AN IMPORTANT DISTINCTION: EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, NOT DESEGREGATION

During the late 1960s and 1970s, both parties’ presidential campaigns tried to understand a conundrum: white voters claimed to support school desegregation but vehemently opposed the most readily available tool to desegregate schools—busing. As a Hubert H. Humphrey campaign report explained, “An important distinction needs to be made here—the distinction between integration and equal opportunity. There is considerable opposition to integration…but these same voters are not opposed to allowing Negroes equal opportunities to a good education and a good job” (Quayle and Company 1968). Humphrey’s team argued that the “important distinction” white voters drew between being against race-conscious policies to desegregate schools (i.e., busing) and their commitment to equal educational opportunity grew from “deep roots of racism” grounded in their ignorance of racial inequality in the United States. A Humphrey adviser explained that “white America has very little idea how black America lives.” He continued, “70 percent think Negroes are treated the same as whites; 65 percent believe business firms do not discriminate against Negroes in hiring practices; and 50 percent do not believe trade unions discriminate” (Holmes Reference Holmes1968).

In 1972, George McGovern’s team shared this perception of white voters as ignorant about racism in American society but concerned about nonwhite students’ access to a quality education. His strategists concluded that white voters would be receptive to an education message emphasizing “that money spent on busing could be more efficiently applied to the upgrading of classroom facilities and perhaps better pay for teachers in the cities” (McGovern Campaign 1972). Four years later, Jimmy Carter’s team agreed with its predecessors. A Carter campaign report stated: “Perhaps partly as a compensation for their opposition to busing, voters express strong support for Federal aid to education as a way of solving part of the same problem” (Cambridge Survey Research 1976).

Simultaneously, Republican strategists were drawing the same conclusion about white voters’ commitment to equal opportunity but rejection of race-conscious policies (i.e., busing) to ensure equal opportunity. Richard Nixon’s political advisers wrote that when it comes to race-conscious policies such as busing, Americans “profess to believe in” the principle of “egalitarianism” even if they “often find themselves in the position of betraying it in real world situations” (Harper Reference Harper1972a). Later in the 1970s, Gerald Ford’s team acknowledged that many of the white voters who rejected busing to desegregate schools were “good government people who used to be strong on civil rights” (Melady and Lee Reference Melady and Lee1976). Thus, any school desegregation message had to demonstrate a concern for nonwhite students, just not to the extent that Ford would advocate for busing.

Republicans faced the additional struggle of voters’ perception that the Republican Party did not care about people of color. Strategists argued that education was the perfect political issue to reassure voters of Republicans’ compassion. For Nixon, his claim to support “quality education” for all students was an attempt to reassure middle-class voters that he cared about the “educationally disadvantaged in segregated schools” (Harper Reference Harper1972b). A strategist advised Ford to express concern for the disadvantaged because “relatively few Americans perceive the Republican Party as a political organization that has compassion and concern for the lives of the average citizen, particularly people of below-average economic status” (Belin Reference Belin1975). Another Ford strategist argued that support for “better and more education” would demonstrate a strong commitment to an issue that all voters valued without including divisive race-conscious policy proposals (Teeter Reference Teeter1975).

By the end of the 1970s, both parties had successfully pivoted away from the contentious school desegregation debate. In doing so, they effectively replaced debates about remedies for the constitutional violation created by school segregation—that is, the violation of nonwhite students’ rights under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment—with a benign call for “quality education for all students.” This was a move aimed at appealing to white voters’ contradictory commitment to educational equality and ignorance (or denial) about racial inequalities. In the future, this shared understanding of white voters’ racial attitudes would lead the two parties to take different positions on school vouchers.

REPUBLICANS PLACE VOUCHERS IN A CIVIL RIGHTS FRAME

In the 1980s, Republican strategists were increasingly concerned that white voters perceived their candidates to be racially insensitive. As a Reagan campaign strategy memo stated, appeals to Black voters “would certainly beam a positive message to white voters who like their Presidents to demonstrate that they are broad-minded” (Hannaford 1980). Republican strategists argued that vouchers provided a racially sensitive message to appeal to white voters. Students of color also provided a sympathetic rhetorical proxy for Republican efforts to target Catholic voters with pro-voucher messages. Such messaging did not risk alienating white voters who otherwise might see vouchers as a way for Catholics and whites to avoid desegregating schools.

