Ethnic Politics

Simultaneously with the demands for greater political participation, there was a trend towards the official recognition of the island's variety of (ethnic) cultures and languages (e.g. Nagapen Reference Nagapen2010). This opened the way for a political system in which income no longer determined the right to vote and increased the electorate substantially. The new constitution granted the right to vote to everyone above twenty-one years old who could pass a simple comprehension test in one of the specified languages of the country: English, French, Gujarati, Hindi, Tamil, Telugu, Urdu, Chinese (in the case of Mauritius Hakka) and the local Creole. Although it was not until 1958 that universal suffrage became a reality, the 1948 elections, the first under the new constitution, marked the fact that ‘the [political] power of the Franco-Mauritian elite was conclusively broken’ (Seekings Reference Seekings2011: 172).

Subsequently, with the quest for independence, political divisions based on ethnicity increasingly replaced the (colonial) racial and class divide in politics in the period between the 1948 elections and 1968. Ethnic differences that were already present in Mauritius, albeit in a less politically expressed way, now became relevant for political mobilisation – with ‘cultural forms, values and practices of ethnic groups [becoming] political resources for elites in competition for political power and economic advantage’ (Brass Reference Brass1991: 15). Illustratively, the Labour Party's focus on class instead of ethnic affiliation did not last, and as a result certain features of the island's inequality remain untouched, as I will show below.

The transition was partly a reaction to the exclusionary mechanisms of the Franco-Mauritians. As a white elite, the Franco-Mauritians had a history of using many ‘ethnic’ traits to shape their symbolic superiority and maintain exclusive control over resources. In contrast to South Africa this happened in the absence of explicit racist laws, yet even socially prominent Hindus remained often excluded from Franco-Mauritian networks (both socially and in business), notwithstanding relative similarities in class. This contributed to ethnicity gaining political prominence. To challenge the existing order in Mauritius, Hindu politicians realised the advantages of stressing their ethnic background in a political system relying on universal suffrage. In contrast to the Franco-Mauritians, they could mobilise substantial numbers on the basis of ethnic affiliation. In other words, just like established powers, subordinate groups can choose to apply ethnic characteristics in their aim to obtain power. Once this process is set in motion and the political prominence of ethnicity is on the rise, feedback effects may further enhance ethnic solidarity (Nielsen Reference Nielsen1985: 135).

Owing to ethnicity gaining political prominence, intra-group cultural and class differences were increasingly downplayed. In the Hindu community, caste was replaced by ethnic identity – a process that had already started earlier, but a common Hindu ethnic identity was further intensified during the political transition (Hollup Reference Hollup1994: 297–8). Similarly, among the heterogeneous grouping of Muslims, with wide socio-economic differences, an ethnic consciousness developed (Jahangeer-Chojoo Reference Jahangeer-Chojoo2010: 126). This downplaying of intra-group differences affected the intensification of inter-group differences. The changing political landscape, for example, intensified the separation between Hindus and Muslims (Eriksen Reference Eriksen1998: 52). Both were initially classified as Indo-Mauritians, but the political process set in motion a legislative process that would officially classify them into two different groups from 1962 onwards (Bal & Sinha-Kerkhoff Reference Bal, Sinha-Kerkhoff and Oonk2007: 124).

Franco-Mauritian aims to preserve their power further contributed to intensifying ethic rivalry, in particular through the instigation of fear of the Hindu community's potential to politically dominate. With the support of the gens de couleur and the Creoles, who shared Franco-Mauritian opposition to and fear of Hindu domination, they proved initially successful. The renowned writer V.S. Naipaul (Reference Naipaul1972: 283), who visited Mauritius in the 1960s at the invitation of the (Hindu) politician Seewoosagur Ramgoolam (who was to become the first prime minister of an independent Mauritius), writes:

The decisive 1967 elections, in which the final decision over independence was made, illustrated how divided Mauritian society had become, even leading in the final months before independence to the first ethnic riots in Mauritius, resulting in numerous fatalities (Simmons Reference Simmons1982: 186) – something Mauritius has since luckily avoided, with the more recent exception of riots in 1999 (in both cases the Franco-Mauritians were not involved). The elections were a close call between supporters and opponents of independence: the pro-independence block won, but received ‘only’ 54·82% of the votes. This figure corresponded closely to the percentage of the population who were Hindus, although it would be wrong to simply equate the supporters of the pro-independence movement with the Hindu community. In the end, for example, Ramgoolam did manage to gain the support of a Muslim political party. The election results, nevertheless, reveal the fact that many Mauritians feared Hindu domination.

