Hostname: page-component-745bb68f8f-g4j75 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-02-07T05:20:03.963Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Experiential effects on mirror systems and social learning: Implications for social intelligence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 April 2014

Simon M. Reader*
Affiliation:
Department of Biology, McGill University, Montréal, QC H3A 1B1, Canada. simon.reader@mcgill.cahttp://biology.mcgill.ca/faculty/reader/ Department of Biology and Helmholtz Institute, Utrecht University, 3508 TB Utrecht, The Netherlands.

Abstract

Investigations of biases and experiential effects on social learning, social information use, and mirror systems can usefully inform one another. Unconstrained learning is predicted to shape mirror systems when the optimal response to an observed act varies, but constraints may emerge when immediate error-free responses are required and evolutionary or developmental history reliably predicts the optimal response. Given the power of associative learning, such constraints may be rare.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

Cook et al. present a compelling case that mirror neurons (MNs) have a developmental origin in associative learning. Moreover, they legitimately argue that empirical testing is required to determine whether MNs and mirror systems have evolutionary origins as adaptive specializations, echoing criticism of adaptationist “just-so” stories in other fields (Pigliucci & Kaplan Reference Pigliucci and Kaplan2000). Here, I discuss whether work on mirror systems can be informed by, and inform, the fields of social information use and social learning. I leave aside discussion of communicative signals, by definition adaptive specializations.

Many animals use social information (information provided by other individuals) and social learning (learning from this information; Reader & Biro Reference Reader and Biro2010). Debate over mirror system origin and function can be viewed as part of a broader debate over the origins of a reliance on social cues and of the mechanisms underlying social information use, a debate Heyes (Reference Heyes1994; Reference Heyes2012a; Reference Heyes2012c) has also championed. Besides the fact that mirror systems utilize social information, there are numerous points of intersection between the two research fields. Mirror systems have been proposed to underlie various forms of social learning, including stimulus enhancement, emulation, and imitation learning (Byrne Reference Byrne2002; Keysers & Perrett Reference Keysers and Perrett2004), and such systems could potentially associate personal and conspecific location and thus also underlie local enhancement. Social learning propensities, biases, and processes have been proposed to be products of general learning processes, in a similar fashion to the Cook et al. proposal (Church Reference Church1957; Heyes Reference Heyes1994; Reference Heyes2012c; Keysers & Perrett Reference Keysers and Perrett2004; Laland & Bateson Reference Laland and Bateson2001; Leadbeater & Chittka Reference Leadbeater and Chittka2007; Miller & Dollard Reference Miller and Dollard1941). Furthermore, like mirror systems, the assumption that social learning is an adaptive specialization has been questioned, as has whether any such adaptive specialization would involve input systems rather than the learning mechanisms themselves (Caldwell & Whiten Reference Caldwell and Whiten2002; Heyes Reference Heyes2012c; Lefebvre & Giraldeau Reference Lefebvre, Giraldeau, Heyes and Galef1996; Reader et al. Reference Reader, Hager and Laland2011). These points of intersection suggest the two fields may usefully inform each other.

Experiential effects on the propensity to use and learn from social information have been demonstrated in several species (Kendal et al. Reference Kendal, Coolen, Laland, Dukas and Ratcliffe2009), supporting the idea that responses to social cues can be learned. However, flexibility alone is insufficient to demonstrate that the value and meaning of social cues are acquired by learning, since flexibility could be genetically encoded. For example, individuals could follow evolved unlearned rules-of-thumb of when, where, and how to employ social information (Rendell et al. Reference Rendell, Fogarty, Hoppitt, Morgan, Webster and Laland2011). Direct manipulation of the benefits of social information provides superior evidence for learned biases in social information use. For example, sparrows raised with an artificial parent that had reliably indicated food were more likely to approach feeding conspecifics than if the parent had not reliably indicated food (Katsnelson et al. Reference Katsnelson, Motro, Feldman and Lotem2008). Similarly, in finches manipulation of the net benefits of attending to others resulted in changes in individual tendencies to use social information, with lags that suggested the birds were learning the optimal response on the basis of received rewards (Mottley & Giraldeau Reference Mottley and Giraldeau2000). Perhaps the most compelling current evidence for associative learning shaping social information use involves the acquisition of matching and nonmatching responses during social learning. Dawson et al. (Reference Dawson, Avargues-Weber, Chittka and Leadbeater2013) trained bumblebees in a feeding array where conspecific “demonstrators” indicated either the presence of sweet sucrose or bitter quinine. Bees thus readily learned to approach or avoid conspecifics. Later, the bees observed demonstrators at one color of flower in a two-color array. Bees previously rewarded for approaching conspecifics were more likely to choose the same color as demonstrators, whereas the reverse was true in the quinine-trained bees. Such data strikingly parallel mirror and counter-mirror effects observed in budgerigars and dogs (Mui et al. Reference Mui, Haselgrove, Pearce and Heyes2008; Range et al. Reference Range, Huber and Heyes2011).

