Machiavellian Moment Interpretations

There are three complementary interpretations of the Machiavellian Moment.

The first, and the oldest, refers to the crystallization of Machiavelli’s thinking on the threats that affected the Republic of Florence due to the citizens’ participative disengagement in the survival of their city. This analysis stems from observing the historical context that marked the evolution of the Florentine republic and led Machiavelli to develop his political philosophy (Bergès Reference Bergès2000).

The second, more recent, interpretation stems from the work by Pocock (Reference Pocock1975), which puts Machiavelli’s political philosophy in perspective. Pocock offers a rereading of Machiavelli’s work to support the idea that the secretary of Florence developed a political philosophy that later was found in the North American republican tradition and that opposed John Locke’s thinking. According to Pocock, Machiavelli and his contemporaries—Girolama Savonarola, Donato Giannotti, and François Guichardin—were confronted with the problem that the republic is a historical phenomenon, something that is born, lives, and, often, ends up ceasing to exist. From this perspective, Pocock believes that Machiavelli would have had the intention, in the Discourses, to identify the reasons why republic regimes endure. This proposition is based on an explanation of the dialectic between virtù and fortuna that Machiavelli proposes to understand the development and decline of both republics and principalities. To better understand Pocock’s position, it is necessary to recall the reasons why he defends the dual interpretation of his book’s title, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition. Indeed, the book’s title refers to a first interpretation of the Machiavellian Moment as the period in history when Machiavelli’s thinking appeared. It also designates the dialectic among virtù, fortuna, and corruptio that allows Pocock to reinterpret Machiavelli’s republicanism.

Without initiating a more specific analysis of Pocock’s work (Gaille-Nikodimov Reference Gaille-Nikodimov, Sfez and Senellart2001; Ménissier Reference Ménissier, Sfez and Senellart2001, Reference Ménissier2013), we believe his thinking gives a significant place to a more traditional interpretation of a Machivellian Moment as a result of the dialectic between virtù and fortuna, leading either to generalized corruptio or to the social stability desired by the people, which corresponds to the concept of ordine. Pocock feels that many authors’ interpretations of the dialectic between virtù and fortuna did not give sufficient weight to the concept of ordine, which Machiavelli employs in both the Discourses and De Principatibus, to show that the people want to benefit from institutions able to promote sufficient social equilibrium within the meaning of Pareto.^{Footnote 5} The ordine is the result of the opposing forces of virtù and fortuna, which allow the people to pursue the social and economic activities they want to pursue. The ordine, as an institution, may become accustomed to the political regimes of the republic as well as the principality, so Pocock’s thesis, according to which Machiavelli is at the origin of the North American republican tradition,^{Footnote 6} is defendable stricto sensu, but must be repositioned. According to Machiavelli in the Discourses (1952), “if the object of the Nobles and of the Ignobles [populace] is considered, it will be seen that the former have a great desire to dominate, and the latter a desire not to be dominated and consequently a greater desire to live free, being less hopeful of usurping it [liberty] than are the Nobles” (p. 198). Therefore, the problem for the prince or those who lead the republic is to find the appropriate way to balance the opposing forces of virtù and fortuna, because “part of the people wishes to be free to lead; but the others who are more numerous, wish to live in freedom and security” (Machiavelli, Discourses, Reference Machiavelli1952, I, p. 16).

Of course, the rupture of the equilibrium between virtù and fortuna assumes the end of the ordine. It is this third interpretation of the Machiavellian Moment, as equilibrium and rupture between virtù and fortuna, to which Pareto refers and which we will address here. This interpretation finds an analytical continuity in many political science and sociology works focusing, specifically, on the interactions between these two concepts to explain the management of public affairs, the evolution of institutions, and, in a broader sense, social dynamics (Burnham Reference Burnham1943; Strauss Reference Strauss1958; Colonna d’Istria and Frapet Reference Collona D’istria and Frapet1980; Sfez Reference Sfez and Senellart2003, Audier Reference Audier2005; Rochet Reference Rochet2008; Collin Reference Collin2008).

