INTRODUCTION
From the chaos of the early years of the Russian Federation, a certain mode of interdependent relations and mechanisms of cooperation between the state and religious organizations have emerged. The Russian Orthodox Church (hereinafter called: the ROC) calls it simply the “Russian model” (rossiskaja model).Footnote 1 I will refer to it as “the post-Soviet” (not just Russian) religious model because relations between the state and religious organizations in Russia display many similarities with those of some member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)Footnote 2 (Curanović Reference Curanović2013). For the purposes of this article, this expression (i.e., the post-Soviet religious model) denotes a set of empirically observed characteristics of state authorities’ relations with religious institutions as well as solutions adopted by the state in managing religious issues.
One of the main goals of the established modus operandi between state authorities and religious institutions is to manage interfaith and interethnic relations, which are traditionally strongly connected in Russia. The post-Soviet religious model is an element of a more complex system of state control over societal religious life. In case of the Russian Federation, this system rests on two pillars. One is the Federal Security ServiceFootnote 3 (Federal'naya sluzhba bezopasnosti; hereinafter called: the FSB) which keeps an eye on religious communities and investigates signs of extremism and possible links to terrorism. Organizations representing “traditional” religions are the other pillar. They depend on state support and act as an intermediary between citizens and the state. Organizations associated with “traditional” religions can promote views and behaviors favored by the state. They enable and help the Kremlin to influence the potentially unstable domain of societal religious life.
In this article, I concentrate on the latter of the two mentioned pillars, i.e., “traditional” religions, or more specifically, on the two most active representatives of “traditional” religions: the ROC and Russian muftiates.Footnote 4 They are the main partners of the Kremlin within the framework of the post-Soviet religious model. In this article, I will use the example of interethnic tensions to determine weak points of this religious model as it functions now in Russia. In short, I will try to establish if the cooperation between the “altar” and the “throne” in Russia and the growing involvement of religious organizations in state ethnic policy can really be effective and beneficial for solving the problems of a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society. As Russia's future social stability partly depends on the success of the solutions invented and adopted within the post-Soviet religious model, the importance of this issue can hardly be underestimated.
The article starts with a presentation of the features of the post-Soviet religious model, followed by a short overview of interethnic relations in Russia. The next two points deal with the Kremlin's ethnic and immigration policies and the activity of “traditional” religions in this field.
THE POST-SOVIET RELIGIOUS MODEL: MAIN FEATURES
The post-Soviet religious model exhibits three features. The first is the secular character of state guaranteed by the Constitution. The second is the particular category of the so-called “traditional” religions, i.e., religions distinguished by authorities due to their special role in shaping national culture and identity. In case of Russia, these are Orthodox Christianity (represented by the ROC), Islam, Buddhism (the Gelug school), and Judaism. In this context, it is important to note that the practice of distinguishing “traditional” religions already narrows the constitutional principle of secularism. Acknowledging a religious organization as “traditional” is de facto a political decision since no legal definition of this expression has been so far adopted in any of former Soviet republics.Footnote 5 Obtaining the status of a “traditional” religion is very desirable, as it results in concrete privileges, e.g., state subventionsFootnote 6 or access to mass-media.Footnote 7 However, these privileges (granted by the state) are not without consequences — in return, the authorities demand loyalty. “Traditional” religions are expected to support the official policy and strengthen the legitimacy of holders of power, which is so important for many of the post-Soviet non-democratic regimes. If a religious organization loses the trust of the state, it risks weakening its presence in the public sphere.Footnote 8
Since it is not the law but political will which determines the status of “traditional” religions, it can be said that in the reality of the post-Soviet religious model states grant a sort of “license to preach” which can be limited or in extreme circumstances even taken away. That is, the third feature of the model. I use this metaphor (“license to preach”) in order to emphasize the vulnerability of religious organizations to the pressure exerted by the authorities. The character of the regime has an impact on the religious model, as does the fact that none of the CIS countries is a properly functioning democracy.
State-church relations in the CIS countries are still being shaped; the model is in statu nascendi. Therefore, if we try to compare it to other models, we can notice the hybrid nature of solutions applied in the former Soviet republics. In the typological framework of six models set by Winfried Brugger,Footnote 9 the post-Soviet religious model would fit somewhere between the model “Division and Cooperation” (model No. 4, the case of Germany) and the model “Formal unity of Church and State, with Substantive Division” (model No. 5, Greece, Israel, the United Kingdom). With model No. 4 the post-Soviet religious model shares “partial cooperation and mutual coordination” of church and state despite the declared separation (Brugger Reference Brugger, Brugger and Michael2007, 38). The considerably strong identification of political community with a particular church (or to be more precise — religious tradition) brings the post-Soviet religious model closer to model No. 5. With respect to this particular feature, Igor Ponkin classifies Russia as “identification type,” a secular state which cooperates with selected religious communities in order to guarantee citizens’ rights to cultivate their culture identity.Footnote 10
As mentioned, religious organizations considered “traditional” in the former Soviet republics enjoy certain privileges in comparison to other religious communities without this status. This difference between the “traditional” and non-traditional religions in the CIS is more significant than in Germany (Brugger's model No. 4), where the religious minorities’ rights are respected and protected by a system of independent courts. In CIS states, the judiciary — despite its legally guaranteed independence — can de facto still be influenced by the actual holders of power. Due to the abovementioned privileges “traditional” religions in the CIS countries resemble “national/state religions,” characteristic of the model of “formal unity of Church and State.” However, such a formal unity is expressed in the legal order; also, in these cases, state and church are, typically, closely linked organizationally (Brugger Reference Brugger, Joas and Klaus2010, 169–170), which is not the case for “traditional” religions in the CIS countries.
This asymmetry in church-state relations does not mean that “traditional” religions are forced to cooperate with the state. As a matter of fact the initiative for cooperation often comes from them, e.g., when they look for support in order to deal with challenges presented by non-traditional religious groups. However, although the state-church cooperation is mutually beneficial, it is nevertheless the authorities who hold the reins. The state treats “traditional” religions instrumentally, i.e., as an intermediary in achieving certain goals. One of the most important ones is soothing interethnic and interreligious tensions by promoting dialogue and offering a good example for their adherents.
