Introduction
The year 2015 will mark 50 years since Japan and South Korea normalized diplomatic relations. The 1965 Basic Treaty between South Korea and Japan seemed to have brought visible improvements in bilateral relations. When the Korean President Kim Dae-Jung and the Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi announced the Joint Declaration: A New Korea‒Japan Partnership towards the Twenty-first Century in 1998, the long rivalry between the two nations of Northeast Asia seemed to have entered a new and happier phase. Not only the two leaders but also many citizens of the two countries expected that future agreements, such as those involving economic, cultural, and social cooperation, might characterize bilateral relations (Chun and Kim, 2014). Each country has remained the third-largest export market of the other. In addition, they share security concerns over North Korea's nuclear threats and the assertive rise of China in East Asia. Close cooperation between the two neighbouring countries is seen as necessary to deal effectively with these two issues.
However, the worsening ties between South Korea and Japan because of territorial disputes and the controversy over forced sexual slavery in World War II are clearly visible in recent public surveys. A poll, conducted by Japan's Genron NPO and South Korea's East Asia Institute in May of 2013, asked respondents about ‘changes in the two countries’ relations over the past year'. Of the Japanese respondents, 66.3% believed that bilateral ties ‘had gotten worse’ (this figure includes both ‘have gotten much worse’ and ‘have gotten relatively worse’), while 53.9% of the South Korean respondents ticked the same boxes (Genron NPO/East Asia Institute, 2013). In another poll, taken from January to November 2013, Asan Institute for Policy Studies surveyed South Koreans every two months. The results of this research echoed previous surveys, with 82.1% saying relations between the two countries had deteriorated (Asan Institute for Policy Studies, November 2013). Most of the respondents cited historical issues, such as the ‘territorial disputes over Dokdo/Takeshima.
Many aspects of the relations between Korea and Japan are difficult to explain, even after considering the dynamics of international relations and varying national interests. Bilateral ties often rapidly improve or deteriorate, changing from aggressive to conciliatory in an instant. The existing studies do not fully explain these unique features. Thus, this paper seeks to overcome these limitations by using a three-stage model of international reconciliation to answer the question, ‘How far have South Korea and Japan progressed in achieving reconciliation’? It reveals that reconciliation between nations can exist in different forms – ‘procedural’, ‘material’, and ‘ideational’ – and explores the present stage for Japan and South Korea.
Existing explanations
Most discussions of the relations between South Korea and Japan focus on historical enmity. They attempt to explain the conflict by analysing the two countries' diplomatic histories, which are dominated by memories of colonial rule (Bridges, 1993). Expressions such as ‘politicizing the past’ are commonly used in discussing conflicts over textbooks and the Yasukuni Shrine (Hundt and Bleiker, Reference Hundt and Bleiker2007: 77–82), the former being the most popular target of analysis (Heo, Reference Heo2012). While the ‘historical enmity’ or ‘psycho-historical’ approach is regarded as the most persuasive analytical framework to explain the uniqueness of Korean–Japanese relations, it has its limits in describing the broader picture. Seoul and Tokyo have not always been hostile to one another. They have cooperated at times in various fields. As Cha (Reference Cha1999: 34–5) points out, historical variables are necessary but not sufficient in their explanatory power and cannot fully describe the positive changes in bilateral ties.
To overcome such limitations, the ‘realist’ approach argues that the degree of cooperation between Korea and Japan correlates with the level of external threat. Victor Cha proposes the ‘quasi-alliance model’, which adopts the concepts ‘fear of entrapment’ and ‘fear of abandonment’ from alliance theory. Cha's model shows that one variable in the case of cooperation between clients is moderated by another variable, the patron's security commitment. When applied to Korea and Japan, the two sustain the discord structure of their relationship, until the United States provides less security, which then triggers greater cooperation between the two countries (Cha, Reference Cha1999). Cha's model regards American engagement as a negative force that keeps Korea and Japan from working together, so his theory is optimistic in that bilateral relations could improve when the United States withdraws its military from North Asia in the future. However, the ‘quasi-alliance model’ still fails to explain the boost in Korea–Japan cooperation while the US's presence remains strong.
