RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

This article utilizes a case study approach to analyze the research question posed in the previous section. The Kyrgyz case is puzzling when we consider the regional context. Russia, which is the most influential country in the region, has passed legislation to restrict women's rights. For example, Russia restricted abortion rights in 2011 and decriminalized domestic violence in 2017, when the Duma transferred the statute on domestic violence from the Criminal Code to the Administrative Code. Russia does not have a domestic violence law or a legislative gender quota. Kyrgyzstan, which remains under Russia's influence despite American and Chinese attempts to alter the status quo, has passed legislation to protect women's rights. For example, Kyrgyzstan passed a domestic violence law in 2003, a legislative gender quota for parliament in 2007, and an amended domestic violence law in 2017. It also toughened the bride theft penalty in 2013.Footnote ³ The share of women in each state's parliament is similar: 16% in the Duma and 19% in the Jogorku Kenesh.Footnote ⁴ A key factor distinguishing these cases, which I discuss in the conclusion, is the extent to which civil society is able to instigate legislative change.

In the following pages, I process trace legislative change in the areas of bride theft and domestic violence. My analysis is based on in-depth personal interviews that I conducted in 2013, 2015, and 2018 in Bishkek and Osh, Kyrgyzstan's two largest cities. I chose these locales because members of parliament reside in Bishkek at least temporarily and because many women's and human rights organizations have offices in Bishkek and/or Osh. While representatives of these organizations—gender specialists with years of field experience who are well acquainted with the “women and politics” topic—were a critical resource for this project, I took steps to avoid overreliance on their views. First, I approached the interviews from an ethnographic perspective, which interprets responses as political actors’ understanding of their own decisions, rather than as accurate information (Schatz Reference Schatz2009).Footnote ⁵ Second, I pursued source triangulation by analyzing varied data points, including (1) personal interviews with former and current government officials as well as representatives of the country's best known women's NGOs, crisis centers, and human rights organizations; (2) Russian-language articles about women and politics in the region; (3) Kyrgyz legislation pertaining to bride theft, domestic violence, and the legislative gender quota; and (4) secondary English- and Russian-language sources addressing these topics. These measures helped me critically assess the interviewees’ explanations for legislative change.

Over the course of several three-week trips into the field in 2013, 2015, and 2018, I conducted 61 semistructured interviews with individuals who worked in some capacity on women's issues to hear stories about political achievements and failures. Employing the snowball method of respondent recruitment, I began in 2013 to interview representatives of local organizations I had met with in 2007 and 2008 while conducting research in Kyrgyzstan on a different topic. These interviewees suggested others who might be willing to share their views and experiences. I thus expanded my network and conducted several interviews during each visit until I obtained information saturation in 2018.

My respondents are former or current government officials and representatives of the country's largest and/or well-known women's or human rights organizations. To protect their confidentiality, I describe rather than name the organization with which a respondent is affiliated if I consider the information conveyed to be sensitive. I was unaware of a respondent's position prior to the interview unless the individual in question had stated it publicly. While a few interviews were conducted in cafés or parks, most were held in offices. I asked every interviewee a series of open-ended questions concerning gender role stereotypes; women's issues; the passage of bride theft, domestic violence, and gender quota legislation; interactions between women's NGOs and members of parliament; and the challenges that women who want to become involved in politics confront. I asked follow-up questions based on the interviewee's response to learn more about these issues. The city and date of each interview that I reference in the text is given in a note.

TRANSACTIONAL ACTIVISM, CRITICAL ACTORS, AND ELECTORALLY MARGINALIZED GROUPS

Because women are electorally marginalized throughout the region, the small body of academic literature on women and politics in Central Asia addresses women's activism outside formal institutions of political power (Beyer and Kojoekova Reference Beyer and Kojoekova2019; Borbieva Reference Borbieva2012; Freizer Reference Freizer2005; Hoare Reference Hoare2016; Kim et al. Reference Kim, Myrzabekova, Molchanova and Yarova2018; Simpson Reference Simpson2006). Most scholars do not study women's activism inside national parliaments and local councils. Only a few, such as Satybaldieva (Reference Satybaldieva2018), have analyzed connections between nonstate actors and critical actors within formal political institutions. This article accompanies Satybaldieva's study, which focuses on older women who act as informal leaders in urban neighborhoods, in addressing this gap in the literature.

Encompassing a wide variety of groups and relationships, civil society in Central Asia is an arena rather than a defined set of associations. Research suggests that civil society, which has existed for centuries, includes kinship networks, aksakals (“white beards” or male elders), mahalla (neighborhood) networks, religious fellowships, social organizations, OBON (Women Units for Special Purposes), labor unions, and NGOs (Anderson Reference Anderson2000; Beyer and Kojoekova Reference Beyer and Kojoekova2019; Borbieva Reference Borbieva2012; Freizer Reference Freizer2005; Simpson Reference Simpson2006; Ziegler Reference Ziegler2016). Local NGOs are a critical component of civil society in postcommunist Central Asia (Buxton Reference Buxton2009). Following Taylor (Reference Taylor1995, 208), I view women's NGOs in Kyrgyzstan as an “ensemble of associations [that] can significantly determine or inflect the course of state policy.”

