After Timothy Wickham-Crowley's classic analysis of guerrilla movements in 1992 (Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America (Princeton University Press)), new comparative studies have been scarce. In 2011, Edelberto Torres-Rivas published a study about the civil wars in El Salvador and Guatemala with the telling title Revoluciones sin cambios revolucionarios (F and G Editores), one of the best books he wrote in his long life. In 2014, Verónica Oikión Solano, Eduardo Rey Tristán and Martín López Ávalos were the editors of El estudio de las luchas revolucionarias en América Latina (El Colegio de Michoacán and Universidad de Santiago de Compostela), a volume on Latin American insurgencies. Then, in 2019, Jerónimo Ríos Sierra and José Manuel Azcona Pastor published a new study, Historia de las guerrillas en América Latina (Catarata). Rachel May, Alejandro Schneider and Roberto González Arana's book appeared a year earlier. Their book is about leftist revolutions in six countries in the Caribbean Basin during the Cold War: Colombia, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Puerto Rico.
The authors typify the Caribbean for the purpose of their book as ‘the islands of the Caribbean, along with Central America and the South American countries with a common Spanish colonial past’ while excluding the Mexican and Venezuelan guerrilla movements as ‘relatively minor’ (p. 2). At first sight, for reasons of geographical and historical pureness, they should have included the important case of the Dominican Republic and might have deleted Colombia, a NATO country that does not define itself as predominantly Caribbean. For other reasons, the inclusion of Colombia is suitable: it was the most important breeding ground for guerrilla movements in the region and its post-Second World War civil wars lasted until 2016. Colombian historian Darío Villamizar identified at least 30 Colombian guerrilla movements. Although the selection of the countries is somewhat arbitrary, the inclusion of the case of Puerto Rico makes sense.
Central America, however, is a more homogeneous region. The five Central American countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua) refer to their common destiny in their region and compare themselves with their four neighbours much more than with all other countries in the western hemisphere. Central American citizens retain a kind of dual nationality – as citizens of their own country and as Central Americans. I will need this notion later in the discussion.
The authors developed a comparative scheme that includes: (i) the example and influence of Cuba and Che Guevara's foquismo thesis; (ii) three phases of revolutionary evolution; (iii) a Marxist-inspired ideology; (iv) the context of the Cold War. I assume the authors intend the book to be an introductory textbook and they include suggested literature, websites and films.
There are some points that could have been more emphasised. The bibliography is sometimes rather old and its quality varies per chapter. The introductory chapter could have benefitted more from recent studies about Cuba and its reach and influence. I found the chapter on Guatemala disappointing given that in 2012–13 the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (Latin American Social Sciences Institute, FLACSO) published a five-volume exhaustive study about the insurgency and counter-insurgency period between 1954 and 1996, an absolute must for researchers. Fortunately, the chapter on Colombia is up to date and uses, in my opinion at least, the most important bibliography and reports. The selection of only three guerrilla movements: Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia, FARC), Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army, ELN) and Movimiento 19 de Abril (19 April Movement, M-19), the three most important ones, is also an appropriate choice.
Firstly, there is no doubt about Cuba's influence on the insurgencies in Latin America and the Caribbean. But its influence was not always overwhelming. The FARC, for instance, only entered into direct contact with Cuba in the late 1980s. Guevara's (and thus Fidel Castro's) idea of the foquismo strategy as a recipe for revolutionary triumph appeared not replicable in other countries. Guevara's own interventions in Congo and Bolivia were disastrous. In the 1970s and 1980s the foco concept had become passé. The Nicaraguan victory was only achieved after abandoning the idea of a rural guerrilla. But there is also a clear learning effect after the fiasco of the foco guerrilla movements of the 1960s. In the 1970s and 1980 the then emerging or already existing guerrillas had passed through a learning curve and adaptation process, and had modified their ideas of aims and the necessity of urban and rural mass support. When Cuba decided to assist the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola, MPLA) it was not in the form of a handful of guerrilla veterans but with vast expeditionary forces of regular soldiers using the most modern Soviet weaponry of the time.
Secondly, the influence of other countries (the Soviet Union, China, Vietnam, Algeria, Palestine) was also relevant. Nicaraguan and Honduran guerrilleros participated in PLF (Palestinian Liberation Front) operations and Salvadoreans regularly travelled to Vietnam. The influence of the multiple Latin American dictatorships and the role of the United States as a driving force of counter-insurgency and counter-revolution could also have been mentioned more explicitly.
Thirdly, it is clear that the Cubans unified the disputing guerrilla factions and movements in Central America. But the Nicaraguan and Salvadorean guerrillas also assisted each other, and Sandinista Nicaragua was the sanctuary of the Salvadorean guerrilla during the entire 1980s. The Sandinista comandantes even provided their Salvadorean counterparts with surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). The Guatemalan guerrillas learned much from the Salvadorean peace negotiations and the Unidad Revolucionario Nacional Guatemalteco (Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union, URNG) leadership and, negotiating with the army in the 1990s, had to reluctantly confess that they had lost contact with Cuba. It was not the guerrilla leadership but instead General Balconi, the minister of defence, who contacted Ramiro Abreu, then the Cuban Central Committee handler for Central American affairs. Honduras was the home of the Contra forces against the Sandinista government and Costa Rica played a decisive role during the regional peace processes.
Marxism, or at least the extracts and ideas of Marta Harnecker about Marxism, was of course important. But the guerrilla leaders were mostly Marxist at heart and, at least until their victory (Cuba and Nicaragua) or their demobilisation, they had only a scant knowledge of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Even in Cuba, all leaders and cadres had to return to the basics, to learn not only about planning and building socialism, but also about the essentials of Marx and Lenin. In February 1961, the Spanish-Soviet professor Anastasio Mancilla flew in to lecture about Marx's Capital (1867) at the Council of Ministers. And even in Cuba, José Martí was more invoked than Marx, and ‘communist’ as an adjective was gradually substituted by ‘revolutionary’.
Not only Marxism but also dependency theory in universities and liberation theology in the churches and the base community Bible reading groups were of strong influence, at least in recruiting from the younger generations and attracting the guerrillas’ intelligentsia. In particular, this influence was essential in Central American countries. Colombian priest Camilo Torres and the murdered Archbishop Romero became revolutionary icons. Over decades, the Colombian ELN was commanded by Manuel Pérez Martínez, born in Spain in 1943, a priest-worker in Europe and liberation theologist who died in Colombia as ‘Comandante Poliarco’ in 1998.
The book will find its way to the classroom and I hope some of these comments will serve for a more robust introduction and conclusion in the second edition.