At first, Republicans found that vouchers were a solution in search of a problem. Having run in 1988 on a promise to be the “education president,” President George H. W. Bush’s team was dumbfounded after the election to learn that Americans were rather satisfied with their schools. As a domestic policy adviser explained, “The public is more satisfied than one might think about the quality of their schools,” although voters did believe “that the nation’s inner-city schools have ‘gotten worse’ over the last several decades.” Voters supported efforts to improve those schools (Porter Reference Porter1989). Bush’s team set out to get “education consumers agitated about the poor quality of our educational system” to justify its education reform efforts in order to keep Bush’s campaign pledge (Kolb Reference Kolb1990).

The Rodney King trial put race and racism in the national spotlight, and the Bush team saw political potential in the situation. As an adviser explained, “This year, we have the historic opportunity to expand our Black base without shrinking our white base.” He concluded that education was a key issue in making appeals to voters because Bush could discuss the issue of education as one of “giving people the power to control their own lives” (Snow Reference Snow1992). Such messaging justified voucher programs for all students, was consistent with conservative political ideology, and would demonstrate to white voters a concern for urban Black children. To reassure voters that his education voucher program (i.e., the GI Bill for Children) was designed, in part, to help nonwhite urban youths—rather than help whites continue to avoid desegregating schools—Bush promoted the Milwaukee voucher experience. He was always sure to note that the program was supported by state Democratic leaders and Black community leaders.

In 1996, Bob Dole made education a key campaign issue and repeatedly proclaimed (without citing evidence) the Milwaukee program a success, asserting that it demonstrated that vouchers were the answer for how to close the black–white achievement gap. Such statements seemed to be aimed at minority voters, in particular because Dole called out racial-ethnic minority students by name during campaign speeches as personalized examples of those in need of voucher programs. Yet, internally, the Dole team acknowledged that a key target of such messages was Catholic voters who wanted vouchers for parochial schools (Shea Reference Shea1996).

In 2000, George W. Bush avoided using the term “vouchers” because his advisers believed it had negative connotations for white voters (Dao Reference Dao2000). They were sensitive to white voters perceiving Republican support for vouchers, at best, as pandering to Catholics and, at worst, as a way for whites to avoid desegregating schools. Rather than emphasize the solution—vouchers—George W. Bush emphasized the problem—failing urban schools. Bush readily connected race and education in asserting his “compassionate conservatism.” His rhetoric about education as a civil rights issue (i.e., the “soft bigotry of low expectations”) and his commitment to leaving “no child behind” assured white voters that he was a candidate who cared for disadvantaged children of color within the context of caring for all children’s educational quality.

John McCain and Mitt Romney continued to promote vouchers as necessary for improving the quality of education for students of color while avoiding any suggestion that vouchers should be available only to students of color. Their use of Bush’s civil rights frame resulted in confusing discourse. In his nomination-acceptance speech, McCain stressed that many students were trapped in failing schools and needed voucher programs to realize quality education. “Education is the civil rights issue of this century,” he said, before continuing, “Equal access to public education has been gained” (McCain Reference McCain2008). McCain did not explain why any students would be particularly in need of vouchers if they had “equal access” or what constitutional violation made education the civil rights issue of the new century. Notably, no Democratic candidate ever challenged a Republican candidate to name that constitutional violation—perhaps because Democrats know that any such discussion will reopen the school segregation debate that puts them at odds with white voters. Romney perfectly captured white voters’ equality ideology when he expressed concern for “minority children” and their “third-world education” in his call for vouchers (Romney Reference Romney, Peters and Woolley2012).

Certainly, Republican support for vouchers reflects several realities: vouchers are consistent with their market-based political ideology and support appeals to Catholic and, more recently, Evangelical voters. However, the emphasis that Republican candidates put on failing urban schools in promoting vouchers specifically seeks to present an image of a nation in violation of white voters’ equality ideology, one that does not provide equal educational opportunity. Republican support for vouchers does not exist despite white suburban voters; rather, Republicans support vouchers because of these voters and their need to hear Republican candidates express concern for children from minoritized populations.

