After 1949, both the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan and the People's Republic of China (PRC) strove to win recognition and legitimacy from the international community. In 1971, Taiwan lost its seat in the United Nations and became what Deon Geldenhuys describes as a contested state.Footnote 1 Contested states constitute anomalies in the conventional interstate system as they often lack sufficient international recognition.Footnote 2 Although some have possessed a certain degree of statehood by viably ruling their domestic constituents and demonstrating domestic sovereignty,Footnote 3 the international community challenges their purported statehood.Footnote 4 Examples of contested states include Palestine, Kosovo, Taiwan and Transnistria. Since 1971, Taiwan has received de jure recognition from a minority of confirmed states but has lacked sufficient international legal sovereignty,Footnote 5 and thus has had only limited participation in intergovernmental organizations (IGOs).Footnote 6 However, it has achieved domestic sovereignty by effectively controlling events within its borders. Moreover, it has expanded its functional ties with a majority of confirmed states and used its economic power to win some degree of international recognition, thereby mitigating its level of isolation, in contrast to other contested states.Footnote 7 Kosovan and Transnistrian officials have even regarded Taiwan as an example to follow.Footnote 8
This paper presents the findings of original research on the important yet under-explored case of Taiwan's admission to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1991.Footnote 9 It moves beyond a state-centric analytical framework to explore how and why APEC became the first IGO that Taipei joined as a contested state, despite Beijing's initial opposition. The first enlargement of APEC took place in Seoul in November 1991, two years after its formation, when Taiwan, the PRC, and Hong Kong (the so-called “three Chinas”) were admitted as new members. By including three economies that had strong regional links, APEC strengthened its “stature as the single largest forum speaking on the subject of trade liberalization.”Footnote 10 Although its accession to APEC was a milestone in Taipei's struggle as a contested state, it has not been thoroughly examined in the scholarly literature. This paper fills the void by explaining the process, causes and repercussions of the accession through original research.
In terms of methodology, I adopted a qualitative single case study approach because of the paucity of existing knowledge on the subject.Footnote 11 This approach allows the researcher to focus on marshalling facts in order to offer a holistic description of the complex case in question and to retain the meaningful characteristics of real-life events.Footnote 12 Research methods included in-depth interviews and the collection of primary and secondary materials.Footnote 13 Major interviewees included American and Taiwanese officials and business leaders involved in the diplomacy leading up to Taiwan's accession. Library research was carried out in the US, Taiwan and mainland China.
The paper is divided into four sections. After the introduction, the second section uses process tracing to detail the pertinent diplomatic history, highlighting the key events and multiple players of state and non-state capacity.Footnote 14 The third section argues that a combination of factors emanating from changes in Taiwan's domestic and external environments as well as from the diplomatic process has accounted for Taipei's diplomatic breakthrough. Taiwan's domestic changes, namely its economic success and the pursuit of pragmatic diplomacy as a new foreign policy initiative, proved to be assets in its pursuit of APEC membership. Externally, Beijing's post-1978 economic reforms and the Tiananmen Incident were also conducive to Taiwan's accession. Moreover, the bottom-up approach to regionalism prior to APEC allowed Taiwanese business elites to utilize their accumulated connections within regional non-governmental organization (NGO) networks to lobby for Taiwan's membership to compensate for the handicapped formal channels of diplomacy stemming from Taipei's status as a contested state. During the diplomatic process, decisions by APEC to define members as economies and to admit the “three Chinas” simultaneously further facilitated Taipei's entry. So did the convergence of interests among pertinent multiple players. Eventually, creative formulae were found, resulting in Taiwan's accession. The final section discusses the four positive effects of accession on Taiwan's position as a contested state and the implications of the study for Taipei's continuous survival as a contested state.
The Diplomatic Process of Taiwan's Accession
The diplomatic process leading up to APEC's first expansion comprised the pre-negotiation phase, from early 1989 to the July 1990 Singapore meeting, and the negotiation period, from October 1990 to October 1991. The issue of expansion was problematic for APEC because of Taipei's sovereignty dispute with Beijing. According to Richard H. Solomon, former US assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, “The issue was constant. That is, would China agree to it [Taiwan's admission to IGOs]? Then there would be negotiations on the language – how would Taiwan be described?”Footnote 15 The diplomacy leading to enlargement, however, was far more complicated than that described by Solomon.
Pre-negotiation period
Before the formal negotiations began, a number of actors had worked for or against Taiwan's entry. They included the Australian, American and Chinese governments, the members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and Taiwanese state and non-state actors.