Also, this third interpretation corresponds to Pareto’s interpretation. Pareto suggests the desire is to identify that which is consistent in economic, political, and social relationships in order to distinguish the laws of evolution for society. For Pareto, these laws are based on the dynamic that he highlights among the categories of residues, derivations, interest, and heterogeneity or social circulation, whose foundations are found in those of fortuna, virtù, and ordine proposed by Machiavelli.

Virtù, Fortuna, Corruptio, Ordine, and Rupture of the Machiavellian Moment

According to Machiavelli, fortuna takes on a dual dimension. It is the source of malevolent coincidence, and can refer to events that bring benefits. In relation to the first eventuality, fortuna is responsible for the struggles among men for power, struggles that produce changes in political and social equilibriums. Thus, on the one hand, it is synonymous with destructive or destabilizing events and angry actions emanating from the greed of princes and men more generally (Machiavelli, De Principatibus, 1952, pp. 356–362).^{Footnote 7} On the other hand, it is at the origin of the changes required for social progress. In the latter sense, it is a positive principle, as long as those who have the requisite virtues are able to grasp the opportunities (Machiavelli, De Principatibus, 1952, ch. VI). Therefore, fortuna is not systematically harmful; however, it is a necessary condition for better organizing political institutions (Machiavelli, De Principatibus, 1952, p. 42). Therefore, fortuna, as “goddess of fertility,” but also of “arbitrary strength and instability,” designates what men should not to their personal merit (Rélang Reference Rélang2003, p. 650). It is synonymous with good fortune and that which politicians owe to others (Machiavelli, De Principatibus, 1952, pp. 306–312). It also designates that which men owe to good fortune and which they are able to grasp, either to gain power or to maintain it for as long as they possess the necessary virtues (Machiavelli, Discourses, 1952, p. 996).

Further, fortuna expresses uncertainty—that is, the full range of the threats that jeopardize the stability of the entire political regime.

In a complementary way, the role of virtù is to enable the emergence of an institutional order (ordine) that is able to resist the assaults of fortuna as long as this order allows the people to perform the activities they want to perform, even if, by nature, the people do not like to be governed. For Machiavelli, ordine is the equivalent of an institutional organization that must guarantee lasting civil peace. In this sense, Machiavelli believes there are no ideal institutional organizations; thus, ordine may result from the republic as well as the principality. The dynamic between virtù and fortuna supports the laws governing the evolution of political institutions—that is, their moments of equilibrium and possible rupture. The author of The Prince seeks confirmation in Ancient Rome and the Florence of his day.

For his part, as does Machiavelli, Pareto refers to the history of institutions to define the categories of his sociology and to explain the dynamic of social equilibrium as the result of the struggles among the elite for power. In this sense, Pareto acknowledges that Machiavelli always wanted to outline the uniformities between the facts and to deduce the laws of social evolution that result from the struggles for power (Pareto [Reference Pareto1916] 1935, p. 1377). Machiavelli expresses the same idea in the Discourses:

According to Machiavelli, fortuna is a source of threats for the men who must take action to maintain the stability of the republic or other forms of political regimes, if these men are marked by virtù. In this sense, fortuna is at the origin of the destabilization of the social equilibrium resulting from power struggles during which men are well advised to use force. In the Treatise, Pareto transposes this dynamic to the study of the struggles for power among the elite. He proposes an analysis based on the reasons that motivate men’s actions when their goal is to promote a political regime or institution (Pareto [Reference Pareto1916] 1935, pp. 1378–1379).

Virtù also refers to men’s physical and moral values, which allow them to seize the opportunities of history. It allows the people to take power when fortuna incites them to do so, or to protect institutions if they show themselves capable of resisting fortuna’s assaults. It is due to the leader’s virtù and because the citizens show themselves able to share certain civic values (ordine) or economic institutions that the republic can endure, just as can any other regime, which somewhat diminishes Pocock’s interpretation that Machiavelli is the forerunner of American republicanism.