Although these examples provide evidence that experience can shape reliance on social cues, interpreting all individual and between-species variation in social information use as the result of prior learning would risk telling associationist “just-so” stories. Studies of the evolution of learning provide useful insights into when an evolutionary account may explain variation in social information use (e.g., Boyd & Richerson Reference Boyd and Richerson1985; Dunlap & Stephens Reference Dunlap and Stephens2009; Johnston Reference Johnston1982). When opportunities for learning are limited, learning or errors are costly, or the optimal response to a social cue is highly predictable, natural selection could shape genetically encoded predispositions to respond in a certain manner to particular social cues. Similarly, if experiences in early life predict later payoffs of social information, and there are costs to learning, early life experience may result in fixed social learning tendencies during adulthood (Lindeyer et al. Reference Lindeyer, Meaney and Reader2013).

There are several instances where responses to social cues appear fixed. Cases such as humans copying the most successful individual even when this is suboptimal (Offerman & Schotter Reference Offerman and Schotter2009), birds ignoring reliable asocial information to copy conspecifics (Rieucau & Giraldeau Reference Rieucau and Giraldeau2009), and the aforementioned counter-mirror effects taking longer to develop than mirror effects could all be the result of the extensive social experience individuals have prior to testing. However, other examples are more difficult to explain in terms of experiential effects. For example, several avian species use conspecific and heterospecific nesting or breeding success during their own habitat selection without clear opportunities to learn to use these cues (although experience can shape later choices; Morand-Ferron et al. Reference Morand-Ferron, Doligez, Dall, Reader, Breed and Moore2010). Restrictions on the stimuli monkeys and warblers socially learn about are also consistent with an adaptive specialization account (Davies & Welbergen Reference Davies and Welbergen2009; Mineka & Cook Reference Mineka, Cook, Zentall and Galef1988, but see Heyes Reference Heyes1994). Such predispositions would reduce errors during social learning, rather like predispositions to attend to conspecifics protect young birds from errors during filial imprinting (Horn Reference Horn2004).

Given that predispositions are expected for certain forms of social information use, the unconstrained flexibility of mirror systems that Cook et al. note raises two possibilities, assuming that mirror system efficiency is a determinant of fitness. Either (1) mirror system flexibility is vital to their adaptive function, suggesting that social cues have variable meanings that must be learned, or (2) evolved alternatives to associatively acquired mirror systems are constrained, perhaps by their cost. The broad affordances of associative learning may mean that beneficial mirror systems come virtually “for free,” reducing the likelihood of alternate evolved solutions.

If mirror systems and social learning tendencies are the products of general learning processes, the evolution of social and general intelligence may be closely entwined (Brown & Brüne Reference Brown and Brüne2012; Dunbar & Shultz Reference Dunbar and Shultz2007; Reader et al. Reference Reader, Hager and Laland2011). Furthermore, because associative learning and social information use are phylogenetically widespread, mirror systems could be studied in species such as insects, where evolutionary studies could examine the related but separate questions of adaptiveness and adaptive specialization. Particularly informative would be studies of species where deviating from group behavior carries strong costs, such as certain fish (Bates & Chappell Reference Bates and Chappell2002). Studies of links between mirror system efficacy and behavioral competence are essential, ideally by measuring costs and benefits for fitness in “real-world” group situations to establish when individuals out-compete or interact more effectively with others. Cook et al. present a parsimonious model that inspires broad application and testing of mirror system concepts.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I gratefully acknowledge funding by Utrecht and McGill Universities and the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC).

