Huang & Bargh (H&B) argue that goals are “selfish” in the sense that Dawkins (Reference Dawkins1976) proposed that genes are selfish. Although organisms can reasonably be considered vessels that further the interests of their genes, they cannot be considered vessels that further the interests of their goals. Goals serve the organism – not vice versa – and goals have no life beyond the organism (i.e., they have no informational component that is transmitted across generations). Organisms evolved to have goals with survival or reproductive value because such goals improve the organism's fitness, but unlike genes, goals cannot serve themselves.
The problem with the selfish goal metaphor becomes apparent when H&B use it to guide their interpretation of research on goals. For example, H&B write, “the tension between the behavioral imperatives issued by the currently active goal and the other priorities of the person pursuing that goal (over time and across situations) can produce trade-offs between what is ‘good’ for the goal being pursued versus what is ‘good’ for the individual” (sect. 4, para. 2). Such statements do not bring us any closer to understanding goals and their interactions because nothing is “good for a goal.” Rather, some goals are achieved and others are not, and achievement of some goals (e.g., satisfying a desire for sweets) will lead to failure of others (e.g., satisfying a desire to lose weight).
This problem of how to interpret mutually incompatible goals is compounded by H&B's tacit assumption that an individual's paramount goal is to enhance survival. For example, H&B note that young women with a mating goal are more likely to enhance their attractiveness through diet pills and tanning booths, despite the fact that such activities “operate to the long-term detriment of the individual” (sect. 4, para. 3). H&B interpret the fact that mating goals can undermine longevity as evidence that such goals are acting selfishly.
The confusion here lies in H&B's assumption that survival goals act in the best interest of the individual and mating goals do not. From an evolutionary perspective, however, survival is only important to the degree that it facilitates reproduction – reproductive success, not survival, is the currency of natural selection. Indeed, this is a clear implication of Dawkins's selfish gene argument (and later arguments about selfish genetic elements; Burt & Trivers Reference Burt and Trivers2006). Thus, both survival and reproduction are in the interest of the individual, but because the factors that enhance one are not always the same as those that enhance the other, there will be times when the two goals are in tension. When reproduction goals can be enacted well before there is any cost to survival goals – as in the case of tanning and excessive dieting – the individual can be counted on to sacrifice long-term survival in pursuit of reproductive opportunities.
This effect can be seen in a wide variety of biological trade-offs, including senescence itself. Organisms age and die in part because selection favors the allocation of resources to reproduction over tissue maintenance and repair. Because selection pressures diminish with age (Medawar Reference Medawar1952), traits that are deleterious for long-term survival can flourish if they have a positive effect on reproduction. An intriguing example of such an effect can be found in the ε4 allele of the ApoE gene. This allele leads to a greater likelihood of developing Alzheimer's disease late in life (Corder et al. Reference Corder, Saunders, Strittmatter, Schmechel, Gaskell, Small, Roses, Haines and Pericak-Vance1993) but, ironically, is associated with better attention and memory early in life (Han et al. Reference Han, Drake, Cessante, Jak, Houston, Delis, Filoteo and Bondi2007). As such examples demonstrate, the goal of maximizing reproduction typically wins out over the goal of maximizing longevity, thereby causing genetic variants such as ApoE-ε4 to be relatively common.
Indeed, because reproduction goals are paramount, the individual will often risk immediate survival in pursuit of reproductive opportunities. For example, men take greater physical risks when in the presence of attractive women, and this rise in risk-taking is mediated by increases in testosterone (Ronay & von Hippel Reference Ronay and von Hippel2010). Similar effects can be seen in many other animals. Because men have much greater reproductive variability than women, and because they are much more likely than women to leave behind no offspring at all, selection favors men who will risk their survival in service of the goal to reproduce. Such findings are not evidence that goals are acting selfishly at cross-purposes to the individual who holds the goal. Rather, they are evidence for sexual selection; genes that cause the organism to behave in a manner that facilitates reproduction are more likely to increase in frequency over generations. This includes genes that result in more offspring at the expense of longevity.
If goals are not selfish, then how are we to understand the goal conflict that H&B highlight? We suggest that the research reviewed by H&B is better understood as individuals choosing between competing opportunities than as the goals competing themselves. Perhaps the most common source of goal conflict occurs when short-term and long-term goals collide. When people choose between short-term gains and long-term costs, they often seem to be acting against their own self-interest in a manner that suggests selfishness on the part of short-term goals. But economists and evolutionary theorists agree that future opportunities must be discounted because of their inherent uncertainty, and thus there is strong and recurrent selection pressure to weight the present more heavily than the future. Such selection pressures are misapplied in cases like drug use, when the good feelings that are produced by drugs hijack a motivational system that evolved to induce organisms to pursue their basic needs (e.g., for social status; Morgan et al. Reference Morgan, Grant, Gage, Mach, Kaplan, Prioleau, Nader, Buchheimer, Ehrenkaufer and Nader2002). Nevertheless, none of these effects require that we hypothesize that the goals themselves are selfish, and indeed such an analogy is more likely to lead researchers astray than to serve as a useful metaphor for evolutionary research on goal pursuit.