Machiavelli recognizes the existence of a continuous destabilization of institutions when fortuna overtakes virtù, which corresponds to a movement between two groups of people: those who do not wish to be governed and those who intend to lead. The future of the republic or of any political institution depends upon a virtuous sharing of civic values between the citizens and the prince or between the citizens and the elite. To guarantee the stability of an institution or political regime, the dynamic between virtù and fortuna implies that ethics favor the end of a political regime and that the common good should be disassociated from the necessary means to maintain it. In this sense, the Machiavelli of the “black legend” does not correspond to the thinker in the Reason of State. Machiavelli is a republican, even though the precepts he develops can also be applied to other institutions. Also, it is essential to appreciate completely the concept of dissociation of the ways to guarantee an ordine, whose ethics are uncontestable. In fact, if Machiavelli believes in the republic and in the principality, he does not believe in regimes of assemblies that legislate, because he believes these regimes are not viable, as the history of Florence confirms. Therefore, the problem is knowing how to impose an ethics for the republic or the principality that might imply the use of force.

This point does not escape Pareto ([Reference Pareto and Pareto1920a] Reference Pareto1970), who explains about plutocratic regimes that “modern parliaments appear to be efficient instruments for demagogic plutocracy. First in the elections, and then in the deliberations, they provide a large field of activity for men who have a strong instinct for combinations. For this reason, the modern parliamentary regime partially follows the fate of plutocracy: it prospers and declines with it; and its transformations” (p. 50). According to Machiavelli, regarding principalities (Machiavelli, De Principatibus, 1952, pp. 317–320), and according to Pareto, regarding plutocracies, the political organization of a durable ordine involves the existence of governments that want to dominate and a people who aspire to politico-economic stability but who do not want their freedoms limited.

We find this opposition between the masses and the elite in Pareto, who defines “the elite” as the group of people who possess certain qualities, as against those, more numerous, who do not possess them. This opposition implies a second one, which concerns the elite’s struggle for power and the organization of economic and social institutions that would benefit it. These struggles are expressed as a series of ruptures of Machiavellian Moments, which Pareto uses to express the laws that determine social equilibriums between the political elite itself, as well as between the elite and the governed masses.

Paretian Categories and the Reformulation of the Machiavellian Moment

According to Pareto, a social heterogeneity is characterized by an elite consisting of a minority of individuals with exceptional qualities and a majority with lesser qualities (Pareto [Reference Pareto1916] 1935, pp. 1421–1428). The struggles between the government elite, on the one hand, and the masses, on the other, support the prevailing mechanisms to conquer or defend power. The struggles explain also how new institutions—in particular, economic ones—may be promoted and why others continue (Pareto [Reference Pareto1916] 1935, pp. 1423–1429). Alongside the idea of establishing sufficient ordine, these struggles are organized around a series of Machiavellian Moments resulting from the interactions among the categories of residues, derivations, interests, and social heterogeneity. These categories support the non-logical actions of individuals and groups (Pareto [Reference Pareto1916] 1935, pp. 89–93, 1435–1436). An action is non-logical (which does not mean “illogical”) when its objective goal differs from its subjective goal (Pareto [Reference Pareto1916] 1935, pp. 75–88), regardless of whether or not these goals exist. The subjective goal depends on an individual’s assessment, and the goal is objective if a scientist has verified empirical basis or validity, but the individual does not necessarily accede to these scientific proofs. An action is logical if the objective goal of the scientist corresponds to the subjective goal of the individual agent (Pareto [1906–1909] 2014, pp. 20–21; Pareto [Reference Pareto1916] 1935, p. 77). In this case, the rationality of economic agents corresponds to Herbert Simon’s instrumental rationality and considers it as a harmony between the means used and the targeted goals. With reference to the concept of non-logical actions, the behaviors of individuals depend on psychological forces beyond their conscious control and that manifest themselves through residues. These are an indirect and partial expression of instincts specific to human nature that we find discussed in Machiavelli (Aron 1938–1940b; Perrin Reference Perrin1966; Busino Reference Busino2008). The residues correspond to préconstruits, which cannot be completely understood and which men use to act and to adapt to their environment (Pareto [Reference Pareto1916] 1935, pp. 499–516).

