This is a translation of Schiavone's Ius. L'inventione del diritto in Occidente, first published by Einaudi in 2005. It is immediately striking that the translated title omits the leading Latin word Ius. Perhaps the publisher was fearful that the use of a non-English term in the title would put off English readers, as it presumably did not put off Italian ones. It is nevertheless unfortunate as, notoriously, the English word Law is both somewhat more general and more specific than the Italian diritto or the Latin ius. The term is more general, insofar as “law” covers a field of legal notions, encompassing both determinative law, statute (legge, lex) and legal principle (diritto, ius). It is also more specific, inasmuch as diritto and ius express a measure of rightfulness, as in modern “human rights,” absent from the basic meaning of “law.” In brief, Schiavone's argument is that the Romans created a unique notion of law, which permeates modern political assumptions about the role and function of law and the state. It is no part of his claim that the West has an exclusive claim to have invented all law, as the English title might lead one unwarily to conclude. The claim is, rather, that the Western, Roman, conception of law, ius, whether actually superior to others, is in any case functionally operative in modern Western political and legal thought.

Perhaps, however, it is unfair to blame all on the publisher, as conceptual and linguistic clarity in this area can be difficult to achieve. In an important critique of the study of ancient legal systems (473, n. 29), Schiavone takes legal historians to task for having confused the nature of the legal experience in Ancient Greece, Mesopotamia, Egypt, and Israel with that of Rome by using “law” indifferently to describe each (the word appearing in scare quotes in his text). I have been unable to confirm whether in his original Schiavone used the term diritto here for “law,” as seems likely, but whereas his criticism might apply to the use of diritto, it is far from clear that it rightly applies to “law,” the broad meaning of which seems to encompass whatever differences there might quite properly be between these various legal experiences.

The bulk of the book contains a rich and detailed examination of the development of the concept of law in Rome over time, from its emergence at the time of the Twelve Tables in the fifth century BCE to the consolidation and alterations introduced in the compilation of Justinian in the sixth century CE. It is, in effect, an inner history of the Roman conception of law, ius, formal and yet practical, in vital tension with the use of force to regulate society. It follows in a distinguished European tradition that encompasses Savigny and Mommsen, Koschaker and Wieacker and is a worthy successor of these, very different, nineteenth and twentieth century accounts of the significance of Roman law for our time. Like these earlier writers, Schiavone is the product of a modern European assimilation of Roman law whose roots lie as far back as at least the twelfth century. Because of the distinctive path taken by the English common law in that very century, English, and, therefore, modern North American legal and political thought is rather distanced from this Roman background. In presenting an English version of his text Schiavone is, however, committed to the view that the Roman law is and remains a pervasive force in contemporary Western politics: English, American, and European.

One can accept, and even be convinced by, this premise and still be concerned that the acceptance of the demonstration of its truth presents considerable problems to those unfamiliar with the Roman and medieval European background. The richness of the argument is supported by a densely detailed survey of the relevant literature. It will be read for profit by those primarily interested in the legal history of Roman law, but deserves to be more widely read by those who interests lie more in the fields of human rights and the spread of Western forms of democracy.

The translation, granted the difficulties glanced at, is extremely well done and amply justifies the time and effort referred to in the author's preface to this version. It is, however, odd to find the Roman jurist Alfenus, uniformly so referred to in English Romanist literature (and as Alfeno in the Italian), masquerading as Alphenus, a spelling, however, encountered in contemporary North American use. It is less disturbing to find Irnerio for the medieval Irnerius, an indication perhaps of the chronological limitations of advice sought.