Perpetual First Generation Strategy

In the case of minorities, particularly the Turks, religious loyalty is considered the guarantee and proof of national loyalty. The transfer of national identity, and consequently that of religious identity, is directly correlated with the transfer of the collective memory to new generations.

The transfer of collective memory for the purposes of ensuring unity and integrity rests on three identity pillars: the longing for and loyalty to ‘the Motherland’ (Turkey in general, the hometown or village in particular); transfer of the Turkish language to the younger generation despite French being the official language; and the continuation of customs and traditions believed to be rooted in religion. The reason the community is so fervently attached to these three topics is their desire that the Turkish children born in France could share the same sentiment of ‘Turkishness’ with them. Various methods are employed by the community to transfer these three elements to new generations. The leading method has to be the perpetual first generation strategy. What is meant by this is the marriage of young French people of Turkish descent to Turkish brides and grooms who preferably live in Turkey, and even more preferably are brought to France for marriage from the region of the French family’s hometown. In other words, young French people of Turkish origin rarely marry people who are of French or other nationalities, and seldom marry other members of the Franco-Turkish community. As a result, a second or third generation of ethnic Turks has not arisen in France. From a statistical point of view, one of the parents (usually the mother) of all Turkish (and Kurdish) children born in France is a new arrival in France. The ‘fresh blood’ spouses are received as representatives of genuine ‘Turkishness’ (particularly in terms of language and religion) who will help to correct the degeneration in the ‘Turkishness’ of ethnic Turks who have lived in France for too long.

The loyalty to Turkey of the ethnic Turks in France is also shown by how they call Turkey the ‘Motherland’. The pillars of identity building in the community are language (Turkish and/or Kurdish) and religion (Sunni or Alevi). But the two pillars need a hinterland. The hinterland is primarily Turkey, but expands to concentric circles of the immigrant’s own home villages, towns and provinces. The ties with their country are both physical and mental. Physical ties are the result of frequent travel to Turkey, whether for business, school or leisure, following the developments in Turkey via newspapers, television and other media, and contact with the country by phone or the internet. These three methods of contact have developed significantly in the last two to three decades: flights and trips between the two countries are frequent and fares are low; the number of national and local television stations has boomed and these stations may be received abroad; the internet provides a means to communicate at minimal cost whilst phone tariffs are also going down. All of these enable the ethnic Turks in France to keep in contact with Turkey. Interaction with Turkey is now ubiquitous.

It is more difficult to grasp the emotional or mental ties with Turkey. These ties are probably correlated to two approaches:

• ∙ First, ethnic Turks in France are more interested in Turkish politics than they are in French internal affairs. In fact, they pay close attention to the political environment in Turkey, and want the political context in Turkey either to change or remain as it is; much like their compatriots in Turkey. From this perspective, the change in the discourse of French Turks regarding the accession of Turkey in the EU is noteworthy. Although they desire Turkey and France to be members of the same union for emotional and practical reasons, they too have begun to voice the anti-French and anti-European discourse recently on the rise in Turkey. Meanwhile, none of the Turkish associations or organisations in France have attempted to block Turkey’s accession to the EU. They desire the membership of Turkey for two somewhat irrational reasons: one is the desire for the Turkish state to attain a better future and position. Second is their hope that the accession of Turkey will legitimise their presence in France and improve their image in the eyes of the French public. This attitude points out that the people of Turkish origin have evolved into a ‘diaspora’ as defined by Kim Butler. According to Butler, members of the diaspora continue to be interested in the politics of the root nation. The interest is not necessarily in the way of support. On To the contrary, a section of the diaspora may even side with the opposition. However, it is interest that matters; not its direction.Reference Butler⁵

• ∙ These irrational ties may be explained by Benedict Anderson’s imagined communities theory. In other words, the Turks in France associate themselves with the other individuals comprising their community (even if they do not know all of them personally) and strongly applaud the success and victory of other Turks in a setting of competition with the majority, brought about by being in the minority.