Even before the inception of APEC, Taiwan's private sector elites had started lobbying for Taipei's membership. In April 1989, heavyweight Taiwanese businessman, C.F. Koo 辜振甫, met the Australian envoy, Richard Woolcott, during a meeting of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) in San Francisco. He argued that Taipei's official designation would not become a problem so long as it could join APEC.Footnote 16 Australia initially sought the inclusion of the “three Chinas” but later decided to defer the issue.Footnote 17 In March and April 1989, Woolcott sought the opinions of proposed APEC members on the issue.Footnote 18 He concluded that, “most countries believed that China should become a participant, as well as Taiwan and Hong Kong, as major regional economies, if the difficulties surrounding their status could be overcome.”Footnote 19 On 15 May, the Australian minister of foreign affairs, Gareth Evans, expressed Canberra's desire to include Taiwan in the APEC regime: “Because of the importance of the Taiwanese economy and its links with other regional economies, we would also like to see Taiwan – although recognized by most potential participants as part of the PRC – associated in some way with the initiative.”Footnote 20
In May 1989, Woolcott met the Chinese premier, Li Peng 李鹏, foreign minister, Qian Qichen 钱其琛, and the minister of foreign economic relations and trade, Li Lanqing 李岚清, in Beijing.Footnote 21 China insisted that if APEC meetings were to be held at a formal, intergovernmental level, then only sovereign states should participate, not Taiwan and Hong Kong.Footnote 22 Subsequently, Woolcott deferred the issue.
In Washington, DC, Woolcott met US officials and regional NGO leaders to discuss membership issues.Footnote 23 The focus was to establish APEC along the lines of a “six plus six” formula, with six ASEAN countries “counterweighted” by six non-ASEAN members in order to allow APEC to get off the ground and to assure ASEAN of its central role in the APEC regime.
According to Robert Zoellick, the US state department counsellor at the time, the immediate membership of the “three Chinas” would hinder the US objective of getting APEC started.Footnote 24 Furthermore, this formula was to convince ASEAN of its key role in the creation of APEC. From the outset, ASEAN members were ambivalent about the participation of the three Chinese economies.Footnote 25 Some were against including China without Hong Kong and Taiwan for fear that ASEAN's collective voice would be muted.Footnote 26 Others were suspicious of Taiwan, dreading that the latter's friendly ties with Washington would threaten ASEAN's position.Footnote 27
In Washington, Woolcott gave an American member of the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC), another regional NGO, the briefing papers on the Australian initiative. On 24 May, these papers were sent to Koo, deputy international president of PBEC at that time. Given Koo's close relations with the Taiwanese authorities in his capacity as a member of the Central Standing Committee of the ruling Kuomintang, these papers must have reached the Taiwanese government.Footnote 28
After Woolcott's second-round trip came the Tiananmen Incident on 4 June 1989, which resulted in Beijing's temporary diplomatic isolation. The Tiananmen Incident helped to reinforce the existing consensus among the initiators of APEC that it should be launched on a “six plus six” basis. On 7 July, the US secretary of state, James Baker, stressed that the China–Taiwan issue was a political problem of long standing, and that Washington preferred to establish APEC using a “six plus six” formula.Footnote 29
By this time, it was certain that Taiwan would not be included in the initial APEC membership. The major reasons were Beijing's opposition to Taipei's membership, the consensus on launching APEC with a smaller group of 12 members, and ASEAN's worry that its own position would be undermined if the “three Chinas” were included from the start. The revulsion created by Tiananmen did not cause the exclusion of the “three Chinas” from the 1989 meeting. At a Senior Official Meeting (SOM) held in September in Sydney, it was decided that the three entities would not be admitted to the inaugural meeting. Nevertheless, Taiwan continued to lobby for membership. At the September PECC meeting in New Zealand, Koo argued that since PECC had decided to support APEC, PECC should demand that Canberra invite all the PECC member countries, including Taiwan, to the meeting.