Huang & Bargh (H&B) argue that goals are “selfish” in the sense that Dawkins (Reference Dawkins1976) proposed that genes are selfish. Although organisms can reasonably be considered vessels that further the interests of their genes, they cannot be considered vessels that further the interests of their goals. Goals serve the organism – not vice versa – and goals have no life beyond the organism (i.e., they have no informational component that is transmitted across generations). Organisms evolved to have goals with survival or reproductive value because such goals improve the organism's fitness, but unlike genes, goals cannot serve themselves.
The problem with the selfish goal metaphor becomes apparent when H&B use it to guide their interpretation of research on goals. For example, H&B write, “the tension between the behavioral imperatives issued by the currently active goal and the other priorities of the person pursuing that goal (over time and across situations) can produce trade-offs between what is ‘good’ for the goal being pursued versus what is ‘good’ for the individual” (sect. 4, para. 2). Such statements do not bring us any closer to understanding goals and their interactions because nothing is “good for a goal.” Rather, some goals are achieved and others are not, and achievement of some goals (e.g., satisfying a desire for sweets) will lead to failure of others (e.g., satisfying a desire to lose weight).
This problem of how to interpret mutually incompatible goals is compounded by H&B's tacit assumption that an individual's paramount goal is to enhance survival. For example, H&B note that young women with a mating goal are more likely to enhance their attractiveness through diet pills and tanning booths, despite the fact that such activities “operate to the long-term detriment of the individual” (sect. 4, para. 3). H&B interpret the fact that mating goals can undermine longevity as evidence that such goals are acting selfishly.
The confusion here lies in H&B's assumption that survival goals act in the best interest of the individual and mating goals do not. From an evolutionary perspective, however, survival is only important to the degree that it facilitates reproduction – reproductive success, not survival, is the currency of natural selection. Indeed, this is a clear implication of Dawkins's selfish gene argument (and later arguments about selfish genetic elements; Burt & Trivers Reference Burt and Trivers2006). Thus, both survival and reproduction are in the interest of the individual, but because the factors that enhance one are not always the same as those that enhance the other, there will be times when the two goals are in tension. When reproduction goals can be enacted well before there is any cost to survival goals – as in the case of tanning and excessive dieting – the individual can be counted on to sacrifice long-term survival in pursuit of reproductive opportunities.
This effect can be seen in a wide variety of biological trade-offs, including senescence itself. Organisms age and die in part because selection favors the allocation of resources to reproduction over tissue maintenance and repair. Because selection pressures diminish with age (Medawar Reference Medawar1952), traits that are deleterious for long-term survival can flourish if they have a positive effect on reproduction. An intriguing example of such an effect can be found in the ε4 allele of the ApoE gene. This allele leads to a greater likelihood of developing Alzheimer's disease late in life (Corder et al. Reference Corder, Saunders, Strittmatter, Schmechel, Gaskell, Small, Roses, Haines and Pericak-Vance1993) but, ironically, is associated with better attention and memory early in life (Han et al. Reference Han, Drake, Cessante, Jak, Houston, Delis, Filoteo and Bondi2007). As such examples demonstrate, the goal of maximizing reproduction typically wins out over the goal of maximizing longevity, thereby causing genetic variants such as ApoE-ε4 to be relatively common.
Indeed, because reproduction goals are paramount, the individual will often risk immediate survival in pursuit of reproductive opportunities. For example, men take greater physical risks when in the presence of attractive women, and this rise in risk-taking is mediated by increases in testosterone (Ronay & von Hippel Reference Ronay and von Hippel2010). Similar effects can be seen in many other animals. Because men have much greater reproductive variability than women, and because they are much more likely than women to leave behind no offspring at all, selection favors men who will risk their survival in service of the goal to reproduce. Such findings are not evidence that goals are acting selfishly at cross-purposes to the individual who holds the goal. Rather, they are evidence for sexual selection; genes that cause the organism to behave in a manner that facilitates reproduction are more likely to increase in frequency over generations. This includes genes that result in more offspring at the expense of longevity.
If goals are not selfish, then how are we to understand the goal conflict that H&B highlight? We suggest that the research reviewed by H&B is better understood as individuals choosing between competing opportunities than as the goals competing themselves. Perhaps the most common source of goal conflict occurs when short-term and long-term goals collide. When people choose between short-term gains and long-term costs, they often seem to be acting against their own self-interest in a manner that suggests selfishness on the part of short-term goals. But economists and evolutionary theorists agree that future opportunities must be discounted because of their inherent uncertainty, and thus there is strong and recurrent selection pressure to weight the present more heavily than the future. Such selection pressures are misapplied in cases like drug use, when the good feelings that are produced by drugs hijack a motivational system that evolved to induce organisms to pursue their basic needs (e.g., for social status; Morgan et al. Reference Morgan, Grant, Gage, Mach, Kaplan, Prioleau, Nader, Buchheimer, Ehrenkaufer and Nader2002). Nevertheless, none of these effects require that we hypothesize that the goals themselves are selfish, and indeed such an analogy is more likely to lead researchers astray than to serve as a useful metaphor for evolutionary research on goal pursuit.