The Pali Vinaya: tradition versus historical facts

The Pali Vinaya, the disciplinary code of the Theravāda school, is a large and highly redacted ascetic text regulating many and diverse aspects of ascetic life through detailed descriptions of legal procedures, ceremonies, multiple “dos and don'ts” and several hundred rules for the Buddhist monk and nun. The Pali Vinaya consists of three main parts: the Suttavibhaṅga, the Khandhaka and Parivāra. Footnote ¹⁰ Of these three, the Parivāra (Appendix) is the most recent. It is a very technical text, giving a systematic overview of law.Footnote ¹¹ The Suttavibhaṅga contains and comments on the Pātimokkhasutta, or the 227 rules of conduct for the Buddhist monk and the 311 rules of conduct for the Buddhist nun.Footnote ¹² The Suttavibhaṅga introduces each of its rules with an introductory story recounting the occasion and reason for their formulation. The Khandhaka starts with the Buddha's enlightenment and contains, besides technical guidelines for ceremonies, admission and ordination procedures, rules defining decorum and proper clothing. Like the introductory stories of the Suttavibhaṅga, narratives are attached to each regulation of the Khandhaka, recording the specific incident that would have necessitated them. The fact that the Suttavibhaṅga and the Khandhaka have introductory stories and narratives accompanying each of their regulations makes the Pali Vinaya a potentially rich source of information regarding the formative stages of the early Indian Buddhist ascetic community.Footnote ¹³ However, as Vinaya experts have pointed out, there are several serious difficulties with consulting the Pali Vinaya as a historical document. Regarding factuality and completeness of the Pali Vinaya, we cannot be sure to what extent the precepts (and this is true for all Vinayas) were actually observed and, turning this problem around, we do not know to what extent the precepts regulating early Indian Buddhist ascetic life have factually been included in the Pali Vinaya.Footnote ¹⁴ Broadly speaking, the main difficulties with consulting the Pali Vinaya as a historical source relate to: (1) its complex textual development; and (2) its overt concern for tradition versus historical facts.

I will tackle the crux of the Pali Vinaya’s textual development first – having developed over a long period of time, the Pali Vinaya presents itself as a very fragmented, heterogeneous text. First, the various “Māgadhisms” encountered in the so-called Pali language suggest that the Pali Vinaya is in part the result of a transposition from (an) earlier eastern version(s).Footnote ¹⁵ Second, the Pali Vinaya had a complex textual development, having ensued from a set of ascetic regulations first brought from India to Sri Lanka during Aśoka's reign, before being written down in a Vinaya compilation.Footnote ¹⁶ The textual fragmentation of the Pali Vinaya is still well observable at the temporal gap between the precepts and their accompanying introductory story in the Suttavibhaṅga. In this section of the Pali Vinaya introductory stories often betray a made-up character by misunderstanding or showing a different concern from the precept they introduce.Footnote ¹⁷ Also, many of the narratives of the Khandhaka section are at times only very loosely connected to the rules they precede, and have an invented ring.Footnote ¹⁸ This brings us to the second difficulty with consulting the Pali Vinaya as a historical document: the problem of tradition versus historical facts.

Given the invented tone of many of the introductory stories of the Suttavibhaṅga and the Khandhaka narratives, it is clear that they were – contrary to what we would have liked – not developed as faithful historical reports. But the question persists as to why they were developed. Being structured around the principles of what today is called “case law”, the Pali Vinaya needs to ground each of its precepts on a specific incident.Footnote ¹⁹ The overall function of the stories within the Pali Vinaya is precisely this: recounting the alleged when and why of each Pali Vinaya regulation. Unfortunately, these stories are, as we have just seen, rarely historically faithful.

When we question the function of the various Pali Vinaya stories by considering their narrative structure, then their prime function appears to have been the creation of the very tradition they claim to represent. The typical narrative structure of the stories effects a strong traditional story regarding the origin and development of the Buddhist ascetic saṅgha. It is created by reverting to stock phrases; by using a repetitive structure; and, most importantly, by placing the executive role for every legal decision with the Buddha himself.