I join researchers who analyze the efficacy of civil society in terms of its ability to influence legislation, rather than organizational density or organizational membership (Bingham Reference Bingham2016; Cox and Gallai Reference Cox and Gallai2014; Cox, Ilonszki, and Vass Reference Cox, Ilonszki and Vass2007; Green Reference Green2002; Johnson and Saarinen Reference Johnson and Saarinen2011). Petrova and Tarrow have influenced my understanding of civil society in Kyrgyzstan. Skeptical of the claim that civil society in east-central Europe is weak, they rely on a case study and survey evidence to assess the strength of civil society in Hungary. In so doing, they find that transactional activism, or “the ties—enduring and temporary—among organized non-state actors and between them and political parties, power holders, and other institutions” (Petrova and Tarrow Reference Petrova and Tarrow2007, 79), is in fact robust. Their relational interpretation of civil society stresses lateral links between nonstate actors and vertical links between nonstate actors and public officials that can exist at local, national, and international levels. The literature on women's descriptive and substantive political representation bequeaths theoretical nuance to Petrova and Tarrow's argument.

The women and politics literature has demonstrated that the presence of women in parliament matters because it can shape the legislative agenda. Research shows that female legislators have different policy preferences than male legislators (Clayton Reference Clayton2015). Montgomery (Reference Montgomery, Matland and Montgomery2003, 4) suggests that although they have diverse views and agendas, female legislators tend to sponsor bills designed to improve the familial, social, economic, and political lives of women: “Women may differ widely among themselves about the desirability of particular policies, but they share a common emphasis on family and child-related issues, and they tend to focus more on issues of gender equality than do men.” Likewise, Paxton and Hughes (Reference Paxton and Hughes2014) argue that female legislators in many countries prioritize and propose bills focused on women, children, family, health care, the elderly, and gender equality. A leading gender expert in Kyrgyzstan, Zulfiya Kocherbaeva, finds this to be the case in her country: “Women raise problems that they themselves experience. In the majority of cases, they would discuss children, education, housing, pensioners, domestic violence. Men never raise the issue of domestic violence. So these problems will not be addressed if there are few women in rural and city keneshes [councils] and in parliament” (Toktonazarova Reference Toktonazarova2017).

Though there may be a link between descriptive representation—the share of women in politics—and substantive representation— the alignment of women's interests and policy—research suggests that descriptive representation does not guarantee substantive representation. For example, Wängnerud (Reference Wängnerud2009, 59) argues that “substantial change—whatever that means—cannot be taken for granted just because a group, such as women, is taking part in decision-making to a larger extent than before.” Johnson (Reference Johnson2016) finds this to be the case in Russia, where women are represented but unable or unwilling to promote gender equality legislation because informal rules and parallel institutions discourage or prevent them from doing so. Moreover, substantive representation can exist without descriptive representation. As Dahlerup (Reference Dahlerup2006, 520) explains, “Numbers and percentages are of only minor importance for the policy outcome . . . Even a few women in politics, under the right circumstances, can make a big difference, while a large minority of women parliamentarians may not wish or be able to change the political agenda in a certain political system at a certain time.” The Kyrgyz case offers evidence in support of Dahlerup's claim as it indicates that just one critical actor, aided by supportive women's NGOs, can influence the passage of legislation tackling violence against women.

These theoretical issues have led scholars to research different variables that might contribute to legislative change. Some, such as Paxton and Hughes (Reference Paxton and Hughes2014), suggest an emphasis on the critical acts of women. Dahlerup (Reference Dahlerup1988, 296) argues that critical acts, or “the willingness and ability of the minority to mobilize the resources of the organization or institution to improve the situation for themselves and the whole minority group,” have been more important than critical mass to the success of women in Scandinavian politics. Others, such as Childs and Krook (Reference Childs and Krook2006), propose a focus on critical actors, or individuals motivated to initiate women-friendly bills. Sawer (Reference Sawer2012) found that in addition to critical mass and institutions inside and outside parliament, critical actors played a role in the passage of legislation facilitating access to an abortion drug in Australia. Others suggest a focus on women's movements. For example, Weldon calls for an emphasis on collectivity rather than individuality, arguing that social movements can be representative of marginalized groups. In an analysis of 36 democratic countries, she finds that “women's movements are more effective avenues of expression for women: in combination, they give women a stronger voice in the policy-making process than does the presence of women in the legislature” (Reference Weldon2002, 1153–54).

The Kyrgyz case highlights the importance of a relationship between nonstate actors and critical actors in parliament and, in so doing, sheds light on an intriguing and less researched question: what conditions enable women's NGOs to make a difference outside the formal legislative arena? My analysis suggests that lateral links between women's NGOs and vertical links between these nonstate actors and critical actors in parliament can generate legislative change even if women are electorally marginalized. Next, I discuss the conditions required for the development of lateral and vertical links in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan that have been leveraged during campaigns for legislative change.

THE EMERGENCE OF WOMEN'S NGOS IN POST-SOVIET KYRGYZSTAN

The Kyrgyz state took three steps that facilitated the development of lateral and vertical links imperative for transactional activism undertaken by women's NGOs: it established a regulatory framework for NGO activity; it signaled through the passage of national legislation and the signing of international agreements that it was at least rhetorically committed to improving women's lives; and it introduced a legislative gender quota enabling the election of women—potential critical actors—to parliament. Under President Askar Akaev's leadership during the 1990s, Kyrgyzstan became a magnet for aid organizations determined to build democracy by assisting in the development of local NGOs. The rapid development of such NGOs proceeded as international aid organizations began to operate in the country, and their potential grew with the help of the United Nations, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and Soros Foundation (Kaparova Reference Kaparova2017). In 1991, Akaev signed the Law on Public Associations,Footnote ⁶ which established the regulatory framework for the registration of NGOs. This was followed by additional legislation regulating the milieu in which NGOs operate, including the Civil Code and the Law on Nonprofit Organizations.Footnote ⁷