Meanwhile, Taiwan was offered some conciliatory arrangements that would allow it to be “associated” with the inaugural meeting. As Frederick Chien 錢復, Taiwan's then-foreign minister, recalled, “We were allowed to send one or two people to Australia so as to establish contacts with APEC delegations outside the formal meeting.”Footnote 30 The Taiwanese delegation included Tzu-dan Wu 吳子丹, C.F. Koo, and C.K. Chang 張錦崑.Footnote 31 Wu was a career diplomat, Koo was the deputy international president of PBEC, and Chang was an economist from Koo's think tank. Owing to his position in PBEC, only Koo was formally invited to the APEC opening banquet.Footnote 32
By utilizing the connections he had established in regional NGOs since 1969, Koo collected information for Taipei and lobbied for Taiwan's membership during meetings with officials and his NGO counterparts during the 1989 meeting. On 5 November, he met Japanese and South Korean ministers, and the Indonesian PECC representative, Jusuf Wanandi. He also phoned Richard H. Solomon seeking American support. During the banquet, Koo lobbied the Australian prime minister, Robert Hawke, the Australian foreign minister, Gareth Evans, as well as the Singaporean representative, Lee Hsien Loong 李显龙, for Taiwan's membership. According to Evans, Beijing criticized Canberra for inviting Koo to the banquet, and refused to send the Chinese ambassador to Australia and the Chinese PECC delegate to the event. Some participants expressed their support for Taipei and suggested that Taiwan should work out a feasible formula.Footnote 33
On 7 November, APEC members discussed the expansion issue. The positive attitudes of South Korea, Japan and Canada were countered by ASEAN's reservations, and no conclusion was reached. In March 1990, the first SOM in Singapore concluded that, on this issue, it would be necessary to proceed by consensus despite internal discord over the question of timing and modalities.Footnote 34 The second SOM in May addressed the issue of admitting the “three Chinas” by establishing the principle of simultaneous participation, with still no resolution on the expansion of APEC.Footnote 35
Disagreement over enlarging APEC membership continued during the first few days of the second APEC ministerial meeting in July. While some ASEAN members considered the inclusion of the “three Chinas” as premature, others believed that their entry should take place as soon as possible.Footnote 36 A breakthrough emerged during a five-hour lunch attended only by the heads of the delegations.Footnote 37 Members agreed that consultations should proceed with the three economies, with a view to reaching modalities acceptable to all parties involved, for the simultaneous participation of the three as soon as possible.Footnote 38 Furthermore, the decision-making process would be a “collective” one. All consultations would be referred back to the ministers at APEC who would then reach a consensus on the final inclusion of the three.Footnote 39
Behind this decision lay a complex political drama. First, Taiwan continuously lobbied for its inclusion, with its state and non-state actors working before, during and after the Singapore meeting.Footnote 40 As one participant recalled, “Taiwan's role at that point was lobbying different delegations.”Footnote 41 In contrast, Beijing reiterated its refusal to allow Taiwan and Hong Kong to become members because “they are territories.”Footnote 42
Second, Washington tried repeatedly to resolve the enlargement issue. State Department officials kept contact with Seoul, the designated host of the 1991 APEC, and worked closely with the Taipei representative in Washington, Mao-shih Ding 丁懋時. Taipei and Washington agreed that Seoul should take the lead in negotiating with Beijing. Washington viewed Seoul as a less difficult negotiating partner for the Chinese than the US would be. If Washington worked as a mediator, issues about its Taiwan policy would become part of the discussion and further complicate the negotiations. Concurrently, America knew that Seoul was willing to undertake such a project and it had confidence in the skill of the person chosen to undertake the mediation, Lee See-young. As Robert Fauver recalled, “Once America had made that determination to get the Koreans to work in the front, the US delegation worked behind the scenes during the surroundings of the meetings and Baker worked on the agreement at the lunch itself.”Footnote 43
A third complication involved the wording of the July agreement and ASEAN members. As one participant observed, “Technically it allowed ASEAN to say ‘we have not yet agreed’ but it got the process going to see if there would be a solution … So they still had a chance to say ‘no’ even though the process had started.”Footnote 44 From Washington's standpoint, to maintain ASEAN's comfort level was important for APEC, and “to maintain that comfort level was critical to answer the Three Chinas' question.”Footnote 45
Formal negotiations
Following the July 1990 agreement, consultations began, with Seoul as the mediator and Beijing and Taipei as the concerned negotiating parties. Behind the scenes was the “silent but active bystander” – America.Footnote 46 The key players in the formal negotiations were diplomats from Seoul, Taipei, Beijing and Washington; Taiwanese non-state actors moved into the background.
Nine rounds of negotiations took place between October 1990 and October 1991. Taiwan negotiated with Korea alone three times; the rest of the negotiations were conducted between Korea and Taiwan, and Korea and China in a “simultaneous but non-overlapping” manner. There were no face-to-face negotiations between Beijing and Taipei. The negotiations took place in locations such as Beijing, Taipei, Seoul, Washington, DC, and New York.Footnote 47
In October 1990, the Taiwanese negotiator Tzu-dan Wu set out Taipei's position in Seoul.Footnote 48 In January 1991, Lee embarked on his mission to incorporate the three entities into APEC. From 19 to 23 August, crucial negotiations took place in Seoul, with Korea proposing a compromise plan concerning Taipei's designation within APEC.Footnote 49 However, no agreement emerged until the August SOM meeting in Kyongju. “Lee received the news by phone of Taipei's acceptance when he was chatting with Bob Fauver in his hotel room, who congratulated him on the breakthrough,” wrote Yoichi Funabashi in his account of the negotiation.Footnote 50 APEC members then endorsed the secret Memoranda of Understanding (MOU), which set out the terms for the expansion of APEC, and announced that the “three Chinas” would participate in the November ministerial meeting.Footnote 51
In late September in New York, the final agreement on the wording of the Korea–PRC MOU and the Korea–ROC MOU was reached at midnight before the morning that the Chinese foreign minister was due to leave. The signing of the Korea–PRC MOU on 2 October was followed by the signing of the Korea–ROC MOU on 15 October, concluding the pertinent negotiations.