Recognizing this and other, so to speak, “flaws” of the Pali Vinaya as a ready historical document for the ins and outs of early Indian Buddhist ascetic life, scholars have been quick to point out that the Pali Vinaya nevertheless also has a rich historical value. For instance, according to Charles Hallisey the Pali Vinaya is historically valuable “in its being a coherent expression of a particular Buddhist mentalité”.Footnote ²⁰ Also, if not representing actual Indian Buddhist ascetic life, it is at least “providing us with rich insights into how the canonical authors/redactors, the ascetic lawmakers, envisaged the Indian Buddhist experience…”.Footnote ²¹ Shayne Clark in a recent study highlighted the value of the various Vinaya stories as follows:

Concurring with this opinion that the narratives attached to ascetic regulations are indeed invaluable for the present-day researcher, I wish to demonstrate in this article how the various stories within the Pali Vinaya throw light on the processes of othering of the early Buddhist ascetic community. Thanks to their various terms for and references to the early Buddhist bhikkhu's ascetic other, the stories can disclose valuable information on the dialectical role non-Buddhist ascetics played in the development of the early Buddhist ascetic community.

What's in a name? Denominations for the ascetic other in the Pali Vinaya

Given the normative character of the Pali Vinaya, how are we to identify in this body of text processes of othering? An efficient method, I suggest, is by means of analysing its various denominations for the ascetic others. The terms the Pali Vinaya uses to refer to the early Buddhist's real or imagined ascetic others can, I believe, give valuable insights into the processes of othering of the early Buddhist ascetic community. For denominations are never neutral. They are value carriers and establishers. As such they are not interchangeable; each denomination gives a unique insight into how the early Buddhist community perceived and related to its ascetic other in terms of sameness and difference.

When perusing the Pali Vinaya an obvious but important observation is that the Pali Vinaya hosts a wide array of terms to refer to the early Buddhist's ascetic others. This, in itself, is already reflective of the dynamic and dialectic force ascetic others exerted on the Buddhist ascetic saṅgha. For analytical purposes, the various terms may be grouped into three categories: one-to-one denominations; generic denominations; and metonymical denominations.

By one-to-one denominations I understand terms having an explicit correspondence with an individual or a group of individuals belonging to the historical ascetic landscape of the early Indian Buddhist ascetic community. This group includes terms such as nigaṇṭha, nigaṇṭhasāvaka, Nātaputta Nigaṇṭha, ājīvika and jaṭila Footnote ²³ – such terms show that early Buddhists knew how members of other contemporary ascetic communities denominated themselves, or at least, if the terms in question were not (the sole ones which were) applied internally, how they were commonly referred to by others.Footnote ²⁴ Therefore these terms could have sufficed to refer to their contemporary ascetic others. Yet, despite the presence and knowledge of these denominations that, it should be stressed, had an unambiguous one-to-one correspondence, they developed and adopted a large vocabulary for their ascetic others with far more ambiguous terms.

The group of generic denominations includes terms referring to individuals or communities supposedly belonging to the historical ascetic landscape of the early Buddhist community, but whose ascetic affiliation is uncertain. In generic denominations the specific affiliation of the ascetic cannot be deduced from the denomination itself. Terms belonging to this group are the compound samaṇa-brāhmaṇa; and the terms samaṇa; brāhmaṇa; paribbājaka; aññatitthiya; aññatitthiya paribbājaka; titthiya; titthiyasāvaka; titthiyapakkanta; sabbapāsaṇḍika; samaṇakuttaka, etc.Footnote ²⁵

Standing alone in the third category is the metonymical denomination acela(ka). Though also having an ambiguous reference field, acela(ka) needs to be set apart from the group of generic denominations for its explicit reflexive element. As will be explained, in metonymical denominations the other is being referred to in direct relation to the self. This reflexive aspect typical of metonymical denominations makes the term acela(ka) particularly suited for our present study of the processes of othering of the early Buddhist ascetic community. It will therefore be analysed in detail in Part III.

Of all the Pali Vinaya terms referring to ascetic others, the generic denominations are those reverted to most frequently (and then especially titthiya). This is not surprising when we remember the normative nature of the Pali Vinaya. Considering the Pali Vinaya's unfailing emphasis on the central role and authority of the Buddha in the development of the Buddhist ascetic saṅgha, we can readily understand why generic denominations were preferred to one-to-one denominations. Generic denominations can refer to the Buddhist's ascetic others without, however, accrediting the positive influence they had on the development of the Buddhist ascetic saṅgha. One-to-one denominations if used too abundantly do. Be that as it may, the very presence in the Pali Vinaya of this wide array of terms referring to ascetic others, shows how they played a dynamic role in the development of an early Buddhist identity rhetoric. This especially becomes clear when ascetic contemporaries to the early Indian Buddhists are understood to be the latter's “proximate other”.

The dynamic concept of “proximate other”

It is not difficult to imagine how direct and indirect contact between the Buddhist saṅgha and brāhmaṇa or other similarly organized samaṇa communities such as the nigaṇṭha (i.e. Jain) and ājīvika concretely resulted in the formulation and establishment of certain Vinaya precepts and structures. Indeed, nineteenth-century scholars, investigating in the true scientific spirit of their century the original “Buddhism” and “Jainism”, have pointed out the many similarities between the principal ascetic precepts and structures of the Buddhist, nigaṇṭha and brāhmaṇa communities.Footnote ²⁶ In fact, they were often so struck by these similarities that they concluded that the Buddhist and Jain community must have borrowed extensively from the brāhmaṇa community, generally considering the latter as the more powerful and authoritative.Footnote ²⁷ In addition their broad similarities, the different ascetic communities seem also to have had a detailed knowledge of each other's organization, practices and doctrine.Footnote ²⁸ Seen from this perspective it is only sound to assume that the Buddhist saṅgha's interaction with brāhmaṇas and samaṇas resulted in concrete dynamic contributions to its development. But the influence of contemporary non-Buddhist ascetics was not limited to this, as it were, positive dynamic contribution. These non-Buddhist ascetics also exerted a negative, or rather, reflexive dynamic force on the organization, self-perception and identity rhetoric of the Buddhist ascetic saṅgha. The mere presence of ascetic others continuously challenged the authority of the Buddhist saṅgha vis-à-vis both its internal organization and its claim of membership within the wider ascetic landscape. The recognition of the Buddhist saṅgha as a samaṇa community not only depended on a functional and somehow unifying internal organization of its members, but also on the willingness of both the lay community and the other samaṇa communities to acknowledge its samaṇa status, an acknowledgement which ensured specific types of social relationships and actions. In this respect, the various contemporary ascetic communities constituted the early Buddhist's “proximate other”.

The dynamic concept of “proximate other” has been developed by theorist and historian of religion Jonathan Z. Smith in his essays entitled “Differential equations: on constructing the other” and “What a difference a difference can make”.Footnote ²⁹ The core idea behind the concept of proximate other is that, unlike the ideologically (and, in our case, geographically)Footnote ³⁰ remote other (as, for instance, the Native American Navajo is to the Indian Jain), the proximate other demands, and effects, a process of othering. The proximate other invites a discourse of difference wherein a rhetoric of self-definition and reflection can be developed. Unlike the remote other or absolute other, the presence of a proximate other creates the basic need for the establishment, or at least the reconsideration, of boundaries where differences and similarities can be negotiated. The dialectical force of the proximate other lies in the fact that when a community is defining its proximate other it is simultaneously defining itself. Dealing with and defining one's proximate other entails “complex reciprocal relationships” and results in a double definition of “them” and “us”, with “us” being defined vis-à-vis “them”, and “them” vis-à-vis “us”.Footnote ³¹ It is in the presence of one's proximate other that a “theory of the other” becomes compelling. In the words of Jonathan Z. Smith:

To this he further shrewdly adds “[a] ‘theory of the other’ is but another way of phrasing a ‘theory of the self’”. (Smith (Reference Smith and Smith1985) 2004: 275.) Smith formulated his reflections on “proximate other” while investigating “the history of the western imagination of the ‘other’”, and though his reflections are therefore mainly framed by a historical perspective on the dynamics of cultural encounters, it is nevertheless highly relevant to question to what extent his dynamic, dialectical concept of “proximate other” is applicable to the manner in which early Buddhists conceptualized and dealt with their contemporary ascetic others. As Jonathan Z. Smith ((Reference Smith and Smith1985) 2004: 245) remarks “the issue of problematic similarity or identity seems to be particularly prevalent in religious discourse and imagination”.