As has been said before, the post-Soviet religious model is, at its core, a system of state control over religious institutions, and with their help, society. Naturally, democratic countries supervise religious organizations too. In the case of most post-Soviet republics, however, the difference stems from the undemocratic dominance of politics over law. The post-Soviet regimes’ interest in controlling this area of social life is understandable, as it is, one could say, in accordance with the regime's systemic logic. The less obvious interest, however, is the surprisingly fruitful cooperation between authorities and “traditional” religions in the CIS countries, especially in the Russian Federation.
The rapprochement between the state and religious organizations (most notably between the ROC and the Kremlin) can be observed in recent years in Russia (Malashenko and Filatov Reference Malashenko and Sergei2012) and manifests itself in cooperation taking place in selected areas of the public sphere, in education and social care. This cooperation is usually referred to as social partnership. It also has an international dimension — I wish to call this form of cooperation “religious diplomacy” (Curanović Reference Curanović2012). However, religious diplomacy has a lesser impact on interethnic relations and I will therefore not examine it in this article.
In the system of control over religious activity, of which the post-Soviet model is a part, the state disposes over two main instruments: on the one hand, it encourages “traditional” religions to promote interfaith dialogue and foster mutual understanding among different ethnic groups; on the other hand, the FSB takes — often quite harsh — measures to fight signs of religious extremism.Footnote 11 Figuratively speaking, this is essentially a stick and carrot approach. These two elements create the basis for a system whose intended goal is to provide social stability without actually activating the society. In other words, the state establishes supports and controls official institutional frames within which citizens can express their religious identity and fulfil their spiritual needs. The whole system, as well as the post-Soviet model itself, is marked by the top-bottom approach.
These systemic solutions and the way in which the Russian state currently conceptualizes the presence of religion in the public sphere are in certain aspects reminiscent of practices of the USSR and the Russian Empire. Without underestimating crucial differences between them and the Russian Federation we can note some elements of continuity. The first one is a strong link between ethnic and religious identities. This is a feature of most multi-ethnic empires and was, albeit modified, preserved also in the Soviet Union.
The second one is the dominance of the state over the Church which dates back to the reforms of Peter the Great. Russian emperors turned religion into an instrument of politics, which created incentives for institutionalization of religious communities; once created, religious institutions became a part of the state administrative structure. Instrumentalization and rigid institutionalization also marked the Soviet approach to religion. Despite the initial attempt to destroy “harmful” religious influence, the Soviet authorities eventually decided to use it. In 1944, the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults was established; its purpose was to control and use, if necessary, religious groups.
The third important similarity is an implicit assumption of the Russian political tradition that religion is not just a private affair of an individual but also a matter of state security and stability. Consequently, authorities strived to form and control this area of social life. The Imperial and Soviet legacies have created a specific set of constraints for the Russian Federation's efforts (as well as for other states which used to be a part of both the Russian Empire and the USSR) to develop her mode of managing religious affairs.
The post-Soviet religious model has been used as a tool for managing not only interreligious but also interethnic relations — a matter of great importance to Russian internal stability and security. However, the almost exclusive reliance of the state on loyal institutions reveals the first serious weakness of this model. The “elitist” club of “traditional” religions is not fully representative of the increasingly complex Russian society. This is especially evident in the case of muftiates, which are weak, internally conflicted,Footnote 12 fractioned, and with diminishing authority among young Russian Muslims.Footnote 13 In these circumstances, a number of questions can be posed about the limits of the model in its current state: Can ethnic stability and religious concord really be achieved with these measures? What could be an alternative solution for the Kremlin? Does the religious model reflect the Russian regime itself? If so, would a change in the model first require reforming the regime?
In order to answer these questions and determine the weaknesses of the post-Soviet religious model in the Russian socio-political reality, I will use the test case of interethnic tensions.
“DISTURBING STRANGERS”: CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERETHNIC RELATIONS IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Undoubtedly Russian nationalism and the shape of interethnic relations in the multi-ethnic Russian state (in each of its historic forms) are issues of great complexity (Laruelle Reference Laruelle2009; Allensworth Reference Allensworth1998; Hosking and Service Reference Hosking and Robert1998; Duncan Reference Duncan1998; Rancour-Lafarriere Reference Rancour-Laferriere2001). In the Russian Federation, a country still forming a narrative of its identity, interethnic tensions present a serious challenge to internal security. Distinguished scholars, e.g., Emil Pain (Reference Pain2007), Alexander Verkhovsky (Reference Verkhovsky, Emil and Pain2007), and Viktor Schnirelman (Reference Schnirelman2011), agree that xenophobia has risen significantly in Russian society in recent years.
Xenophobia could be defined as “various expressions of intolerance towards groups which are perceived in the public consciousness as strangers” (Pain Reference Pain2007, 895–909). And strangers in today's Russia do seem disturbing to many.Footnote 14 In a multi-ethnic country, strangers are of two kinds: foreigners and fellow-citizens from ethnic groups other than the dominant one — in other words, immigrants and ethnic minorities. The latter force the majority to face the question of national identity, while the former bring along the challenges of assimilation. These two issues, i.e., national identity and immigration are crucial for understanding interethnic relations in the Russian Federation. In this article, I focus on immigration, since it, in my opinion, better exposes the weaknesses of the post-Soviet religious model.