Yoon and Woo propose a model that refutes Cha's framework. Yoon explains the fragile cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo using the ‘net threat’ theory. This theory explains their cooperation/frictions (dependent variable) mostly as a function of a ‘net threat’ (independent variable), which is defined as ‘the balance between a common threat and the resources that are mustered against it’. When applying the theory, Yoon assumes that in the context of the Japan–Korea–US security triangle, the net threat that Japan and Korea perceive is mainly determined by common threats and the credibility of US commitment (Yoon, Reference Yoon2006: 174–5).
In what he calls ‘the engagement‒coalition politics’ hypothesis, Woo suggests an alternative to Cha's quasi-alliance model. He offers two axes in his hypothesis. He states that the proactive engagement of the US is a promoter of cooperation between Korea and Japan. In addition, the changes in coalition politics, especially in Japan, should be analysed together with the policies of the United States. Hence, in order to explain the increase in Korea–Japan cooperation, the two most influential factors for both countries' diplomatic policies – American policies and domestic coalitions – have to be analysed together. This perspective considers both the vertical relationship (between international and domestic politics) and the horizontal relationship (between nations) to explain international cooperation (Woo, Reference Woo2003: 129–31). However, Korea's political coalitions form differently from those of Japan, and the progressive forces of Korea, which have recently risen, do not see cooperation with the United States and Japan as an imperative. In this regard, applying Woo's hypothesis to the latest Korea–Japan relations requires some further thought.
Park's ‘convergence–management’ hypothesis emphasizes the difference between the quasi-alliance model and net threat theory in an effort to overcome the shortcomings of both. Park incorporates the realist tradition by focusing on the threat perception of an adversary. However, unlike the balance of threat theory, the locus of analysis is not the level of perceived threat but the symmetry, or convergence/divergence, of the perceived threat by the two countries. Instead of the degree of perceived threat, Park highlights whether threat perceptions are or are not converging. As long as they move together, the two countries have the potential to develop similar strategic designs against a third party (Park, Reference Park2008: 19–20).
Constructionists argue that the memory of war hinders efforts to build peace between Korea and Japan (Berger, 2003). They maintain that reminiscences and historical contentions reflect and reinforce historical enmity, but this interpretation is not adequate to explain the Korea–Japan cooperation that has existed for decades. From a slightly different historical angle, J. J. Suh argues that history is not an objective fact that awaits discovery and that historical contentions serve as a medium of dialogue that helps establish a common understanding (Suh, Reference Suh2007: 386). This approach is very persuasive but still requires further empirical verification.
As seen in the aforementioned critical perspectives, more than a handful of theories and hypotheses are available for an analysis of Korean–Japanese ties. However, the existing theories have their limits in exploring the unique complexity of the politics, economies, and histories of the two countries. Hence, this study tackles Korea–Japan relations with an original framework called ‘three stages of international reconciliation’, which looks at policies, compensation, and law, as well as history.
Definitions of reconciliation
Scholars of reconciliation have diversely framed the term and the levels of analysis. Little (Reference Little2007) follows the dictionary in defining individual reconciliation. Reconciliation means to bring a person back into friendly relations with another after an estrangement or to bring estranged parties together. Nobles (Reference Nobles2008) looks at the word from individual and societal perspectives, employing it to describe a positive change in emotions between individuals or groups. Bar-Tal and Bennink (Reference Bar-Tal, Bennink and Bar-Siman-Tov2004: 13) suggest that reconciliation is required when two conflicting societies support conflicting goals, seek to maintain conflict, delegitimize each other, and thus negate the possibility of a peaceful resolution and prevent the development of harmonious relations. Finally, Bloomfield defines social reconciliation as a process through which a society moves from a divided past to a shared future (Bloomfield, 2003: 12).
While reconciliation between individuals is based on restoring friendship and harmony, nations place most importance on building mutual trust and maintaining friendly relations (Phillips, Reference Anne1998: 66). Kriesberg (Reference Kriesberg1998) defines the word as a process of conciliatory negotiations between two parties that once shared hostile relations, while Maoz (Reference Maoz and Bar Siman-Tov2004) says that it refers to the willingness to build a more peaceful relationship, founded on cooperation. Based on the aforementioned definitions, a broadly acceptable characterization of international reconciliation might be ‘changing a hostile relationship between two nations in conflict to a friendly and harmonious one’ (Ackermann, Reference Ackermann1994; Kriesberg, Reference Kriesberg1998; Phillips, Reference Anne1998; Gardner-Feldman, Reference Gardner-Feldman1999; Kelman, Reference Kelman and Rothstein1999; Reiner et al., Reference Rienner and Bar Siman-Tov2004).