Within this permissive environment, NGOs “mushroomed in Kyrgyzstan to shepherd the country's reforms based on the belief that the emergence of a civil society would guarantee the country's democratization” (Petric Reference Petric2005, 319). Emboldened by this atmosphere and influenced by the 1995 World Conference on Women in Beijing, women in Kyrgyzstan founded many local organizations to address issues they considered germane to their lives (Simpson Reference Simpson2006). This has led to a plethora of women's NGOs dedicated to different issues, including but not limited to gender equality, political participation, bride theft, and domestic violence. The Women's Support Center is one example. Established in 1996, it aims to change gender stereotypes and increase gender sensitivity through “gender schools,” monitor the observance of women's rights, and participate in campaigns for legislative change.Footnote ⁸

The women who run these NGOs are undoubtedly influenced by international constructions of women's rights. But this does not preclude them from adapting these norms to local conditions to solve problems in ways that resonate with the Kyrgyzstani population. Paasiaro (Reference Paasiaro2009, 63) aptly characterizes the women who run these NGOs as “individuals with their own ideas and aims, who craft strategies that enable them to use the available resources to fulfill what they see as their missions.” Although women's NGOs compete for scarce resources and do not always collaborate, they create and leverage lateral links when shared interests arise. For example, the Forum of Women's NGOs of Kyrgyzstan was established in 1994 as an umbrella association to unite approximately 85 NGOs committed to consolidating women's activism, advancing gender equality and women's rights, and monitoring the state's commitment to those ideals.Footnote ⁹

Legislative decisions taken by the Kyrgyz government, particularly during the 1990s when the country embarked on an economic and political transition, were based in part on the need for international aid. Regardless of its source, the state's rhetorical commitment to improving women's lives gave women's NGOs license to articulate their demands. In the aftermath of the Beijing Convention, the Kyrgyz government ratified five international conventions on women's rights; appointed a state commission for women, children, and families; declared 1996 the year of women; ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and developed a four-year program called Aialzat to improve the lives of women.Footnote ¹⁰ The 1996 decree establishing Aialzat acknowledged the need to overcome patriarchal attitudes to improve women's lives: “The inclusion of women in public-political positions is one of the important criteria for surmounting the patriarchal character of social relations and for ensuring their equal participation in all levels of political processes and social life.” The decree argued for radical change in education, health, economic activity, poverty, political participation, and violence against women.Footnote ¹¹ Aialzat was followed by a number of National Plans for Action dedicated to the formation of gender equality policies.

This constellation of measures created a receptive public discourse in which women's NGOs were able to articulate and represent women's interests. Though it has not yet resulted in gender equality, the combination of a regulatory framework for NGO activity and the state's rhetorical commitment to improving women's lives is the foundation of an arena in which women can work together to voice their concerns. Hoare (Reference Hoare2016, 293–94) astutely describes this arena as follows: “A space has been created in Kyrgyzstan where groups of ‘active citizens’ are able to come together to help others and to hold institutions to account, in a way that does not exist in the other Central Asian republics; this is specifically the case in regard to gender equality and women's rights.”

Though women's NGOs continue to fight for gender equality in the political arena, the Kyrgyz government has established an institutional mechanism to facilitate the presence of women in parliament. Elections to the Jogorku Kenesh in 2005 resulted in a parliament composed solely of men, rendering Kyrgyzstan one of 10 countries in the world with a parliament devoid of women.Footnote ¹² Two years later, the government inserted a legislative gender quota into the Electoral Code: Article 72 states that no more than 70% of a party's list of candidates can be male or female, and the difference between male and female candidates on a list cannot exceed three positions.Footnote ¹³ The Central Elections Commission cannot register a party that violates these regulations. Though imperfect, the new guidelines enabled the election of 23 women to parliament in the first post-quota elections: women made up 25% of the Jogorku Kenesh in 2007. In easing the election of women to parliament, the quota permits the possibility of critical actors in parliament and thus increases the likelihood of vertical links between women's NGOs and public officials.

WOMEN'S NGOS AND THE LEVERAGING OF LATERAL AND VERTICAL LINKS

Women's NGOs in Kyrgyzstan leverage lateral and vertical links during the course of their humanitarian and advocacy work. Some scholars, such as Fink-Hafner (Reference Fink-Hafner, Fink-Hafner and Robbins1997, 116), have found that civil society organizations are driven to become active in policy making because they understand that they must intervene in this process if they want their demands to be translated into law. This happened in Kyrgyzstan soon after independence. For example, Open Line works to eradicate bride theft and thus provides legal services to victims, but it also lobbies for legislative change.Footnote ¹⁴ Similarly, Mutakalim works to spread Islamic values and offers courses on Sharia, but it also protects the rights of Muslim women and therefore is active in the policy arena.Footnote ¹⁵ One of Mutakalim's most notable legislative successes occurred after the organization collected 45,000 signatures in support of a controversial proposal: the government granted women the right to wear a hijab in passport photos.Footnote ¹⁶

Women's NGOs in Kyrgyzstan—80% of which are run by women—work with the government whenever possible (Soltoeva Reference Soltoeva2012). For example, the crisis center Sezim provides legal consultations and mental health counseling, maintains a 24-hour hotline, and runs a shelter and transition home.Footnote ¹⁷ But it also advocated for establishing the legislative gender quota mentioned above, toughening the bride theft penalty, introducing domestic violence laws, and closing casinos. Leveraging lateral and vertical ties, Sezim worked with other women's NGOs and critical actors in parliament on all these issues; it also worked with the Muftiate, or Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kyrgyzstan, on the closure of casinos.Footnote ¹⁸