The derivations correspond to the expressed and variable part of the residues. They support the mechanisms of pseudo-logical rationalization to which individuals turn to justify their actions. They are the expression of reasoning, accurate or false, that enables individuals to convince themselves or to convince others of the relevance of the ideologies or institutions they wish to promote cynically or in good faith (Pareto [Reference Pareto1916] 1935, pp. 992–994).^{Footnote 8} They correspond to the means the individual finds to better reach his goal, without the reasoning being perfectly rational.^{Footnote 9}

The residues, instinctively, and the derivations, as pseudo-logical arguments, express the interests of the social actors to reclaim their desire to possess goods and power (Pareto [Reference Pareto1916] 1935, p. 1406).

The interdependency among these categories allows Pareto to explain the power struggles among the elite. These struggles are the expression of different derivations and residues that differentiate one elite from another (Pareto [Reference Pareto1916] 1935, pp. 1421–1478). This dialectic allows Pareto to explain that the evolution of socio-political equilibriums can be represented by an “undulating curve” whose reversal points can be identified as ruptures of the Machiavellian Moment. We can understand here that the elite, who owns the most efficient residues, or who would be able to develop sufficient derivations, will also be more apt to seize the most appropriate moment to use virtù to act at the most favorable time or to respond to fortuna.

Three classes of Pareto’s residues (I, II, and IV; Pareto distinguishes six classes) crystallize the forces necessary to renew and maintain some of the elite, and the form this renewal may take from an intentional point of view.^{Footnote 10}

For Pareto, to remain in power, an elite must be driven more by residues of instinct for combinations (Class I) than by residues of persistence for aggregates (Class II), which the elite might lack if it exercises its power for a long time. Class I’s residues are the expression of the instincts of cunning, adaptation, or innovation. The elite in power often activates these residues to avoid using force against another elite who would try to take power or promote institutions that would be of interest to it. The instinct for combinations clearly corresponds to the cunning behaviors Machiavelli attributes to foxes. However, the residues of persistence for aggregates express instincts of defence or conquest, possibly violent, of an institution. They express the behaviors of the defending family, religion, or nation. They refer to the behaviors of Machiavelli’s lions in the sense that, if an elite wishes to remain in power, he must be willing to use force.

Also, the elite in power may, by activating the residues of instinct for combinations, ensure the loyalty of individuals who possess residues of persistence for aggregates so that they eliminate the elite that would attempt to gain power.

Finally, if the elite in power is unable to use force and cunning (because it does not possess sufficient residues of persistence for aggregates or residues of instinct for combinations), it often is characterized by residues connected with sociality (Class IV), such as those from reasoned repugnance to useless sufferings or those from self-sacrifice for the good of others. In many circumstances, residues connected with sociality display the weakness of the elite in power, which prefers to satisfy its opponents to preserve its interests momentarily, even if it means losing power in the long term.

There is little doubt that Pareto’s categories borrow extensively from the Machiavellian themes of force and cunning (Burnham 1949). The author of the Treatise refers to the author of De Principatibus by indicating that the opinion of certain elite is eventually imposed through cunning when the derivations that they activate are effective for convincing others that their objectives are appropriate. In other circumstances, the use of force allows the elite to exercise power or to impose an institution. Pareto shows how strategies based on the residues of Class I, if they enable the short-term survival of the elite, often lead to loss if this same elite refuses to use force (residues of Class II) and if this elite is characterized by too much residue of Class IV. The dynamic between residues of instinct for combinations and residues connected with sociality, on the one hand, and persistence for aggregates, on the other hand, gives way to the power struggle that Machiavelli expresses in the foxes and lions metaphor. We can consider, without misrepresenting Machiavelli’s thinking, that the foxes are characterized by cunning and, therefore, instinct for combinations, and the wolves are characterized more by violence and, therefore, persistence for aggregates. This dynamic implies also that the foxes may use cunning or their instinct for combinations to guarantee the strength of the lions, in order to respond to the strength of wolves, who would take power by activating residues of persistence for aggregates.