Culturalism
After the fall of the USSR, Russian nationalism — with support of the authorities — has emerged in the civilizational/imperial form (Verkhovsky and Pain Reference Pain2007, 170–210). Proponents of civilizational nationalism claim that Russia is not just any country but a unique civilization with a distinctive cultural and spiritual identity. According to them, one of the things which differentiate Russia from the West as well as its Asian neighbors is its “know-how” in creating circumstances for harmonious and peaceful coexistence of many ethnic and religious groups. A characteristic feature of imperial nationalism is an essentialist approach to culture (mentality, national character, etc.). Culture is thought to be an objective factor which determines behavior and development of nations. Each individual is said to be born into a concrete culture; as a consequence, identity is not a matter of an individual's choice but is an objective condition which marks the individual for life (Schnirelman Reference Schnirelman2011, 33). This set of views is called culturalism or cultural racism (Hunter and Lewis-Coles Reference Hunter and Lewis-Coles2004, 209; Schnirelman Reference Schnirelman2011, 16–17). Instead of race, this type of racism uses culture as a main differentiating criterion (Schnirelman Reference Schnirelman2011, 21). While it does not deny pluralism of cultures and civilizations, it does, however, evaluate and rank them according to “excellence.” According to this narrative, civilizations, viewed as complete, closed entities, can either clash or agree on a dialogue, but they should not influence each other or intermingle because this erodes their cultural identity (Schnirelman Reference Schnirelman2011, 310–311). In the narrative of culturalism, cultural differences are emphasized and politicized; and since culture is deemed as an important factor of internal and national security, the protection of national culture and identity should be one of the objectives of government policy.
Ethnisation
Culturalism has dominated the discourse on identity in Russia since the mid-1990s (Schnirelman Reference Schnirelman2011, 291). However, having analyzed the sociological data from the last years, Alexander Verkhovsky argues that Russian nationalism has been evolving from an imperialistic/civilizational type to ethnic nationalism, i.e., a nationalism whose identifying feature is a desire for an ethnically homogenous state and having an anti-immigration edge.Footnote 15 According to surveys conducted by the Levada Center in 2013, the slogan “Russia for Russians” (Rossiya dlya russkich) was accepted (“fully” or “under certain circumstances”) by 66% respondents, while 71% have sympathized with the slogan “Enough of feeding Caucasus”Footnote 16 — these numbers have been the highest since polling on these issues began. In the report from 2012, 29% admitted having experienced interethnic tensions in their hometown, while 18% expressed feelings of animosity toward people of different ethnic origin.Footnote 17
In general, Russian society is characterized by a tendency for ethnisation of relations (Schnirelman Reference Schnirelman2011, 234–288). Ethnisation is a part of the phenomenon of culturalism. According to it, people are born in an ethnic group and this fact determines their lives, character, and mentality. Ethnisation sharpens division lines between groups and exaggerates the differences; it thus influences the way strangers are perceived and provides fertile ground for xenophobia. In Russia, ethnisation of “home-born” strangers, i.e., non-Russian ethnic groups, manifests itself most prominently in caucasophobia,Footnote 18 while ethnisation of foreigners is evident in some aspects of migrantophobia.Footnote 19
Immigration: Social Attitudes
According to official estimates, there are around 7–9 million immigrants in the Russian Federation; half of them stay illegally.Footnote 20 Russian citizens react to this with growing concern. In 2011, 53% of Russians stated that there were “many immigrants” and 28% that there were “too many” (Mukomel Reference Mukomel2011, 37). According to the 2012 Levada Report, 47% of respondents declared a negative attitude toward immigrants,Footnote 21 while 70% expected the state to take measures to limit immigration. Data obtained by the Levada Center two years before show that when asked about emotions evoked by immigrants, 57% of respondents answered having “no particular emotions”; however, 15% declared unfriendliness and 6% — fear (The Levada Report 2010, 192). Especially interesting is the fact that respondents had more negative emotions toward some ethnic groups than others, which clearly indicates existence of a hierarchy of minorities. Respondents interviewed by the Levada Center demanded limiting first of all the presence of immigrants from the Caucasus (37%), followed by Chinese (36%), Vietnamese (33%), and Romani people (30%). Interestingly, 10% fewer people were bothered by immigrants from Central Asia than those from the Caucasus (The Levada Report 2010, 190) Also, 16% supported limiting the presence of all nations apart from ethnic Russians; 21% were against creating a census on the basis of ethnic criteria (The Levada Report 2010, 191); 58% of Russians would like to close their region to immigrants, while 46% approve of deportation (Bavin Reference Bavin2007, 56–77). In the 2012 ranking of societies’ openness toward immigrants which included 59 states, Russia came up in 44th place.Footnote 22 This tendency will probably continue in the near future since projections are that the number of immigrants in the Russian Federation will rise to 10.5 million by 2030 (Mukomel Reference Mukomel2011, 35).
Traditionalisation
Ethnisation is just one manifestation of culturalism in Russia. The other one is traditionalisation. Its main assumption is that the essence of each nation's culture is captured in its tradition. Therefore, in the narration of culturalism, nations have to protect this legacy, especially from foreign influences. They have to guard its purity in order to maintain their identity and civilizational sovereignty.
In the logic of culturalism, nations should integrate around their traditional values which are understood in an essentialist way, i.e., they are considered definable and permanent. Cultural racism demands protecting traditional values in face of strangers who come with their own culture, customs, and habits and pose a threat to the national culture of the dominant group. Significant in the context of this article is that tradition is often associated with religion. In the case of Russia, national tradition is increasingly often identified with Orthodox tradition.Footnote 23 Traditional Russian values — which traditionalists present as a main moral reference point for society — are thus virtually equated with Orthodox values. Moreover, these values are said to serve as the basis for renewal of the ethnic Russian “core” of rossiyskaja nacja; this revival should be achieved through a process referred to as “spiritual up-bringing.” It is telling that both traditional values and spiritual upbringing are high on the social agenda of the ROC.
Traditionalisation is the ideological phenomenon which plays the main role in bringing “traditional” religions to the Russian public sphere. In the Russian Federation (as well as in the CIS area), religious organizations are perceived (and they also consider themselves) as repositories of national tradition and identity, which survived Soviet times. Since the mid-1990s the Kremlin has turned to tradition in its attempts to rebuild national identity and strengthen its own legitimization. Boris Dubin (Reference Dubin2011, 79) underlines the fact that it was the state which initiated and supported neo-traditionalisation in Russia. Within society the focus on tradition, inspired by the state, fosters great power nostalgia, isolationism and last but not least — xenophobia (Dubin Reference Dubin2011, 80).
