O'Neill, Onora. 1996. Towards Justice and Virtue: A constructive account of practical reasoning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Okin, Susan Moller. 1989a. Gender, justice and the family. Basic Books: New York.
Okin, Susan Moller. 1989b. Reason and feeling in thinking about justice. Ethics 99 (2): 229–49.Google Scholar
Okin, Susan Moller. 1994. Political liberalism, justice, and gender. Ethics 105 (1): 23–43.Google Scholar
Okin, Susan Moller. 2004. Justice and gender: An unfinished debate. Fordham Law Review 72: 1537–67.Google Scholar
Okin, Susan Moller. 2005. Forty acres and a mule for women: Rawls and feminism. Politics, Philosophy, Economics 4 (2): 233–48.Google Scholar
Pateman, Carole. 1988. The sexual contract. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Phillips, Anne. 2004. Defending equality of outcome. Journal of Political Philosophy 12 (1): 1–19.Google Scholar
Pogge, Thomas. W. 1989. Realizing Rawls. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Pogge, Thomas. W. 1994. An egalitarian law of peoples. Philosophy and Public Affairs 23 (3): 195–224.Google Scholar
Pogge, Thomas. W. 2000. On the site of distributive justice: Reflections on Cohen and Murphy. Philosophy and Public Affairs 29 (2): 137–69.Google Scholar
Pogge, Thomas. W. 2001a. Priorities of global justice. In Global Justice, ed. Thomas Pogge. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Pogge, Thomas. W. 2001b. Rawls on international justice. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (203): 246–53.Google Scholar
Rawls, John. 1958. Justice as fairness. Philosophical Review 67 (2): 164–94.Google Scholar
Rawls, John. 1999 [1971]. A theory of justice, revised edition, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Rawls, John. 1980. Kantian constructivism in moral theory. Journal of Philosophy 77 (9): 515–72.Google Scholar
Rawls, John. 1985. Justice as fairness: Political not metaphysical. Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 (3): 223–51.Google Scholar
Rawls, John. 1987. The idea of an overlapping consensus. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 7 (1): 1–25.Google Scholar
Rawls, John. 1993. The law of peoples. In On Human Rights, eds. Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley. New York: Basic Books.
Rawls, John. 1996 [1993]. Political liberalism, paperback edition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Rawls, John. 1999. The law of peoples. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Rawls, John. 1999. The idea of public reason revisited. In Collected Papers, ed. Samuel Freeman. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Originally published in University of Chicago Law Review I 64 (Summer 1997): 765–807.
Rawls, John. 2000. Lectures on the history of moral philosophy, ed. Barbara Herman. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Rawls, John. 2001. Justice as fairness: A restatement. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Raz, Joseph. 1990. Facing diversity: The case of epistemic abstinence. Philosophy and Public Affairs 19 (1): 3–46.Google Scholar
Reidy, David. 2000. Rawls's wide view of public reason: Not wide enough. Res Publica 6 (1): 49–72.Google Scholar
Richardson, Henry, ed. 1999. The two principles and their justification. New York: Garland Publishers.
Richardson, Henry, and Paul Weithman, eds. 1999. The philosophy of Rawls: A collection of essays. 5 vols. New York: Garland Publishers.
Riphenburg, Carol J. 1998. Oman: Political development in a changing world. Westport, CT: Praeger.
Rorty, Richard. 1979. Philosophy and the mirror of nature. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Rorty, Richard. 1983. “Postmodern bourgeois liberalism.” Journal of Philosophy 80 (10): 583–89.Google Scholar
Rosenblum, Nancy L. 1998. Membership and morals. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Sandel, Michael. 1982. Liberalism and the limits of justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sandel, Michael. 1984. The procedural republic and the unencumbered self. Political Theory 12 (1): 81–96.Google Scholar
Scanlon, T.M. 1989. Rawls' Theory of Justice. In Reading Rawls: Critical studies on Rawls' A Theory of Justice. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Schattschneider, E. E. 1942. Party government. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc.
Scheffler, Samuel. 1992. Responsibility, reactive attitudes, and liberalism in philosophy and politics. Philosophy and Public Affairs 21: 299–323.Google Scholar
Scheffler, Samuel. 1994. The appeal of political liberalism. Ethics 105 (1): 4–22.Google Scholar
Sen, Amartya. 1990. Justice: Means versus freedoms. Philosophy and Public Affairs 19 (2): 111–21.Google Scholar
Shapiro, Ian. 1999. Democratic justice. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Shapiro, Ian. 2003. The moral foundations of politics. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Shiffman, Gary. 2002. Construing disagreement: Consensus and invective in “constitutional” debate. Political Theory 30 (2): 175–203.Google Scholar
Silvers, Anita. 1998. Formal justice. In Disability, Difference, Discrimination: Perspectives on Justice in Bioethics and Public Policy, eds. Anita Silvers, David Wasserman, Mary B. Mahowald. Lanham, MD: Roman and Littlefield.