Therefore, knowing to activate the effective derivations at the right moment can be interpreted as knowing to express the principles of virtù, which Machiavelli considers to be necessary to exercise effective power. Likewise, fortuna, as a synonym of conditions to grasp, characterizes the moments of opposition between the Paretian elite with different virtù, while, for Machiavelli, it is about either how to organize an institution to protect the established order against the assaults of a new elite, or how an elite can reduce this order to take power. In this sense, according to Pareto, the precepts that prevail for the rupture of social equilibrium are based on the same explanations as those recommended by Machiavelli. Pareto explains how the struggles among the elite, characterized by different quantities of residues from classes I and II, lead to a reduction or emergence of a political regime. According to Pareto, the accumulation of individuals in possession of residues of instinct for combinations or residues connected with sociality among the dominant class explains the loss of their power, because these same individuals will prefer the cunning that consists of buying peace to sustain their interests in the short term, rather than preserving power by using force. This dynamic for conquering power is coupled with the dynamic between the political elite who hold this power and the people. A political elite cannot keep itself in power unless it has sufficient residues of persistence for aggregates to impose upon the people by means of ideological arguments and, eventually, strength. Referring to Machiavelli, Pareto stresses the role of residues of Class II, which were lacking in Italy in the early twentieth century (Pareto [Reference Pareto1916] 1935, p. 1685). Likewise, quoting the Discourses, he states that to maintain a State, the prince will come up against fewer obstacles among uneducated peoples who are subject to religion than among civilized peoples who are corrupt by nature. Here, he parallels Machiavelli, for whom the virtù of the prince, if he wants to maintain power, must ensure that an ordine that meets the interests of the people and reduces their natural tendencies toward corruptio continues. In Paretian terms, this means establishing derivations that allow an elite to impose itself in order to guarantee a lasting social equilibrium. If this equilibrium is ruptured, another elite comes to power.

We find many examples of this dynamic in Pareto’s sociology and economics. Two in particular illustrate the way the author of the Treatise adapts the concepts he borrowed from Machiavelli for his own purposes. One of these examples concerns the evolution of social equilibriums; the other concerns the alternative between free trade and protectionism.

The Machiavellian Moment and Social Equilibrium

If we follow the Sommaire du Cours de Sociologie Générale, Pareto’s main objective is to highlight the laws of moving from one social equilibrium to another.^{Footnote 11} In the Treatise this objective implies synthesizing the results obtained in pure economics with those from sociology (Pareto [Reference Pareto1916] 1935, p. 1415). To do so, Vilfredo Pareto indicates that he proceeds by successive approximations, from the simplest (pure economics) to the most complex (sociology) (Pareto [1906–1909] 2014, pp. 9–20),^{Footnote 12} and by applying a method he calls “logico-experimental” (Pareto [Reference Pareto and Pareto1898] Reference Pareto1966, Reference Pareto1900, [Reference Pareto1916] 1935, [Reference Pareto and Pareto1918] Reference Pareto1976).

A significant part of this synthesis requires an explanation of the struggles among some of the elite to obtain power. Therefore, the objective of the final chapter of the Treatise is to explain the differences between a “Maximum of ophelimity FOR a community in political economy” and a “Maximum of utility FOR a community in sociology.” This problem illustrates how social equilibriums succeed and gives significance to the rupture of the Machiavellian Moment. It constitutes an example enabling us to understand why a theorem in pure economics is not necessarily compatible with an explanation in sociology.

For this purpose, our author attempts to show why a “Maximum of utility FOR a community in sociology” is a consequence of the struggles among certain elite, while this maximum does not correspond to that which is obtained in pure economics. Pareto starts from the principle that it is impossible to compare, inter-individually, ophelimity in economics. A contrario, for Pareto, it is possible that a public authority, or a group of individuals interested in doing so, may assess various levels of “utility FOR a community in sociology.”