Vertical links between nonstate actors and public officials can aid the passage of legislation targeting violence against women when women are electorally marginalized. Some women's NGOs aim to launch women into political careers in order to generate a pool of potential critical actors in parliament. For example, the Women's Discussion Club for Democracy is devoted to “dragging women to the level of decision-making” in local and national government.Footnote ¹⁹ My interviewee used the word “dragging” because in their estimation, women without political experience in patriarchal societies—democratic or not—often believe they are not suited for politics because they are weaker and less persistent than men. This sentiment stems from constructions of gender in the region that define men as breadwinners and women as “keepers of the hearth,” or caretakers. Striving to combat these stereotypes, club representatives travel throughout Kyrgyzstan to tell women that they must work within the party system to reach the level of decision-making.Footnote ²⁰

Several female Jogorku Kenesh deputies, including Ainura Altybaeva, emerged from the Women's Discussion Club for Democracy. Elected to parliament in 2010, Altybaeva has prioritized women's issues since she launched her political career. In 2005, she spearheaded the creation of a political party called Kyrgyzstan Aialdary, or Women of Kyrgyzstan. Altybaeva and her colleagues later changed the party's name to expand its horizontal and vertical links: “We wanted to participate in elections, and men didn't want to be near us. They said ‘This party is named Women of Kyrgyzstan. We are Eastern men, we cannot join a women's party!’ So we renamed it Birimdik, which means unity.”Footnote ²¹ In broadening its appeal, Birimdik sought to establish links with male members of parliament whose votes, in an institution dominated by men, would determine the passage of legislation targeting violence against women. Altybaeva was the most important critical actor in parliament for women's NGOs seeking bride theft and domestic violence legislation; she wrote, introduced, and lobbied for legislation in these areas. Though she now has allies in parliament, at the time, she was essentially a lone wolf who persistently fought for women's rights. A representative of a women's organization that lobbies for women's rights identified Altybaeva and one other deputy as key allies in a parliament dominated by men: “Altybaeva, [Roza] Aknazarova—these are the women with whom we work. It's possible to literally count them with your fingers. But a few are very active.”Footnote ²²

Two local NGOs—the Agency of Social Technologies and the Alliance of Women's Legislative Initiatives—seek to establish vertical links between women's NGOs and public officials interested in advancing women's rights. Both engage in advocacy work. Rooted in an informal network called Women Can Do Everything that emerged in the late 1990s, the Agency of Social Technologies was registered in 2001 following parliamentary elections that resulted in the appointment of one female deputy.Footnote ²³ The agency promotes gender equality in the political arena by working with state organs—including parliament—to influence legislation. In addition to working with members of parliament on new legislation, amendments to existing legislation, and policy implementation, the agency lends gender expertise to the state and in this capacity conducts research, develops handbooks on gender aspects of policy, and leads trainings for state officials.Footnote ²⁴

The agency's interests were furthered in 2008, when the Alliance of Women's Legislative Initiatives was established to introduce gender approaches into legislative processes, strengthen the political voice of women, increase interactions between the state and society regarding gender policies, and maintain dialogue between public organizations, political parties, and state organs.Footnote ²⁵ A vehicle for political activism promoting women's rights, the alliance has one coordinator from parliament (Altybaeva) and one coordinator from civil society (Kocherbaeva, who also directs the Agency of Social Technologies). Comprising 69 organizations and 66 individuals, the alliance is an informal association that connects women's NGOs to each other, thus establishing lateral links, and women's NGOs to critical actors in parliament, thus establishing vertical links.Footnote ²⁶ These links facilitated the passage of bride theft and domestic violence legislation.

CASE I: BRIDE THEFT LEGISLATION

The Kyrgyz phrase ala kachuu means “getting married by abducting a young woman” (Kleinbach and Salimjanova Reference Kleinbach and Salimjanova2007). Though the practice takes different forms, I refer in this article exclusively to what I see as a form of violence against women: nonconsensual bride kidnapping.Footnote ²⁷ Some scholars argue that bride theft arose among nomads living on the territory of contemporary Kyrgyzstan because women were goods for trade between clans or kidnapped during tribal warfare (Abdukhamimov et al. Reference Abdukhamimov2014). Others claim that bride theft among Kyrgyz nomads was rare, and usually happened when an average family rejected a marriage proposed from a wealthy and powerful family (Kleinbach and Salimjanova Reference Kleinbach and Salimjanova2007). Regardless of its origins, bride theft is practiced in Kyrgyzstan today: according to one estimate, 20% of all marriages are a result of violent bride theftFootnote ²⁸; according to another, 30% are consecrated in this manner (Erkebaeva Reference Erkebaeva2018).

While not everyone considers nonconsensual bride theft a crime or an act of violence against women, women's NGOs tend to see it this way. One crisis center representative characterized present-day bride theft in terms of violence and condescending attitudes toward women: “Ala kachuu is simply violence; they even shut her mouth . . . it's an attitude toward women. A woman is a thing. It's also a gender stereotype: ‘I can do whatever I want.’”Footnote ²⁹ Some cases of bride theft lend credence to this view. For example, 20-year-old Burulai Turdaaly was stolen for marriage and then murdered by her kidnapper at a local police station in 2018 (Akylbekova Reference Akylbekova2018). Burulai's fate sparked a large public protest featuring a speech given by former President Roza Otunbaeva, who argued that both men and women were to blame for continued cases of bride theft (Erkebaeva Reference Erkebaeva2018). Burulai's case speaks to the fact that bride theft happens, and that the authorities are unwilling and/or unable to protect its victims.