References

Bates, L. & Chappell, J. (2002) Inhibition of optimal behavior by social transmission in the guppy depends on shoaling. Behavioral Ecology 13:827–31.Google Scholar
Boyd, R. & Richerson, P. J. (1985) Culture and the evolutionary process. University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Brown, E. C. & Brüne, M. (2012) The role of prediction in social neuroscience. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 6:147. doi:10.3389/Fnhum.2012.00147.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Byrne, R. W. (2002) Imitation of novel complex actions: What does the evidence from animals mean? Advances in the Study of Behavior 31:77105.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Caldwell, C. A. & Whiten, A. (2002) Evolutionary perspectives on imitation: Is a comparative psychology of social learning possible? Animal Cognition 5:193208.Google Scholar
Church, R. M. (1957) Transmission of learned behavior between rats. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 54:163–65.Google Scholar
Davies, N. B. & Welbergen, J. A. (2009) Social transmission of a host defense against cuckoo parasitism. Science 324:1318–20.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Dawson, E. H., Avargues-Weber, A., Chittka, L. & Leadbeater, E. (2013) Learning by observation emerges from simple associations in an insect model. Current Biology 23:727–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dunbar, R. I. M. & Shultz, S. (2007) Evolution in the social brain. Science 317:1344–47.Google Scholar
Dunlap, A. S. & Stephens, D. W. (2009) Components of change in the evolution of learning and unlearned preference. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, B: Biological Sciences 276:3201–208.Google Scholar
Heyes, C. M. (1994) Social learning in animals: Categories and mechanisms. Biological Reviews 69:207–31.Google Scholar
Heyes, C. M. (2012a) Grist and mills: On the cultural origins of cultural learning. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 367:2181–91.Google Scholar
Heyes, C. M. (2012c) What's social about social learning? Journal of Comparative Psychology 126:193202.Google Scholar
Horn, G. (2004) Pathways of the past: The imprint of memory. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 5:108–20.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Johnston, T. D. (1982) The selective costs and benefits of learning: An evolutionary analysis. Advances in the Study of Behaviour 12:65106.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Katsnelson, E., Motro, U., Feldman, M. W. & Lotem, A. (2008) Early experience affects producer-scrounger foraging tendencies in the house sparrow. Animal Behaviour 75:1465–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kendal, R. L., Coolen, I. & Laland, K. N. (2009) Adaptive trade-offs in the use of social and personal information. In: Cognitive ecology II, ed. Dukas, R. & Ratcliffe, J. M., pp. 249–71. University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Keysers, C. & Perrett, D. I. (2004) Demystifying social cognition: A Hebbian perspective. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8(11):501507.Google Scholar
Laland, K. N. & Bateson, P. (2001) The mechanisms of imitation. Cybernetics and Systems 32:195224.Google Scholar
Leadbeater, E. & Chittka, L. (2007) Social learning in insects – From miniature brains to consensus building. Current Biology 17:R703–13.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Lefebvre, L. & Giraldeau, L.-A. (1996) Is social learning an adaptive specialization? In: Social learning in animals: The roots of culture, ed. Heyes, C. M. & Galef, B. G. Jr., pp. 107–28. Academic Press.Google Scholar
Lindeyer, C. M., Meaney, M. J. & Reader, S. M. (2013) Early maternal care predicts reliance on social learning about food in adult rats. Developmental Psychobiology 55:168–75.Google Scholar
Miller, N. & Dollard, J. (1941) Social learning and imitation. Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Mineka, S. & Cook, M. (1988) Social learning and the acquisition of snake fear in monkeys. In: Social learning: Psychological and biological perspectives, ed. Zentall, T. & Galef, B. G. Jr., pp. 5173. Erlbaum.Google Scholar
Morand-Ferron, J., Doligez, B., Dall, S. R. X. & Reader, S. M. (2010) Social information use. In: Encyclopedia of animal behavior, vol. 3, ed. Breed, M. D. & Moore, J., pp. 242–50. Academic Press.Google Scholar
Mottley, K. & Giraldeau, L.-A. (2000) Experimental evidence that group foragers can converge on predicted producer–scrounger equilibria. Animal Behaviour 60:341–50.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Mui, R., Haselgrove, M., Pearce, J. & Heyes, C. (2008) Automatic imitation in budgerigars. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 275(1651): 2547–53.Google Scholar
Offerman, T. & Schotter, A. (2009) Imitation and luck: An experimental study on social sampling. Games and Economic Behavior 65:461502.Google Scholar
Pigliucci, M. & Kaplan, J. (2000) The fall and rise of Dr Pangloss: Adaptationism and the Spandrels paper 20 years later. Trends in Ecology and Evolution 15:6670.Google Scholar
Range, F., Huber, L. & Heyes, C. (2011) Automatic imitation in dogs. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 278(1703):211–17.Google Scholar
Reader, S. M. & Biro, D. (2010) Experimental identification of social learning in wild animals. Learning and Behavior 38:265–83.Google Scholar
Reader, S. M., Hager, Y. & Laland, K. N. (2011) The evolution of primate general and cultural intelligence. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 366:1017–27.Google Scholar
Rendell, L., Fogarty, L., Hoppitt, W. J. E., Morgan, T. J. H., Webster, M. M. & Laland, K. N. (2011) Cognitive culture: Theoretical and empirical insights into social learning strategies. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15:6876.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Rieucau, G. & Giraldeau, L. A. (2009) Persuasive companions can be wrong: The use of misleading social information in nutmeg mannikins. Behavioral Ecology 20:1217–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar