Mercier and Sperber (M&S) argue that the notoriously bad logical reasoning performance in classic reasoning and decision-making tasks can be attributed to the lack of argumentative context or interaction in these tasks. They point out that when the same problems are put in an argumentative context, people have little trouble solving them. From this they conclude that, except for a few “almost freakish” (sect. 6, para. 7) individuals, people will engage in a genuine logical reasoning process only when arguing. Clearly, this seems to question the validity of classic reasoning tasks: In these nonargumentative tasks, people will typically not do what they do in the real (argumentative) world. This impression is further strengthened by M&S's claim that it would be a mistake to treat as paradigmatic examples of human reasoning those few individuals who do exert control over their biases and manage to solve the classic reasoning tasks.
I want to point out that although M&S nicely demonstrate that providing an argumentative context can boost people's logical reasoning performance, this does not imply that people do not already seek to reason logically in the absence of this context. It should be stressed that M&S's claims with respect to the poor performance in classic reasoning tasks are typically based on traditional studies that focused merely on accuracy data (i.e., the output of the reasoning process).
Recent studies that examined a wider range of processing measures such as latency or brain-activation data (e.g., Bonner & Newell Reference Bonner and Newell2010; De Neys et al. Reference De Neys, Vartanian and Goel2008) sketch a more optimistic picture of people's reasoning performance in the classic, nonargumentative tasks. These data suggest that although people very often fail to select the correct logical response, they at least seek to adhere to the logical norm. For example, although people typically fail to solve classic reasoning problems in which intuitive beliefs conflict with normative considerations, latency studies indicate that people do take longer to respond to these problems compared to problems in which the norms are not being violated (e.g., Bonner & Newell Reference Bonner and Newell2010; De Neys & Glumicic Reference De Neys and Glumicic2008). Problems in which cued intuitive beliefs conflict with logical considerations are also longer inspected and better recalled (e.g., Ball et al. Reference Ball, Philips, Wade and Quayle2006; De Neys & Glumicic Reference De Neys and Glumicic2008).
Neuroscientific research further suggests that brain areas involved in the detection of conflict between competing responses are activated when people err and violate a logical norm (e.g., De Neys et al. Reference De Neys, Vartanian and Goel2008; Reference De Neys, Moyens and Vansteenwegen2010). Clearly, if people were not at least engaged in some elementary logical processing and tried to adhere to the logical norm, it is hard to see why violating it would affect their inference process. In addition, De Neys and Franssens (Reference De Neys and Franssens2009) observed that after solving problems in which the intuitive believability and logical validity of a conclusion conflicted, reasoners showed an impaired access to words that were associated with the intuitive beliefs. Such an impaired memory access is considered a key marker of inhibitory processing. Even people who were always biased by their beliefs showed a minimal impairment, indicating that they had attempted to inhibit the intuitive beliefs but failed to complete the process. Once again, if people were not trying to adhere to the logical norm, there would be no reason for them to block the conflicting belief-based response.
The crucial point is that these studies suggest that even without an argumentative context people are already engaging in a logical reasoning process. What the “freakish” individuals who give the correct response seem to be better at is completing the inhibition of conflicting intuitive heuristic responses (De Neys & Franssens Reference De Neys and Franssens2009; Houdé et al. Reference Houdé, Zago, Mellet, Moutier, Pineau, Mazoyer and Tzourio-Mazoyer2000). However, the important finding in the studies cited is that all reasoners are at least engaging in this inhibition process and try to adhere to the logical norm. In that sense we're all freaks who seek logical truth when solving classic reasoning tasks. The bottom line is that this indicates that the standard tasks are less artificial–and logical reasoning in these tasks less exceptional–than M&S's framework might suggest.
In sum, M&S convincingly demonstrate that human reasoning can benefit from an argumentative context. By pointing to recent processing data, I tried to clarify that this does not necessarily imply that people simply fail to engage in a logical reasoning process in the absence of such a context. This should give pause for thought before drawing strong negative conclusions with respect to the validity of classic reasoning tasks or the illogical nature of people's reasoning in these tasks.