The definitions of Kriesberg and Mao imply that reconciliation is an ongoing process that should not be evaluated by its existence or degree (Funabashi, Reference Yoichi2003). Scholars such as Crocker (Reference Crocker1999) describe reconciliation as a gradual development from what is called a ‘thinner’ state of simple coexistence to a ‘thicker’ state of recognition as an independent country or citizen. Crocker distinguishes three levels of reconciliation. The shallowest level exists when the hostile parties engage in no further injuries or killings and the law is observed. The next level occurs when differences and conflicts between the two still exist, but they recognize and respect each other as partners and are thus able to reach understandings through dialogue and the pursuance of negotiations in areas of mutual interest. The deepest level of reconciliation involves the sharing of broad visions and the achievement of recovery and forgiveness (Crocker, Reference Crocker1999).Footnote 1 Ross (Reference Ross and Bar Siman-Tov2004) distinguishes a ‘strong’ version of reconciliation from a ‘weak’ version. The strong version refers to a total transformation of relations between two hostile countries, whereas the weaker version describes an end to violence and a start to constructive exchanges between two adversaries.
Finally, case studies apply different degrees of international reconciliation to explain the dealings of countries that have engaged in war or of a nation and its colonizer. He (Reference He2009) analyses the ties of Germany and Poland, using the terms ‘shallow’ and ‘deep’ reconciliation. Kupchan (Reference Kupchan2010), who analyses mostly Anglo-American cases, argues that stable peace can take three different forms: rapprochement, security community, and union.
The three stages of international reconciliation
Previous analyses of international reconciliation tended to regard reconciliation as a process and categorized it according to different degrees, such as ‘thinner’ or ‘thicker’ and ‘shallow’ or ‘deep’. This way of measuring reconciliation may be appropriate when the relations of past adversaries are improving or deteriorating. However, it does not provide a detailed and objective description of existing relations. Because of its vague methods of judging the degree of reconciliation, it makes observer bias quite likely. In order to overcome such limitations, this study divides reconciliation into three phases: procedural, material, and ideational. Normally, these stages happen in a given order (e.g., procedural reconciliation comes before material reconciliation), but this is not always the case.Footnote 2 More than one stage can take place simultaneously. By providing objective criteria for each phase and explicitly stating what has been achieved and what is missing between the association of the two parties, it accurately maps out the current bilateral ties of South Korea and Japan.
Table 1. The three stages and conditions of reconciliation
Procedural reconciliation
Procedural reconciliation, the first stage, begins with the signing of a peace treaty or agreement. A peace treaty refers to a written agreement between two or more hostile parties to end a war (Kunz, Reference Kunz1952; Grewe, 1982). Various terms are used to explain the process of settling conflicts, such as ‘recognition’, ‘the establishment of diplomatic relations’, and ‘the normalization of relations’. Like peace treaties, these all occur in the earliest stages of reconciliation between hostile nations. ‘Recognition’ takes place when a former colonial ruler acknowledges its colony's independence and accepts it as a subject of international law. After the approval stage, the two countries establish diplomatic relations through mutually agreed upon conditions,Footnote 3 followed by the installation of embassies and the exchanges of diplomatic missions.Footnote 4 The establishment of diplomatic ties does not always correspond to the normalization of relations. Even after diplomatic ties are in place, conflict may exist in the economic or political arenas. For this reason, a more comprehensive process called ‘normalization of relations’ is necessary.
Material reconciliation
Material reconciliation occurs when economic exchange takes place between two formerly hostile countries. The most passive forms of material reconciliation are economic cooperation and foreign aid. Economic cooperation refers to the transfer of both private and public capital between countries, including official development assistance and other government, private, and non-government funds (Rix, Reference Rix1990). Providing foreign aid is a broader type of economic cooperation and refers to ODA, which transfers reserves to developing countries under conditions most favourable to the recipients (Wall, Reference Wall1973; Meier, Reference Meier1974).