Scholars agree that bride theft is common in Kyrgyzstan (Handrahan Reference Handrahan2004; Ibraeva, Moldosheva, and Niyazova Reference Ibraeva, Moldosheva and Niyazova2012; Kirmse Reference Kirmse2010; Kleinbach and Salimjanova Reference Kleinbach and Salimjanova2007; Nantes Reference Nantes2005; Sadyrbek Reference Sadyrbek and Kruessmann2015; Werner Reference Werner2009). Kozhomkulov (Reference Kozhomkulov2016) argues that what he calls “vestiges of the past” such as bride theft have become widespread in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan because the state and society no longer battle them: “They unsuccessfully fought such ‘vestiges of the past’ like bride theft, payment of kalym [bride price], and polygyny during the Soviet era. Unfortunately in conditions of sovereignty and the choice of a so-called democratic path of development these negative phenomena not only remain, but have developed. Now the state and society have practically stopped battling them.”

Elites also acknowledge the practice. For example, former President Akaev's wife identified two factors that, in her view, speak to the degeneration of Kyrgyz society: polygyny's popularity and the acceptance of bride theft as a standard marriage practice (Mikhailov Reference Mikhailov2012). Similarly, former ombudsman Kubat Otorbaev states on the official ombudsman government website that ala kachuu is a shameful phenomenon for Kyrgyzstan.Footnote ³⁰ Bride theft is also a topic of conversation in the mass media. For example, the news site 24.kg published an article outlining steps victims should take, including calling hotline 102, ignoring threats made during the ritual, employing self-defense techniques, reminding parents that they reject the practice, saying ‘No!’ during the nikah ceremony that consecrates a Muslim marriage, and submitting a complaint to the authorities (Masalieva Reference Masalieva2018).

Kyrgyzstan's 1997 Criminal Code punished perpetrators for stealing livestock and kidnapping individuals more severely than it punished perpetrators for stealing brides. Maximum penalties were property confiscation and 11 years’ incarceration for livestock theft (Article 165); 10 years’ incarceration for kidnapping a person (Article 123); and a fine or five years’ incarceration for kidnapping a woman for marriage (Article 155).Footnote ³¹ Dissatisfaction with these stipulations led women's NGOs to launch a lobbying campaign for legislative change in 2010 when Altybaeva became a member of parliament. Her electoral victory was a historic opportunity because it allowed for the establishment of a vertical link between nonstate actors and public officials that created a path for the advancement of legislation targeting violence against women. Lateral links between nonstate actors were important as well.

The Alliance of Women's Legislative Initiatives, itself based on lateral links between NGOs and individuals dedicated to promoting women's rights, initiated the fight to toughen the bride theft penalty by submitting a formal proposal to Altybaeva. The alliance suggested the term “bride theft” to emphasize the criminal nature of the act. In one of many instances of cooperation between women's NGOs and critical actors in parliament during the campaign, Altybaeva agreed to call the practice “by its name—bride theft” to correct what in her view is the mistaken idea that “bride kidnapping” is a respected Kyrgyz tradition.Footnote ³²

Parliament repeatedly rejected the proposal to toughen the bride theft penalty until a united civil society front based on lateral links between nonstate actors emerged. Open Line engineered an awareness campaign based on short films, animated cartoons, sketches, and comics portraying a typical bride theft scenario and its consequences for the victim.Footnote ³³ Because the previous tactic—simply telling people that bride theft is wrong—had proven ineffective, Open Line began to model alternative behavior through visual creations, such as films, featuring supportive parents who welcome their stolen daughter home (Karimova Reference Karimova2012). In addition, women's NGOs collaborated with the United Nations on the organization of a mass bike ride through Bishkek to bring attention to the crime.Footnote ³⁴

Lateral links between nonstate actors including NGOs, the Muftiate, and aksakals were extensive. Many women's NGOs contributed to the campaign to toughen the bride theft penalty, such as the Women's Support Center, which lobbied parliament for harsher sanctions.Footnote ³⁵ Sezim assembled a petition, and Mutakalim gathered signatures to protest a crime that violates the central tenets of Islam.Footnote ³⁶ On the basis of shared interests, Open Line and Mutakalim worked together to organize campaign events. Grim statistics—16,000 girls were stolen between 2010 and 2011—and requests from women in the regions to raise awareness of bride theft prompted the Women's Discussion Club for Democracy to participate in the campaign as well.

The Muftiate was also involved. Hadith, an NGO that helps women cope with social, economic, and political instability, worked with the Muftiate to encourage a fatwa banning ala kachuu among Muslim worshippers.Footnote ³⁷ Similarly, Open Line asked the Muftiate to give worshippers informational pamphlets it had prepared on bride theft, which the Muftiate took because it has a shared interest in preventing a practice that Islam does not condone. Altybaeva confirmed this instance of cooperation: “The Muftiate supported the law because as they themselves said, Islam asserts that every woman must enter marriage voluntarily; no one, not her father or brothers, can force her against her will.”Footnote ³⁸ A Muftiate representative recently stated during an interview that it considers a nikah ceremony concluded through violence illegitimate: “during nikah the girl must give consent herself; no one else may answer” (Masalieva Reference Masalieva2018).