It is noteworthy that Washington had continued to work behind the scenes trying to find a solution. As Fauver recalled, “During the discussions, from the beginning to the end, we talked to all participants on a number of different occasions, trying to move all sides towards the middle.”Footnote 52 Furthermore, Washington continued to express its support for Lee and the proposed enlargement.Footnote 53 As Fauver noted, “All three sides knew that they could not split us from See-young. That was important to the process.”Footnote 54 During the US–Korea summit on 2 July, US president, George Bush, supported the enlargement.Footnote 55
Once the negotiations had started, thorny questions pertaining to the sovereignty dispute between Beijing and Taipei were brought to the negotiation table. These included issues such as the timing of membership, the name of participants, the level of representation, the ministries of representation, as well as the future hosting of APEC meetings. Procedural questions were also negotiated, such as who would enter the door first, and whether there would be the use of national flags.Footnote 56 As Lee recalled, the two sides were initially “far apart and compromise seemed elusive,”Footnote 57 with both merely agreeing not to use flags in the meetings, a consensus that had already been reached when APEC was established.
The contrasting focus of the two sides loomed large, with Taiwan concerned about substance while Beijing concentrated on process. One American official observed that, “Taiwan was interested in the substance of APEC first and the process second. My foreign ministry friends in Taiwan understood the longer-term interest was more on the substantive benefits of APEC than on the diplomatic benefits … Conversely, for Beijing, the focus was on process first, process second and process third, with a focus on substance coming in last.”Footnote 58 On the issue of timing, for example, Beijing initially suggested that the PRC should be the first to be admitted, and hold the right to veto new applicants.Footnote 59 Others, however, insisted on the simultaneous admission of all three in accordance with a prior principle established by APEC.
Taipei's designation was a sticking point in negotiations. Both sides were initially poles apart on this topic. Taiwan first put its official name, “ROC,” on the table; however, this was rejected by the PRC. Beijing demanded that Taipei should agree to enter APEC as a province of China, under the name of “Taipei-China” or “Taiwan-China.”Footnote 60 Taiwan disagreed. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) model and the formulation proposed in General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations were also tabled for discussion.Footnote 61 While Taipei intended to choose a name that would not imply the inclusion of Taiwan as part of the PRC, Beijing favoured names that would not signify Taiwan's independence from the mainland.Footnote 62 Eventually, Lee put forth “Chinese Taipei,” known as the Olympic model, and both sides agreed.Footnote 63
Equally thorny was the protracted question of who would represent Taipei in APEC. Taipei initially insisted on sending its foreign minister to APEC meetings, on an equal footing to Beijing's representation, but Beijing disagreed. Subsequently, Taiwan agreed that only its ministers in charge of APEC-related economic affairs would attend the meetings, and not its foreign minister or vice-foreign minister. The Taipei delegation could, however, include officials of foreign and other ministries at or below the level of department directors.Footnote 64 As Frederick Chien explained, “Foreign ministers attend APEC mainly to conduct private bilateral talks outside the formal meetings, whereas APEC is a forum to discuss issues of a non-political nature. So whether our foreign minister attends APEC would not influence our main interest … Because APEC discusses trade matters, we insist on the participation of our minister of economic affairs. We have to be treated as an equal in this regard.”Footnote 65
Factor Analysis
Arguably, Taipei succeeded in joining APEC because of a combination of factors emanating from Taiwan's external and domestic environments as well as from the diplomatic process. The external environment focuses on the trend of regionalism and on the China factor, whereas the domestic environment refers to political and economic changes at home.
External and domestic changes
The first external factor refers to the shift in regionalism in the Asia-Pacific region. For nearly three decades prior to APEC's inception, regionalism was characterized by a bottom-up approach with a strong societal involvement because of deepening regional economic interaction. The formation of APEC, however, signalled a shift towards state-led economic regionalism, driven by a sense of economic insecurity among some members in the face of a multilateral trading system under threat. This shift created problems for Taiwan's accession because of Taipei's status as a contested state. While Taiwan's business leaders had forged stronger connections with their regional counterparts and influences in regional NGOs, its state actor was unable to join the inaugural IGO in 1989.
However, the long-standing bottom-up development of regionalism created opportunities for Taiwan's accession because it enabled Taiwanese business leaders to take part in regional NGOs and thus enhanced their ties with their regional counterparts. They utilized these NGOs as platforms of diplomacy to help Taipei's bid for APEC membership in pursuit of national interests. Because of Taiwan's contested statehood, these informal diplomatic channels became important in partly alleviating Taipei's isolation for the sake of gaining APEC membership.