Until recently Turkey, the motherland, had irrational ties with the Turks in Europe. For years, every administration tried to prevent European Turks from acquiring citizenship of the countries they were living, and even born, in. They feared that by acquiring a different nationality, European Turks would detach from ‘Turkishness’ and Turkey. Legal attachment to the motherland seemed more important than emotional and identical loyalty. This was partly influenced by Germany’s denial of dual-citizenship status. It should be remembered that the nationalist mind-set considers national identity to be one and singular. As Max Weber suggests, nationalism is a system of one belief over all, and just as a person may be loyal to only one religion among monotheistic faiths, so must an individual choose to be loyal to only one nation. Multiple national loyalty is severely condemned. Nevertheless, a recent radical change occurred in Turkey’s approach to the issue: since the late 1990s, but particularly after 2002, European Turks are expected to acquire the citizenship of their country of residence. This will give them a voice in the national and local politics of their respective countries, and allow them to lobby in favour of Turkey.

The emigration of Turks to Western Europe starting with the 1960s did help to expand the concept of external Turks. With the settlement of migrant workers from the mid-1970s onwards, a group of immigrants, scorned by the elite yet cherished for their accumulation and capital transfer, emerged as the backbone of ‘external Turks’. After 20 years of neglect, this group was framed within the ‘omnipresent fatherly State’ in the wake of the 1980 junta. One purpose of this framing was to prevent them from ‘taking the wrong path’. The wrong path, of course, was paved with leftist movements and dissenting religious organisations.

The real danger was assimilation, ‘forgetting’ Turkishness and losing loyalty to Turkey. So while this group was exposed to Turkish propaganda by print, media and imams and teachers commissioned from Turkey, they were prevented from entering into any kind of multiple loyalty. As a knee-jerk reaction by nation-states whose strength is dubious, the perpetual first generation strategy was imposed upon generations born in Europe. The objective was to ensure that ethnic Turks born in Europe were at least as loyal to the country as those who came from Turkey, and the strategy was adopted and implemented by European Turks. The rejection of multiple loyalty applied to the change in legal affiliation – acquiring citizenship of the country of residence.

For decades, administrations in Turkey considered change in citizenship or an additional citizenship dangerous. Turks who acquired the citizenship of their country of residence would make compromises from Turkishness, and their loyalty would weaken. So they were expected to remain only Turkish. This policy has however changed since the 2000s. The relief brought by globalisation led Turkish officials to believe that European Turks were no longer under threat of assimilation, to decide that these communities would lobby for European relations, and to encourage them to acquire the citizenship of their countries of residence. Nevertheless, these groups are still viewed as social mechanisms that are at the disposal of the Republic of Turkey.

From another angle, these people are being called upon as soldiers: 10 years ago, their duty required them to be Turkish citizens; now, they are instructed to become French or German citizens. Wealth accumulation by migrant workers is still seen as a remedy for economic distress; the sentimental discourse around homesickness, loyalty and the motherland is still maintained – to the extent of sheer emotional exploitation as seen in the most recent Paris rally. The idea is that migrant workers are the soldiers (envoys) of Turkey: all of these make it clear that the motherland’s view of the migrant communities has not changed radically.

The improvement and expansion of communication technologies removes the threat of assimilation that came with the changes to French or German citizenship. Although multiple legal affiliation has become acceptable, this is not the case in cultural loyalties. Multiple cultural loyalties are still viewed as dangerous and even treasonous.

As noted earlier, cultural loyalty was built on two pillars: language and religion. When in the minority, teaching the language to new generations becomes particularly difficult. Naturally, the language of the majority immediately becomes the dominant language in a social environment. Furthermore, France insists on fluency in French as a prerequisite to integration in the country, and this has come to be accepted by the majority as well as the minority, who initially resisted the idea. Fluency in French is the most important measure of good integration. As a result, lack of fluency in Turkish no longer poses a threat to loyalty to ‘Turkishness’.

Meanwhile, religious loyalty, being based on the sacred and therefore immune to intervention, gained great importance and took priority. In a contradictory way, this type of loyalty became an indispensable and paramount element of ‘Turkishness’, for both Sunni and Alevi Turks in France. However, filling the gap left by language with religion gave rise to a number of issues in the French case: the French system is constructed on the principle of laicism and Turkish immigrants have diverse cultural and social backgrounds.