The disadvantages of ethnicity

Unlike political leaders, especially of Hindu background, who can obtain support on the basis of religious (or ethnic) affiliation, Franco-Mauritians face a problem in a political system based on universal suffrage. Abner Cohen, in his seminal ethnography The Politics of Elite Culture (1981) on the Creole elite of Sierra Leone, argues that an elite has to reconcile tensions between two ends of a continuum. On the one hand, an elite needs to enhance its image and to seek legitimacy for its high status by assuming universalistic functions, i.e. by promoting its service to the public. On the other hand, the success of an elite relates to how well it succeeds in organising itself particularistically, i.e. sharing a number of characteristics that foster cohesion and distinguish it from other social groups (Cohen Reference Cohen1981: xiii). The conclusion is that a failure to reconcile tensions between the two ends leads, inevitably, to the disappearance of existing elites and the rise of new ones. Mauritian independence, in line with Cohen's continuum, marked a watershed moment for the Franco-Mauritians.

In postcolonial Mauritius, Franco-Mauritians have difficulty in reconciling the tensions between their particularistic and universalistic tendencies, since they are associated with colonial injustices and are virtually the only whites on the island. In contrast to white Africans in Rhodesia and South Africa facing similar issues when the majority demanded a voice, Franco-Mauritians did not resort to force in order to prevent universal suffrage from happening (see Chua Reference Chua2003 for a comparative discussion on the challenges ethnic elites face when they are confronted with majority groups). This eventually led to the decline of their political and public voice. The closing of the newspaper Le Cernéen in 1982, which was characterised by its defence of both the whites and the sugar industry, is illustrative in this respect. Franco-Mauritians, as a community, stopped voicing a public opinion in order to safeguard access to their economic resources. In order to maintain their economic dominant position and control in the Mauritian private sector, they rather avoid attracting unwanted (political) attention. Instead, Franco-Mauritians, and white elites elsewhere in Southern Africa, try to publicly portray themselves as supporters of the public ideology of non-racialism and equal opportunity – or at least, they avoid public statements or behaviour that might counter this image. Their particularistic interests, then, need to be performed hidden from the public eye as far as is possible, since openly pursuing their own racial and/or ethnic group's political and economic interests is contradictory to the public ideology – this resonating with Cohen's argument (1981: xvi) that in liberal societies adhering to the principle of equality of opportunity (usually upheld by their constitutions) the furthering of the elites’ particularistic tendencies tends to be performed secretly. As I will illustrate below, however, pursuing elite interests in ‘secrecy’, even when these are racist and exclusionary in nature, is facilitated in Mauritian society because ethnic and cultural diversity is encouraged.

Despite their aim to minimise public attention, as a result of the absence of universalistic tendencies – after 1968, their anti-independence alliance with Creoles and other communities quickly became defunct – Franco-Mauritians often serve as an easy target. The Franco-Mauritian politician Paul Bérenger illustrates this perfectly, even though he is an outlier in many ways and as such his rich political career is unique, rather than exemplary of the wider Franco-Mauritian community. As a matter of fact, Bérenger gained prominence by criticising Franco-Mauritian economic privileges in the 1970s, for which many Franco-Mauritians still dislike him today – one Franco-Mauritian female informant even referred to him as a ‘clown’ (Int. 2015). Nevertheless, owing to the continuous prominence of ethnicity in the political domain, his political opponents frequently associate him with white privileges in order to discredit him (see for a more detailed analysis Salverda Reference Salverda2015). As a result, some argue that Bérenger's political career has been severely hampered by the fact he is white (Le Mauricien 2015).