The second external factor refers to China's domestic transition, namely the Tiananmen Incident and Deng Xiaoping's 邓小平 economic reforms after 1978. Some contend that the Tiananmen Incident led to the exclusion of the three Chinese economies from the inaugural APEC meeting; yet, if it were not for the Tiananmen Incident, China would have been invited to Canberra in 1989, which might have created more obstacles to Taiwan's entry.Footnote 66 This explanation is problematic in that the exclusion of the three entities from the Canberra meeting primarily resulted from a consensus to start APEC with a smaller grouping, and such a consensus predated the Tiananmen Incident. As Fauver argued, “I don't think it [Tiananmen] affected the membership question or the timing of the membership question.”Footnote 67
However, the Tiananmen Incident indirectly influenced Taiwan's accession. With its strategic position eroded by the East–West détente in the late 1980s and its international reputation damaged because of Tiananmen, China suffered a severe blow to its international importance. Accordingly, it had less bargaining power vis-à-vis the relevant parties regarding Taipei's accession. Furthermore, Tiananmen challenged the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime. To make up for legitimization deficits, Beijing aspired to improve its foreign relations so as to restore its great-power status and to regain its international acceptance.Footnote 68 Although hardliners became dominant following the Tiananmen Incident, the CCP would still have to pursue an open-door policy in order to sustain economic growth, which would be central to regime legitimacy. Hence, friendly relations with the West were deemed important. The aftermath of Tiananmen thus reinforced China's desire for membership of APEC. Given APEC's preference for Taipei's accession, Beijing had to make concessions on Taiwan's admission during the negotiations, which began just months after Tiananmen, in order to make its own accession possible.
Deng's post-1978 economic reforms included the expansion of trade and the encouragement of foreign investment.Footnote 69 China's links with the international economy deepened, especially in the Asia-Pacific region,Footnote 70 and Beijing decided to embrace international economic organizations, including APEC.Footnote 71 These changes were conducive to Taiwan's APEC membership because China consequently saw multiple economic interests in Beijing's APEC accession. The membership could help Beijing manage its relations with pertinent market-oriented economies, engage in economic rule-making, seek foreign resources for economic cooperation, and pursue trade liberalization. APEC's aim to save a shaky multilateral trading system further matched China's interest as a growing trading power. Owing to the aforementioned political and economic considerations, China could not afford to be excluded. Hence, the principle of simultaneous participation increased the costs to Beijing of its initial move to block Taipei's membership.
Taiwan's domestic transition in the late 1980s created further boosts to its APEC membership. Politically, the move towards pragmatic diplomacy after 1988 was conducive to accession because Taipei was no longer constrained by the zero-sum rationale that had dictated its strategy towards IGO membership. Economically, Taiwan's trade liberalization reinforced its preference for joining APEC, and its increasing economic regional links through overseas investment,Footnote 72 intra-regional trade, and technology transfers made it more attractive to APEC. The formation of APEC was driven by an urgent regional need to establish a grouping in order to secure an open trading system, and APEC recognized that Taiwan's accumulated economic power could enhance the collective strength of the regime. This demonstrates that the well-documented economic statecraft was functioning. Taiwan's economic clout further facilitated the active engagement in regional NGOs of its business leaders, which, in turn, contributed to Taiwan's bid.
Effects of the decisions by APEC
Enabling factors emanating from the diplomatic process included two decisions by APEC prior to negotiations. The first was to define APEC as an organization composed of “economies” rather than “states.” The second referred to the principle of simultaneous participation. Arguably, these rules were the accommodations APEC made in order to facilitate Taiwan's inclusion, because the IGO regarded Taiwan, despite its contested statehood, as an asset to the nascent regime because of its economic power.
Each rule influenced the negotiations as follows. The first decision, made in 1989, aimed to make the involvement of Taiwan (and Hong Kong) possible.Footnote 73 Specifically, the rule was to bypass the issue of statehood and sovereignty that had irritated Beijing over Taipei's IGO membership, thereby minimizing the emergence of political disputes in negotiations on enlargement.
The second principle of simultaneous participation, as argued above, constrained Beijing's manoeuvrability to block Taipei's inclusion. If the PRC blocked Taiwan's membership, it would be excluded as well.Footnote 74 Once the price of exclusion became too high because of its aforementioned interests, Beijing had to accept this rule in order to join the regime.
Concessions by Beijing and Taipei amid APEC incentives
Another enabling factor from the diplomatic process resulted from concessions made by Taipei and Beijing partially because of perceived incentives offered by APEC membership. As William Habeeb argues, “All negotiations involve concessions and all successful negotiations involve convergence.”Footnote 75 Both parties made concessions during the negotiations, finally reaching a convergent point from their initially disparate positions over Taiwan's membership. Because perceived political and economic incentives offered by APEC made the price of exclusion exceedingly costly, concessions became desirable.