More enhanced forms of reconciliation are ‘claims’ and ‘reparations’. Since World War I, the concept of compensation has taken a different turn. Before that time, a defeated nation had the obligation to compensate the victor, regardless of who initiated the war. So-called ‘indemnities’ were paid by a vanquished nation to acknowledge defeat and meet a victor's financial demands. The term ‘reparation’ only came into use after World War I because of increased civilian losses.Footnote 5
While traditional international law relied on compensation between countries, the signing of the Versailles Treaty justified compensation between individuals and the state. In other words, the rights of individuals to claim post-war compensation were separated from the rights of countries; hence, a clear distinction was made between compensation and reparations. It is worth noting that compensation strongly implies a moral obligation, including the recompense and atonement for one's crimes. Individual compensation for civilian victims is accomplished when a perpetrator fully acknowledges responsibility for past wrongdoings, hence establishing complete material reconciliation.
Ideational reconciliation
Ideational reconciliation takes place when parties do not hide their past animus but discuss it so as to build constructive relationships. Civil and cultural exchanges are ways to accomplish this objective. The main goal of a cultural exchange is to develop mutual understanding between the citizens of two countries. The importance of such exchanges has already been recognized by many nations. The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) of the United States Department of State runs cultural exchange programs (United States Department of State, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs). In international reconciliation, the best examples of cultural exchange can be found in relations between Germany and France. These nations have offered support in particular to youth exchange programs. The Elysee Treaty, signed in 1963, became a pivot of bilateral youth exchange, since it led to the establishment of the Franco-German Youth Office responsible for the systematic implementation of youth exchanges (The Franco-German Youth Office).
The Franco-German Youth Office is an independent international organization. The French Education Minister and the German Family Affairs Minister co-chair the office, and the secretariat is run under the supervision of a board of directors. About 70 people work from offices in Paris and Berlin. The major tasks of these offices include accelerating exchanges among young people and teachers from France and Germany; rediscovering the cultures of both nations; promoting cross-cultural learning, sports exchanges, and exchange student programs; strengthening vocational training; developing joint projects to educate the public; strengthening Germany and France's responsibilities in Europe; and promoting the learning of German and French. The two countries have achieved remarkable outcomes through human and cultural exchange over the 50 years since the signing of the Elysee Treaty. Almost 5,000 sister schools exist in Germany and France; 2,200 exchange contracts have been signed by local governments, and over 200,000 people-to-people exchanges have occurred at the youth level (The Franco-German Youth Office).
In terms of commemoration and acknowledgement, each country must not only remember its own fallen soldiers but also honour the victim country and its people and try not to forget past mistakes. Monuments can become opportunities for reflection (Koshar, Reference Koshar2000; Young, Reference Young1993; Buruma, Reference Buruma2002). Symbolic acts occur among states through the international interactions of public officials. These acts can strengthen bilateral nodes and bind people together. Thus, symbolic acts construct a particular understanding of the present and provide guidance and direction for the future (Krotz and Schild, Reference Krotz and Schild2013: 76–7). Apologies, a form of expressing acknowledgment, are critical in ideational reconciliation. Scheff (Reference Scheff1994) says that the acknowledgement of feelings may play an important role in resolving conflicts. Montville (Reference Montville1991) also claims that admitting wrong-doings, often expressed through formal apologies, are profoundly important to heal the victims and to help them reconcile with their perpetrators. Minow (Reference Minow1998) and Tavuchis (Reference Tavuchis1991) also emphasise the importance of admitting past wrongs.
The procedural and material reconciliation of Japan and South Korea
The relations between South Korea and Japan reached material reconciliation after the procedural reconciliation stage. After signing the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951, the nations, following 14 years of dialogue, finally normalized diplomatic relations by signing the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea in 1965; they thereby achieved procedural reconciliation. However, areas of dispute remained. The governments failed to agree on nullifying Japan's colonial rule and seeking claims. On the material reconciliation front, the two countries signed the Claims and Economic Cooperation Agreement, which could be seen as providing compensation. However, material reconciliation is limited. Official reparations have come to an end, and since the 1990s, individual victims have filed lawsuits in Japanese and Korean courts.