For Pareto, the pleasure or the ophelimity of a community does not exist. There is no risk of mistaking, in pure economics, the maximum of utility for a community and the maximum of ophelimity of a community. However, by explaining how a political elite accedes to or remains in power, or how an elite can defend its interests, Pareto justifies why certain collective choices are made (Pareto [Reference Pareto1916] 1935, p. 1376). These choices take the shape of institutional rules or types of government favorable to the elite in power. Therefore, we understand that the “Maximum of utility FOR a community in sociology” does not correspond to the “Maximum of ophelimity FOR a community in political economy.” This means that the social equilibrium resulting from the struggles among the elite is not always the “Maximum of utility FOR a community in sociology.” First, the social equilibrium achieved may not be collectively optimal; second, by switching from one social equilibrium to another, the gain obtained by one elite may not compensate the loss of another elite; and, third, it does not correspond to the “Maximum of ophelimity FOR a community in political economy.”

To justify his remarks, Pareto considers various configurations of the struggles for power, which he discusses using historical examples. Each configuration is a reflection of the variable quantities of residues that characterize the elite concerned. Five possibilities can be considered.

The first corresponds to situations in which the elite that rules or holds some type of power is not able to use force against a small number of individuals who are ready to use force. The individuals who are able to use force, in this case, have sufficient residues of persistence for aggregates. The situations anticipated by Pareto are those in which a humanitarian aristocracy is in power, but is unable to maintain power because it is characterized by too many residues connected with sociality (Residues of Class IV—Instinctive repugnance to sufferings; Reasoned repugnance to useless sufferings; Self-sacrifice for the good of others; Sharing one’s property with others; Need for group approbation). In this case, for Pareto,

This quotation attests to the fact that Pareto views humanitarian aristocracies or plutocracies as unstable institutional forms.

To illustrate this, the author refers to Machiavelli’s foxes and lions metaphor, which shows how a prince must use cunning or force if he wants to retain power (Pareto [Reference Pareto1916] 1935, pp. 1342, 1377–1382). Citing the Discourses, Pareto specifies: “I hold it very true that seldom if ever do men of low estate rise to a high place without use force and deceit … nor do I believe that force alone will ever be found to suffice, but it will be easily found that deceit alone may suffice” (Pareto [Reference Pareto1916] 1935, pp. 1377–1378).

Based on a second possibility, the author of the Treatise admits that it is difficult to remove an elite from power if it has sufficient residues of instinct of combinations to make it skilled in the use of cunning or corruption:

In other circumstances, and based on a third possibility, in order to remain in power, the elite must ensure the service of those who possess a sufficient instinct for combinations so that they do not seize power themselves by leading the masses, who are governed and are able to resort to violence.

A fourth possibility corresponds to situations where, within the class of dominated individuals, there are enough individuals characterized by residues of persistence for aggregates, which they have accumulated over time. These residues correspond to the capabilities of these individuals to use force if they are guided by an elite (Pareto [Reference Pareto1916] 1935, p. 1516).

In Machiavellian terms, these conditions are ripe for the torments of fortuna and the violence of the wolves if those in power do not have sufficient virtù to withstand it.

However (the fifth possibility), if those in power are characterized by sufficient residues of the instinct for combinations—that is, the ability to corrupt those who are able to defend their interests—and sufficient residues of persistence of aggregates characterize the mass of the governed class, the prevailing political system will show strong stability.

Once again, in Machiavellian terms, the above quotation stipulates that an elite can maintain power if the cunning of the fox is able to supplant the strength of the wolves.

This is not always possible: first, in particular, if the elite contesting power accumulates more residues of the instinct for combinations than the elite that is in power; and, second, if the elite in power is less and less able to use force because it is characterized increasingly by residues connected with sociality. In this case the strength of the wolves triumphs.

In summary, an elite maintains power if it holds a sufficient instinct for combinations, which reflects its abilities to corrupt those who are able to respond, by force, to individuals contesting the established order. Corruption, according to both Pareto and Machiavelli, plays an essential role here because it allows an elite momentarily to maintain power. However, it is corruption that precipitates the fall of this same elite if too many individuals from the governed class are corrupted. This scenario arises if more individuals characterized by residues of instinct for combinations accumulate within the governed class on the side of those in power and are characterized by too many residues connected with sociality. In other words, the accumulation of the corrupted individuals within the governed class and within the elite in power threatens the equilibrium of the Machiavellian Moment.

