Some regulations do not only reduce human deaths, injuries, and illnesses; they also protect nonhuman animals. Regulatory Impact Analyses, required by prevailing executive orders, usually do not disclose or explore benefits or costs with respect to nonhuman animals, even when those benefits or costs are significant. This is an inexcusable gap. If a regulation prevents dogs, horses, or cats from being killed or hurt, the benefits should be specified and quantified. This proposition holds even if those benefits are in some sense incidental to the main goal of the regulation. At the same time, turning the relevant benefits into monetary equivalents raises serious challenges, akin to those raised by the valuation of statistical children.

Asthma is a non-communicable and non-curable lung disease that affects 10% of children and 4% of adults worldwide and is associated with an array of environmental contaminants and chemicals. This article offers values suitable for use in cost–benefit analyses of the willingness to pay (WTP) for reduced severity of asthma in adults and children and in reduced probability of getting asthma for these two population groups, all in the context of reducing chemical exposures. To this end, an online survey was administered between November 2021 and May 2022 to 12 727 respondents from seven countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). This article applies two stated preference methods for eliciting WTP: the contingent valuation method for reduced asthma severity and choice experiments for reduced probability of getting asthma of various severities. The context for such elicitations was a set of household products that contain fewer hazardous chemicals than what is currently available in supermarkets but are more expensive. The study finds that the WTP for reducing asthma severity in adults by one step, e.g. from “moderate plus” to “moderate”, is USD2022 529 per year on average. The parental WTP for reducing asthma severity in their children is USD2022 PPP 948 per year and is on average 1.8 times higher than their WTP for themselves. The mean value of a statistical case (VSC) of adult asthma which would be applied to predictions of new cases of asthma avoided by a regulation equals USD2022 280 000, while the mean VSC of childhood asthma equals USD2022 430 000.

In this article, we examine the evolving landscape of Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) decisions made by the National Health Regulatory Agency (Agência Nacional de Vigilância Sanitária [Anvisa]), a prominent federal agency leading RIA implementation in Brazil. We quantify Anvisa’s RIA usage rates, exploring the influence of emergency and other justifications for RIA exemptions both pre and post the enactment of detailed procedural requirements in a recent Presidential Order No. 10,411/2020. Our quantitative analysis shows a sharp decline in RIA usage after Presidential Order No. 10,411/2020 came into force in April 2021, as well as a diversification of the justifications given in decisions not to use RIA (exception decisions). This effect is present even if we take into consideration a large proportion of exception decisions tied to Anvisa’s regulatory stock review and to urgent measures prompted by the COVID-19 pandemic. Additionally, we conduct a qualitative analysis of exception decisions due to emergency, post-Presidential Order. We find that Anvisa failed to provide compelling justifications for exempting RIA in emergency regulations in several cases and avoids ex post reviews when RIAs are waived due to emergencies. We conclude the article with recommendations to enhance the scrutiny and transparency of Anvisa’s exception decisions to conduct RIA.

We explore the changes in central government administration due to European Union (EU) membership and its consequences for policy outcomes and economic efficiency in Finland and Sweden. Both countries became members of the EU in 1995. Upon joining the union, member states are expected to adopt common legislation and are encouraged to develop similar rule-making procedures. The actual implementation of EU directives varies considerably between member states, however. This is also the case for Finland and Sweden. Despite the two Nordic countries for historical reasons having had similar government systems, upon becoming members of the EU, they started to diverge. Using a model of delegation and comparing the more centralized Finnish system with the decentralized institutional setup in Sweden, we show that the Swedish approach leads to a stricter than optimal environmental policy, which in turn makes EU policy non-optimal from a global point of view, ceteris paribus. We also provide empirical support for our findings in the form of some example cases. We focus on environmental policy since this is an area that has been high on the EU agenda.