Indeed, the group of narratives that we selected for examining the process of othering in the Pali Vinaya reflects an anxious concern of the early Buddhists to be distinctive from their contemporary ascetics. Before turning to a close reading of these Vinaya narratives, we need to make explicit that the “proximity” of the various contemporary ascetic others is – naturally – gradated. As such there is not one but multiple proximate others. The presence of certain ascetic communities had dialectically a greater impact than others, or certain ideological claims and practices could dynamically challenge the Buddhist ideology and practices more fiercely than others. Considering the “issue of problematic similarity or identity”, we can conclude that the closer a (practice or ideology of a) community presents itself to the Buddhist community at a certain place and time, the further the Buddhist community will need to differentiate itself from it.

Othering with one's proximate others

The selected group of Vinaya passages consists of six dukkaṭa offences (that is, offences of wrongdoing requiring expiation) and their accompanying small narratives at Mahāvagga I 70.1–6 (Vin I 90–1; BD IV 114–5). Mahāvagga I 70.1–6 is part of a larger section discussing occasions when a bhikkhu should not ordain. Setting Mahāvagga I 70.–6 apart from this section is the presence of the stock phrase seyyathāpi titthiyā, meaning “just like adherents of a different ascetic community”. In these stories Buddhist bhikkhus are rebuked for not wearing any robe or not using any begging bowl on the basis that they, in such instances, become too much like their ascetic others (seyyathāpi titthiyā). It should be noted that the occurrence of the stock phrase seyyathāpi titthiyā in the Pali Vinaya is already, in itself, reflective of the early Indian Buddhist saṅgha's ongoing preoccupation with marking boundaries from its ascetic, proximate others in order to prevent its merging into these very others.Footnote ³² Let us now examine the processes of othering in our selected group of Vinaya passages.Footnote ³³

Mahāvagga I 70.2 determines a dukkaṭa offence for a monk who ordains a candidate into the Buddhist saṅgha without having provided him first with a Buddhist robe. The accompanying narrative tells how a Buddhist bhikkhu who is acῑvara and who, in this case, goes for alms naked (naggā piṇḍāya caranti)Footnote ³⁴ is thought to be seyyathāpi titthiya. The Vinaya passage reads as follows:

The apparent difficulty here for allowing a Buddhist bhikkhu to be acīvara and, in our case, to be without a robe and thus naked, is that his distinctiveness from other ascetics risks dissolving.Footnote ³⁵ Nakedness appears thus to be for the Buddhist saṅgha a signifying characteristic of a community other than itself. A Buddhist acīvaraka certainly is an acīvaraka but only perhaps a Buddhist. In other words, the problem is that the Buddhist acῑvaraka might, from the Buddhist's point of view, become too similar or even identical to a titthiya (Skt. tīrthika). In an identical manner, at Mahāvagga I 70.1 Buddhist bhikkhus are being rebuked for walking for alms without a begging bowl (apatta) on the basis that they are seyyathāpi titthiyā or just like adherents of another ascetic community.