In other cases, Franco-Mauritian economic power is more directly targeted, such as was the case with the government suggesting to ‘democratise’ the economy in 2005 (L'Express 2005). The idea was to reform the economy, open it up internationally, break the economic monopolies and, especially, to increase chances for other local players. Partly owing to the government's communication on the subject, many Franco-Mauritians perceived it as specifically targeted at them. In line with their aim to avoid public attention, this was mainly voiced privately. Only one Franco-Mauritian openly compared the government to that of Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe (Le Mauricien 2007) – something of an exaggeration, as Franco-Mauritian property has not been appropriated. Yet the belief that Franco-Mauritians were unfairly targeted was shared more widely. In the 2010 African Peer Review Mechanism country report on Mauritius, the fact that Hindus lack a solid economic base (except, via their political power, their control of numerous state-owned and parastatal companies) was considered an inspiration for the democratisation of the economy (APRM 2010: 185). Or in the words of a retired gens de couleur journalist: ‘the democratisation of the economy is suspect. [Prime-Minister] Ramgoolam [the son of the first prime minster] wants to take the wealth from the whites and give it to his community. It is aimed at the consolidation of his power’ (Int. 2006). Whatever the (hidden) intentions were, it did not alter much. It hardly features on the political agenda anymore, or at least not in the same way, and when I visited the island in early 2014 as well as during the elections later that year Franco-Mauritian economic power barely faced political opposition. While Franco-Mauritian control over large parts of the island's private sector has continued – as a matter of fact, in the words of a retired university professor, ‘Franco-Mauritians have never had it so good as today’ (Int. 2014).

To a certain extent, the targeting of Franco-Mauritians in the public political discourse can be considered to be a similar situation to that faced by white Africans elsewhere, though the Zimbabwean case illustrates that a small minority of whites can do relatively little when their opponents resort to the use of force. As Andrew Hartnack (Reference Hartnack2014) argues, the Zimbabwean case is more nuanced than the image presented by the polarised public debate, yet it is evident that white farmers stood little chance against Mugabe's mobilisation of force (see also Pilossof Reference Pilossof2012) – and as recent developments illustrate, the position of the small number of white farmers still left remains precarious (Mail & Guardian 2015). Franco-Mauritians and white South Africans have so far avoided similar challenges to their position, though in South Africa discontent about the whites’ perpetuation of economic power and land ownership remains looming as a contender for the mobilisation of political support. In Mauritius, it is often believed that the island is too small for (state) violence aimed at particular ethnic groups. Yet, as the mobilisation of native populations against ‘newcomers’ in the case of, for example, Fiji illustrates, it is not only size that matters. If Mauritius had had a large indigenous population, the rhetoric (and consequences) may have been different.

Mauritius is certainly not the picture-perfect image of ‘unity in diversity’. Ethnic categories remain associated with the distribution of power (Hempel Reference Hempel2009), with ‘ethnic identity [providing] clear lines to determine who will be excluded and who will not’ (Horowitz Reference Horowitz1993: 18). This instrumentalisation of ethnicity is hard to undo, and, beneath the façade of inter-ethnic compromise, determines competition and struggle between the various ethnic groups in attempts to establish political hierarchy and control (Boswell Reference Boswell2006). ‘All communities in Mauritius are hindering each other’, a Creole informant said (2006). Political struggles often have an implicit ethnic undertone, with ethnic groups competing over resources. As a result, not only Franco-Mauritians but also other communities have difficulty in obtaining support from other communities. The Hindus may have the largest support base, which is translated into their political power, yet too much power in the hands of the Hindus is, like in the preamble to independence, met with suspicion. The Hindus are, for example, kept in check as a result of tensions between them and the second largest group, the Creoles. It is a competition in the middle over state resources such as access to education and to jobs in the civil service, with the Creoles being the poorest and most hybrid community (see also Boswell's Reference Boswell2006 account on Le Malaise Créole). This enhanced suspicion between other communities to a certain extent facilitates the Franco-Mauritians. A Sino-Mauritian informant said, ‘because politics aren't neutral, the Franco-Mauritians are of the opinion that they better stay out and let others fight in politics’ (Int. 2006).