Machiavelli sets a similar problem when he deals with corruptio and ordine as recurring themes in Discourses. According to Machiavelli, corruptio is a characteristic of human nature (Machiavelli, Discourses, L. I, chs. 17, 18, 42, 55). It bears witness to the passing of time in the explanation of political cycles. In this sense, the accumulation of corrupted behaviors leads to the degradation of a political institution or the power in place. This accumulation marks the end to the prevailing ordine at a given time during the history of a republic, a principality, or a rule of law. A contrario, “the good armies and good laws, guaranteed by a religion that has become the moral sense, allow virtù to delay the dangers induced by fortuna and corruption” (Machiavelli, De Principatibus, 1952, pp. 324–325; Discourses, 1952, I, ch. 31, pp. 688–689). To prevent this from happening, only the force of a prince can prevent corruptio from leading to the collapse of the established ordine:

According to Machiavelli, generalized corruptio among the ruling class and an increasing number of individuals belonging to the people correspond to the role that Pareto assigns to the accumulation of the residues of instinct for combinations to the detriment of the residues of persistence of aggregates.

Pareto’s references to Machiavelli are clear also when he explains that the concessions an elite might make towards those who contest the established order are in vain if this elite does not agree to use force: “If concessions made to the extreme parties were not effective in the past, they will be even less so in the future, because, as Machiavelli observed, with a deep knowledge of human nature, the concessions that we believe are made due to fear or weakness, always backfire on those who make them” (Pareto [Reference Pareto and Pareto1904] 1984, p. 244).

Therefore, we have a better understanding of why Pareto makes a distinction between “Maximum of utility FOR a community in sociology” and “Maximum of ophelimity FOR a community in political economy.” The purpose is to demonstrate that even if mathematical economics allows us to demonstrate that a “Maximum of ophelimity FOR a community in political economy” is an optimal allocation, nothing explains that this allocation effectively takes place. It is more the struggles among the elite that allow us to understand why a “Maximum of utility FOR a community in sociology” effectively takes place.

An example borrowed from the Treatise well illustrates this eventuality in economy. It involves legal rules that some of the elite benefit from in promoting the fostering of free trade or protectionism.

The Machiavellian Moment as a Principle to Explain the Alternative between Free Trade and Protectionism

In the Manual, Pareto considers that he has mathematically demonstrated the superiority of free trade over protectionism (Pareto [1896–Reference Pareto1897] 1964, pp. 208–275; [1906–Reference Pareto, Montesano, Bruni, Zanni, Chipman and McLure1909] 2014, pp. 255–267; [Reference Pareto1916] 1935, pp. 1544–1545). He confirms this result on several occasions by highlighting statistically the adverse consequences of increasing customs tariffs imposed by Italian law in 1887 (Pareto [Reference Pareto and Pareto1891] Reference Pareto1992, [Reference Pareto and Pareto1892] 1984, [Reference Pareto and Pareto1893] Reference Pareto1984). However, Pareto thinks that these demonstrations are not sufficient to explain why, in many situations, protectionism prevails over free trade. He proposes to explain this phenomenon based on the struggles among some of the elite in favor of one or another of these types of international trade (Aron Reference Aron1967; Steiner Reference Steiner1995; Ragni Reference Ragni, Arena, Festré and Lazaric2012).

The demonstration is principally based on a diagram developed in chapter II of the Treatise that involves four elements (Pareto [Reference Pareto1916] 1935, p. 90). It is completed in chapter IX through the use of several examples. The aim is to explain the interactions among residues, derivations, interests, and social heterogeneity to understand why protectionism and free trade occur. In this respect, Pareto stresses the preponderant role of non-logical actions and the residues to explain the emergence of laws favorable to protectionism or free trade. These interactions are examined based on three main relationships and three secondary relationships, which reveal ruptures of the Machiavellian Moment, depending on whether such and such an elite has an interest that protectionism or free trade occur.