Women's NGOs also worked with aksakals to influence opinion at the community level. Described as “a customary rural institution” that survived the Soviet period, aksakal courts continue to resolve family disputes (Spector Reference Spector2017, 140). This is particularly true in the regions.Footnote ³⁹ As one crisis center representative explained,

Cognizant of the fact that legislative change requires more than lateral links between nonstate actors, women's NGOs identified Altybaeva as the most committed critical actor in parliament. The vertical link between a united group of NGOs and Altybaeva contributed to the passage of legislation stipulating a more severe bride theft penalty. Representatives of women's NGOs have acknowledged this. During an interview that took place two years into the campaign, Open Line's director identified Altybaeva's presence in parliament and opposition to bride theft voiced by elites such as former president Otunbaeva and then president Almazbek Atambayev as the factors permitting a historic opportunity for legislative change: “First, parliament paid attention to this negative phenomenon and Altybaeva was of considerable value in this. She initiated the introduction of amendments to the law . . . It was also delightful that President Otunbaeva spoke about ala kachuu as a problem . . . and President Atambayev also stated that bride theft is a negative phenomenon that should not be ours” (Karimova Reference Karimova2012).

My interviewees underscored the consequential role Altybaeva played in campaign events that took place throughout the country and the connection between those events and the passage of the amendment to the Criminal Code. For example, an Open Line representative argued that despite resistance from men and women, Altybaeva won people over: “Altybaeva did not lose hope. She had a voice at these events, she was like a megaphone; eventually there was support for her argument. Male and female deputies said that if the law passed men would go to jail and there wouldn't be enough room in the prisons. And women said it was our tradition, that our families are built this way.”Footnote ⁴² Similarly, a Women's Discussion Club for Democracy representative highlighted the importance of vertical links between women's NGOs and a critical actor in parliament when she described Altybaeva's influence in an institution dominated by men: “We travelled everywhere and explained that men in parliament did not support the bill. We taught them, and they began to stand behind Altybaeva, who travelled with us to discuss the legislation. And they began to support it, they gave thousands of signatures. When Altybaeva presented the petition to parliament showing how many women were demanding the law, men adopted it.”Footnote ⁴³

Working closely with NGOs committed to a more severe penalty, Altybaeva began in 2011 to persuade members of parliament that the Criminal Code violated the Kyrgyz constitution, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender.Footnote ⁴⁴ She argued that gender discrimination underlay the harsher penalties stipulated in the Criminal Code for stealing livestock and kidnapping individuals than for stealing brides.Footnote ⁴⁵ In an attempt to tackle gender discrimination, Altybaeva wrote a bill at the end of the year featuring a harsher penalty for bride theft. The bill, which went through four committees amid heated debate, did not pass easily. After the second reading, Altybaeva stood in front of the White House, which houses the parliament, and read a letter to her colleagues from a victim of bride theft describing how she had attempted suicide because she could not make peace with her forced marriage (Osmongazieva Reference Osmongazieva2012). Her effort to break the resistance was successful. Though it took three readings, the bill ultimately was opposed by a minority of four (Kazybekov Reference Kazybekov2012).

The Criminal Code was amended in 2013 to reflect a tougher penalty: Article 155 stipulates that kidnapping a woman for the purpose of marriage garners a five- to seven-year incarceration term.Footnote ⁴⁶ This law eliminates the fine stipulated in the 1997 Criminal Code and sets five years as the minimum incarceration term, rather than the maximum incarceration term stipulated in the 1997 Code. The 2013 Code also raises the age of a minor from 16 to 17 and toughens the penalty for stealing a minor for marriage: the 1997 Code stipulated a three- to seven-year incarceration term, while the 2013 Code stipulates a five- to 10-year incarceration term (Article 154 of both versions).

Transactional activism, or lateral links between nonstate actors and vertical links between nonstate actors and a critical actor in parliament, based on a commitment to instigate legislation targeting violence against women resulted in a tougher penalty for bride theft. During our conversation, Altybaeva highlighted the importance of political activism initiated by NGOs and individuals outside formal institutions of power to her legislative success: “A year and a half of discussion, for this time I was very grateful to friends, the women's movement, journalists, the Muftiate, all of whom discussed this issue on television, radio. We discussed this issue everywhere . . . we went to universities, there were discussions among the youth and they understood that this is not a tradition, that even if their papa stole their mama, this is not a tradition—it is a crime that went unpunished.”Footnote ⁴⁷ Altybaeva has emphasized the importance of NGO activism during interviews with journalists as well. For example, when speaking with the news agency InoZpress in 2013 shortly after President Atambayev signed the new Criminal Code, she expressed gratitude for NGOs “that led the information campaign” (Myrzabekova Reference Myrzabekova2013). The legislative change resulted, in part, from a conscious decision made by women's NGOs to establish lateral links between themselves, the Muftiate, and aksakals that created a united front, and vertical links between themselves and a critical actor in parliament. A similar dynamic drove the passage of domestic violence legislation.

CASE II: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LEGISLATION

The reported number of girls and women suffering from domestic violence in Kyrgyzstan more than doubled between 2014 (2,431) and 2018 (6,562).Footnote ⁴⁸ The actual number is presumably higher because cultural, legal, and institutional barriers discourage victims from reporting domestic violence allegations to the authorities (Childress, Gioia, and Campbell Reference Childress, Gioia and Campbell2018). Childress (Reference Childress2018) argues that several barriers deter abused women from seeking help, including the importance of marriage and stigmatization of divorce, hierarchical relations between mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law, attitudes legitimizing domestic violence, and a lack of family support. These barriers stem from an attitude that women should just endure abuse. Though not held by everyone, this view is common enough that it perpetuates violence. A local sociologist explains the impact of this attitude on victims in stark terms: “It's considered normal that you need to suffer violence. The Kyrgyz have an expression ‘sabyrduu bolush kerek,’ which means ‘just be patient.’ And so when a woman says ‘I'm experiencing abuse, my husband beats me,’ her circle gives her the following advice: ‘be patient, hold your tongue’” (Li Reference Li2017).