Official Islam/Dissident Islam

The aversion of Turkish associations to unite under one roof is due to the presence of a dissenting Islamic movement that is in conflict with the official Islam in Turkey. An in-depth analysis of the division reveals that the rift is not as wide or severe as it seems or is commonly believed to be.

Dissident Islamic movements opposed to the official Islam have existed throughout the Ottoman Empire and were carried over to the Republic of Turkey. Both movements, eager to dictate and control religious thoughts and practices, considered those who reject whatever is imposed as subversive elements threatening unity and security, and branded them as heretics. Dissenting Islamic movements resisted annihilation when the Jacobin Kemalist regime saw them as a threat against the newly-founded secular regime, and their resistance brought them strength. People of the Anatolian Islamic culture, followers of heterodox faiths and practices in various congregations and even some Sufis were devastated when their religious orders, lodges or holy tombs where they congregated were banned and closed. However, contrary to the wishes of the state, the banning of religious orders did not diminish their importance, particularly in rural areas. They continued their existence in hiding. The state began to rein in the religion with the Office of Religious Affairs established in lieu of the abolished Caliphate. Religious orders that fell outside the planned official religious project were classified as dissident Islam, even though some were not even remotely tied to politics. These orders remained hidden until the 1950s, when the Democrat Party came to power with the votes of the rural population, and then began to take part in politics as conservative Islam was then viewed favourably. The orders joined a variety of political movements until the mid-1960s, but ‘political Islam’ was not yet developed. The foundation of political Islam is the relatively liberal environment created in the wake of the military coup of 1960. Millî Görüş completed its association in the 1970s and became one of the leading political parties in Turkey. To eliminate any previous misconceptions, it must be noted that the ‘dissidence’ of this party is first and foremost political, and not tied to religion. To the contrary, Millî Görüş holds the belief that Islam already has a very special place in the private and social lives of the people or Turkey; it is only missing in the political arena. The purpose is not to discuss religion and draw a roadmap; it is to introduce religion in the world of politics. In this political environment, Millî Görüş managed to stay away from radical Islamic movements despite incorporating smaller fundamental groups. As explained above, despite the fact that the armed forces and other groups of the society did not acknowledge its legitimacy, the Millî Görüş movement became an indispensable part of politics, or the ‘system’, starting with the 1970s. Kemalist circles were unable to prevent the political parties stemming from the Millî Görüş movement from entering coalitions and finally becoming the ruling party in 2002. Although the Justice and Development Party argues that it is separate from the movement, the leaders of the party are all from the Millî Görüş movement, and their constituency is composed of voters loyal to the same movement.

For these reasons, it is difficult to differentiate between official Islam and dissident Islam. In the European case, such a difference has lost its raison d’être.

Considering Islam as a system of belief that shapes all aspects (personal and social) of an individual’s life, dissident Islam may be said to be composed of individuals who desire a greater weight of religion in social life. From this perspective, it becomes easier to understand why the people of Turkish origin in Europe place so much importance on religion. First and foremost, their inadequacy in the other loyalty measures of ‘Turkishness’ causes religion to gain more importance within these communities. The prioritisation of religion is a phenomenon that is observable in all minority groups, and even constitutes one of the minority theories in sociology today: minorities value religion more than their compatriots who are in the majority in another country; or, non-religious practices are accepted with more ease if the community in question is in the majority.

There are two further advantages to being a supporter of the widespread Millî Görüş movement in Europe. Siding with this movement is not limited to supporting an ideology that plays a significant part in Turkish domestic politics. As the importance of Millî Görüş rises in Turkey, the proponents of the party in France become even more legitimate and gain a surer foothold within the Muslim community. In other words, members of Millî Görüş organisations in France are not there because they are interested in Turkish domestic politics; they are there to rise to a better social status in France.

Nationalising Religion: An Attitude Unique to Nation-States

Important changes have occurred in the attitude of the French state towards laicism and the perception of the French people of secularism recently. Manifest both in discourse and in legislation, these changes are connected to the presence of Muslims in France and their quest for legitimacy. This situation has both a direct and an indirect connection to the Muslims in France. The first is a structural connection. Four to five million Muslims may have acquired French citizenship, but have not achieved legitimacy in the eyes of the French society yet. These ‘new’ French want their presence to be accepted, both individually and as a religious community with special rights. The quest for legitimacy causes tension in French society from various perspectives. On the one hand, the French government has been trying, for more than 15 years, to establish an authority that will represent the Muslims of France in an attempt to create a French Islam. On the other hand, the public is not in favour of such an authority, with the idea that it will create separate communities in society.