Procedural reconciliation
Through the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the Allied Powers officially terminated their occupation of Japan and announced its independence. The treaty became the groundwork for clarifying post-war issues in Northeast Asia and establishing a new framework for international relations (Lee, Reference Lee2010; Kim, Reference Kim2010). South Korea was not included in the scope of Japan's post-war responsibilities; however, because Seoul and Tokyo were not considered to have been in a state of war, South Korea was not entitled to sign the memorandum (Choi, 2010; Hahm, 2003). Hence, South Korea, once a colony of Japan, was not invited to take part in the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Since the Treaty eliminated colonial rule, the agenda was left to be discussed at bilateral talks between South Korea and Japan, which involved 14 years of wrangling.
After the San Francisco Treaty was signed, South Korea and Japan began preliminary talks on 20 October 1951 with the objective of establishing diplomatic relations and settling post-war responsibilities. The first bilateral meeting on 15 February 1952 was a turbulent confrontation. While the Republic of Korea focused on ‘reckoning the past’, Japan insisted on ‘establishing new relations’. Notable progress was made in the sixth round of talks in 1961, after the military government was established in South Korea. At the exclusive talks held on 12 November 1962, the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency chief Kim Jong-pil and Japanese Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira were able to compromise on war reparation payments and the status of South Koreans residing in Japan, the two biggest issues in the negotiations.
Fourteen years of talks finally resulted in the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea, which was signed on 22 June 1965 and which took effect on 18 December 1965. When discussions to normalize bilateral diplomatic relations reached their final stage in February 1965, Foreign Minister Shiina read a statement aloud at Kimpo Airport in Seoul. His statement has been regarded as the first official apology by Japan to South Korea. It contained the crucial phrases ‘great regret’ and ‘deep remorse’, which accelerated the negotiations on the treaty that was finally initialled in Seoul. Japan's intention to express its ‘regret’ and ‘remorse’ was included in the joint communiqué issued by the Japanese and South Korean foreign ministers (Yoshibumi, Reference Yoshibumi1999: 235–6).
Since 1967, Japan and South Korea have intensified their official contacts. In order to boost bilateral cooperation and to discuss unresolved issues, the two sides have been holding minister-level conferences in Seoul and Tokyo every year. Occasionally, these regular conferences have been postponed or cancelled because of domestic politics in South Korea or Japan, but they have, nevertheless, become an important diplomatic channel to discuss, fine-tune, and resolve key issues. The two sides have also built other procedural methods to allow smooth communication, such as presidential and minister-level summits. The presence of bilateral institutions does not rule out changes in their relations. However, it does reduce the likelihood of dramatic change or sudden rupture in bilateral ties (Krotz and Schild, Reference Krotz and Schild2013: 74). This is exactly why the procedural stage is an important first step in achieving reconciliation.
Material reconciliation
Once talks began, South Korea requested that Japan compensate individuals for unpaid wages, deposits, enforced imprisonment, and labour. The Japanese government, affirming the legitimacy of the occupation, asserted that conscripted South Koreans had equal legal status with Japanese citizens and insisted Japan's domestic laws had been obeyed.
In the fall of 1961, Japan's Ikeda administration proposed ‘the economic cooperation method’ as a solution to the claim issue at the sixth round of bilateral talks. This proposal consisted of two major parts; first, to divide South Korea's demands on claims into payments and ostensible reasons, whereby Japan would attempt to meet South Korea's expectations on payments but would do so under the pretext of economic cooperation; and, second, to provide South Korea with Japanese industrial goods, which would be used to enter the South Korean economy in the future. Japan wanted to persuade South Korea to waive its claims by providing the South Korean government with Japanese capital goods, with or without credit because South Korea suffered from economic difficulties and a lack of development funds (Lee, Reference Lee2006: 117–18).