Beijing's major concession was to consent to Taiwan's membership, thereby agreeing to a format that would allow dual Beijing–Taipei membership of the new IGO. Before the launch of APEC, Beijing had insisted that members should be limited to sovereign states in order to keep Taiwan and Hong Kong out of the IGO. In July 1990, Beijing reiterated the same stance. In the initial rounds of negotiations, however, Beijing gave consent to Taipei's membership on condition that Taiwan would join APEC as a province of China. It eventually agreed to terms that would allow Taipei to become a member but which would not necessarily imply that Taiwan was a province of China. Nonetheless, it still managed to prevent Taiwan from using its official designation and to limit the political presence of Taipei in APEC by ruling out the participation of its foreign minister and vice-foreign minister. Arguably, China's concessions demonstrated, as of the early 1990s, what Gary Klintworth describes as a growing Chinese tolerance of Taiwan's new international role.Footnote 76
Beijing's concessions can be partly explained by the strong economic and political incentives offered by APEC membership. In economic terms, as argued earlier, APEC attracted China because it could offer the country multiple benefits. First, APEC's objective to push the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of negotiations would also be in China's interest as a growing trading power. According to a Chinese official, APEC membership dovetailed with Beijing's outward-oriented economic reforms.Footnote 77 Second, China aspired to engage with this rule-making regional mechanism in order to create a predictable environment for its economic development.Footnote 78 Finally, Beijing regarded its accession to APEC as useful to its GATT membership.
Politically, APEC membership was attractive to Beijing for two reasons. First, the regime created a regional setting in which Beijing could pursue its bilateral diplomacy outside formal discussions.Footnote 79 For instance, after its admission to APEC in Seoul, the Chinese delegation met the Korean president, Roh Tae Woo, to discuss bilateral issues, paving the way for the normalization of Beijing–Seoul relations in 1992. Second, accession served as a political asset for Beijing because it marked China's return to the international community after Tiananmen.
Taipei yielded mainly its name and level of representation of its delegation to APEC. As illustrated above, even before the negotiations Taipei had recognized the external constraints imposed upon its pursuit of membership and indicated its willingness to concede regarding its designation in APEC. Although Taipei put its official designation on the negotiation table, it was highly likely that Taipei knew that it would attend APEC using a different name.
That Taipei viewed joining APEC as a priority was clear from the outset. According to Chien, “There is a total consensus in the government that we should participate. The only concern is how we can minimize damage to our country. If we do not participate, it will violate our logic of pragmatic diplomacy.”Footnote 80
In order to achieve its objective of joining APEC, considering the strong economic and political incentives offered by membership, Taipei was ready to make concessions. In economic terms, APEC appealed to Taiwan for four reasons. First, APEC aimed at maintaining an open trading system, which served Taipei's economic interests as an aggressive export maximizer. Second, accession would help Taipei to manage its interdependence with neighbouring countries.Footnote 81 Third, Taiwan shared APEC's objective of economic liberalization. Fourth, Taiwan could use APEC to seek support for its GATT membership.
In political terms, membership would provide both symbolic and substantive gains for Taiwan because APEC would become the first IGO that Taipei had joined since 1971, despite Chien's claim that the main reason for Taiwan's accession was “economic, not political” considerations.Footnote 82 Symbolically speaking, the act of entering its first IGO since the inception of its contested statehood would enhance Taiwan's official visibility and improve its international standing. More importantly, Taiwan could use APEC to promote its interests of “dual recognition”; by concurrently becoming a member together with the PRC, Taipei could seek de facto recognition from APEC members of two separate political entities on each side of the Taiwan Strait. After all, confirmed states could grant Taiwan, as a contested state, de facto recognition through participation in multilateral conferences with the latter.Footnote 83 Besides, accession could help Taipei improve its political legitimacy at home by presenting the IGO membership to its domestic audience as a product of the success of its pragmatic diplomacy in response to the growing desire among its constituents to expand Taiwan's international space. As for substantive political gains, membership could enable Taiwan to establish high-level bilateral diplomatic channels with its neighbours, channels that had been largely blocked since 1971 because of its contested statehood.
In sum, both political rivals, partly driven by the perceived gains from their membership of APEC, put accession as the first priority, and thus made concessions in order to achieve their top objective.
Convergence of interests among actors other than Beijing and Taipei
During the diplomatic process leading up to the first enlargement of APEC, the impact of what Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye describe as “the multiple channels of contacts among societies”Footnote 84 became critical to Taipei's accession. Besides the Chinese and Taiwanese officials, additional key players included Taiwanese business leaders, the Korean official mediator and American officials. Arguably, each player was driven by different interest calculations, and it was the convergence of their interests that contributed to Taiwan's accession. Since the converging interests of Taiwanese and Chinese state actors have already been analysed, this section will examine the convergence of interests among the Taiwanese non-state actors and the Korean and American state actors.
