Introduction
Every ethical doctrine is, or claims to be, an answer to moral skepticismFootnote 1 and sets out the principles of a kind of behavior which can reconcile the human quest for happiness with the norms required by community life. Two fundamentally different ways exist to establish such principles, and both have recourse to what they hold to be the essence or nature of mankind. For the first of these, such an essence or nature can only be understood in its relationship with a transcendent reality, or with God himself. For the second, human essence or nature is sufficiently defined by a characteristic feature of its own, such as sensitivity, reason, feeling, etc. The first way leads to theological ethics, the second to humanistic ethics.Footnote 2 Theological ethics falls within the context of a philosophy founded in and crowned by a theology: everything in the world has an end, and the end of all things is God; so the end of a human being is the contemplative life, which must resemble, as far as possible, the divine “life,” and the “happiness” to which human beings naturally aspire consists only in this end. The means to achieve happiness are virtues, which consist in the exercise of reason. Reason may be employed to discipline the impulses of the senses and then give rise to moral virtues, such as temperance and justice; or else it may be exercised in science, art and wisdom, which are purely “intellectual” virtues.Footnote 3 Humanistic ethics is based on the needs of humankind, first of all survival. Not just biological survival: but survival of the human being as a conscious subject guided by reason and the survival of the community as peaceful coexistence and free collaboration among individuals. “Humanistic” morals take the form of norms or laws designed to govern the conduct of human beings towards themselves and others. Moral norms sanction reciprocity of behavior, according to which what is licit for one towards others, is licit to others towards them. Respect and justice thus become the fundamental conditions for individual and social life, since they prevent conflict and guarantee coexistence and collaboration. Theological ethics may in part embody humanistic ethics, but the contrary is not possible.
The texts this work is concerned with, though based on different approaches, both belong to the genre of theological ethics. Both Saʿdi and Bono Giamboni belong to a religious tradition—Islamic and Christian—which is the theoretical base (with all relevant doctrinal references) for describing the moral system outlined in their works. A comparative critical approach to ethics does not only deal with “how” moral discourses work, but also with “what means” are used to present such discourses to the public for which they were written: these will be the key points of our study. Moral (and religious) ideas, which base moral discourses, always belong to a certain time, a certain community and a certain place. However, works of this genre share a common purpose, namely, to indicate how to live a happy life, fulfill one’s humanity and access a life after death, which represents a coherent realization of life on earth.
Authors and Works
Moslehoddin ʽAbdollah Saʿdi was born in Shirāz around 1210 and, under the protection of the Salghari atabeg Saʽd ben Zangi, completed his studies at the Nezāmiye in Baghdad,Footnote 4 where he stayed until 1226. After the Mongolian invasion which overthrew his patron, Saʿdi began to travel around much of the Near and Middle East, as well as in the Arabian peninsula, staying away from his native city until 1256. He finally settled down in Shirāz until his death (1291 or 1292), respected and revered by his fellow citizens.Footnote 5 Two works by Saʿdi belong to the genre of moral literature:Footnote 6 his most famous work, in rhymed and rhythmic prose mixed with verse, the Golestān Footnote 7 (1258), and the Bustān,Footnote 8 a mathnavi of 4,100 verses completed in 1257.Footnote 9 The Golestān,Footnote 10 on which we focus, consists of eight chapters, each of which contains a succession of anecdotes taken from different sources (ranging from exemplary events which took place in ancient Persia to traditions of the Prophet, to autobiographical or pseudo-autobiographical narratives,Footnote 11 etc.), intending to show the good and evil in human behavior.Footnote 12 Generally speaking, anecdotes are stories which have the power to burst into our lives, to catch our attention and to induce us to follow them from beginning to end, sometimes being intimately transformed by them.Footnote 13 This was Saʿdi’s intention, as we shall see. Saʿdi deliberately chose to compose a moral work based on anecdotes using the maqāmāt genre, responding to the adab principle of “to educate without pulling [sic] and to instruct while entertaining”;Footnote 14 he had in fact an alternative model in a literary genre widespread in the Islamic world called al-Maḥāsin wa-l-Masāwī, and widely used to deal with moralizing subjects, in particular debates on vices and virtues.Footnote 15
Bono Giamboni was the dominant figure of thirteenth-century moral and allegorical treatises in the vernacular Italian of Florence. Like his father, he acted repeatedly as a judge in the civil court of the podestà of the district of Por San Piero in Florence, an activity documented, with different roles, from 1261 to 1291. He was also translator/vernacularizer of works in LatinFootnote 16 and the original author of two important moral treatises: Della miseria dell’uomo Footnote 17 (Of the Misery of Man) and Il Libro de’ Vizi e delle Virtudi (The Book of Vices and Virtues, which we shall henceforth call the Libro).Footnote 18 With the latter text, which we will compare with Saʿdi’s Golestān, Bono Giamboni “seems to have been the first person in Italy to have conceived of creating an artistic prose which could be adapted to a context at once narrative, didactic and eloquent.”Footnote 19 It was in fact the first Italian work of doctrinal prose and, according to critics, opened the way to Dante’s Convivio and to fourteenth-century prose. Bono used a highly allegorical language to lift his text to a moralistic level suggesting a model of behavior: following the model of medieval didactic literature, the allegory of Bono is constituted by the personification of abstract entities (vices and virtues in particular, but also faith and philosophy, for example) and by the construction of a conflict between the two.Footnote 20 This vision of vices, ranked in order as an army, besieging the fortress of the human soul, dates back to the Moralia in Iob of Gregory the Great (about 540–604), written between 578 and 595, a text which had an enormous impact throughout the Middle Ages. It is interesting to remember that the idea of capital vices, absent in the Bible and among the early Fathers of the Church, became a long-lasting topos which nourished all of medieval culture, thanks to Gregory the Great. The allegory of vices and virtues, described in a great many literary works and in thousands of examples of figurative art for meditation by the illiterate too, substantially summarizes the moral teachings of the Middle Ages.Footnote 21 It is easy to recognize, at the base of this allegorical construction, the Stoic idea of morals as a battlefield (where the virtuous man is the one who has suppressed all passion) and of virtues as warriors fighting the temptation of vices leads us back to the principle of the war of the soul against evil, which of course is rooted in original sin.
Both these authors were independent personalities. Following the custom of medieval Muslim literature, Saʿdi addresses to the rulers of Shirāz several panegyrics and some passages of captatio benevolentiae in his moral works as well.Footnote 22 However he was never a court poet in the strict sense of the word, and the fame and authority he enjoyed allowed him to keep a profound intellectual freedom to the end. Bono Giamboni belonged to the educated bourgeoisie of communal Florence, and was able to write free from political or material pressures.
Despite their intellectual independence, it should be remembered that Saʿdi’s text still belongs to the context of court literature (where the advice literature had an undisputed prestige) and its “light” structure of anecdotes with a tinge of subtle irony met the expectations of Persian courts of his day. Bono’s text, on the other hand, belongs to the genre of medieval preaching and sermons, addressed to churches and public squares rather than to courts, whose aim was to admonish by instilling fear and to moralize through an allegorical language. The allegory responded to the hallowed medieval practice of transmitting moral and theological teachings per visibilia ad invisibilia.
Notwithstanding the conventions of their respective literary canons, one does find affinities between the two authors in the reasons underlying the composition of their works. Saʿdi tells us:
I was one night meditating on the time which had elapsed, repenting of the life I had squandered and perforating the stony mansion of my heart with adamantine tears. … After maturely considering these sentiments, I thought proper to sit down in the mansion of retirement to fold up the skirts of association, to wash my tablets of heedless sayings and no more to indulge in senseless prattle.Footnote 23
At this point, a friend appears who cheerfully invites him to conversation, but Saʿdi tells us: “I would give him no reply nor lift up my head from the knees of worship.”Footnote 24 Another friend informs the one who has just arrived of the poet’s decision to keep silent, but the latter objects that a tongue like Saʿdi’s could never stay still in his mouth, and that to flee from relations with one’s friends is both unpleasant and foolish. So finally Saʿdi is convinced to start talking again. Conversing in a garden delighted by the singing of birds and the perfume of roses, hyacinth and wild herbs, he makes his decision:
I may compose for the amusement of those who look and for the instruction of those who are present a book of a Rose Garden, a Golestān, whose leaves cannot be touched by the tyranny of autumnal blasts and the delight of whose spring the vicissitudes of time will be unable to change into the inconstancy of autumn [and adds:] we have in this book recorded, by way of abridgment, some rare events, stories, poetry and accounts about ancient kings, spending a portion of our precious life in the task. This was the reason for composing the book Golestān; and help is from Allah.Footnote 25
Bono Giamboni began to write the Libro during a very troubled night, seized by an anxiety so great as to regret having been born: “Almighty God, why did you let me into this miserable world, letting me suffer such great pain, and endure such fatigue and torment? Why did you not kill me in my mother’s womb, or put me to death at the moment I was born?”Footnote 26 As he complains, “above his head there appears a figure”; it is the personification of PhilosophyFootnote 27 which first gently reproves him:
My son, it marvels me that you, though a man, behave like an animal, with your head always bent, and looking at the dark things of the earth, and hence you have fallen into a severe illness. If only you would lift up your head and look at the sky, and take into account the beautiful things of the sky, as human beings should naturally do, you would free yourself from every ill, and would see the sin you are committing with your behavior, and it would pain you.
Bono does not immediately recognize who it is that has come to succor him, and Philosophy has to convince him patiently to accept her explanations (which concern the state of humanity in this world and the loss of the goods of Fate as well as of the goods of Nature).Footnote 28 Bono responds pessimistically, raising constant objections. Finally, the author departs with Philosophy, “to go to the Virtues with which one gains Heaven.” The Libro thus was born from Bono’s unhappiness and suffering, disappointment and imperfection of his material life, and was composed to recount the steps which led him to consolidate his faith and know good and evil (or rather virtues and vices), the purpose of life and how to gain Heaven after the death of the body.
Both authors, taking their cue from an existential malaise (however conventional this motivation may be), design a work able to contribute to how humanity must behave righteously in this world, proposing two substantially didactic texts. In the case of the Golestān, the text makes use of rich and witty anecdotes, whereas in the Libro the text exploits the power of allegorical speech.Footnote 29 Both works overtly fit within the framework of their respective religious and doctrinal system, i.e. the authors are coherent, beyond doctrinal dogmas, with the codes of beliefs, body of teachings and instructions relevant to their respective religious systems. However, each freely interprets spirit and letter with shared didactic purposes.
No doubt exists that Saʿdi’s work had a greater impact on the Persian literature and civilization of his day and after, than Bono’s had on his. Whilst Saʿdi’s fame is not only beyond dispute, but also an important element of Persian culture today, Bono has almost been forgotten, except within specialized milieux. However, here we shall try to identify the way each approaches the theme of Temperance (crucial for both religious traditions), with respect to which the relative success of the text has no real bearing. Saʿdi, in his main works, presents under a new form the IslamicFootnote 30 and pre-Islamic traditions of Persian moralistic literature.Footnote 31 Bono, in his turn, is an interpreter and a “vernaculizer” of a religious tradition, which in the thirteenth century had accurately codified a complex system of moral values in the so-called septenarium of vices and virtues.Footnote 32 Our authors show the pulse of the moral situation of medieval Persia and thirteenth-century Europe, and may be read as a representation of the complex social framework within which they provide their guidance. In other words, their texts represent the evolution of a certain literary genre in a different linguistic and cultural context.
Temperance, قناعت qanāʿat: definitions of a virtue
In Saʿdi’s day, Islamic morals had already been laid out in detail, and its principles were well known and widespread.Footnote 33 For a general description of the term قناعت qanāʿat we can begin by referring to the Loghat-nāmeh-ye Dehkhodā,Footnote 34 which, on the basis of the glosses of the main Persian dictionaries, provides us with this range of definitions: contentedness, being satisfied with what destiny has given us, being content, being satisfied with little; eating, drinking, dressing, etc. with simplicity; being satisfied with what is necessary; moderation; spiritual happiness for what has been given to us; considering sufficient what little a human being needs to live.
Based on the main medieval works on morals, the previous definition may be integrated as follows: when human beings are content with what little they have and feel no more avidity or desire, they are practicing the virtue of temperance (قناعت پیشگی qanāʿat-pishegi). Temperance is thus also defined as the opposite of avidity and desire. This virtue also implies not showing off one’s poverty or the state of need in which a person may find themself. Temperance is the mother of all virtues, since practicing it leads to peace in this world and admission to the other. The virtue which educates the lustful soul, correcting its defects and raising it to detachment from worldly goods and pleasures, from everything which is not strictly necessary. قناعت qanāʿat is based on the trust (or faith) that God gives to each creature what they need: this trust keeps human beings away from avidity and greed. Eating, drinking and mating are bestial instincts, and to follow them means to follow the customs of animals: cultivating قناعت qanāʿat raises human beings above the beasts. The practice of this virtue includes restraint from coveting what belongs to your neighbor, because this indifference will allow a human being to avoid suffering. قناعت qanāʿat therefore is a means of achieving happiness. The practice of this virtue allows a person to benefit from a limitless treasure, lead a peaceful and wholesome life, preserve their honor and dignity, ensure their positive fate on the Day of Judgment, be moderate (balanced) in their work and profits, grow spiritually, keep their faith firm and whole, to accept without resistance what God grants.Footnote 35
Saʿdi feels no need to define this term in his texts, taking it for granted that his reader knows its meaning and scope. On the other hand, Bono Giamboni, in various parts of his book, is careful to define Temperance. Reference in the first place is to the treatises by Gregory of Nyssa (about 335–94), Thomas Aquinas (1225/26 to 1274) and Augustine (354–430); temperance belongs to the cardinal virtues, and is defined in this way: temperance is the moral virtue which moderates the attraction of pleasures and makes one capable of equipoise in using created goods. It ensures the rule of the will over instincts, and keeps desires within the bounds of honesty. The temperate person directs their own sensual appetites towards the good, keeps a healthy discretion, and does not follow their own instinct and force, submitting to the desires of their heart. Temperance is often praised in the Old Testament and in the Apocrypha: “Do not follow your base desires, but restrain your appetites” (Ecclesiasticus 18:30), and also in the New Testament: “Training us to renounce impiety and worldly passions, and in the present age to live lives that are self-controlled, upright, and godly” (Titus 2:12).Footnote 36 Besides doctrinal sources, Bono Giamboni certainly must have had in mind Brunetto Latini’s Tresor, where temperance is thus defined:
Temperance is mastery which keeps steadfast before lust and other indecorous impulses, that most noble virtue which keeps in check the pleasures of the flesh and gives measure and moderation when we are in prosperity, so that we do not rise in pride or remain slaves of our will; because when the will wins over reason, man is on an evil path.Footnote 37
Bono himself, in his Libro, has Philosophy give a clear definition of Temperance in these words: “Temperance is the virtue of the soul whereby the human being keeps in check the desires of the flesh which assault and tempt him … . So you can see that Temperance is used when human being abstains from illicit pleasures, or when he holds back the fire of lust with the reins of reason, or when he represses the signs of lust, or when he withholds from eating or drinking immoderately, or when he moderates his expenditure to what is proper, or when he is humble towards his neighbor, or when he is honest and content with what life offers him, or when he is ashamed of excess, of evil or of obscene speech. And one always uses this virtue when one keeps to the middle path in things.”Footnote 38
Philosophy specifies:
And this Virtue is put into practice in eight ways, each of which has its own name. These ways are the Virtues which are born from Temperance and are the captains of her troops, and have these names: Continence, Chastity, Modesty, Abstinence, Thrift, Humility, Honesty and Shame.Footnote 39
Each of these manners of practicing temperance is then defined and described (see below).
قناعت qanāʿat in Saʿdi’s Golestān
The theme of temperance is central to Saʿdi’s work, beyond the quantitative impact of the term قناعت qanāʿat, which appears 16 times in the text. Both in the Golestān and in the Bustān we find a whole chapter dedicated to this virtue (the third chapter of the Golestān and the sixth of the Bustān) and the principles of this virtue are to be found in many other passages of his works. Here we shall try to identify the main principles, in order to highlight the exact connotations of such virtue in his work.
As we said, the third chapter of the Golestān is dedicated entirely to temperance: در فضیلت قناعت dar fazilat-e qanāʿat that is, “The excellence of contentment,” and opens with a brief anecdote showing how such a virtue, which would lead the rich to be more generous and the poor to be satisfied with their state, is the ground for a balanced and more fair society:
Footnote 40
Lords of wealth, if you were just and we contented, the trade of begging would vanish from the world.
O contentment, make me rich
For besides thee no other wealth exists.Footnote 41
From this passage on, in a series of twenty-eight hekāyat, Saʿdi shows all the shades of this virtue: attachment to wisdom rather than to worldly goods and power (hekāyat no. 2); the capacity for being content with what one has and one’s state, however humble, in a dignified manner (hekāyat nos. 14, 18, 19, 24, 27), rather than humiliating oneself with petitions to the rich and powerful (hekāyat nos. 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13); moderating avidity for food (hekāyat nos. 4, 5, 6, 7),Footnote 42 moderating the desire for belongings (hekāyat no. 23) and stigmatizing greed when one is privileged by the possession of riches (hekāyat nos. 20, 21, 22).
The third hekāyat summarizes some of these shades: it speaks of a dervish in misery who calls on himself to be content with the very little he owns, rather than feeling obliged to someone else:
Footnote 43
Let’s be contented with dry bread and a patched robe
For it is easier to bear the load of one’s own trouble than that of thanks to other.Footnote 44
And after someone suggests he ask for help from a rich benefactor, the dervish adds:
Footnote 45
Hush! It is better to die of inanition than to plead for one’s necessities before any man.
It is better to patch clothes and sit in the corner of patience
Than to write petitions for robes to gentlemen.
Verily it is equal to the punishment of hell
To go to paradise as a flunkey to one’s neighbour.Footnote 46
In the twenty-first story, we find the opposite situation: a very rich merchant endlessly plans new business and new earnings, constantly postponing the moment to dedicate himself to his own soul. Saʿdi warns him against such greed with these words:
Footnote 47 Footnote 48
Thou mayest have heard that in the plain of Ghur
Once a leader fell down from his beast of burden,
Saying: “The narrow eye of a wealthy man
Will be filled either by content or by the earth of the tomb.”Footnote 49
The twenty-seventh tale is a very long anecdote about the ups and downs of a boxer, who leaves home hoping to be able to achieve success with the strength of his arms. His father, to dissuade him from seeking his fortune, admonishes him with these words:
Footnote 50
The father replied, “My son, get rid of this vain idea and place the feet of contentment under the skirt of safety because great men have said that happiness does not consist in exertion and that the remedy against want is in the moderation of desires.”Footnote 51
In the second chapter, dedicated to “The morals of dervishes,” Saʿdi clearly expresses how the true dervish, who is his model of the ideal man, pure of heart and focused totally and without hypocrisy on goodness and God, has among his goals that of possessing the virtue of temperance, which not only has a fundamental place in ascetic practice, but is also the source of other benefits for the soul:
Footnote 52
The way of dervishes is praying, gratitude, service, obedience, almsgiving, contentment, professing the unity of God, trust, submission and patience. Whoever possesses these qualities is really a dervish, although he may wear an elegant robe, whereas a prattler who neglects his orisons, is luxurious, sensual, turns day into night in the bondage of lust, and night into day in the sleep of carelessness, eats whatever he gets, and speaks whatever comes upon his tongue,Footnote 53 is a profligate, although he may wear the habit of a dervish.Footnote 54
Besides the explicit mention of temperance as an essential virtue, in this passage we see expressed other associated qualities, such as gratitude for what God grants us, patience and submission. We also see how the absence of such virtue makes room for parallel vices—that is, indulgence in bodily pleasures, avidity and incapacity of measuring one’s own behavior.
In the first chapter of the Golestān, dedicated to “The manners of kings,” we also have a tale which shows the crucial nature of this virtue: a dervish is alone in the desert, and pays no attention whatsoever to the king who passes next to him, provoking the ire of the sovereign. Says Saʿdi:
Footnote 55
A solitary dervish was sitting in a corner of the desert when a padshah happened to pass by but ease having made him independent, he took no notice.Footnote 56
So temperance means renouncing worldly goods and being indifferent to the possibility of obtaining favors or benefits.
The second chapter of the Golestān speaks of a hermit who used to eat ten man of food each night and would pray until morning. A ṣāḥebdel (pious fellow) comments:
Footnote 57
It would have been more excellent if he had eaten half a loaf and slept till the morning.Footnote 58
Temperance is in this case represented by moderation, by not exceeding in gluttony, but also not in outward gestures of devotion (always suspected of hypocrisy).
Again in the second chapter, we find the story of an ascetic who lived in a forest, eating the leaves of the trees, until a king came to visit him, offering him the luxuries of city life and telling him that in this way he could dedicate himself better to devotion and be an example, in words and behavior, to others. The hermit accepted, and gave in to the pleasures of gluttony and the beauty of a slave and of a girl, forgetting the way of the spirit.
Footnote 59
The curls of belles are fetters to the feet of the intellect and a snare to a sagacious bird. […]
Any faqih, pir and murid
Or pure minded orator,
Descending into the base world,
Sticks in the honey like a fly.Footnote 60
The philosopher-minister holds forth before the king, who is pleased with his own generosity:
Footnote 61
“Bestow gold upon scholars that they may read more but give nothing to hermits that they may remain hermits.”Footnote 62
And concludes:
Footnote 63
When I have and covet more
It will not be proper to call me an anchorite.Footnote 64
Being content with what one has is therefore a sign of temperance, as is not to desire to improve one’s condition, preferring to trust in God, knowing He will give us whatever we need to survive.
In the sixteenth story of the first chapter, we read about a man who lives in poverty and tries to join the service of the king to free himself from this state. Saʿdi discourages him, presenting him all the unknowns and dangers of such a choice, and calls him to temperance:
Footnote 65
I’m of opinion that thou shouldst retire to the domain of contentment and abandon aspirations to dominion. Wise men have said:
“In the sea there are countless gains,
But if thou desirest safety, it will be on the shore.”Footnote 66
In the second chapter, always referring to the ups and downs of fortune described in an anecdote within the twenty-eighth tale, Saʿdi finally expresses his moral:
Footnote 67
“When thou sawest me last, I was distressed for bread and now a world of distress has overwhelmed me.”
If I have no wealth I grieve
If I have some the love of it captivates me.
There is no greater calamity than worldly goods.
Both their possession and their want are griefs.
If thou wishest for power, covet nothing
Except contentment which is sufficient happiness.
If a rich man pours gold into thy lap
Care not a moment for thanking him.
Because often I heard great men say
The patience of a dervish is better than the gift of a rich man.Footnote 68
Being poor afflicts us, being rich makes us slaves of worldly goods. The goods of the world are the true danger for man: if one has them, one fears losing them, if one does not have them, one is tormented by desire for them. Temperance is the only true richness.
The fifth chapter is dedicated to “love and youth,” and we find a tale, the seventeenth, written in the first person, which invites one to control the impulses of carnal passion. In the mosque of Kashghar, the poet meets a beautiful and alluring youth who is studying Arabic; he approaches him with a joke, and surprises him with his erudition. However, when the youth learns who he is and invites him to stay, the poet, so as to avoid temptation, decides to leave, saying:
Footnote 69
I beheld an illustrious man in a mountain region
Who had contentedly retired from the world into a cave.
Why, said I, comest thou not into the city
For once to relax the bonds of thy heart?
He replied: “Fairy-faced maidens are there.
When clay is plentiful, elephants will stumble.”Footnote 70
In this case, temperance concerns the pleasures of the flesh, and, as we shall see, this is a rare occurrence in the Golestān.
In the last chapter, too, “On rules for conduct in life,” we have some anecdotes inspired by temperance. The thirtieth involves moderation in food and then extends to moderation in the possession of worldly goods and control over carnal desire. Saʿdi writes:
Footnote 71
A greedy person will still be hungry with the whole world, whilst a contented man will be satisfied with one bread. Wise men have said that poverty with content is better than wealth and not abundance [Wise men have said that strength accompanied by temperance is better than strength accompanied by wealth].
Narrow intestines may be filled with dry bread
But the wealth of the surface of the world will not fill a greedy eye.
When the term of my father’s life had come to an end
He gave me this one advice and passed away:
Lust is fire, abstain therefrom,
Make not the fire of hell sharp for thee.
In that fire the burning thou will not be able to bear,
Quench this fire with water today.Footnote 72
The continuous novelty of stories is linked to the impossibility of exhausting the moral question they arise from; likewise, the possibilities of human experience are inexhaustible, while knowledge is finite.
Temperance in Bono Giamboni’s Libro
Bono’s Libro has a completely different structure from Saʿdi’s Golestān. In his pseudo-autobiographical tale, the author, guided by Philosophy, undertakes an allegorical voyage to the court of Religion, undergoes the examinations of Faith, is trained by the Cardinal Virtues, observes from a hilltop the battle between Vices and Virtues (where Virtues prevail), listens to the account of a war against heresies and religions (Islam in this case), is exhorted to do “good” by all the personified Virtues, is questioned by them, and is finally welcomed among the “devotees” after the last, affectionate recommendations by Philosophy. Vices and virtues, personified and ready for an allegorical battle, are defined by the way they line up.Footnote 73 The underlying idea of this allegory is that (it is worth paraphrasing here the observations of Le Goff) life down here is a struggle for salvation; the world is a battlefield where human beings fight against the devil—that is, actually, against himself. In fact, having inherited original sin, human beings run the risk of letting themselves fall into temptation, of committing evil and of damning themselves. People house the clash between vice and virtue within themselves, and what is at stake is their eternal destiny. Drawing on warrior traditions derived from both Roman and barbarian sources, the gnostic theme of the struggle between vice and virtue, which soon became part of Christian literature and iconography, brought the prospect of the other world down to earth and into the soul of every Christian. Human beings, in this battlefield for life or death which is the world, have as their allies God, the Virgin, the saints and angels and the Church, and especially their own faith and virtues; however they also have enemies: Satan, the demons, the heretics and above all their own vices and weaknesses which come from original sin. For Christians, the presence of the other world must be constantly alive and felt, since in every instant of their existence, their salvation is at stake, and even if they are not aware of it, this struggle for their souls is ceaselessly being fought down here. The daily life of a Christian in the Middle Ages revolved around an eschatological plot.Footnote 74
Describing the opposing ranks, Bono tries to define in the clearest possible way what is substantially part of the nature of human being, for better or for worse.Footnote 75 While it is true that the whole system for classifying and defining vices and virtues had already been carefully codified by Bono’s time (see above), he intervenes actively (as shown in several points by the editor of his work, C. Segre) on the doctrinal materials available to him.Footnote 76
Temperance, as a lemma, appears thirteen times in Bono’s text, and two chapters are directly dedicated to it. Chapter XXXV (Of the ranks of Temperance and her captains) and chapter LXXIII (Of the admonishments of Temperance). Reading these two chapters, and the other occurrences of the term, allow us to accurately outline the character of this virtue, fitting into the traditional context of the interior conflict between the lowest, animal impulses human beings and their efforts to detach themselves from the materiality of the body to elevate their souls towards God.
The first occasion when Temperance appears is in chapter XXXII, at the preparatory phase of the allegorical battle. Bono first describes the armies of the vices (eight ranks altogether, each subdivided among various captains)Footnote 77 and then those of the virtues. There are four cardinal virtues and each, like the vices, has its captains, to which they refer:
E quando vidi questo [oste delle virtudi], dissi:—Maestra de le Virtudi, che intendono di fare queste genti che sono divise in quattro parti? E chi sono i segnori di ciascun’oste?—Ed ella disse:—Queste Virtú son provocate a battaglia: però voglion fare le schiere loro, da che veggono i loro nimici schierati. E i quattro segnori che son guidatori de le dette quattro osti, cioè catuno della sua, son quattro Virtú principali laonde nascono tutte l’altre Virtudi—. E io dissi:—E come hanno nome?—Ed ella disse:—Prudenzia, Iiustizia, Fortezza e Temperanzia—. E io dissi:—Ben so’ coteste grandissime Virtudi, e molto ho già udito predicare dell’opere loro -. Ed ella disse:—Le loro opere son tutte perfette, e nasconne quanti beni nel mondo si fanno. Footnote 78
And when I saw [the army of virtues], I said: Mistress of virtues, what do these people, divided into four parts, intend to do? And who are the commanders of each army? And she replied: Against these virtues, battle has been declared, so they want to line up their troops, since the enemy have already formed their ranks. And the four commanders who are respectively at the head of the four armies are the four main virtues from which all other virtues are born. And I said: What are their names? And she replied: Prudence, Justice, Fortitude and Temperance. And I said: These are certainly very great virtues, and I have heard much spoken about their works. And she replied: Their works are all perfect, and all the good that is done in the world arises from them.
So all the good in the world arises from the four cardinal virtues. In the case of Temperance, the following “good” arises: Continence, Chastity, Modesty, Abstinence, Thrift, Humility, Honesty and Shame, in their turn defined as follows (chapter XXXV):
Contenenza è virtú per la quale l’uomo s’astiene de’ desideri non liciti. Castità è virtú per la qual l’uomo costringe lo ‘ncendio della lussuria col freno della ragione. Pudicizia è virtú per la qual non solamente si rifrena lo ‘ncendio della lussuria, ma rinfrenasi i suoi segni; e sono i segni della lussuria i reggimenti del corpo e l’abito del vestimento. E cosí vedi che differenza ha tra Castità e Pudicizia, perché Castità rinfrena i movimenti della lussuria, ma Pudicizia i movimenti e i segni. E dividesi Castità in tre parti: perché altra è Castità virginale, che non ebbe anche uso d’uomo, e altra è castità vedovale, che già uso d'uomo hae avuto, ma or se ne astiene; e altra è castità matrimoniale, c’ha uso d'uomo, ma legittimamente; e catuna di queste è detta castità. Astinenzia è virtú per la quale si costrigne la volontà della gola, cioè del mangiare e del bere di soperchio. Parcità è virtú per la quale si ritiene quel che si convien ritenere, secondo che Larghezza è virtú per la quale quel ch’è convenevole si spende. La Umilità è virtú per la quale l’uom porta vile abito, e ‘l ben che fa nasconde acciò che non appaia di fuori; e dividesi in tre parti: per la prima s’umilia l’uomo al maggiore, e questa è detta bastevole; per la seconda s’aumilia al pare, e questa è detta perfetta; per la terza s’aumilia l’uomo al minore, e questa è detta sopraabbondevole. Onestà è virtú per la quale tutte le cose che bisognano alla vita dell’uomo si recano ad uso temperato. Vergogna è virtú per la qual si vergogna l’uomo de le soperchianze e de’ mali, e si rifrena la lingua che sozze parole o di soperchio non favelli. Footnote 79
Continence is the virtue thanks to which we abstain from illicit desires: Chastity is the virtue thanks to which man represses the fire of lust with the use of reason. Modesty is the virtue thanks to which one not only controls the fire of lust, but also its manifestations, which are the movements of the body and the way one dresses. Now consider the difference between chastity and modesty: the first subdues the drive of lust, while the second subdues its manifestations. And chastity is divided into three parts: virginal chastity (when there has been no contact with a man), widow’s chastity (when there has been contact but one now abstains), matrimonial chastity (when there is contact but in a legitimate manner). Abstinence is the virtue thanks to which one subdues the desires of gluttony, that is drinking and eating immoderately. Thrift is the virtue thanks to which one withholds what is proper, whereas Largesse is the virtue thanks to which one spends what is proper. Humility is the virtue thanks to which man wears plain clothes and does not boast in public of the good he does; this virtue has three manners: when one humbles oneself before someone more important (called sufficient), or before a peer (called perfect), or before someone of a lower level (called superabundant). Honesty is the virtue thanks to which one makes moderate use of everything necessary for life. Shame is the virtue thanks to which man is ashamed of every excess and of the evil he does and thanks to which he does not speak too much or pronounce unsuitable words.
While the four Cardinal Virtues are the pillar and foundation of the Christian system of doctrine, the complex of sub-virtues which derive from them tends to fluctuate, as we can also see from the different versions of the Libro.Footnote 80 If we consider the final version, we can see how, for Bono, Temperance is basically achieved “when one steers a middle course in things”; when man withholds from “illicit” desires according to Christian morals;Footnote 81 when he uses reason to put a brake on bodily impulses, when he avoids gestures which would unleash such impulses (in movements and clothing); when he eats and drinks moderately; when he spends moderately; when he is moderate in showing himself off and maintains an honest behavior without excesses; when he shows embarrassment (shame) before excesses (in word or deed) whether his own or of others, managing to withhold from them. Two points seem to be of special interest: one concerning Humility, which in its turn is described with three expressions: sufficient, perfect and superabundant, according to whether one is dealing with someone of higher, equivalent or lower social rank. Here in fact the middle way does not seem to be the prevailing criterion. Humility appears rather as an absolute good, especially if expressed towards one’s inferiors. Reference is in any case to a kind of behavior based on awareness of one’s limits and detachment from any form of pride or excessive self-assuredness. The second point concerns Honesty, defined as a moderate use of all things needed in life, and hence closely tied to one of the ancient meanings of this term, which also indicated decorum, dignity, nobility of the soul and modesty, that is composure and restraint.
The other passage in which Bono expresses himself on the issue of temperance is in chapter LXXIII.Footnote 82 Virtue now admonishes the “maker of the work” so that he may understand how to behave to earn heaven, since Temperance holds one of the five keys. Here eschatology becomes individual, as we speak of the ultimate purpose for human beings’ moral commitment according to Bono, that is ensuring Heaven after death. The admonitions of Temperance are perfectly symmetrical to the previous definitions:
Appresso venne la Temperanza ad aprire e mostrare i suoi amonimenti, e disse:—Figliuol mio, io tegno le chiavi de la quinta porta di paradiso, e no·ll’apro a neuno che nel detto luogo vogli’andare, se non è d’animo temperato in refrenare i desiderî de la carne laonde è assalito e tentato, e in tenere il mezzo di tutte le cose. E puote l’uomo esser d’animo temperato per [otto] virtudi, cioè per [contenenza] e castitade e pudicizia e astinenzia e parcitade e umilitade e onestade e vergogna. [Per contenenza puote l’uomo esser d’animo temperato, quando s’astiene dai desiderî non liciti]. Per castità è l’animo temperato, quando costrigne l’uomo l’incendî de la lussuria col freno della ragione. Per pudicizia è l’animo temperato, quando non solamente l’incendî, ma i segni della lussuria rifrena, che sono ne’ reggimenti del corpo e ne’ vani ornamenti. Per astinenzia è l’animo temperato, quando s’astiene l’uomo del manicare e del bere di soperchio. Per parcitade è l’animo temperato, quando ritiene l’uomo quello che si conviene: ché la larghezza è quando quello ch’è convenevole si ispende. Per umiltà è l'animo temperato, quando porta l’uomo vile abito, e ‘l ben che fa sí nasconde, acciò che non paia di fuori. Per onestà è l’animo temperato, quando tutte le cose che li fanno bisogno a la vita reca ad uso temperato. Per vergogna è l’animo temperato, quando si vergogna l’uomo de le soperchianze e de’ mali e delle sozze parole. Per tutte le dette virtù è bisogno ch’abbia l’animo temperato chi per la detta porta vuole intrare.Footnote 83
Immediately after, Temperance came to open and express her advice, saying:—My son, I own the keys to the fifth door of heaven, but I open it to none who wishes to go there, unless his soul is temperate in dominating the desires of the flesh which assault and tempt him, and knows how to keep the right middle way in all things. Man can be of a temperate soul thanks to eight virtues, that is continence, chastity, modesty, abstinence, thrift, humility, honesty and shame. Thanks to continence, man is of a temperate soul because he abstains from illicit desires. Thanks to chastity, the soul is temperate because it holds down with the bridle of reason the flames of lust. Thanks to modesty, the soul is temperate because it not only holds down the flames of lust, but also holds down its manifestations in bodily gestures and superfluous ornaments. Thanks to abstinence, the soul is temperate because it withholds from drinking and eating immoderately. Thanks to thrift (sobriety), the soul is temperate because man withholds for himself only what is needed, while largesse consists in spending properly. Thanks to humility, man is temperate because he wears plain clothes and if he does good, does not boast of it. Thanks to honesty, the soul is temperate because everything necessary for life is used with moderation. Thanks to shame, the soul is temperate because man is ashamed of excessive gestures, of the evil he has committed and of obscene words. He who wishes to enter through this door must possess a soul which is temperate thanks to all the virtues we have mentioned.
Bono substantially repeats in full, but under the form of advice, what he expressed as a description in chapter XXXV, without adding anything except—a little later—a fervent appeal to Philosophy, where he complains that he does not feel up to the tasks to which virtues call him, and hence feels desperate about his destiny after death. It is always Philosophy which settles this doubt, and has Bono accepted among the faithful of virtue at the close of the book, trusting his commitment and making herself his guarantor.
We can observe that in the Libro the virtue of Temperance is treated in an extremely rigid and normative manner, and it is instead the set of sub-virtues that represents a way to place this theoretical framework into the experience of life.
Conclusions
Here we propose some comparative observations: the texts have been considered as a whole, although in the body of the article of course we have only quoted the most significant passages.
If, as we have seen, the reason for composition and the purpose of both works are largely shared, the structure of the two books is radically different: Saʿdi creates a theatre of exemplary anecdotesFootnote 84 according to the tradition of the اندرز andarz;Footnote 85 Bono follows a pedagogical-allegorical model, trying to describe in full the temptations and dangers against which man, using his reason, must oppose his will to do good. The human spectacle which Saʿdi’s text offers has many facets and is lively: his brilliant language flows without worrying about the consistency of its contents.Footnote 86 Bono’s allegory has a compact and rigid structure; each question of humanity is framed within a structured scheme, so that each element finds its place and definition in a framework which is simple, essential and complete. The structure of the works affects the manner in which the topics are dealt with. Saʿdi’s text is light and ironic, Bono’s serious and composed. The former certainly seeks to educate his readers, but he also tries to involve them and convince them with irony and a certain warm-heartedness which embraces human limits; the latter describes fearsome scenarios of human abjection and perdition which induce man to seek the straight path to earn Heaven. In terms of style, the same pattern can be identified: Saʿdi’s figured language is more poetic, Bono’s allegorical language more didactic; while the former is a great artist, the latter is an honest author of treatises.
The comparison which we have drawn on temperance should be read against this background. Regarding temperance, Saʿdi is interested in the human being’s capacity to stay in their condition, however unfortunate, to accept it without compromise, safeguarding honor and dignity,Footnote 87 which are more important than material needs, avoiding attachment to earthly goods and finding a proper balance between their own well-being and a responsible presence in the community. For Bono, the virtue of temperance, in the normative context of the Christian tradition, represents a constant quest of the believer for an existential condition beyond the dimension of human beings’ animal impulses: temperance in a way saves people from themselves, from the desires of their guts and sexuality, from the excesses of selfishness and from those of material avidity. It puts a bridle on the link that human beings tend to establish with this netherworld, and opens the gates of the other world. The stress on the vices that temperance is called upon to correct are very different. While in the Golestān greed and attachment to worldly goods are the nucleus around which such virtue must be practiced, in the Libro priority definitely goes to lust, confirming the radical hostility to sex of Christian morals.Footnote 88 Temperance which should be exerted over the vice of gluttony is a theme common to both texts, with an intensity and recurrence which we can consider similar, while the principle of balance and moderation, of in medio stat virtus (andāzeh or miyānehravi in Persian tradition),Footnote 89 extends to the other contexts shared by both texts (possession of goods, showing off, verbal expression,Footnote 90 etc.). At the base, what the two texts have also in common is the fact that the morality they convey has no claim to be original: it is traditional and common and in this lies also its authority and the power of persuasion (it is well known, in fact, that the public only accepts what it recognizes to be already in itself).
Another element which seems profoundly to distinguish the two texts is their outlook: Saʿdi is guided in his moralizing mission not only by the tradition, but also by his own experience and hence his understanding of the dynamics of the world; his wisdom comes from below rather than above, and this is also the reason for his insisting on the importance of preserving one’s dignity and honor and avoiding self-humiliation to obtain favors. Bono’s path to knowledge and moralistic writing is guided by Philosophy, by a supreme comprehension which comes more from above than below. These different outlooks manifest themselves right from the motives leading to composition of the book (however conventional they may be): whereas Saʿdi complains of himself, his own limits, his incapacity to fully live the spiritual dimension, Bono complains of life itself, falls ill because of the adversities and fatigue of existence, finds the origin of his distress outside of himself, and therefore seeks external help, a spiritual guide.Footnote 91
These different outlooks bring out two different ideas of human beings in relation to themselves and the world: Saʿdi’s, deeply immersed in his social context and religious community, recognizes in individual experience a general, collective value; Bono’s, more concentrated on individual salvation, and hence on his own destiny, is obsessed by a world which is constant fall and temptation. However, when we read these texts, we are left with the feeling that temperance for Saʿdi is good in itself and has an absolute value, whereas for Bono it is more instrumental to be recognized as a good Christian and to enter Heaven. For the former, it seems more the condition for an existence worthy of the name, for the latter more an idea from above, dictated by reason, accepted by faith and realized for fear of God’s punishment.Footnote 92
However, an aspect shared by the two texts is certainly awareness that a human being cannot truly progress towards the good and towards God without the intervention of a transcending element, a fact taken for granted in both the Islamic and the Christian context. In both cases, however, this intervention “from above” does not absolve the human being from responsibility and personal commitment. When Bono Giamboni confides to Philosophy the “superhuman” difficulty of realizing virtues, he declares that being virtuous is not within the reach of a human being in the absence of superior help. Saʿdi says, instead, that this virtue is human, naturally belongs to mankind, that reason (kherad) makes us understand the need for it and that faith and God’s help can make it perfect.
Hypocrisy too, which in our case means showing oneself temperate without truly being so, is the worst evil for both our authors: Saʿdi says so ceaselessly in his text, especially in his second chapter on the ethics of the dervishes (see for example the tale no. 6 which ends with this verse):
Footnote 93
O thou who showest virtues on the palms of the hand
But concealest thy errors under the armpit
What wilt thou purchase, O vain-glorious fool,
On the day of distress with counterfeit silver?Footnote 94
Bono affirms the same in a peremptory fashion in chapter LXVII:
perché li ipocriti, che sono di cotesta maniera, che mostran di fare una cosa e fannone un’altra, Dio li innodia sopra li altri peccatori. Footnote 95
God hates hypocrites more than other sinners, because they show they are doing one thing, while actually they are doing another
No less than other texts, moralistic literature is an opportunity to speak of human beings and the world. Whether the goal of human existence be perfect asceticism or ensuring oneself entry to Heaven, control over human nature, in all its aspects, is the path for human realization.