Mercier and Sperber (M&S) argue that the notoriously bad logical reasoning performance in classic reasoning and decision-making tasks can be attributed to the lack of argumentative context or interaction in these tasks. They point out that when the same problems are put in an argumentative context, people have little trouble solving them. From this they conclude that, except for a few “almost freakish” (sect. 6, para. 7) individuals, people will engage in a genuine logical reasoning process only when arguing. Clearly, this seems to question the validity of classic reasoning tasks: In these nonargumentative tasks, people will typically not do what they do in the real (argumentative) world. This impression is further strengthened by M&S's claim that it would be a mistake to treat as paradigmatic examples of human reasoning those few individuals who do exert control over their biases and manage to solve the classic reasoning tasks.
I want to point out that although M&S nicely demonstrate that providing an argumentative context can boost people's logical reasoning performance, this does not imply that people do not already seek to reason logically in the absence of this context. It should be stressed that M&S's claims with respect to the poor performance in classic reasoning tasks are typically based on traditional studies that focused merely on accuracy data (i.e., the output of the reasoning process).
Recent studies that examined a wider range of processing measures such as latency or brain-activation data (e.g., Bonner & Newell Reference Bonner and Newell2010; De Neys et al. Reference De Neys, Vartanian and Goel2008) sketch a more optimistic picture of people's reasoning performance in the classic, nonargumentative tasks. These data suggest that although people very often fail to select the correct logical response, they at least seek to adhere to the logical norm. For example, although people typically fail to solve classic reasoning problems in which intuitive beliefs conflict with normative considerations, latency studies indicate that people do take longer to respond to these problems compared to problems in which the norms are not being violated (e.g., Bonner & Newell Reference Bonner and Newell2010; De Neys & Glumicic Reference De Neys and Glumicic2008). Problems in which cued intuitive beliefs conflict with logical considerations are also longer inspected and better recalled (e.g., Ball et al. Reference Ball, Philips, Wade and Quayle2006; De Neys & Glumicic Reference De Neys and Glumicic2008).
Neuroscientific research further suggests that brain areas involved in the detection of conflict between competing responses are activated when people err and violate a logical norm (e.g., De Neys et al. Reference De Neys, Vartanian and Goel2008; Reference De Neys, Moyens and Vansteenwegen2010). Clearly, if people were not at least engaged in some elementary logical processing and tried to adhere to the logical norm, it is hard to see why violating it would affect their inference process. In addition, De Neys and Franssens (Reference De Neys and Franssens2009) observed that after solving problems in which the intuitive believability and logical validity of a conclusion conflicted, reasoners showed an impaired access to words that were associated with the intuitive beliefs. Such an impaired memory access is considered a key marker of inhibitory processing. Even people who were always biased by their beliefs showed a minimal impairment, indicating that they had attempted to inhibit the intuitive beliefs but failed to complete the process. Once again, if people were not trying to adhere to the logical norm, there would be no reason for them to block the conflicting belief-based response.
The crucial point is that these studies suggest that even without an argumentative context people are already engaging in a logical reasoning process. What the “freakish” individuals who give the correct response seem to be better at is completing the inhibition of conflicting intuitive heuristic responses (De Neys & Franssens Reference De Neys and Franssens2009; Houdé et al. Reference Houdé, Zago, Mellet, Moutier, Pineau, Mazoyer and Tzourio-Mazoyer2000). However, the important finding in the studies cited is that all reasoners are at least engaging in this inhibition process and try to adhere to the logical norm. In that sense we're all freaks who seek logical truth when solving classic reasoning tasks. The bottom line is that this indicates that the standard tasks are less artificial–and logical reasoning in these tasks less exceptional–than M&S's framework might suggest.
In sum, M&S convincingly demonstrate that human reasoning can benefit from an argumentative context. By pointing to recent processing data, I tried to clarify that this does not necessarily imply that people simply fail to engage in a logical reasoning process in the absence of such a context. This should give pause for thought before drawing strong negative conclusions with respect to the validity of classic reasoning tasks or the illogical nature of people's reasoning in these tasks.