In Russia, religion functions as a criterion of identity, an additional standard of belonging to a particular ethnic group and even to a particular culture. For an example, according to a survey conducted by the Levada Center in 2012, 69% of respondents agreed that “real ethnic Russians should be Orthodox.”Footnote 24 Thus religion, so tightly connected to ethnic identity, strengthens ethnic divisions and reduces understanding of religion and ethnicity to mere culturalism (Schnirelman Reference Schnirelman2011, 313). Ethnisation also influences the image of religion and its adherents. An example of this is the distrust among the Slavic population toward Muslims which is growing on the basis of prejudices against immigrants from the Caucasus.Footnote 25 The tendency to associate ethnic identity with religion is relatively strong in Russia in comparison to the sense of community created by citizenship (rossijskost’).Footnote 26 The fact that authorities involve “traditional” religions in managing interethnic affairs does not help to reverse this trend, on the contrary — it reinforces it. It also creates the impression that the tensions arise from cultural differences, while, as is evident from surveys, the main causes of tensions are of a socio-economical nature (challenging Labor market, uncertain economic outlook, etc.) (Schnirelman Reference Schnirelman2011, 45).
Already at this point, it becomes evident that bringing a religious factor into interethnic affairs can be risky — and herein lies another weakness of the post-Soviet religious model. It preserves the tendency for ethnisation of religious identity and thereby sharpens division lines within Russian society. Furthermore, it casts “traditional” religions as representatives of not only religious but also ethnic communities, which show up in public opinion polls. More and more ethnic Russians consider religion an inseparable element of national identity; 30% of Russians would like Russian Orthodoxy to be granted the status of a state religion; and while 48% still support the separation of church and state, the trend is decreasing.Footnote 27 The surveys also show that believers tend to be less tolerant toward minorities and immigrants (Dubin Reference Dubin2000, 45–46; Verkhovsky Reference Verkhovsky2007; Reference Verkhovsky2004, 127–143). Adherents of “traditional” religions are more likely to claim that although Russia is a multi-ethnic state, ethnic Russians should have a better, privileged status (Karpov and Lisovskaya Reference Karpov and Elena2008). Furthermore, in recent years another phenomenon can be observed — a number of ethnic Russians tend to consider themselves a majority under threat in their own country.Footnote 28
Symbolic racism in Russia has still not reached the level where it would have an impact on legal regulations or the political programs of parties. However, it can already be found in mass-media and political debates (Schnirelman Reference Schnirelman2011, Vol. II, 462). The moods revealed by the surveys eventually manifested themselves violently on the streets of Kondopoga in 2006.Footnote 29 The so-called Kondopoga riots together with the riots in Moscow Manege square in 2010Footnote 30 have been considered a wake-up call for Russian elites. The new policy of preventing interethnic clashes assumes involvement of “traditional” religions within the framework created by the post-Soviet religious model. Interestingly, this is not contrary to people's expectations: 77% of respondents want the ROC to help the state in the field of interethnic and interreligious relations, only 8% are against.Footnote 31
3. THROUGH DIALOGUE AND CULTURAL ADAPTATION: THE KREMLIN'S POLICY IN FACE OF INTERETHNIC TENSIONS
The main plank of the state ethnic and immigration policy were presented in one of Vladimir Putin's articlesFootnote 32 during the presidential campaign in 2012, which later on were included in “The State Strategy on Ethnic Policy until 2025” (December 19, 2012).Footnote 33
Russian Civilization, Russian Nation
Both texts contend that keeping civil and ethnic peace is the highest priority for the Kremlin in the face of the observed growth in tensions. Multi-culturalism as well as the “melting pot” approach have been rejected as ways of managing interethnic tensions due to their inefficiency and unsuitability for Russia's ethnic situation.Footnote 34 Putin's definition of the Russian national and state identity fits the ideological frame of culturalism. In the article, Putin presented the following understanding of the Russian nation: “We are a multiethnic society but one nation”; and of Russia — a unique civilization with a unique experience of coexistence of different ethnic groups, founded on Russian (russki) language and culture. In this multi-ethnic society Putin distinguished ethnic Russians who in the past were the “state-builders” (gosudarstvoobrazoyushchiy) but who should now consider themselves a part of a “multi-ethnic civilization integrated by the Russian cultural core.” The great contemporary mission of ethnic Russians, according to Putin, is to sustain Russian (rossiyskaya) civilization; ethnic Russians are also responsible for developing the potential of rossiyskaja nacija (multi-ethnic nation of the Russian Federation).
To find a role for the ethnic Russian majority within the multi-ethnic and multi-religious state is indeed a major challenge for the Kremlin. The difficulty of this task becomes obvious when one considers how dissonant the authorities are about the national narrative. On one hand, politicians declare their commitment to the idea of a multi-ethnic, multi-religious state, while at the same time they acknowledge the special role of ethnic Russians, e.g., by making Russia's future development conditional on ethnic Russians’ spiritual revival etc.Footnote 35 Worryingly, the Kremlin does not seem to know how to solve this problem in practice, which results in further ambivalence. Thus, the authorities of the Russian Federation are likely to repeat the mistakes made by the decision makers of the Soviet Union, who tried to create one Soviet nation, but one which would, at the same time, enable the development of all nationalities and ethnic groups (Schnirelman Reference Schnirelman2011, 288).
In Vladimir Putin's vision, presented in his article, an individual living in the Russian Federation can develop a strong sense of patriotism and civil duty, but should at the same time be able to cultivate one's particular ethnic and religious identity. This could be a basis for the Russian authorities’ modern approach toward building sense of citizenship. It contrasts, however, with the suggested solutions, which are acutely anachronistic. What Putin calls “sophisticated culture therapy”Footnote 36 for Russia's multi-ethnic nation is turning out to be nothing more than blown-up patriotism with very traditional methods of promoting Russian language, literature, and history (e.g., by creating a canon of 100 “must-read books”Footnote 37 or by organizing national knowledge quizzes for youth).
