I thank Marisa Abrajano and Zoltan Hajnal for their comprehensive review and positive assessment of my book. I will address here her chief questions: how state integration programs have fared in light of the refugee crisis and whether policies have a direct impact on integration outcomes.
The 2015 refugee crisis in Europe has already proved to be a watershed moment. Alongside spontaneous, community-led acts of generosity and charity, and the incomparable openness of German borders, it has also exposed a distressing underbelly. On this darker side, we observe governments applying religious tests for entry (Slovakia), cutting off access altogether (e.g., Hungary), and restrictive quotas (the UK), as well as myriad political consequences, like the electoral success of the Swedish Far Right.
In light of the crisis, the resilience of state civic integration programs stands out as remarkable yet unsurprising. If anything, the distinction between insiders and outsiders is more pronounced than ever, as is the understanding that states could play (and perhaps need) a greater role in facilitating integration. Yet in balancing pragmatism with varying domestic politics, integration policy adaptation has not been uniform. In Germany, for example, every refugee has access to government-paid integration courses, thus stretching its resources to accommodate its unprecedented intake. In addition to language classes, which simultaneously teach refugees about their rights and obligations, there is also a new, free handbook for refugee integration. Migrants even have access to free German language classes abroad, such as the Goethe Institutes in Istanbul. By contrast, the Dutch cabinet rejected the notion of offering language lessons to new arrivals, suggesting such a policy as “undesirable” in that it creates incorrect “expectations” about their rights (Tweede Kamer, Parliamentary Briefing No. 2073, 2015–2016). Laws requiring integration “kick in” as soon as refugee status is granted, though the government no longer funds it and information to access it is not readily available to refugees. Finally, in states most resistant to refugee intake, we have seen little change in integration approaches. In fact, this large flow has led to restriction in other areas, such as British Prime Minister David Cameron’s sudden suggestion that migrants on spousal visas may have to leave if they fail to improve their English proficiency.
Given that state integration programs encouraging labor market and social mobility are more in demand than ever, more research needs to be done on the tangible effects of language and civic education. More than a decade has passed since these material conditions for status have been introduced, and so there should be sufficient data to assess policy effectiveness. The looming question however—a central one addressed in my book—is how effectiveness is defined. Is the goal migration control? Employment? Commitment to liberal-democratic values? Some of the first studies on this question show that requirements do indeed yield meaningful results for new immigrants, but less so for immigrants farther along in the integration process. Whatever their goal, state integration programs will only grow in time as European nation-states struggle to define “who belongs” while they undergo massive demographic transformation.