These Mahāvagga passages, together with Pali Vinaya narratives wherein types of begging materials and robes are declared unfit for the Buddhist bhikkhu, may be quoted, and justifiably have been, to argue how the early Buddhist community desired at a certain point to be visually distinctive from its ascetic, proximate other.Footnote ³⁶ Though this is true, it is not all. In these narratives “the” Buddhist bhikkhu is also dialectically defining himself in relation to his ascetic, proximate other. First, the Buddhist bhikkhu is relating to his real or imagined proximate other by simply becoming this other (here, in our case, by becoming naked or acīvara) before he, in a second instance, distinguishes himself from this very other by rejecting the practices he came to associate with him. As such these narratives contain informative traces of the processes of othering of the early Buddhist community. They show how the early Buddhist ascetic community, or at the very least the monk-editors of the Pali Vinaya, reflected on the importance of the Buddhist robe and begging materials in direct relation to those of their ascetic others. Further, in such Pali Vinaya narratives, practices of ascetic others, whether real or imagined, are never simply referred to. Practices supposedly marking titthiyās are drawn in, their significance and value experimented with, at the end of this process either to be adopted as “Buddhist” or rejected as “other” (titthiya). In both cases, it will have effected a re-evaluation and if found necessary a (re-)negotiation of the Buddhist community's own practices and values. These arguments will shortly be substantiated with a close reading of other Vinaya narratives prohibiting nakedness.

Jonathan Z. Smith's theory shows that the presence of a proximate other in particular is problematic. Generally speaking, a theory of the other is a sine qua non for the establishment of any society, but in the vicinity of a proximate other, or in the presence of a community that is similar to one's own, the need for a “theory of the other” becomes “an urgent necessity” (Green Reference Green, Neusner and Frerichs1985: 49–50). The underlying dynamics of a society's theory of the other have been discussed with great clarity by William Scott Green in the theoretical introduction to his essay “Otherness within: towards a theory of difference in rabbinic Judaism”.Footnote ³⁷ In the most basic sense a theory of the other establishes or confirms the singularity of a community in (re)defining its collective identity. Further, it makes a community draw and reflect upon its boundaries. On a more dialectical level the theory of the other, and then, particularly of those viewed as proximate, are means by which communities can “explore their internal ambiguities and interstices, experiment with alternative values and symbols, and question their own structures and mechanisms” (Green Reference Green, Neusner and Frerichs1985: 51).

With these observations let us return to our Vinaya narrative wherein Buddhist bhikkhus are prohibited from being acīvara (without robe) and thus naked on the basis that they might be perceived as belonging to a community other than their own. What does this narrative do? Perhaps it relates the historical event wherein bhikkhus indeed went for alms naked and were indeed mistakenly thought of as titthiyas, but perhaps it does not. What the narrative does tell, however, is how the early Buddhist ascetic community evolved in dialogue with its ascetic others. Containing traces of the processes of othering, it provides a glimpse of the dynamic, reflexive impact that ascetic others had on the development of the early Buddhist ascetic community. Referring to a practice of ascetic other, whether real or imagined, the narrative illustrates how Buddhist bhikkhus, or at least the monk-editors of the Pali Vinaya, questioned their own customs in direct relation to those of their ascetic others. Or the narrative shows how, through processes of othering they, to follow Green's formulation, “explored their own ambiguities” and “experimented” with alternative practices and values. When referring to the titthiyas' ascetic practice of wandering naked, the monk-editors of the Pali Vinaya reflect on the significance or additional value of being acīvara and thus, simultaneously (re)question their own practice of being cīvara or a wearer of robes. However quirky this issue might appear to the present-day mind, it most probably was not a random matter for early Indian Buddhists. On a historical note, we know that certain ascetics belonging to the nigaṇṭha and most probably also the ajīvīka community took up nakedness as an essential ascetic observance on their path to liberation. We may note, for instance, that one of the few fundamental points to have internally divided the nigaṇṭha community was the observance or rejection of the ascetic practice of nakedness and its doctrinal motivation. The great significance the two nigaṇṭha communities attached in being or not being naggiya is seen nowhere more clearly than in their later developed and adopted denominations of “Śvetambāra” (White clad) and “Digambara” (Sky clad).

Another Mahāvagga passage also reflects on the significance of nakedness (and, reflexively, on the significance of not taking up the practice of nakedness) by again prohibiting it on the basis that ascetic others (titthiyas) adopted the practice. It is worth quoting the passage at length:

In this passage, a member of the Buddhist saṅgha is quickly put in his place for pleading to incorporate “nakedness” as an effective means on the ascetic path. Rebuking him, the Buddha prohibits nakedness (naggiya) on the basis that it is being practised by ascetic others. Though the ascetic practice of nakedness might indeed have been valued by some Buddhist monks, its possibility for the Buddhist community is seen as problematic. In the presence of ascetic others practising “nakedness” Buddhist monks would lose their distinctiveness. I will return to this point below.