The purpose of this paper is to answer the research question: How may methods of Benefit–Cost Analysis (BCA) influence policy decision-makers? The new research is a continuation of the previous research, and it is updated with new data and new examples. As it is well-known by BCA experts and practitioners, BCA is a relatively simple and widely used technique for deciding whether to make a change. BCA is very important in political and governmental decisions. Governments are policy creators, and Governments are usually formed of politicians. How much do experts inside Governments influence the policymakers? Do politicians allow enough experts to influence policymaking? The research regarding the work of the Croatian Government’s Office for Legislation and its Unit for the system and coordination of the Assessment of the Effects of Regulations (Unit) showed that the analysis of that Unit was not very good in some very important laws. These laws were changed very often because in practice was seen that the application of some laws was not good, and had caused some problems for the citizens, caused legal uncertainty for them, and in some cases had caused a lot of damage.

Compromised kidney function is associated with an array of environmental contaminants and pathogens that may be considered for regulation. However, there are few valuation estimates for kidney effects for use in benefit–cost analyses, particularly willingness-to-pay estimates. This paper is one of several surveys valuing morbidity developed by the OECD Surveys to elicit Willingness-to-pay to Avoid Chemicals-related negative Health Effects project, which aims to improve the basis for benefit–cost analyses. We report the results of a stated preference survey valuing reduced the risk of symptomatic chronic kidney disease, filling an important gap in the valuation literature and addressing a need for applied benefits analysis of chemical regulation. The survey was administered to representative samples in each of 10 countries: Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Norway, Türkiye, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The mean (median) WTP for an average reduction of 3.5 in 1,000 of the risk of serious kidney disease over 5 years is $2,609 ($764), corresponding to a mean (median) value per statistical case (VSC) of chronic kidney disease of $805,000 ($224,000). The mean VSC varies between $700,000 for Canada and $1,200,000 for Türkiye.

Mask mandates were controversial policies during the pandemic. Although there is considerable research on the benefits of masks, there has been no research on the distribution of perceived costs of compliance with mask mandates. This article presents the results from a hypothetical set of questions related to mask-wearing behavior and opinions that were asked of a nationally representative sample of over 4,000 participants in early 2022. We use survey valuation methods to assess how much participants would be willing to pay to be exempted from rules of mandatory community masking. The survey asks specifically about a 3-month exemption. We find that the majority of respondents (56%) are not willing to pay to be exempted from mandatory masking. However, the average person was willing to pay $525, and a small segment of the population (0.9%) stated they were willing to pay over $5,000 to be exempted from the mandate. Younger respondents stated higher willingness to pay to avoid the mandate than older respondents. Combining our results with standard measures of the value of a statistical life, we estimate that a 3-month masking order was perceived as cost-effective through willingness to pay questions only if at least 13,333 lives were saved by the policy.

President Biden’s first-day memo “Modernizing Regulatory Review” directs the Office of Management and Budget to “propose procedures that take into account the distributional consequences of regulations… to ensure that regulatory initiatives appropriately benefit and do not inappropriately burden disadvantaged, vulnerable, or marginalized communities.” This paper makes two contributions. First, it discusses how economic analysis can transparently provide the information needed to make value-judgments about what distributional effects are appropriate and inappropriate. Second, it discusses the distributional consequences of regulations that are either designed to reduce internalities or might have the additional benefit of reducing internalities. Examples include tobacco product regulations, appliance energy efficiency standards, and automobile fuel efficiency standards. In many cases, the regulations will increase the prices or decrease the availability of goods that disadvantaged consumers prefer. This paper discussed how to determine whether restricting their consumption opportunities creates net benefits or net costs for disadvantaged consumers. Inframarginal consumers who do not change their consumption face higher opportunity costs but do not receive any benefits from reduced internalities. Empirical challenges include the need to quantify the fraction of inframarginal consumers and the size of the internalities.

The considerable literature on the value of a statistical life (VSL) documents the wage-mortality risk trade-offs for the working population. Regulatory analyses often must monetize risks to populations at the tails of the age distribution. Because of the longer life expectancy for children, there have been proposals to add a premium to their VSL, which would generate an inconsistency with revealed preference estimates of the VSL trajectory over the life cycle. The shorter life expectancy among older people has led to various arbitrary senior discounts for seniors’ life expectancy. Application of the value of a statistical life year (VSLY) can address valuation of small changes in life expectancy. Examples of inappropriate age adjustments that we discuss include practices by the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).