First, Taiwanese business players utilized their private sector resources to facilitate Taipei's accession because of their interest in ending their country's international isolation, an interest which overlapped with that of the state. According to C.F. Koo, “There are many countries with which we do not have diplomatic relations, and in striving to join international organizations we must use the strengths of civil industry and business to influence representatives of each country and thus through them influence their governments.”Footnote 85 These non-state actors utilized regional NGO settings to lobby for Taiwan's entry and gather information for Taipei. For instance, Taiwanese PECC members invited their NGO counterparts, especially those with influence over their governments, to Taipei to lobby for Taiwan's membership.Footnote 86 They also used their NGO connections to gain acceptance as Taipei's unofficial representatives when dealing at the official level, as illustrated by Koo's attendance of the opening banquet of the inaugural meeting.
As Lawrence T. Woods argues, “There is a possibility that NGOs may at times be better at performing tasks of interest to states than states themselves or IGOs.”Footnote 87 While the Taiwanese state actor found the utility of formal diplomatic channels lacking because of its position as a contested state, its societal actors better served the state interests by utilizing their private sector resources, thereby bypassing barriers in the formal channels. Hence, multiple channels engineered by Taiwanese economic elites helped the state actor in its bid to join APEC. During the process, official channels did function, as demonstrated by the low-profile presence of a Taiwanese diplomat in the surroundings of the inaugural meeting and later by the diplomatic negotiations. However, these official channels were supplemented by unofficial ones, especially when the Taiwanese diplomat was excluded from the inaugural meeting. It was Koo who attended the opening banquet, whereas his official partner stayed outside the official gathering. By utilizing his “unofficial” status as the PBEC representative at the banquet, Koo pursued the official interest of Taiwan – to be admitted to the IGO. His unofficial status thus became blurred, yet his interest overlapped with that of his country.
Second, Korea's mediation was important to Taiwan's membership, and its success resulted from the special Taipei–Seoul–Beijing relationship and the well-respected diplomatic skill of the leading Korean negotiator. The diplomatic channels between Taipei and Seoul were smoother than those between other APEC members and Taipei because South Korea was the only APEC country that still recognized Taiwan. Moreover, Seoul was eager to normalize relations with Beijing, which made South Korea a less confrontational negotiating partner for China compared to other major APEC powers, such as the US and Japan. Seoul's success was also owing to the honed diplomatic skill of Lee. As Fauver commented, “his demonstrated objectivity in finding a solution was assumed to win the respect of parties negotiating the deal.”Footnote 88
It was Seoul's perceived future interests that made it keen to conclude the negotiations. As the host of the 1991 meeting, Seoul saw the first enlargement, if achieved, as a way to enhance its international reputation.Footnote 89 In addition, the negotiation process would hopefully accelerate the normalization of Seoul–Beijing relations, and so formed part of its Nordpolitik.Footnote 90 The strategic calculation concerned the changing Seoul–Beijing–Pyongyang relationship. In the mid-1980s, the second wave of East–West détente began to affect the Korean Peninsula, resulting in a warming of ties between Seoul and Pyongyang.Footnote 91 However, Seoul aspired to befriend Beijing and Moscow in order to gain the upper hand when dealing with Pyongyang. Seoul's economic calculation was aimed at deepening its business relations with China through the pursuit of normalization following accelerating bilateral commercial links since the 1980s.Footnote 92
Although Lee stressed that he took on the role of negotiator in his capacity as the chair of APEC SOM and not as a representative of Seoul,Footnote 93 the result of his endeavours benefited his government by bringing the Chinese delegation to Seoul, thereby facilitating bilateral high-level official meetings. The political returns to South Korea were later vindicated by the Seoul–Beijing joint communiqué on normalization on 24 August 1992.
Finally, the American support, driven by interest calculations, was conducive to the accession.Footnote 94 In economic terms, the US saw the importance of including the three economies because of their strong regional links and their individual comparative advantages, which could be useful to other APEC members. Taiwan could especially share its experience in developing small and medium enterprises (SMEs) with industrializing countries in APEC.Footnote 95
In strategic terms, Washington had three considerations. First, the US intended to maintain a strategic balance within the region, so having one (China) without the other (Taiwan) would cause problems. “I think it [to exclude Taiwan from APEC] would have been unfortunate to the regional stability and development both economically and strategically,” admitted Fauver. Second, the US remained behind the scenes while assisting Korea to work in the front for the enlargement in order to avoid a direct Sino-US confrontation.Footnote 96 Third, Washington chose Korea as the “stalking horse” owing to Seoul's position as a reliable ally, and also because of its intention to assist Seoul in strengthening its ties with Beijing through the negotiation process. Seoul's Nordpolitik aimed at moving closer to Beijing and Moscow so as to dominate relations with Pyongyang, which matched Washington's strategic interest in establishing a counterforce against Pyongyang. In short, the US wished to help Korea become the mediator in order to move Seoul and Beijing together.Footnote 97
Creative solutions embodied in MOUs
The creative solutions embodied in the MOUs finally led to Taiwan's accession. “Chinese Taipei,” Taiwan's designation in APEC, was creative because it offered ample room for respective interpretation by Taiwan and the mainland. Both could choose to translate this English title for Taiwan into a different version of Mandarin Chinese to echo their respective interpretations of the status of Taipei. The PRC chose to call Taipei Zhongguo Taibei 中国台北 because Zhongguo was the Mandarin Chinese abbreviation for the PRC, a move that reflected Beijing's sovereignty claim over Taiwan. However, Taiwan chose to call itself Chung-hua Taipei 中華台北 because Chung-hua was the abbreviation for the ROC. By doing so, Taipei could link its name in APEC to its official designation — at least in front of its Mandarin-speaking constituents.