Correlations between private and public ethnicity

Often the strong focus on ethnic differences is dismissed as politically motivated. In Mauritius, and following up on the Indian example, this is referred to as communalism, a term ‘invented by the colonial rulers in the nineteenth century, to refer to the use and manipulation of religious and/or ethnic differences for “political” ends antithetical to the national (or colonial) interests’ (Bates Reference Bates2000: 1). It is evident that many political leaders sense advantages in pursuing ethnic differences and tend not to be inclined to give this up. They do have to walk a fine line in using ethnicity to their advantage, though, because too openly criticising other ethnic groups contradicts the island's dominant beliefs and mutual respect for each other's (private use of) ethnicity.

The prevalence of the politicisation of ethnicity nevertheless has an impact on the organisation of Mauritian life more generally, even though, much more so than in the past, Mauritians of all backgrounds now benefit from the island's economic development (e.g. Sandbrook Reference Sandbrook2007). Politicians have to maintain an image of intra-ethnic homogeneity: ‘polarization in the religious field is not encouraged as it poses a threat to Hindu unity, which is important in maintaining certain alliances of political power’ (Hollup Reference Hollup1994: 308). The widespread belief that ‘only those ancestral traditions deemed authentic and validly founded have the power to shape Mauritian national subjects in a spirit of peaceful and equitable coexistence’ (Eisenlohr Reference Eisenlohr2006a: 400) also contributes to the prevalence of differences. As a result, ethnicity is reinforced in the private domain, as multi-ethnic societies like Mauritius lack any strong impulse towards social and cultural integration (Ramtohul Reference Ramtohul2013: 5). Most Mauritians see themselves through a mental framework of ethnic belonging and accept ethnicity as a dominant organising principle of social life. This positively impacts on the maintenance of Franco-Mauritian economic power.

A central characteristic of ethnicity in Mauritian society, according to Thomas Hylland Eriksen (Reference Eriksen1998: 185), is a differentiation between symbolic and instrumental ethnicity:

Eriksen, however, remarks, ‘[i]t is unclear to what extent symbolic ethnicity can reproduce itself without a political dimension’ (Eriksen Reference Eriksen1998: 185). In practice symbolic and instrumental, or private and public ethnicity (Bowman Reference Bowman1991: 63), are difficult to separate. Hence, as Eriksen (Reference Eriksen1998: 14) argues, ‘[ethnicity is] so pervasive and multifaceted in everyday interaction that it cannot be accounted for as a purely political phenomenon’. This interrelatedness of the different poles of ethnicity prevents an open attack on Franco-Mauritian privileges.

Franco-Mauritians remain economically powerful and many of their businesses are often highly connected, while wealth trickles down to the whole community because Franco-Mauritians relatively easily find employment within Franco-Mauritian companies – similar findings have been reported by Vito Laterza (forthcoming) on Swaziland, where a relatively small white elite retains control of a large share of the business sector. Many Mauritians dislike this concentration of economic power (and wealth) in the Franco-Mauritian community, especially due to the association with colonial injustices. Consequently, and as I have already shown above, Franco-Mauritians are not very successful in obtaining support on the basis of universalistic functions. Certainly, there are Mauritians praising the Franco-Mauritian business spirit and their contribution to the economic development of the island, yet even then they point to the continuing concentration of wealth in the community.