DEMOCRATS WARN THAT VOUCHERS HURT PUBLIC SCHOOLS

Republicans used vouchers to reassure white voters of their racial sensitivity. Democrats did not face this same challenge. Democratic strategists were more concerned with losing white-voter support by giving credence to the Republican charge that Democrats were beholden to racial-ethnic minorities. They attempted to counter the Republican voucher position by arguing that it actually undermined minoritized students’ equality of educational opportunity. Although Democratic candidates have supported school choice, they rarely primed the issue, and it typically plays a minor role in their education discourse—much less their broader campaigns. They tend to emphasize improving educational quality through increased funding. Strategists argued that this resonated with white, middle-class parents by demonstrating the important role of public schools in creating equal opportunity while also acknowledging these voters’ growing concerns about their own children’s educational quality in the emerging global economy.

When James Carville said “It’s the economy, stupid” he was signaling that the 1992 Clinton campaign understood that white, middle-class voters were anxious about their current prospects and their children’s future. Ensuring that their children had access to quality education was a new concern for these white voters. At the same time, the Democratic Party’s reinventing government program of the 1990s aimed to reassure white voters that Democrats were not committed to providing an entitlement lifestyle to racial-ethnic minorities. Clinton’s polling data indicated that voters of all races increasingly supported public school choice. This made public school choice a safe policy for Clinton to use as an example of his “leaner, not meaner” government reform plan (Clinton Reference Clinton, Peters and Woolley1992).

In 1996, Clinton’s team was concerned about Dole’s use of vouchers in his appeals to white voters. As Clinton advisers explained, “We need a better answer to vouchers than we have, especially when the debate focuses on doing something for disadvantaged kids in failing (mostly inner city) schools” (Cohen Reference Cohen1996). However, the Clinton team was cautious about including racial messages in its campaign lest they appear to be pandering to nonwhite voters. Clinton campaign strategists argued that voters supported Clinton’s public school choice position because it required a “comprehensive plan to improve public education and help all students”—unlike vouchers, which had less support, because vouchers might “only help a few chosen students” and hurt public schools (Thornton Reference Thornton1996).

In 2000, Al Gore advocated more strongly for school choice than Bill Clinton had, in part because it was a way for him to draw a distinction between himself and his opponent. George W. Bush might not have wanted to use the word “vouchers,” but Gore was more than happy to do it for him. In key campaign appearances, Gore charged that his opponent was “for vouchers” and that vouchers “drain taxpayer money away” from public schools; thus, vouchers would hurt more than help students of color and public schools (Gore Reference Gore, Peters and Woolley2000). In making such statements, Gore was attempting to undermine Bush’s claims of compassion for students of color. He further reassured white voters of his commitment to their children by pledging to improve educational quality for all students. Gore promised to “make education the number-one priority” in his budget (Presidential Candidates Debate 2000).

As the first Black candidate to win a major party’s nomination for the presidency, Barack Obama regularly shared the important role that education had played in both his and his wife’s lives in ways that reflected white voters’ own belief in the power of education to create equal opportunity. Obama supported public school choice but it was not a central theme in his education discourse. Often saying that No Child Left Behind “left the money behind,” Obama retained the Democratic Party’s emphasis on increased funding for schools, particularly urban schools, as necessary to ensure that schools were preparing all students to be competitive in the global economy.

Democratic candidates have not needed to use vouchers to appeal to Black or Latino voters; however, they have needed to be careful about appearing to pander to these voters. The fact that Republican candidates have continued to advocate for voucher programs but have increasingly avoided using the term “voucher” suggests that Democrats might have been successful in convincing white voters that “vouchers” hurt students of color and public schools. Democrats have consistently promised increased funding for all students, a reassuring message for white voters with a professed concern for students of color and a more personal concern for their own children’s education.

SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

To view supplementary material for this article, please visit https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096518000100