Eventually, the two countries' representatives signed the Kim-Ohira Memorandum and agreed to use the expression ‘claim and economic cooperation’. Japan still pointed out that the term ‘claim’ is not equivalent to ‘compensation’ and hence is not considered an obligation. Japan continued to pursue its original stance that it was providing aid to support South Korea's economic development. According to Article 1 of the Japan and South Korea Claim and Economic Cooperation Agreement, Japan promised to give South Korea $300 million as a grant and $200 million on credit. Article 2 confirms that ‘property, rights, and profits between Japan and South Korea, as well as claim issues related to both countries and its people have been completely and ultimately settled’. Unfortunately, a difference in interpretation still remained. Chang Ki-yeok, the Korean minister of the Economic Planning Board, described Japan's money as ‘claim funds’ or ‘actual compensation’, whereas the Japanese government regarded it as the ‘economic cooperation fund’ or a ‘donation to congratulate Korea's independence’ (Lee, Reference Lee2006: 122; Utsumi, Reference Utsumi2010: 149; Lee, Reference Lee2010: 294–5).
After state-level compensation terminated disappointingly through political compromise,Footnote 6 a movement arose to seek compensation for Koreans who were forced to work during Japan's colonial rule began. When the issue of former sex slaves (‘comfort women’) began to receive international attention, Japan provided a solution to compensate the victims. Japan's idea became official in July 1995, when the Chief Cabinet Secretary Kozo Igarashi announced details of the Asian Women's Fund, including the compensation of former sex slaves with private funds, financial support and medical care to individuals, the expression of an honest apology, the organization of historical data, and the proposal of plans to protect the women's dignity.
The establishment and execution of the funds were dealt with in a hurry, for these steps became the most important part of the Murayama Cabinet's agenda during the fiftieth anniversary year of the war's end. Furthermore, in 1995, the Fourth World Conference on Women was held in Beijing, after the United Nations declared its focus on women for the next ten years. The issue of sex slaves had already been discussed by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, so it was widely expected that this topic would be a major agenda item in Beijing. The rising international interest in sex slaves and the increased criticism of Japan eventually pushed that nation to form the Asian Women's Fund (Ueno, Reference Ueno2008: 186–9; Arai, Reference Arai and Kim2006: 87–9; Kim, Reference Kim2002).
An important issue of the AWF was the inclusion of Japan's formal apology. Prime Minister Hashimoto's letter included phrases such as ‘apology and remorse’ and ‘women's honour and dignity’, without reference to the war of aggression or colonial domination. From 1998 onwards, when Keizo Obuchi succeeded Hashimoto as prime minister, the English version of the letter was changed. In the official Korean version, the word ‘apology’ was translated as ‘sajoe’ (‘shazai’ in Japanese). ‘Sagwa’ is commonly used to mean apology, while ‘sajoe’ is a stronger term that admits a crime rather than just a mistake. However, except for a few undisclosed recipients of the AWF's atonement money, almost no one in South Korea was aware of this change in words. The AWF procedures cannot be performed publicly because of strong objections by the Korean Council (Soh, Reference Soh2001). Furthermore, most of the South Korean media did not report on the word change, focusing instead on the ‘enemy vs. victim’ aspects of the story. Because of this limited information, South Koreans had no way of knowing that the Japanese government had selected the term ‘sajoe’ for its official apology.
The limits and potential of ideational reconciliation
To a certain extent, the reconciliation of South Korea and Japan has been accomplished in the procedural and material phases. Criticism is still prevalent in Seoul, but procedural reconciliation occurred when diplomatic relations were normalized upon signing the San Francisco Peace Treaty and Korea–Japan Treaty. Material reconciliation took place when the two countries signed the Claims and Economic Cooperation Agreement and when Japan provided funds, even though the latter's responsibility was not accurately indicated. In conclusion, Korea and Japan achieved both procedural and material reconciliations, albeit at insufficient levels.
This section explores the challenges and hopes of ideational reconciliation between South Korea and Japan by analysing cultural exchanges and the commemoration of the past. Two youth exchange programs contributed greatly to the ideational reconciliation of the two countries. The Japanese government started the JENESYS Program (Japan–East Asia Network of Exchange for Students and Youths) in 2007. Moreover, the Cabinet Office of Japan operates another youth exchange program. The objectives of this program are to promote mutual understanding and friendship among young people, to broaden their global perspectives, and to cultivate the spirit of international cooperation. The program also aims to foster international awareness through exchanges between Japanese and foreign youngsters, such as going on missions and multinational exchange by air and sea (The Cabinet Office, Government of Japan). The Japan–Korea Youth Friendship Exchange Program started in 1987; it was founded on a joint communiqué by Japan and Korea to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of normalized diplomatic relations in 1985. The purpose of the exchange program is to deepen the mutual understanding and friendship of the young people of the two nations through visits and exchanges (The Japan Foundation).