Economic power may be less vulnerable than political power (Dogan Reference Dogan2003: 13) notwithstanding that politicians frequently target Franco-Mauritian economic power, occasionally even to the extent that they are pushed to distribute part of their wealth (Salverda Reference Salverda2010). Key to my argument, however, is that there is a limit to the criticism. Mauritian governments seem not to want to alienate Franco-Mauritians too much because they are aware of the substantial role Franco-Mauritian capital and skills play in the development of the island's economy – with Franco-Mauritian capital even financially contributing to the island's public infrastructure, such as a publicly accessible bridge in the vicinity of a recently developed shopping mall in the centre of the island. To improve economic conditions, then, the government and Franco-Mauritian capital depend on each other, though this contributes to the maintenance of the latter party's elite position. Besides, too openly and vocally criticising the benefits of ethnicity will undermine the island's social cohesion: in order to maintain (interethnic) peace in a small island many Mauritians consider it best to respect each other's private focus on ethnicity, i.e. the symbolic pole of ethnicity. Franco-Mauritian endogamous marriage patterns and exclusivist patterns of social interaction, for example, are hardly challenged. These patterns are part and parcel of all Mauritian communities and criticising these aspects would potentially jeopardise the cohesion of Mauritian society and even one's own position. Criticising the ‘private use’ of others’ ethnicity may indirectly jeopardise the politicians’ own political power, as their positions very much rely on the prominence of ethnicity – in everyday life. The fact that the complex interaction between private and public ethnicity remains unchallenged works to the advantage of the Franco-Mauritians.

Franco-Mauritians’ preference for marrying ‘white’ is not criticised as it confirms the endogamous marriage patterns of all Mauritian communities (Nave Reference Nave2000). Conversely, exogamous marriage patterns are less appreciated in Mauritius. For Franco-Mauritians, marrying outside the Franco-Mauritian community has, historically, never been well thought of, and has often led to disinheritance and effective banishment from the community. Today, marrying a non-white is less sanctioned and gradually becoming more accepted, though it would still depart from the Franco-Mauritian norm. Many Franco-Mauritians I interviewed and spoke to referred to the (perceived) social disadvantages: a ‘mixed’ marriage jeopardises the socio-cultural embedding of the couple and their children in the Franco-Mauritian community. They rarely voiced economic arguments, despite the fact that the so-called ‘right’ partner choice helps to keep a stake in the island's richest economic network. This confirms the common Mauritian discourse, as the rejection of ‘mixed’ marriages is widespread among all communities and is, in reality, prompted by the widespread (social) consequences these may have and by concerns people have about the identity of the offspring. The importance of ethnic affiliation in Mauritian society does not lend much appeal to having a hybrid identity: ‘the most difficult aspect of mixed marriages in this kind of setting – the self-defined plural society with no hegemonic group – may be the identity of the children’ (Eriksen Reference Eriksen1998: 125). Among Franco-Mauritians, as a result, marrying a white (Catholic) foreigner is regarded as equally bearing fruit because such foreign partners blend into the community.Footnote ⁶ The offspring, furthermore, can attend the whites-only clubs without any objections. Accordingly, the (historical) perception of the Franco-Mauritians as a united white group prevails, despite the fact that the community is not necessarily a united block and that there exists also a level of variety within it (on the grounds of openness and wealth, for example).

Franco-Mauritians’ ethnic identity is reinforced and maintained because of the continuity of their economically powerful position in combination with the fact that (historical) patterns of social life, such as the exclusivity of Franco-Mauritian club life and leisure activities, are hardly challenged. Although some clubs, like the Turf Club, an elite club in charge of the horse racing in the capital, Port Louis, have been forced to open up, there still remain a number of exclusive Franco-Mauritian clubs. Apart from the Dodo Club, these are clubs such as the Grand Baie Yacht Club, Le Morne Anglers’ Club, and the Club Nautique de Pointe d'Esny. In my research, I have frequently encountered political arguments against Franco-Mauritian economic power, but apart from some expressions of dislike, I have never heard any seriously voiced objections against the whites-only clubs – or against the wider exclusivity of Franco-Mauritian private life, which, as a Franco-Mauritian who was born abroad experienced, remains very family-oriented (Int. 2014), and of which these clubs form a part. This, consequently, reinforces a feedback loop: Franco-Mauritians participating in the same social networks more easily marry someone ‘like them’, while their endogamous marriage patterns are maintained because they fear a situation in which they or their children become excluded from these social networks, such as access to the several white-only sports and social clubs (for a more detailed analysis of Franco-Mauritian geographies, see Salverda & Hay Reference Salverda and Hay2014). Besides, there have historically been also a variety of exclusive (sports and social) clubs for gens de couleur, Muslims and Hindus, such as the Racing Club, the Muslim Scouts and the Triveni Club (e.g. Nagapen Reference Nagapen2010). Challenges are, therefore, limited, as these would go against the dominant beliefs underlying the organisation of Mauritian private life along ethnic lines. Neither are other Mauritians particularly interested in challenging the remaining white-only clubs, because most Mauritians hardly take any interest in the leisure activities specific to the Franco-Mauritian community, such as rugby, hunting, water sports and game fishing. Widespread acceptance and lack of (external) criticism of the organisation of social life, however, facilitates the maintenance of economic power, since the spaces in which, to speak with Cohen, elite interests are pursued in ‘secrecy’ are hardly challenged, even when these are racist and exclusionary in nature.

A strong sense of ethnic belonging, openly observed in Mauritian private life, and reinforced by the political system, contributes to the fact that many Mauritian businesses are family businesses and/or employ people according to kin relationships. Franco-Mauritians are not unique in this practice, as it is often argued that the private sector suffers from unwillingness to expand beyond its own community:

Since the end of the colonial period, Franco-Mauritians have certainly become more open, and interactions within the private sector do cross ethnic boundaries. However, it should be realised that the small size of the community and the virtually one-to-one correspondence of elite boundaries with ethnic boundaries remains important to the understanding of the maintenance of their elite position. The link between economic power and Franco-Mauritian (historical) marriage patterns is illustrative, for example. Franco-Mauritians are frequently linked to each other by family ties, since a long tradition of endogamous marriage patterns within a small community has linked many families to each other. This facilitates shared investments and/or participation in each other's businesses, and thus endogamous marriage patterns cannot be separated from the circulation of wealth in the white-only community. In cases where a businessman cannot gather sufficient capital he often turns to other Franco-Mauritians to invite them to share the investment. As a Franco-Mauritian businessman involved in the purchase of numerous businesses said, ‘you always ask people you know first if you have something to offer’ (Int. 2006). The successful consolidation of economic power within the community is partly the result of this pattern: wealth may have changed hands between Franco-Mauritian families but it has to a large extent remained within the Franco-Mauritian community.

Finding stable employment is equally related to Franco-Mauritian social networks. A Franco-Mauritian businessman explained that as a Franco-Mauritian you could always contact a relative or other Franco-Mauritians to inquire after a job for your child (Int. 2005). In the aftermath of the 2007/2008 global financial crisis, which hardly affected Mauritius, this even led to a larger number of Franco-Mauritians returning to the island after their overseas studies since they could still easily find jobs in Mauritius, a Franco-Mauritian informant told me (Int. 2014). The reason for employing other Franco-Mauritians, according to a number of businessmen, is that the employers have more control because they know the parents and the family of the employee. They argue that a point commun enhances trust and confidence, which are vital elements for doing business and dealing with employees. A Franco-Mauritian businessman involved in the textile industry further illustrated this way of thinking. He said, ‘I had problems with a Hindu female secretary who had breached my confidentiality. Besides, I had problems with her professionalism.’ He acknowledged that the ethnification of Mauritian society was at the core of this: ‘I would not have had this problem with a Hindu had I been in Europe. The cause is the Mauritian culture in which there exists a lack of trust between the different ethnic communities.’ Subsequently, he hired a Franco-Mauritian secretary who was, he said, ‘very professional’ (Int. 2006). Hence, the evolution of ethnicity and its continuous role in structuring postcolonial society is notably relevant for understanding the consolidation of the Franco-Mauritian elite position. They may constitute only 1% of the population, yet they still hold a dominant position in the island's present-day economy due to the fact that the organisation of their private and social life is not – and, by virtue of defending the cohesion of Mauritian society, cannot be – criticised.