Immigration Policy
Putin has highlighted illegal migration as one of the reasons for the growth of xenophobia. In his article, from the presidential campaign he called for a positive selection of immigrants (based on immigrants’ skills and merits) and the adoption of harsher legal measures for illegal immigrants. The comparison of the two official strategies for immigration policy (2003Footnote 38 and 2012Footnote 39 ) shows that this issue is still strongly connected to security, linked to terrorism and treated as a possible source of instability, as it may disturb the demographic as well as ethnic balance in Russia.Footnote 40 One of the indicators of securitization of migration is the character of the Federal Migration Office (FMO) which, as Marianna Fadicheva argues, it is becoming increasingly similar to a police force since it started reporting directly to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.Footnote 41
In comparison with the new strategy (2012), the authors of the 2003 document paid less attention to the issue of adaptation. It was mentioned mostly in a socio-economical contextFootnote 42 and never in connection to culture. Meanwhile, the reverse is a very characteristic feature of the strategy from 2012.Footnote 43 This document contains a whole section on supporting cultural adaptation and integration of immigrants. In practice, adaptation means teaching the Russian language, basis of Russian law, and traditional culture in centers for cultural adaptation specially established for this purpose in Russia as well as the immigrants’ country of origin.Footnote 44
Another element of the Kremlin's immigration policy is significant involvement of Russian diplomacy. Since 2003 Russia has been trying to share the burden of dealing with illegal immigration with other CIS countries. Moscow started bilateral and multi-lateral initiatives, e.g., in 2004 the “Concept of cooperation of the CIS countries against illegal immigration in 2005–2007” was issued.Footnote 45 Russia's diplomatic activity in this field is important because it is supported and complemented by “traditional” religions (see below).Footnote 46
“Cultural Therapy” and “Traditional” Religions
The most interesting element of the “cultural therapy” prescribed by Vladimir Putin is cooperation with “traditional religions” in the field of ethnic and immigration policies. In the article, Putin states that he “counts on active participation of traditional religions in this kind of dialogue on values” and that “the society should welcome the participation of traditional religions in the sphere of education.”Footnote 47 The Kremlin justifies the religious institutions’ involvement as a means of dealing with the “erosion of traditional values and morality” which is also stated as one of the reasons for the growth of xenophobia.Footnote 48 In the Russian authorities’ plans, “traditional” religions would also be responsible for preventing the growth of extremism and interethnic tensions by promoting interfaith (inter-civilizational) dialogue with different ethnic and religious communities in the Russian Federation as well as beyond its borders.
The idea of using “traditional” religions for working with immigrants became the main part of the Kremlin's agenda after the Manege riots. On February 3, 2011, at the meeting with the Council of Bishops of the ROC, president Medvedev said: “the ROC is the most respected social institution in modern Russia … [T]ogether, we are solving the most pressing problems and tasks in the lives of our people, one of them being interethnic and interreligious dialogue. The ROC, during all her history has been protecting our fundamental values.” President was convinced that the state and Church must cooperate because “religious/moral up-bringing ... prevents hatred. Today much depends on [the ROC's] stand, preaching, approach ... The real instrument to prevent interethnic conflict is interreligious dialogue, in which the Church is a permanent participant and very often the main initiator.”Footnote 49 On this occasion the president announced establishing working groups for interethnic tensions with the representatives of religious communities.Footnote 50 In November of the same year, during the meeting with muftis in Ufa, Medvedev asked the Muslim clergy for greater involvement in process of immigrants’ adaptation and welcomed mufti Gaynetdin's suggestion on establishing Islamic culture centers for Muslim immigrants.Footnote 51 In July of 2011, Prime Minister Putin confirmed the intention of including “traditional” religions in initiatives aimed at soothing interethnic tensions.Footnote 52
In face of growing xenophobia, the Kremlin wants to make use of the religious factor. According to the official narrative, the remedy for tensions between ethnic Russians and other Russian citizens of different ethnic origin should be the dialogue promoted by religious communities. Issues involving immigrants should be solved with the assimilation program in which “traditional” religions would participate. To standard instruments of ethnic and migration policies (such as the legal solutions, oversight by the FSB or common measures within the CIS), Kremlin thus added cooperation with “traditional” religions. This area is relatively new and a potentially extensive field of state-church cooperation in Russia. It expands the previous frames of social partnership and has concrete consequences for the discourse about Russia's identity. It fosters already relatively strong traditionalisation and what comes along with it — ethnisation of social relations.
Russian “Traditional” Religions in Managing Interethnic Relations
Among representatives of Russian “traditional” religions the Moscow Patriarchate and muftiates are the most active in cooperating with the state in the field of interethnic relations. They both agree that Russia is a separate civilization whose unique legacy lies in peaceful coexistence of different ethnic and religious groups.Footnote 53 They are also both attached to the essentialist understanding of culture. This manifests itself especially in the strong connection between ethnicity and religion still cultivated by representatives of “traditional” religions which basically maintain that in Russia ethnic groups are traditionally adherents of a particular faith (ethnic Russians are “traditionally” Christian Orthodox, Tatars are Muslims, Buryats are Buddhists, etc.). And “traditional” religions are keen on preserving these ties.Footnote 54
Interfaith Dialogue
If in defining Russia as a unique civilization the Orthodox clergy and muftis coincide, the issue of interfaith dialogue, which according to the Kremlin is of crucial importance, reveals a source of potential conflict among these two “traditional” religions. The ROC's understanding of the dialogue was explained thoroughly by the deputy-chair of the Department for External Contacts of the ROC, father Philipp (Riabykh).Footnote 55 He explained that the main condition for the success of such a dialogue was that it was moderated in accordance to a set of principles and values shared by all the “traditional” religions of Russia. One of the most important is the principle of justice, i.e., of fair proportions, which in the understanding of the ROC means that each “traditional” religion's presence and activity in the public sphere should be proportional to the number of its adherents. Thus the key to a successful dialogue is obeying the existing ethno-religious spheres of influenceFootnote 56 by all the “traditional” religions.