Based on a survey conducted on JENESYS Program participants, these programs improve the image of each nation and build positive perspectives on future bilateral relations. When Korean participants were asked about the impact of this program on their views of Japan, 95.3% replied that it helped create an ‘especially positive’ image of Japan and increased interest in that country, its people, and its culture. However, only a small number of youngsters have participated in exchange programs, which has been seen as a setback. From 2007 to 2011, 3,305 Koreans were invited to Japan through the JENESYS program, and 1,593 Japanese went to South Korea. When correlated with the population of both countries, the numbers are far fewer than the 200,000 people who were involved in the exchanges of Germany and France. Learning from the European example, it is essential that the sporadic Korea–Japan exchange programs be combined and managed at a governmental level.
The biggest bottleneck for bilateral cultural exchange is Korea's partially closed door to Japanese culture. Korea's pop culture, known as ‘Hallyu’ (the Korean Wave), is widely accepted in Japan in the forms of K-pop, soap operas, and films. The popularity of ‘Hallyu’ is essential in promoting mutual understanding between the two countries' citizens. However, Korea remains closed to Japanese culture. After the end of World War II, South Korea banned Japanese cultural imports, such as music, films, video games, and literature (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan). The ban was partially lifted under the Kim Dae-jung administration in 1998. In 2004, the ban on imports of Japanese CDs and DVDs was eliminated (Azuma, Reference Azuma2001). However, it is still illegal in South Korea to broadcast Japanese music and television dramas. In 2010, the South Korean cultural minister stated that ‘it is now time to accept Japanese dramas’. A lifting of bans was expected, but even today, the country has not fully unlocked its doors to the Japanese pop culture (Yonhap News, 2011).
When it comes to commemoration and acknowledgement, Japan has made apologies in the past when new prime ministers have entered office. The 1995 Murayama and 1993 Kono statements were made by incumbent officials, and in 2010 Prime Minister Kan apologized for his nation's role in decades of harsh colonial rule on the 100th anniversary of Japan's annexation of the Korean peninsula. Kan apologized to the South Korean people for Japan's past transgressions. In a statement endorsed by his cabinet, Kan said, ‘For the enormous damage and suffering caused by this colonization, I would like to express once again our deep regret and sincere apology’ (Yamazaki, Reference Yamazaki2006; Joong Ang Daily, 10 August).
On 15 August 1995, the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II, Prime Minister Murayama clearly stated that ‘aggression’ and ‘colonial rule’ were results of a ‘mistaken national policy’ (Yoshibumi, Reference Yoshibumi1999: 254–5):
During a certain period in the not too distant past, Japan, following a mistaken national policy, advanced along the road to war, only to ensnare the Japanese people in a fateful crisis, and through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. In the hope that no such mistake be made in the future, I regard, in a spirit of humility, these irrefutable facts of history and express here once again my feelings of deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology.
With these words, Murayama delivered a clear apology with a specific acknowledgement to the victims of Japan's wartime aggression. This apology was widely heralded abroad as the country's clear and explicit regret for Imperial Japan's colonial rule and aggressive acts. The key phrase is the expression of feelings of ‘profound remorse’ (tsusetsu na hansei) and ‘heartfelt apology’ (kokoro kara no owabi), most particularly the latter phrase (Dower, Reference Dower1995). Asian countries, including China and South Korea, welcomed Murayama's statement, which is widely regarded as delivering the clearest acknowledgement of Japan's wartime violations.
However, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has recently dispatched offerings to the Yasukuni Shrine, an action that conveyed a message completely contrary to the views expressed by Kono and Murayama. Lately, Japan's top government spokesperson has suggested that Japan's apology for systematically exploiting former ‘comfort women’ could be re-examined. His comments are boosting Japan's nationalists, who insist that the Imperial military never took part in forcing women into sexual slavery. Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga said in parliament that ‘It is necessary to have additional academic investigations by historians and experts’ on the validity of the 1993 Kono statement, a document that acknowledges and apologizes for Japan's ‘administrative/military personnel directly taking part in the recruitment of comfort women’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1993).