In Kyrgyzstan, domestic violence against women is most often committed by a woman's husband and/or mother-in-law. Consequences of such abuse include loss of identity, powerlessness, fear, uncertainty, psychological distress, and physical health problems (Childress et al. Reference Childress, Gioia and Campbell2018). Domestic violence is so problematic that Childress et al. (2018, 183) reach a dismal conclusion: “women are largely on their own in contemporary Kyrgyzstan. Women receive little or no help from families, health systems and law enforcement, and there are only a few civil society actors . . . that provide help.” The civil society actors whom the authors reference—NGOs offering services to victims of domestic violence—appeared after Kyrgyzstan became an independent state.

In light of the issues discussed above and the unwillingness and/or inability of the state to address them, women began to establish crisis centers in the 1990s. According to one crisis center representative, crisis centers are busy places: “I remember when we began to organize crisis centers people said ‘no one will go to them, no one will say that something happened in her family.’ But this turns out to be wrong—women began to come. In the past they didn't have anywhere to go, but now there is a place where they can get legal services, they can call the hot line. People come. Tens of thousands of women come to us annually.”Footnote ⁴⁹ The Association of Crisis Centers of Kyrgyzstan, an umbrella organization comprised of thirteen women's NGOs including seven crisis centers, was founded in 2001 to coordinates nonstate actors serving victims of abuse.Footnote ⁵⁰

Lateral links between nonstate actors enabled informational campaigns to raise awareness about domestic violence that led to the passage of two domestic violence laws. The first campaign was organized in 1998 in accordance with the international 16-day campaign to end violence. The informational campaign has become an annual occurrence in Kyrgyzstan. Women's NGOs plan approximately 50 events that take place throughout the country at schools, universities, sports complexes, and state institutions to highlight early marriage, bride theft, and domestic violence (Dzhabrailova Reference Dzhabrailova2016). In her description of these campaigns, one crisis center representative highlighted the importance of fighting the attitude that women should just endure abuse: “Every year we launch a campaign. The problem of violence against women is acute in our county . . . We talk about it in schools, universities. We want to explain that violence is a serious problem. In our society there is a stereotype that women deserve whippings. But this is a mistaken view.”Footnote ⁵¹ Women's NGOs organize many events to bring attention to domestic violence. For example, the national movement “Together in Opposition to Violence against Women and Children” organizes an annual march on March 8, International Women's Day, to protest violence against women, early marriage, and bride theft (Malikova Reference Malikova2016). Similarly, a conference titled “Access to Justice for Women and Girls Suffering as a Result of Gender Violence” is held annually in a different region of the country (Nazarova Reference Nazarova2017).

Once crisis centers and a calendar of events had been established, women's NGOs turned their attention toward legislative change. Representatives of some NGOs, including one from a crisis center in Bishkek, claimed during the lobbying campaign that the authorities refused to register cases of domestic violence in the absence of a law protecting victims.Footnote ⁵² Lateral links between nonstate actors were vital to the passage of legislation protecting victims. According to Childress and Hanusa (Reference Childress2018, 147), women's NGOs “were instrumental” in this effort because they drafted a bill and then collected the 30,000 signatures required to submit a bill to parliament. A crisis center representative highlighted the importance of lateral and vertical links to legislative change: “We work with sources of violence and have had successful campaigns. First was our work with other women's NGOs—we gathered more than 30,000 signatures to support the first law on domestic violence that was adopted in 2003. Then we worked with Jogorku Kenesh deputies to ban alcohol advertisements and close the casino because 80% of domestic violence cases are linked to alcohol, drugs, and gambling. We collected signatures and lobbied deputies.”Footnote ⁵³

Kyrgyzstan's first domestic violence law was signed in 2003.Footnote ⁵⁴ Though the Law on Social-Legal Protection from Domestic Violence was a breakthrough in terms of stipulating the existence of physical, psychological, and sexual violence in the family; the right of victims to report allegations of violence to the authorities, including aksakal courts; and the need for restraining orders, it did not satisfy women's NGOs. Weaknesses in the law drove many of these NGOs to launch a campaign based on lateral links between nonstate actors and vertical links between nonstate actors and critical actors in parliament for a second domestic violence law. For example, the Center for Research on Democratic Processes, which focuses on gender equality, began to work with state ministries on establishing a standard operational procedure for victims of domestic violence to appeal to the authorities as a result of perceived weaknesses in the law.Footnote ⁵⁵

A window of opportunity opened in 2013, when parliament introduced more severe sanctions for bride theft and, in so doing, indicated support for legislation targeting violence against women. In addition, parliament had 27 women members; the Jogorku Kenesh has never had more than 28 female deputies.Footnote ⁵⁶ Taking advantage of a large pool of potential critical actors, women's NGOs launched a campaign for a second domestic violence law a decade after the first law was adopted. During our conversation, an Open Line representative emphasized cooperation between nonstate actors and the Ministry of Social Development in the push for a second law: “Open Line is part of a working group concerning the development of a [second] law on domestic violence. We work with the Minster of Social Development so that another law will be adopted.”Footnote ⁵⁷ As in other legislative campaigns, the gathering of required signatures was a central pillar of this campaign. Women's NGOs again led the effort, collecting more than 36,000 signatures in support of a second domestic violence law (Evastratov Reference Evstratov2013). The campaign was punctuated by meetings like the one held in 2014 that brought together the regional director of UN Women, representatives of women's NGOs, and a Ministry of Public Health representative. These meetings strengthened lateral links between nonstate actors, reinforced vertical links between nonstate actors and public officials, and enabled NGO representatives to voice their demands. For example, a Chance crisis center representative argued at the meeting that the first domestic violence law enabled the justice system to acquit perpetrators of violence and failed to serve victims of abuse (Moldalieva Reference Moldalieva2014).