Speaking of the contextual reasons for the change in the French system of laicism, the dark image of Islam in Western societies after the 1990s, particularly in the aftermath of 9/11, must be investigated. Spreading fear as a symbol of threat, and even leading to Muslims being viewed as enemies, this new image had repercussions throughout French society. Although the French are not too keen on the ‘clash of civilisations’, a large number of people want the Muslims in France to undergo the laic system of adapting to society, effectively bringing religion under state control. As part of the same approach, French society wants imams to be raised in French culture and to address their congregations in French in order to keep abreast of religious thought taking root on French soil. From this perspective, it can be argued that the French system of secularism, having clearly separated the state from the church in its time, is now seeking to overcome issues brought by Muslims – a new element in society. Similar to Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s, the idea that the state should keep religion under strict control is gaining acceptance.

This is a process of localising Islam in France. After the oppression of the foreign and heretic French Protestantism, the nationalisation of French Catholicism with the law of 1905, and the absorption of Judaism, which had been accused of dual loyalty for many years, now is the time to nationalise and localise Islam. The objective is to replace Islam in France with a uniquely French Islam. The hottest debate surrounds the imams, and the leading issue on the agenda today is the education and training of imams who will work in France. There are three groups of imams working in French mosques. One group consists of imams sent from Muslim countries. This is the group that is the least accepted by the French society. Imams who serve the people of Turkish origin in France are appointed by DİTİB, or in other words the Office of Religious Affairs, which reports – and has reported – directly to the Prime Minister since 1983. These imams work within Turkish organisations in France and their wages are paid by the government of Turkey through the ‘social affairs attaches’ working in consulates. It is not difficult to understand why these organisations request imams from Turkey: on the one hand, they are received as representatives of true ‘Turkishness’ that the ethnic Turks in France have lost over time, while their affiliation with the state of Turkey serves to confirm their allegiance to the official religion of Turkey. All this and more is available for free. These organisations are far from being rich, so not having to pay the wages of the imam comes as a great relief. In fact, the finances of some organisations are so precarious that they choose to assign their properties to the Office of Religious Affairs to ensure that imams are sent on a regular basis and building maintenance is paid for by the Office.

Despite the negative reaction by the public, French authorities do not object to the imams sent from Turkey because they are under the supervision of the Turkish state, and present less of a threat than local imams who are not controlled by any country. As long as there is no institution to provide education to local imams in France, it is important that foreign imams are under the supervision of the country they come from. If the country is secular like Turkey, this procedure becomes even more important. The foremost criticism of imams is that they do not speak French. Taking this criticism into consideration, the Office of Religious Affairs started a new procedure in 2005: about a hundred young individuals are chosen from the countries of immigration (France, Germany, the Netherlands, etc), travel to Ankara to receive religious education, and are sent back to their countries. In this respect, it must also be mentioned that the Office of Religious Affairs is not disturbed by imams being educated in Europe. The Office of Religious Affairs supports education abroad on one condition: contributing to the education so that the Office can continue to keep imams serving in Turkish mosques under its supervision.

As minorities, all religions take on two contradicting aspects. On the one hand, they resist changes that would have been readily adopted had they been in the majority, while trying to adapt to the country, if begrudgingly, on the other. This contradiction can be observed in the Turkish community in France. Meanwhile, because religious loyalty refers to national loyalty, individuals adopt a religious attitude in an attempt to prove their loyalty to the community and nation to which they belong.Reference Deconchy⁶ This stance seeks to promote rational explanations for religious behaviours (such as claiming that pork is bad for health), and argues that religion has a very important place within the community because it constitutes a critical element of everyday life. By becoming an institution, the community manifests its existence in the eyes of the majority, and reaffirms the fact that it will continue to exist throughout time and place. As an example, while the Turkish community had kept its distance from the Muslims Council of France and the local councils in the beginning, it has since become a part of these organisations for strategic purposes.