As regards the associative powers of nakedness with the ājīvika community, we may refer to Vinaya I 290–92 (BD IV 414–17) and Vinaya III 212 (BD II 45–7). Also these Vinaya passages beautifully reflect the Buddhist's fear of nakedness. At Vinaya I 290–92, bhikkhus were acīvara or naked as they were letting their bodies get wet with rain. Because of their nakedness, they were being mistaken for ājīvikas. To avoid a recurrence of this mistaken identity, a faithful householder asked the Buddha whether she could donate “cloths for the rains” (vassikasāṭika) to the saṅgha, condemning nakedness (naggiya) as being impure (asuci) and objectionable (paṭikkūla).Footnote ³⁸ At Vinaya III 212 we read how a bhikkhu in the unfortunate event of being robbed and, as the narrative implies, being stripped of his robe (achinnacīvara), is exceptionally allowed to beg for a robe from a householder,Footnote ³⁹ or if he is in the neighbourhood of a dwelling of fellow bhikkhus to ask for one there. In the absence of these options, he is instructed to cover himself with either a bed cover (uttarattharaṇa), a ground cover (bhummattharaṇa) or a mattress cover (bhisicchavi)Footnote ⁴⁰ and if these options were also unavailable, he should cover himself with grass (tiṇa) or leaves (paṇṇa), in short, with anything as long as he does not come naked. If he does come naked, however, he commits an offence of wrongdoing. According to the accompanying introductory story, the event supposedly effecting these regulations was the misrecognition of certain bhikkhus to be ājīvikas as they, having been robbed of their robe, were wandering naked.

From these Vinaya passages prohibiting monks from wandering naked, we may safely deduce that the early Buddhist community conceptualized “nakedness” (naggiya) to be much more than the mere absence (a-) of robes (cīvara). For the Buddhist community nakedness was clearly not an accidental feature of being temporarily acīvara; nakedness was the robe or cīvara typifying ascetic communities other than itself. As such, these introductory stories throw light on the processes of othering of the early Buddhist ascetic community. They show how Buddhist bhikkhus, or at the very least the monk-editors of the Pali Vinaya, re-questioned and if necessary re-accommodated their own practices through reflection on the practices of their so-called ascetic other. When referring to the ascetic practice of nakedness, they temporarily “internalize” it, “experiment” with it, subsequently to distance themselves from the possibility altogether by marking it as a difference between themselves and titthiyas. The difference thus marked is utterly significant as it starts to symbolize the very distinction between “us” and “them”. For, it is realized, if the “us” adopts the practice of nakedness it simply might become “them”.Footnote ⁴¹ In other words, there is awareness of what William Scott Green calls “the possibility or the reality of otherness within”.Footnote ⁴² Conversely, the cīvara in the presence of the possibility of being acīvara has become an essential part of what constitutes the early Buddhist identity.

Acela(ka) in the Pali Vinaya

This section analyses the denomination acela(ka). It shows how also the presence of this metonymical denomination in the Pali Vinaya is reflective of the early Buddhist ascetic community's processes of othering. More specifically, just as the Pali narratives discussed in the previous part, the term acela(ka) points to the fact that Buddhist bhikkhus reflected on the significance and value of their practice of wearing a robe (or better “cloth” or cela) in direct relation to the practice of their ascetic others of wandering naked. rOn a more general level, I wish to draw attention to the fact that the development and/or use of metonymies within a community, shows the dynamic, dialectic impact proximate others have on a community's development and self-perception.

At Vinaya IV 91–2 a group of ascetic, proximate others (titthiyā) is denominated with the term “acelaka” (one without cloth).Footnote ⁴³ The denomination acela(ka) is a typical metonymical denomination.Footnote ⁴⁴ In terming a particular proximate other acela(ka) the Buddhist community is differentiating itself from that proximate other by highlighting in this denomination an ascetic custom (here, nakedness), expressed as the lack of a familiar practice among its members (the wearing of a “cloth” or cela).Footnote ⁴⁵ The term acela(ka) therefore not only tells us a little about a real or imagined group of proximate others, but it also and mainly informs us how the monk-editors attached great importance to the practice of wearing a cloth of the Buddhist bhikkhus.