Led by the Agency of Social Technologies, NGOs working on behalf of women launched a lobbying campaign that involved critical actors in parliament like Altybaeva, who introduced a bill in 2016. The campaign spanned four years and culminated in an appeal, issued by representatives of more than 37 organizations, requesting President Atambayev's approval (Abduvaitova Reference Abduvaitova2017). Parliament adopted the legislation despite resistance from numerous deputies, and on April 27, 2017 Atambayev signed the Law on Protection from Domestic Violence.Footnote ⁵⁸ This law, which in effect replaces the first law, reflects demands voiced by the NGO community, such as (1) the inclusion of the term “economic violence,” (2) clearly defined responsibilities of state and local authorities, and (3) a statement regarding who may request a restraining order.Footnote ⁵⁹

Having long emphasized the devastating consequences of economic violence, women's NGOs criticized the first law on domestic violence for only acknowledging physical, psychological, and sexual violence. My interviewees underscored the prevalence of familial dynamics that generate a situation in which a woman lacks the financial means to survive on her own, and thus cannot realistically leave an abusive relationship. For example, the League for the Protection of Children's Rights offers IT training programs for girls to reduce the rate of economic violence against women. Referring to program participants, a League representative emphasized the connection between economic dependence and domestic violence: “She will have critical thinking skills. She will earn money herself, independent of her husband. She will not tolerate violence; she will be able to leave at any point in time.”Footnote ⁶⁰ Not surprisingly, the NGO-led campaign lobbied for the inclusion of the term economic violence in the second law.Footnote ⁶¹ Article 1 satisfies this demand.

Women's NGOs also lobbied for legislation that addresses the need for rehabilitation programs.Footnote ⁶² Various parts of the second law require government agencies to organize and/or inform perpetrators of such programs, including Article 8, Article 11, and Article 27. In addition, the NGO-led campaign wanted the law to list services available to victims of domestic violence. Articles 34 and 35 are devoted to this issue and include, for example, legal, social, medical, and psychological assistance. Article 35 stipulates that a victim may seek these forms of assistance at state and local agencies, as well as institutions offering social services like crisis centers and shelters.

Women's NGOs also criticized the first law because it lacked a coordinating mechanism for all actors responsible for preventing and/or stopping domestic violence. In the midst of the campaign, an Agency of Social Technologies representative explained the need for such a mechanism to me: “We are lobbying, saying that we need to develop a new law in which the responsibilities of state organs are clearly established. We need a mechanism of coordination because when it comes to violence everyone must participate, not only the police but also public health institutes, social services institutes, local organs of authority. There is no mechanism of coordination in the existing law. So we're working on this now.”Footnote ⁶³ Article 7 of the second law requires the government to establish a “state authorized body” to coordinate activities of all actors potentially responsible for preventing and/or stopping domestic violence.

Women's NGOs also lobbied for mechanisms to facilitate the issuance of restraining orders. Although the first law provides for temporary orders issued by the police and permanent orders issued by the court, neither order was issued frequently. An Agency of Social Technologies representative suggested that a lack of training may have contributed to this: “The police don't want to issue restraining orders because they aren't trained for this; they don't know what they're for or how to issue them.”Footnote ⁶⁴ The second law addresses this critique. Article 10 requires the Ministry of Internal Affairs to include education programs and training courses on the prevention and cessation of domestic violence for law enforcement personnel. Article 25 requires organs of internal affairs, including the police, to register reports of domestic violence from anyone, issue and ensure proper execution of restraining orders, and tell recipients of restraining orders about rehabilitation programs. The law thus holds the police accountable: they are obligated to react to every report of domestic violence regardless of the source and to issue a restraining order preventing the aggressor from approaching the victim.Footnote ⁶⁵

A lawyer who participated in the lobbying campaign praised the fact that the second law identifies people responsible for preventing domestic violence (Dzhemasheva Reference Dzhemasheva2014). That list is more detailed than the one in the first law, which was limited to the courts, the prosecutor general, the ombudsman, organs of internal affairs, relevant state institutions, and aksakal courts. The list in the second law includes the mass media, health organizations, and education institutes but also identifies specific state institutions such as those related to the protection of children and local administrations (Article 6). Aksakal courts are also on the list because although staffed by elderly men, women do bring allegations of abuse to them.Footnote ⁶⁶

Women's NGOs also lobbied for legislation that enumerates responsibilities of local government in preventing domestic violence (Dzhemasheva Reference Dzhemasheva2014). The second law satisfies this demand. Article 18 calls on local state administrations to implement the law, organize programs to strengthen the quality of employees in terms of their ability to handle cases of domestic violence, and attract financial assistance to implement domestic violence programs. Article 19 calls on local councils to provide the means for the implementation of domestic violence programs in their local budgets, which entails attracting investments and grants for this purpose.

Lateral links between women's NGOs and vertical links between these nonstate actors and the Ministry of Social Development and critical actors in parliament spawned the second domestic violence law. Though “women's movement” may or may not be an appropriate characterization, Altybaeva recently commented on the power of NGO activism in terms of its ability to influence legislation targeting violence against women: “The women's movement of Kyrgyzstan is very strong. Precisely owing to the women's movement there are now female deputies in parliament, city councils, and local councils. Thanks to the women's movement, many laws have been passed that support the institute of the family—mothers, fathers, and children.”Footnote ⁶⁷ In referencing NGOs dedicated to launching women into the political arena and instigating legislation designed to support the family, Altybaeva acknowledged the importance of transactional activism for an electorally marginalized group in Kyrgyzstan.