Singer, Peter. 1972. Famine, affluence, and morality. Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (3): 229–43.Google Scholar
Singer, Peter. 2002. One world: The ethics of globalization. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Smiley, Marion. 2004. Democratic citizenship v. patriarchy: A feminist perspective on Rawls. Fordham Law Review 72: 1599.Google Scholar
South Commission. 1991. The challenge to the south. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sterba, James P. 1977. Retributive justice. Political Theory 5 (3): 349–62.Google Scholar
Sullivan, Kathleen M. 1998. Against campaign finance reform. Utah Law Review 311.Google Scholar
Talisse, Robert. 2001. On Rawls: A liberal theory of justice and justification. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Talisse, Robert. 2005. Democracy after liberalism: Pragmatism and deliberative politics. New York: Routledge.
Tan, K.C. 2001. Critical notice of John Rawls, The Law of Peoples. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (1) 113–32.Google Scholar
Taylor, Charles. 1994 [1992]. The politics of recognition. In Multiculturalism: Examining the politics of recognition, ed. Amy Gutmann. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Tilly, Charles. 1998. Durable inequality. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Tocqueville, Alexis de. 2000 [1835, 1840]. Democracy in America, ed. and tr. Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Tucker, Robert W. 1975. The inequality of nations. New York: Basic Books.
UN Millennium Project. 2005. Investing in development: A practical plan to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. New York: Earthscan.
Waldron, Jeremy. 1993 [1986]. John Rawls and the social minimum. In Liberal rights: Collected papers 1981–1991. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wallach, John R. 1987. Liberals, communitarians, and the tasks of political theory. Political Theory 15 (4): 581–611.Google Scholar
Walzer, Michael. 1983. Spheres of justice. New York: Basic Books.
Walzer, Michael. 1984. Liberalism and the art of separation. Political Theory 12 (3): 315–30.Google Scholar
Walzer, Michael. 1990. The communitarian critique of liberalism. Political Theory 18 (1): 6–23.Google Scholar
Warner, Michael. 1999. The trouble with normal: Sex, politics and the ethics of queer life. New York: The Free Press.
Weithman, Paul. 2002. Religion and the obligations of citizenship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wenar, Leif. 1995. Political liberalism: An internal critique. Ethics 106 (1): 32–62.Google Scholar
Westie, F.R. 1965. The American dilemma: An empirical test. American Sociological Review 30 (4): 527–38.Google Scholar
White, Stephen. 2000. Sustaining affirmation: The strengths of weak ontology in political theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
White, Stephen, ed. 2002. Political Theory 30 (August): 471–619.
White, Stephen, and Donald Moon, eds. 2004. What is political theory? London; Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Williams, Andrew. 1999. Egalitarian justice and interpersonal comparison. European Journal of Political Research 35 (4): 445–64.Google Scholar
Wolf, Susan. 1982. Moral saints. Ethics 79 (August): 419–39.Google Scholar
Wolin, Sheldon. 1996. The liberal/democratic divide: On Rawls's Political Liberalism. Political Theory 24 (1): 97–142.Google Scholar
Wolterstorff, Nicholas. 1997. The role of religion in decision and discussion of political issues. In Religion in the public square, eds. Robert Audi and Nicholas Wolterstorff. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
World Commission on the Social Dimensions of Globalization. 2004. A fair globalization: Creating opportunities for all. Geneva: I.L.O.
Young, Iris Marion. 1990. Justice and the politics of difference. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Young, Iris Marion. 1997. Reflections on families in the age of Murphy Brown: On justice, gender and sexuality. In Intersecting voices: Dilemmas of gender, political philosophy and policy, ed. Iris Marion Young. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Young, Iris Marion. 2001. Equality of whom?—Social groups and judgments of injustice. Journal of Political Philosophy 9 (1): 1–18.Google Scholar
Young, Iris Marion. 2002. Status inequality and social groups. In Issues in Legal Scholarship, ed. Robert Post. Berkeley: Berkeley Electronic Press.
Young, Iris Marion. 2003. Political responsibility and structural injustice. The Lindley Lecture, University of Kansas.
Young, Iris Marion. 2005. On female body experience. New York: Oxford University Press.
Young, Iris Marion. Forthcoming. The recognition of love's labor: Considering Axel Honneth's feminism. In Recognition and power, eds. Bert Van der Brink and David Owen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.