Not all muftis, however, approve of such an interpretation of the interfaith dialogue presented by the ROC. Among muftis, the sharpest critic of the growing ROC's dominance is Ravil Gaynetdin, the chief of the Council of Muftis of Russia, who demands equal partnership of the ROC and muftiates in the public sphere, a kind of spiritual condominium rather than agreeing on the role of a “younger brother.”Footnote 57
It could be argued that promoting interfaith dialogue moderated by “traditional” religions as a remedy for growing tensions could be problematic, since there is no real consensus regarding the understanding of this concept. In Russian socio-political reality, interfaith dialogue means that “traditional” religions respect each other's ethno-religious sphere of influence and refrain from theological disputes. Thus, the interfaith dialogue does not in fact address essential problems and seems too formal and rigid to have the potential to sooth tensions inside society. Also, ethno-cultural nationalism of the ROC and its expectations that all “traditional” religions should accept its dominance does not provide fertile ground for a real understanding and trust among Russian “traditional” religions (Verkhovsky Reference Verkhovsky, Malashenko and Sergei2012, 148–149).
Immigration
The Kremlin's call for involvement of “traditional” religions in interethnic affairs did not come as a surprise to its main addressees. As a matter of fact, Patriarch Kirill, head of the Department for External Contacts, was among the first to declare in 2007Footnote 58 the readiness of the ROC to work with immigrants. In Patriarch's opinion, migrants were partly responsible for the tensions since, as he said, “the immigrants from other regions of Russia, from the near and far abroad, are not always sufficiently acquainted with the necessary knowledge of tradition, culture, and law for successful adaptation” and that together with the state, the “traditional” religions carry the responsibility for “de-radicalization of the sphere of potential interethnic tensions.”Footnote 59 The leader of the ROC declared that the Church could get involved in the process of teaching Russian language and tradition to immigrants as a part of their cultural adaptation. Furthermore, in Kirill's opinion, it was necessary to provide Russian citizens with spiritual up-bringing and to stimulate the interfaith dialogue.Footnote 60 The patriarch thus defined the most important tasks of the ROC: cultural adaptation for immigrants, dialogue in relations with religious institutions and spiritual up-bringing for Russian citizens, reviving Russian traditional values.Footnote 61
In the Moscow Patriarchate, the department responsible for this particular field is the Synodal Department for Church and Society Relations (OVCO), led by Vsevolod Chaplin. He is notorious for placing a bigger part of the blame for the tensions on illegal immigrants, while at the same time tending to turn a blind eye to ethnic Russian nationalists. Right after the Manege square riots, he called upon the state authorities to start working on a new law and new, stricter immigration policy.Footnote 62 Chaplin claimed that “some representatives of some diasporas behave in a provocative way; they disrespect the law and moral norms.”Footnote 63 On another occasion the chair of OVCO proposed working out a code of behavior for immigrants.Footnote 64 He also said that the role of the Russian nation (russki) should be acknowledged on the political as well as legal level.Footnote 65 However, one condition should be fulfilled first: the Russian (russki) nation, according to Chaplin, needs a revival of its system of values, its faith and culture — Russians need “spiritual up-bringing.”Footnote 66
The head of OVCO is not alone in the ROC with his views on ethnic issues. Results of the research published in 2011 by the Sova Center show that Orthodox priests tend to sympathize with Russian nationalists and put the blame for interethnic tensions mostly on illegal immigrants. Priests increasingly voice their opinion that the rise of nationalism among ethnic Russians is a natural reaction to the failure of multi-culturalism,Footnote 67 that the discrimination of the Russian nation is a fact and that a further weakening of it will collapse the state.Footnote 68 Some priests hold that only “spiritually similar, close to us” people should be invited as immigrants; the majority consider an exam on the language and culture for immigrants as absolutely necessary.Footnote 69
Importantly, Russian Muslims share many of ethnic Russians’ concerns about immigrants. This was also evidenced by reactions to the events in Kondopoga in 2006. Mufti Ravil Geynudtin supported decisions of the local authorities and denied that riots had a religious origin.Footnote 70 The same opinion was expressed by the representative of the muftiate of Karelia, Visam Ali BardvilFootnote 71 and the mufti of Saratov, Mukaddas Bibarsov,Footnote 72 Mufti Talgat Tadjudin underlined that immigrants should respect local traditions and adapt.Footnote 73 The most radical in its judgment was the National Organization of Ethnic Russian Muslims which put the blame for the riots on immigrants who “behaved like occupants.”Footnote 74
Among Russian muftis Ravil Geynudtin is known for occasional controversial statements concerning immigration. For example, he once stated that ethnic Russians didn't want to work and after getting paid they would disappear and immigrants were needed who were more disciplined and hard working.Footnote 75 This does not, however, reflect the general views of mufits on immigration. Most of the Muslim clergy agree that Russia needs immigrants and that they should be assisted with a program of cultural adaptation. They also underline that immigrants are obliged to respect local law, tradition, and order. In fact, muftiates and the ROC coincide in their views on how to deal with immigration.Footnote 76
Kremlin and “Traditional” Religions: Common Views
The Kremlin and “traditional” religions agree on many issues connected to ethnic relations and immigration. Both parties’ views fit the current of culturalism with strong tendencies toward ethnisation and traditionalisation. For both, their main priority is reviving and protecting tradition; they disfavor multi-culturalism and claim that unique Russian civilization has the cultural savoir-faire to bring together different ethnic and religious groups. The ROC and the Kremlin, additionally, have one more thing in common: they realize the reality of the multi-ethnic state but emphasize the role of ethnic Russians.