Conclusion: Accepting the idea of forgiveness
Thus far, this study has examined the stages of reconciliation of Japan and South Korea. To this day, South Korea and Japan remain in contention, despite their vital roles in achieving cooperation in Northeast Asia, in light of their historical relations, geographical positions, and political and economic closeness. Many scholars had tried to apply international relations theories and new models to explain this irony, but these frameworks have not deciphered the complicated and multi-faceted relationship of the two countries.
For this reason, this study analysed South Korea–Japan ties with the three-stage reconciliation model. This framework's biggest strength is that it allows an objective analysis of what has been accomplished and what is missing in the reconciliation of the two parties. It does not simply review the history of reconciliation; rather, it explains the exact stage of this process that the two countries have reached and offers an informed prediction of their future relations. However, this study's weakness is that it is skewed towards an analysis of Japan's reconciliation policy. Reconciliation is a two-way process, but it focuses more on the perpetrator's policies and less on the victim's response. This is a task that must be addressed in further research. Moreover, foreign policy is affected by the realm of domestic politics. Public opinion, nationalism, and the policy changes of leaders influence reconciliation between two nations. However, there is limited space to discuss domestic politics in detail; hence, the role of domestic politics on international reconciliation should also be addressed in further research.
Forgiveness is only possible if and when the two sides that engage in the process of reconciliation agree about the crimes committed by one of them (Auerbach, Reference Auerbach and Bar-Siman-Tov2003: 157). An apology is essentially a speech act that seeks forgiveness (Tavuchis, Reference Tavuchis1991: 27). Japan has in many ways expressed regrets for past wrongs, although these statements have not always satisfied the Korean audience. Japan has made an effort to admit faults and to seek forgiveness through material compensation. However, is South Korea ready to reconcile, especially ideationally, with Japan? Today, Korea is not open to heart-to-heart reconciliation; rather, it wants to emphasize its scars with a closed mind. Considering that reconciliation requires efforts by both parties, the closed minds of South Koreans is one reason that makes ideational reconciliation difficult.
Conservative nationalism and the political leadership that manipulates this ideology in both countries is another factor hindering reconciliation. Political leaders can promote or obstruct the reconciliation process (Feldman, Reference Feldman2012; Bargal and Emmanuel Sivan, Reference Bargal, Sivan and Bar-Siman-Tov2004), and their actions are among the causes of the ups and downs of the relations of Korea and Japan. The Abe administration in Japan and the Park administration in South Korea are not supportive of ideational reconciliation, since the leaders of both nations are tied to domestic conservative powers. A synergy of national interests can only take place when Seoul and Tokyo cooperate on the economic and security fronts. Abe and Park should take into consideration that Japan and South Korea play pivotal roles in the security and stability of North East Asia and must devise policies with long-term perspectives. Besides, Japan and South Korea consider the US as a facilitator. The US was a key player in existing historical disputes and has to take a proactive role in regional reconciliation
Countries in Northeast Asia tend to judge the success of reconciliation by looking at the post-war relations between Germany and France; however, their path to friendship and trust has been long and not yet complete (Feldman, Reference Feldman2014). The reconciliations of South Korea and Japan will not come quickly or easily, given their long and complicated relationship. However, the three stages of the international reconciliation framework demonstrate that their already achieved procedural and material reconciliations carry significant meanings in the international community. Moving forward, Japan and South Korea should aim at ideational reconciliation by conducting active governmental and civic exchanges and promoting mutual understanding. As a pre-requisite, the two countries should not use their pasts to achieve political objectives and should accept each other with open minds. Old emotions should not get in the way of building a constructive future in North East Asia.
About the author
Ja-hyun Chun is a Research Professor at Korea University, Graduate School of International Studies (GSIS). Chun's research interests include international peace and reconciliation in East Asia, foreign policy and collective memory. Her publications include ‘Regressive Relationship between Japan and South Korea: Discordance of Japanese government and Civil Society in Post-war Issues,’ International Journal, and ‘Beyond “Dissatisfaction” and “Apology Fatigue”: Four Types of Japanese Official Apology’ Pacific Focus, ‘The Role of Compensation in Sino-Japanese Reconciliation,’ in Handbook of Memory and Reconciliation in East Asia. (New York: Routledge, 2015) will appear.