Furthermore, three face-saving formulae were found for China in some parts of the MOUs, thereby ensuring Taiwan's membership. First, the Taiwanese foreign minister should not attend APEC because China regarded the post as a symbol of Taipei's political sovereignty. Second, the PRC–Korea MOU took note of Beijing's position “that there is only one China,” which satisfied Beijing's need to proclaim its status as the sole legitimate government of China. Third, the same MOU noted that “distinction should be made between sovereign states and regional economies as a basis for the consultations.” The wording of the MOU reveals Beijing's intention to define itself as a sovereign state and Taiwan as a non-state. It could be argued that Beijing's position was unilateral because the phrasing that preceded Beijing's stated position in the MOU was “taking note of,” instead of “accepting” or “recognizing.” Besides, APEC defined all members as economies, so no distinction should be made between sovereign states and regional economies.Footnote 98 As Fauver commented, “If China made its own stance, that's fine. However, it had no standing in the group and in the official document of APEC.”Footnote 99 Nevertheless, these unilateral pronouncements helped to make Taiwan's accession possible.
Conclusion
Taiwan's APEC accession was an important breakthrough in the contested state's struggle to break its international isolation, which had lasted since 1971. The nuanced process leading up to this diplomatic watershed and the complex explanations of Taiwan's success, as analysed above, demonstrate that the China factor does not single-handedly determine the timing and modalities of Taiwan's IGO membership. In September 1991, Qian Qichen argued that Beijing had “taken the most flexible stance on the issue of Taiwan's accession to APEC.”Footnote 100 However, as shown above, such flexibility is not the only major factor accounting for Taipei's membership.
The accession has four positive effects on Taipei's position as a contested state. First, recognition of Taiwan as a de facto state has increased since 1991 owing to the participation of confirmed states in APEC along with the Taipei delegation, although Taiwan's international legal sovereignty has not necessarily improved accordingly. Second, APEC membership has enabled Taipei to engage in international cooperation with member economies on a wide range of issues, including narrowing the digital divide among members, anti-terrorism measures, and capacity building for SMEs. Consequently, Taiwanese officials have worked with their counterparts to deal with pertinent transnational issues, and these deepening intergovernmental linkages are key assets to Taiwan as a contested state.Footnote 101 Third, APEC accession has helped Taipei mitigate legitimacy concerns at home that stem from its thwarted status as a normal state. For instance, the image of an envoy representing Taiwan's president, side-by-side with other heads of state during the annual APEC summit, a practice established since 1993, has sent a powerful message to Taiwanese constituents that Taipei has a presence, albeit not of equal standing as that of its regional counterparts, at this regional summit.Footnote 102 As a senior Taiwanese diplomat insisted, APEC membership makes Taiwanese constituents feel that their country “exists” on the international stage.Footnote 103 Fourth, APEC accession has enabled Taiwan to advance its interests through the conduct of bilateral diplomacy outside the formal meetings. For instance, outside the 1991 meeting, Taiwan made its first official contact with Japan at a ministerial level since Tokyo severed ties with Taipei in 1971.
As for the major implications for Taiwan's continuous struggle as a contested state, the study shows that many external actors have facilitated Taipei's accession, thereby challenging Beijing's delineation of the Taiwan issue as an “internal” affair. For its future IGO memberships, Taipei should avoid any unqualified reliance on negotiations with Beijing because it may reinforce Beijing's claims over Taiwan.Footnote 104 However, China's increasing power implies that Taiwan's struggle to expand its contested statehood will become more difficult. Even so, it is not enough for Taipei to rely on Beijing's goodwill in order to break its international isolation; Taiwan should also ensure that the functioning of economic statecraft and the conduct of sophisticated diplomacy in various major capitals through multiple channels will continue to be in place, and use favourable external and internal conditions, as they arise, to its advantage.Footnote 105