Such similarity of views enables coordinated action. The Russian state and “traditional” religions agree on solutions for dealing with immigration, i.e., cultural adaptation which includes introducing immigrants to the religious traditions of Russia and promoting interfaith dialogue to integrate Russian citizens of different origins. The strategic coherence of the state and “traditional” religions can be seen in the document on migration issued by the Interfaith Council of Russia in 2010Footnote 77 or the recommendations for ethnic and immigration policy published by OVCO in 2011.Footnote 78
What the Kremlin calls “cultural therapy,” the ROC and muftiates refer to as “spiritual up-bringing.” In practice, this translates into a state supported process of socialization and adaptation to “traditional” Russian values. While politicians use the term “traditional Russian values,” albeit without clear reference to its actual content, it received a more concrete shape due to religious organizations; a good example is the documentFootnote 79 prepared by the ROC “The Basic Values — the Fundaments of National Unity,” issued in 2011, in which 17 such values were specified.Footnote 80 Since the values are defined mostly by “traditional” religions, this implicitly increases the role of religious organizations in the public sphere, first of all in the educational system.Footnote 81 Furthermore, such a narrative could strengthen the tendency to equate Russianness with Orthodoxy, thus further solidifying the ethno-religious bond. The scope of social partnership has expanded with spiritual up-bringing offered to Russian citizens and cultural adaptation directed towards immigrants.
Platforms of Cooperation between the State and “Traditional” Religions
It is important to note that “traditional” religions in their activity in the field of ethnic relations are complementing state strategy. On a practical level of state-church cooperation, two platforms should be mentioned: the first is collaboration with the FMO in Russia and the second is activity in the CIS area (both on a bilateral and multi-lateral level). The activity in the CIS area is a good example of parallel efforts of the Kremlin and Russian “traditional” religions. The ROC prefers to use the forum of the Interfaith Council of CIS, while muftiates focus on bilateral relations.
The CIS Area: Bilateral Contacts
In recent years, Russian muftiates have shown much interest and initiative in working on immigration issues together with their counterparts from other Islamic post-Soviet countries. In 2011, Shafig Psihatschev, from the Coordination Centre of the Northern Caucasus, suggested including muftis from Central Asia in the process of cultural adaptation of immigrants coming to Russia. In the same year, this Northern Caucasian muftiate together with muftis of Kazakhstan announced the introduction of special seminars for immigrants at the Islamic universities of Russia and other CIS countries.Footnote 82
Similar steps have been taken by the Council of Muftis of Russia in relation to Tajikistan, which is important especially after the tensions in Russian-Tajikistan relations caused by the expulsion of immigrants in 2011.Footnote 83 The Council has also been trying to start cooperation with muftis from Kazakhstan and Kirgizstan to work with immigrants in Russia as well as in their homelands before they emigrate, which is in accordance with the Kremlin's strategy.
The CIS Area: The Interfaith Council of CIS
The main platform for multi-lateral contacts of “traditional” religions in the post-Soviet area is the Interfaith Council of CIS, a body established in 2004 to integrate “traditional” religions from the CIS countries.Footnote 84 The ROC uses this forum to garner support and mobilize other religious organizations around its projects and initiatives. It was no coincidence that the annual session of the Council in 2011 in Erevan was dedicated to the problem of immigration. The ROC took steps parallel to the Kremlin's activity in other CIS institutions. In his speech in the Armenian capital, Kirill stated that “religious communities should show initiative in up-bringing immigrants in order to help them to adapt to a new cultural environment, so they would develop awareness focused on cooperation instead of isolation, because isolation from the majority sooner or later results in confrontation.”Footnote 85 In the Conclusions of the Erevan Interfaith Council of CIS, it was stated: “Relations between immigrants and local people, minority and majority are one of the most important issues. On the one hand, immigrants show no respects to local tradition and order. On the other hand, xenophobia occurs along with attempts to exploit cheap migrant labour.... State, society and business are to help immigrants to learn the language, culture and religious tradition of the host country. Our religious communities are ready to help and they are already doing it.”Footnote 86
Inside the Russian Federation: Cooperation with the FMO
Of all areas, the cooperation between the FMO of the Russian Federation and “traditional” religions is the most advanced. In the case of the ROC, one of the first meetings took place in 2009, which was a round table on immigration. A breakthrough happened a year later when, “on the initiative of the FMO and with the blessing of patriarch Kirill,” the Common Commission was established with the ROC is represented by Vsevolod Chaplin.Footnote 87 In February 2011, the commission initiated organizing eparchy centers for cultural adaptation of immigrants. Just a year later, Vsevolod Chaplin reported that three eparchies provided Russian language courses for immigrants; 45 common bilateral agreements had been signed and there were further plans to start courses in 27 other locations.Footnote 88 Satisfied with the results, in April 2013 both sides signed a Memorandum on extending cooperation on adaptation programs. Two months later common efforts of the FMO and the ROC bore their first fruit: a textbook for Russian language and culture adapted for immigrants.Footnote 89
Although the ROC is the main partner of the FMO among “traditional” religions, the FMO is also keen on cooperating with others. In March 2011, the Council of Muftis of Russia presented an initiative to prepare — together with FMO — leaflets for Muslim immigrants from Central Asia who could collect it after prayers in mosques.Footnote 90 Finally, in 2012, the first agreements between local muftiates and the FMO were signed.Footnote 91
Interestingly, the FMO has even reached out to Buddhists. In 2011, the Traditional Buddhist Sangha of the Russian Federation and the FMO signed an agreement on cooperation in the Republic of Buryatia with the aim of taking care of immigrants from Mongolia.Footnote 92
This dynamically developing cooperation between the FMO and “traditional” religions is one of the most telling indicators of the growing participation of religious organizations in managing interethnic relations in Russia. So far, the ROC and muftiates are the most active in this field, which is not surprising since the relations between ethnic Russians and Muslims (both Russian citizens and immigrants) present the biggest challenge to the state's future stability.
