Small states are the largest number of members of most multi-lateral organizations starting with the United Nations. While international law may confer equality of status on states whatever their size, international politics does not. Whatever definition of size is used, states that are bigger in terms of population, military strength, Gross Domestic Product and natural resources such as oil claim more influence than do states that have relatively few people, guns and gold. Moreover, most small states lack any significant form of what Joe Nye calls soft power. Moreover, since size is not measured in absolute terms but relatively, states with an above-average population in international terms may be the weaker participant in asymmetrical relations with big states. Together, these two books make clear the limits on small states in a world of increasing interdependence. They also set out the strategies that enable smaller states to punch above their weight through collective action with other small states or with a bigger state.
Small states have a strong commitment to institutions for collective action such as the European Union, because they know that their relative smallness makes them vulnerable to unilateral action by big states that pursue their own interests and externalize the costs on small states as bystanders. Moreover, if a big state negotiates with a small state, most of the bargaining chips are in the hands of the bigger state. Case studies in the Steinmetz and Wivel volume make clear that small states can no longer hide from the influence of big states. The Netherlands, for example, was able to remain neutral in the First World War but was invaded early on in the Second World War, and the formal neutrality of Austria and Switzerland does not insulate them from the effects of the Cold War or international financial monitoring. Ireland pursues an active policy of neutrality (and distancing from the United Kingdom) through participating in UN peacekeeping missions. The chapter on Iceland is a reminder of what happens when a country seeks to punch too much above its weight by extending leveraged financial activities beyond the capacity of its home state to bail them out.
Diana Panke's book complements Steinmetz and Wivel's focus on international relations by intensively examining how 19 small states seek to protect their interests by exercising influence as members of the European Union. A major strength of the book is that it can be read on two levels. At the top of the page a conceptual framework is applied to generalize about what small states can do and to set out the results of statistical tests of interviews. At the bottom of the page there are lengthy quotations from interviews with more than 100 national officials charged with representing their national government in the multi-lateral system of governance influenced by what is done in their national capital as well as what happens in Brussels.
The European Union strengthens the position of small states by establishing formal institutions in which small countries participate as of right and have formal equality with big states. Moreover, the rules of the EU, enforced by the European Court of Justice, bind large countries as well as small ones. Chancellor Angela Merkel has learned this to her cost as Germany is both the biggest player and payer in the Eurozone. To achieve a collective decision by consensus involves formal and informal discussions in multiple venues. Panke emphasises that small states prefer to arrive at a consensus by discussion and deliberation rather than engage in bilateral bargaining with bigger and more powerful states. If they do not do so, then they are passive decision-takers rather than actively exerting at least a little influence on issues that are their priority.
Panke's analysis postulates that the ability of small states to make the most of their circumstances depends on both their capacity-building efforts and their shaping strategies. Shaping strategies include framing, arguing, networking, bargaining and coalition-building and acting as a mediator or broker of compromises because their small size makes them independent of big states in dispute. Building capacity by investing in the long-term training of public officials to understand both the Brussels and the national dimension in a given policy area is a necessary but not sufficient condition of exercising smart power in the EU system. High-capacity public officials must then use their skills to shape discussions in EU councils at all levels, starting at working parties of mid-career civil servants.
Whereas much discourse about foreign policy is entirely a question of framing issues in carefully chosen words, EU policy deliberations do have tangible outputs. Panke's study emphasizes that if representatives of small state in Brussels are to advance national interests, they must have prompt and realistic guidance from national ministries when an issue comes up affecting such interests. This is because the expertise of diplomats is in negotiating with foreigners rather than in understanding the intricacies of regulations affecting specific industries or categories of workers. With a brief from a ministry that takes other countries into account, a country's Brussels team can then seek to shape the discussion of an issue in a way consistent with the country's interests and initiate discussions that lead to alliances with other governments, large as well as small, with parallel goals.
A strength of Panke's research is that it calls attention to the fact that many national ministries give priority to national politics, and by the time that laggard ministries give their Brussels counterparts the information and ammunition they need, decisions may have been taken against a country's interests. Whereas big countries such as Germany and France can demand re-opening negotiations if they choose, small states do not have this political luxury.
A substantial part of Panke's book is taken up with presenting regression analyses that seek to explain why some small states do better than others in efforts to punch above their weight. The findings qualify the idea that size matters. First, they show that population variations of up to 20 to 1 between small states are not controlling and that states similar in size do differ in influence. This reflects differences in their investment in capacity building and in shaping strategies that affect EU policy outcomes. The length of time a country has been a member of the EU also affects its capacity. Hence, the ten new EU member states that are small or smaller currently tend to be disadvantaged.
The focus on Europe of both studies is understandable but leaves open two important issues. To what extent has the increasing globalization of issues made all EU member states small relative to the United States and the People's Republic of China? To what extent have non-state actors, whether terrorist cells or major players in bond markets, affected the capacity of EU member countries large and small? In global terms, the EU itself may appear a small regional group, especially compared to Asia. Moreover, its inability to agree common economic and security policies creates a fundamental political flaw in trying to create capacity by establishing a European diplomatic service to represent policies that do not exist.