According to Pareto, one or the other of these forms of international trade is the result of an equilibrium between the residues of persistence of aggregates and the residues of instinct for combinations, which reflect the psychological states of the actors. This “psychological state” is qualified as Element A. The equilibrium between these residues gives rise to non-logical actions, which are justified by the derivations that an elite must develop to support either free trade or protectionism. Element A is at the origin of two main relationships.

The first concerns the practice of either free trade or protectionism, as the case may be. This concrete practice of free trade or protectionism is qualified as Element B. The derivations resulting from Element A may be interpreted as pseudo-logical or ideological arguments, which allow an elite to defend the practices of free trade or protectionism. Hence, the purpose of these arguments is to promote the laws determining international trade, such that the interests of the elite developing them are better defended. The elite that possesses the best-adapted residues ends up imposing the laws for its benefit. Here, we find the circumstances that prevail in the oppositions between the foxes and the wolves described by Machiavelli.

According to the above quotation, the foxes (protectionists) use cunning and the wolves (workers) use force, according to whether they are the carriers of the instinct for combinations or the residues of persistence of aggregates. Again, Pareto attempts to show that it is not because a theorem demonstrates the superiority of free trade that this type of international trade should automatically be imposed.

The connection between the demonstrated theorem and the interests pursued by a certain elite is secondary for Pareto. It is more the confrontation between the non-logical actions supported by adequate derivations, which are generated by specific residues that enable an elite to convince the majority to adopt protectionism or free trade.

The second relationship expresses the opposition of the elite characterized by previous residues to promote the pure theory of free trade or protectionism. One or another of these theories constitutes Element C of the explanation at such and such a time in history. Therefore, it is the power struggle among the elite, relayed by an efficient argumentation that explains that protectionism and free trade succeed each other as the result of a series of ruptures of the Machiavellian Moment. The argumentation is demonstrated logically in the case of free trade. According to Pareto, it is false and non-logical in the case of protectionism.

Finally, Pareto highlights how concrete actions of exchange in international trade (Element D) result from the psychological states of agents or from their group behavior, supported by previous residues emanating from Element A.

The adoption of institutions favorable to free trade or protectionism (Element B) results little from theories that might justify them (Element C) or from concrete international trade practices (Element D). It relies more on the psychological state that characterizes one elite rather than another and the rupture of equilibrium between the residues of persistence of aggregates and the residues of instinct for combinations.

The periods in history when free trade and protectionism succeed each other are many moments where the equilibrium between virtù and fortuna is broken and that correspond to the end of an unstable ordine. Using Machiavelli’s terminology, this dialectic can be translated as the impossibility for virtù always to resist the injunctions of fortuna. In other words, the elite that imposed its points of view by resorting to the residues of persistence of aggregates will, in a second phase, be more inclined to resort to the residues of instinct for combinations. It will prefer to use cunning rather than force in order that protectionism or free trade endures. Therefore, an elite that is able to seize fortuna at the right moment, thanks to the virtù that characterizes it, can reveal itself able to prompt the passage from free trade to protectionism or vice versa. In Paretian terms, the elite in favor of free trade at a moment in history will be marked increasingly by the residues of instinct for combinations, expressing the cunning behaviors Machiavelli attributes to the foxes. This same elite shows itself as unable, in some circumstances, to resist the residues of persistence of aggregates that often force behaviors that Machiavelli attributes to the wolves. In this case, the elite in favor of protectionism will be able to activate enough pseudo-logical arguments to impose its interests even if these interests are costly in terms of social welfare. Pareto is clear on this point. He explains that protectionism can favor one part of the population that possesses specific qualities of instinct for combinations at the expense of another part of the same population characterized by an important number of persons who possess residues of persistence of aggregates (Pareto [Reference Pareto1916] 1935, pp. 1563–1565). For Pareto ([1916] 1935):

In the most probable case, where the social actors are guided by non-logical actions, it is the residues and the derivations that play the main role, because they refer to the cunning used by a group of agents to convince the majority to adopt the theory of international trade that suits this group. It is a mechanism of struggle between the strong and the weak that puts in the background demonstrations of pure economics to explain the emergence of free trade or protectionism.