CONCLUSIONS
There is something puzzling in the fact that the authorities of the secular Russian state consider religious institutions their partner in managing interethnic relations, especially in the field of adaptation programs for immigrants. As a result, “traditional” religions turn out to be more than just religious communities; they act as representatives of ethnic groups. The involvement of “traditional” religions carries concrete consequences for defining such issues as national identity, culture, or tradition. The impact the Moscow Patriarchate has on the public debate in Russia has already started to show. A good example is the notion of traditional values, which, vague before, has been recently specified by the ROC. This strengthens the impression that Russian traditional values are synonymous with religious ones and thereby increases the tendency for equating “Russianness” with “Orthodox Christianity.” What is more, according to the ROC, these traditional values should be revived in society through the process of “spiritual (moral) up-bringing” managed by “traditional” religions. This concept was originally initiated and promoted by the ROC, but is now increasingly used in the political debate in Russia. Among Russian “traditional” religions the Moscow Patriarchate is in fact the only one capable of influencing the debate at the state level. This is a recent tendency but it undermines the main principle of the post-Soviet religious model, i.e., the instrumental approach of the Kremlin to religion.
The post-Soviet religious model as a tool of soothing interethnic tensions has several weaknesses. First, while the presence of “traditional” religions in the public sphere is a symptom of traditionalism, it is also a factor which fosters it within Russian society. Culturalism with its rigid understating of culture, tradition, and identity does not provide suitable ideological frames for a modern multiethnic and multi-religious society. Meanwhile, it is culturalism which legitimates the expansion of the social partnership of state and “traditional” religions in Russia.
The attachment of “traditional” religions to the clear ethno-religious division lines reveals the second weakness of the post-Soviet religious model. In fact, “traditional” religions preserve the logic of ethno-religious identity and thereby contribute to the ethnisation of relations within society. They act as representatives not only of the believers but de facto of ethnic groups which are considered their “traditional” adherents.Footnote 93
Third, surveys show that some groups of Orthodox clergy lean toward nationalism. The ROC and the muftiates present rather strict views on dealing with immigration, tend to shift the blame for tensions on immigrants and call for stricter legal measures, which do not bode well for future interethnic concord.
Finally, and most importantly, despite the official rhetoric, organizations representing “traditional” religions have still not worked out a durable mechanism of harmonious cooperation. While it is true that the Interfaith Council of Russia, a flagship institution of successful interfaith dialogue, functions as a platform of contacts between representatives of “traditional” religions, it rarely influences interreligious relations at the local level. One of the most serious challenges to the effective cooperation of “traditional” religions is the growing dominance of the ROC in the public sphere. The Kremlin, as the only actor able to preserve the balance among “traditional” religions (foremost the Moscow Patriarchate and muftiates), has so far decided for a hands-off approach in this regard.
The post-Soviet religious model has a vertical nature. In this respect, the religious model partially reflects the Russian regime dominated by the vertical of power (and by extension reproduces certain features of the Soviet approach to religion). The very efficiency of the model is in doubt. The state prefers the top-down approach: it cooperates with religious institutions which are loyal and cooperative rather than representative of society. The methods, at least some of them, of managing interethnic relations are surprisingly awkwardly conceived (e.g., the cultural adaptation programs for Muslim immigrants organized inter alia by the ROC). Within the logic of the model, society is just a passive receiver of the initiatives brought by the state and church. This is another serious weakness of the model.
Despite assurances of the Kremlin and religious institutions, the truth is that none of the representatives of Russian “traditional” religions has a clear concept of how to deal with interethnic tensions in an efficient way. Public debates are often concluded with general statements about the interethnic and interfaith dialogue, supported by the Kremlin and initiated and moderated by organizations representing “traditional” religions. However, no specific coordinates of this dialogue have so far been mentioned. The ROC argues that the main ideological foundation for cooperation of “traditional” religions should be provided by common “traditional” values, such as family or patriotism. This may sound well on a general level, but when it comes to details, it must turn out that many of these values are understood and interpreted differently by each religious tradition.
The Russian cultural “know-how” of managing interethnic and interfaith relations, so often emphasized by the Kremlin, does not have much to offer when it comes to practical solutions. As Viktor Schnirelman rightly points out, the slogan of “harmonizing interethnic relation” in Russia often simply means tightening control (Schnirelman Reference Schnirelman2011, 45). The post-Soviet religious model cannot be an answer to the challenges of interethnic tensions which the Russian Federation could face in the future. As a matter of fact, it arguably just adds to the problem in the long run — it namely preserves the link between identity and religion, reinforces ethnisation and, additionally, encourages the ROC to play the role of a repository of “Russianness” and so disturbs the important balance between “traditional” religions. The post-Soviet religious model ignores the pluralistic reality, neglects the role of society and equates tradition with religion. Meanwhile, in the context of a strong tendency for traditionalisation, it is crucial to define tradition in other ways than only by associating it with Orthodox Christianity. Russia needs a new patriotism which would not be so strongly connected to Russian Orthodoxy.
Answering the question posed in the beginning of the article, it does not seem probable that ethnic stabilization and confessional peace could be achieved with these measures. Thinking in terms of efficiency, tackling them in the long term would require the actual involvement of society, e.g., including other social institutions and allowing greater pluralism of religious organizations. However, since the functioning of the post-Soviet religious model is connected to functioning of the regime, it can be argued that this change would require some sort of change also within the regime as well. Keeping a model which implies a growing involvement of “traditional” religions in the public sphere is an obstacle on the way to achieving the strategic goal of ethnic stability in Russia, i.e., redefining the formula of national identity and creating a modern sense of citizenship beyond ethnicity and religion.
Emil Pain rightly notices that when Russian leaders talk about the necessity to recognize Russian culture as the dominant one, they in fact appeal to mono-culturalism. What Russia needs, according to the Russian ethnologist, is inter-culturalism directed at creating conditions which would encourage ethnic groups to cooperate. He proposes reviving the idea of fraternity of peoples (druzhba narodov) in which political identity is more important than ethnic identity (Pain Reference Pain2011). Even if one assumes that this is a realistic alternative for Russia, the post-Soviet religious model in its present shape will not help to achieve it.
