The focus of this valuable book is intelligence activity among many countries in Latin America during the period of the First World War and a short time later. What makes it interesting is that intelligence operations carried out during that period obviously were not as sophisticated as they are today, with the current use of modern technology, such as computers and satellites. Nevertheless, throughout the book runs the theme that intelligence operations can help or hurt a country in a variety of ways. The book also shows that intelligence operations go beyond political considerations and affect a host of other matters pertaining to national security. For example, one finds personal information about individuals relating to intelligence gathering, as well as social, political, economic, and international events countries face in times of crisis.
In developing sources for this book, the author relied primarily on declassified information secured from the National Archives of the United States. It seems, however, by the author’s own admittance, that the book is limited because it lacks foreign sources that might add more to it in terms of an analysis. For example, the author notes, “The book suffers from an over-reliance on U.S. records. Many records of Latin American, German, Japanese and U.S. intelligence have been destroyed, lost or remain inaccessible to this author” (2). This may be one reason why there has not been much scholarly activity concerned with the topic of intelligence in Latin America between 1914 and 1922. Therefore, the author did not successfully accomplish the task of securing a wide variety of sources from countries other than the United States. If this task had been done, the author might have made different interpretations of events. Nevertheless, a commendable work has come about from the author’s efforts to secure the available sources.
The book is divided into three main parts. One part focuses on the “European War in the Americas” and explains why a number of foreign countries found it beneficial to be interested in Latin America. For example, these countries often had economic interests in Latin America and needed trade routes to be protected from the dangers of a war. There were also large groups of expatriates from these countries in Latin America, some of whom desired to return to their homeland to help by serving in the military. There was also a concern about the extension of possible U.S. influence in Latin America, which might jeopardize the goals of foreign countries. In addition, the government administrations of particular Latin American countries were important because their activities and views could affect foreign countries in terms of economics and politics.
However, of special interest to U.S. readers might be the material relating to the haphazard roots of U.S. intelligence. This particular information explains the beginnings of many U.S. institutions that had a role in intelligence activities in the early part of the twentieth century. The reader will learn that when World War I started, the United States was limited in its intelligence capability concerning foreign countries. This was especially true in regard to countries in Latin America, although some information was available from U.S. foreign offices serving in that area through consular and diplomatic sources. Yet some agencies, such as the Secret Service of the Treasury Department, which the author refers to as the oldest U.S. intelligence agency, and the Office of Naval Intelligence, characterized as the first dedicated foreign intelligence agency in the United States, provided information to U.S. officials.
Another U.S. intelligence agency existing at the time of the war was the Bureau of Investigation, the forerunner of today’s Federal Bureau of Investigation. It was concerned with Mexican revolutionary activity affecting the U.S. border. In addition, the U.S. Department of State’s office of Counselor provided information, and is described as the youngest and quietest of the U.S. intelligence agencies. The author notes that this office was quite important to the State Department because it reaped most foreign intelligence from its consular offices (23).
Another main part of the book, titled “Strategic Sideshow in Latin America,” provides a substantial amount of commentary about the particulars of U.S. intelligence activity south of the border in World War I and compares it with the intelligence efforts of Germany. For example, the author notes that “the United States and Allies hustled to keep pace with the German intelligence buildup in Mexico in 1917” (162). Readers will learn that Germany’s intelligence activity in Latin America was certainly different from that of the United States: it began earlier and seemed much more active and effective. In contrast, the intelligence activities of the United States were limited, less prevalent, and not as effective. They were often carried out by diplomats and representatives of the U.S. government employed in various capacities. The author notes that in comparison to the intelligence services of other countries in Latin America, “Germany administered her secret services with characteristic Teutonic thoroughness and structure” (25).
The United States had understandable reasons for engaging in intelligence activity in Latin America during the early part of the twentieth century. For example, the political instability in some Latin American countries, such as Mexico, could certainly affect the United States in a negative manner, considering the close proximity between the two countries and the presence of large numbers of Mexican immigrants in the southwestern part of this country. In addition, some observers believed that it was possible for Mexico to be planning an attack against the United States, with the intention of taking back parts of the United States, such as Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. There was also a realization that Germany’s influence throughout Latin America could be used to further its aims in countering the United States if the latter aided Great Britain or entered the war on the side of the Allies. This led to a concern that U.S. ships could be endangered by German submarines involved in unrestricted warfare if military conflict broke out involving European countries.
Part 3 is concerned with the “Endgame of the Intelligence War in Latin America” and extends the commentary in the book through 1922. It demonstrates that a new world order came about after the conclusion of World War I, different in terms of political prominence and influence. The Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires, as well as Germany, lost their influence in the international sphere. Countries such as Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan appeared on the stage as influential major powers. “Yet, the war had opened the eyes of smaller, weaker nations to the value of intelligence and its potential to amplify their influence when they lacked the political, diplomatic, military or commercial muscle” (25).
The book concludes with an interesting epilogue indicating what happened to many of the individuals involved in the intelligence war of World War I. Some of them went on to make significant political contributions to their home countries. A number of them also retained a presence in intelligence activities that were found to be valuable later, when World War II came about. It is also clear that many foreign countries involved in Latin America during World War I still retained some degree of interest and influence there after the conclusion of the war. In a number of situations, this seemed to be due to past immigration activity in Latin American countries and concerns with retaining some degree of economic benefit. For example, in discussing the postwar relationship between Germany and Argentina, the author notes, “Throughout Latin America, economic reality and the need for international commerce forced reconciliation and healing faster than any diplomatic agreement. All was forgiven” (329).
Since the focus in this book is on Latin America during World War I, historians, political scientists, and Latin American specialists may be those who should have a special interest in what is presented in it, because the events noted and described could relate to contemporary events. In addition, there is a paucity of published commentary on the topic of intelligence activity in Latin America during the period of World War I. This book thus helps fill a need for more detailed information about that period and some later years. It should also appeal to anyone who has an interest in how various countries used the role of intelligence to further their goals during wartime, since the intelligence lessons of the past may be a useful guide to those of today.