The reflexive, dialectical aspect of metonymical denominations has also been noted by Jonathan Z. Smith and William Scott Green in their cultural theory of the other.Footnote ⁴⁶ The latter, for instance, in stressing the importance of the semantic component of a society's theory of the other cuttingly remarked that “the terminology it [i.e. a society] invents to describe and classify those besides itself, along with the social action such language entails, are primarily clues to its self-understanding” (Green Reference Green, Neusner and Frerichs1985: 49).

Green further noted that a society's theory of the other is “an exercise in caricature” for, a society “does not simply discover its others, it fabricates them” (Green Reference Green, Neusner and Frerichs1985: 50). With respect to metonymies this is easily understood. In metonymies such as acela(ka) only one aspect of the proximate other's life is highlighted that, moreover, comes to represent this group of titthiyas (here the supposed fact that they were “without cloth” and thus wandering naked). In the words of William Scott Green a society fabricates its proximate other by:

Bearing in mind these gained notions that through metonymies the proximate other is not just referred to but also “fabricated”, and that through them a double dialectical process of (self-)definition is taking place, we can comprehend the additional value of metonymies to both one-to-one and generic denominations. Through metonymies the possibility or the significance of an alternative practice or an internal ambiguity is reflected upon. Through these metonymies, alternative praxes and values are taken to the very boundaries of a community and experimented with. The result of such an “experiment” is that at the end of the exercise the practice or value in question will either be internalized and further adopted or, alternatively, rejected and marked as “other”. It is important to underscore that the practice which comes to be rejected and marked as “other” contributes as much to the “making-off” of a community as the one which is internalized and adopted. The only difference being that the ongoing definition of a community through rejection of what is so-called “other” negatively takes shape, effecting differences between oneself and one's proximate other. These effected differences are highly significant. For, “… difference is rarely something simply to be noted; it is, most often, something in which one has a stake. Above all, it is a political matter” (Smith (Reference Smith and Smith1985) 2004: 252). This is also true with respect to the processes of othering of the early Buddhist ascetic community. The importance of the differences marked between Buddhists and non-Buddhists during processes of othering lies in the fact that they develop specific power relations. The negotiated differences start to represent typifying features on the basis of which the Buddhist community can distance itself from its proximate other. And it is on the very ground of such formulated differences that the proximate other will be perceived and consequently treated as “other” by the Buddhist community. A proximate other who desires to join the Buddhist ascetic saṅgha will first have to give up his “otherness” to be able to become a Buddhist mendicant and to be recognized as such. Several regulations within the Pali Vinaya can be understood within this framework, namely as aiming to dismantle the “otherness” of candidates desiring the going forth. We can think, for instance, of the small regulations for aññatitthiyapubbas (those who previously belonged to a different ascetic community) such as “if an aññatitthiyapubba comes naked (naggo āgacchati) a robe belonging to a preceptor should be looked about for”.Footnote ⁴⁷ The four-month probation period (parivāsa) asked of certain aññatitthiyapubbas may also be understood from this perspective.Footnote ⁴⁸

To conclude, just like the discussed introductory stories referring to supposed practices of proximate others, the metonymy acela(ka) is also reflective of the processes of othering of the early Buddhist ascetic community. Using the term acela(ka) to refer to some (groups of) ascetic, proximate others, the monk-editors show how they negotiated a “Buddhist” identity in direct relation to these proximate others. Further, the use of the denomination acela(ka) reflects how, in the existing reality – or in the imagined possibility – of nakedness as an ascetic practice, the importance of their own practice of wearing a cloth comes to be articulated. Finally, in using the term acela(ka), the difference between the practice of wearing a cloth and the ascetic practice of being naked comes to be marked as a typifying difference between themselves and their ascetic, proximate others.