II. THE TEXT

The text of Political Tactics, recently published in a critical edition, is the result of three succeeding versions (See James et al. Reference James, Blamires, Pease-Watkin, Bentham, James, Blamires and Pease-Watkin1999). The first one, entitled Essays on Political Tactics, was printed and privately distributed in 1791. It contained the plan of the work, a Preface, and two fragments entitled “Essay V” and “Essay VI.” The other essays were probably never finished by the author. In 1816, Bentham's friend and French editor, the Genevan Calvinist pastor Etienne Dumont, published a digestum of the Essays, entitled Tactique des assemblées législatives, suivie d'un traité des sophismes politiques, based on the printed sections and on Bentham's manuscripts. Although the original sources have been lost, it is clear from a comparison of Essays V and VI with the equivalent chapters that Dumont had substantially compressed Bentham's original text.Footnote ¹ The third version, by Richard Smith, contained the translation into English of Dumont's Tactique. It was published under the title, An Essay on Political Tactics in Volume 2 of The Works of Jeremy Bentham, edited between 1838 and 1843 by John Bowring. Unlike Dumont's version, Smith's edition followed the order of chapters announced in the 1791 plan and included the full text of Essays V and VI, which now formed, respectively, part of chapter five and chapter six.

Although the earliest known reference made by Bentham to a work on parliamentary procedure dates from 1778, his interest in this matter was reawakened in the summer of 1788 by the news coming from France, reporting that the Parlement of Paris was going to decree the imminent opening of the Estates-General. From then on, Bentham turned his attention to France; he intended to contribute to the debate on the composition and activities of the French Assembly with a work on parliamentary procedure and with other essays on representation, political economy, public finance, and penal law. He made some efforts to obtain the approval of Count Mirabeau, André Morellet, Mme Necker, the Duc de la Rochefoucauld, and the Marquis de la Fayette, and he asked Morellet to secure a translation of Tactics. But their responses were not encouraging. Only a small fragment appeared, without acknowledgment, in Mirabeau's journal (June 1789), the Dixième lettre du Comte de Mirabeau à ses commettans. Conversely, Dumont's edition was published at the time of the early liberal conspiracies against the Holy Alliance, and it enjoyed a great success on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. It was translated into German, Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish.

Political Tactics is considered by the editors of the critical edition as “probably the first attempt ever made to theorize broadly about parliamentary procedure” (James et al. 1843, p. v). It has the characteristics of a theoretical work in which the reasons for recommending certain procedures are carefully examined in the light of historical evidence.

III. AN ECONOMICS OF PROCEDURE?

Contemporary agenda theory can be defined as a branch of the theory of social choice that enjoys an interdisciplinary status. Although it relies on the economic theory of social choice for its foundations, it is part and parcel of the toolbox of political science and other social disciplines.

Bentham was basically a legal theorist, and at the time he wrote Political Tactics he had just emerged from an attempt to write a Pannomium, a general body of principles embodying every branch of law. Many discussions in Tactics reveal that in establishing the principles of procedure Bentham had in mind not only the regulations of the British Parliament, but also the functioning of the courts, a topic to which he later devoted one of his most impressive works: the Rationale of Judicial Procedure (1808–12). He considered his analysis of parliamentary “tactics” as an element of the theory of constitutional law, a branch that the onset of the French Revolution had made particularly significant. This work accompanied other essays written approximately in the same period, such as the Considérations d'un Anglois sur la composition des États-Généraux y compris réponses aux questions proposées aux Notables & c. (better known as Essai sur la Représentation) (1788) and Nonsense upon Stilts, or Pandora's Box Opened, or the French Declaration of Rights prefixed to the Constitution of 1791 laid open and exposed (1795, published by Etienne Dumont in 1816 under the title Sophismes anarchiques), which discussed, respectively, the theory of representative democracy and the theory of natural rights that formed the basis of the French constitutions of 1791 and 1795 (see Bentham Reference Bentham, Schofield, Pease-Watkin and Blamires2002).Footnote ²

Before 1788 Bentham had written only one work on political economy, Defence of Usury (1787), although the debates in the French Assembly soon drew his attention to issues of public finance, monetary policy, and patent law. These beginnings of an interest in economics may explain the presence in Tactics of examples, analogies, and models taken from the economic world. For example, in the Preface, Bentham describes the French Assembly as being “in the situation of a manufacturer, who, besides the work that was the object of his manufacture, should find himself under the necessity of making the very tools he was to work with” (Bentham Reference Bentham, James, Blamires and Pease-Watkin1843, p. 1). An economic metaphor is employed to illustrate the benefits of publicity: “The public will repay with usury the confidence you repose in it” (1843, p. 30). Finally, he makes a mockery of the conservative opinions of judges on the indeterminacy of British law texts by employing an economic analogy: “Our forefathers lived for ages without the knowledge of commas, stops and figures: why should they be adopted now? The argument amounts to this—Our forefathers lived upon acorns and mast; corn is therefore a useless luxury” (1843, p. 119).

But there are more substantive uses of economic terms. For example, at the core of Bentham's analysis of the distortions generated by flawed procedures, the benefit gained by organized minorities through manipulations is described as a “profit”: “Every cause of disorder is a source of profit to undue influence, and prepares, in the long run, for the approach of tyranny or anarchy” (1843, p. 20). The term profit is used here to identify a rent-seeking type of action: procedural disorder creates opportunities for pecuniary or non-pecuniary “profit,” a net return over illicit “investment.” Moreover, Bentham believes that a procedure is optimal not only when it promotes the interest of the greatest number, but when it generates this result by making “economy” of time and energies. Thus, for example, there is economy of time when the vote on questions on which a large agreement has not yet been reached is postponed: “When an indefinite adjournment is adopted, it is probable that the original motion would have been rejected. The prompt termination of the debate is then an economy of time” (1843, p. 142).

The last quotation reveals an aspect that can be found in other legal texts written by Bentham at that time: the ordinate regulation of a branch of law or administration is considered as an “economy” of means and an “economic” management. Thus, there must be an “economy of punishments,” an “economy of rewards,” and an “economic” management of prisons and other public establishments.Footnote ³ These ideas illustrate Bentham's peculiar approach to the science of “political economy.” Although in the course of time he became aware of Adam Smith's contribution, he had already developed an interest in this discipline some years before the publication of The Wealth of Nations (WN) (1776). In a way he shared with Smith the same intention to turn into a scientific body of positive knowledge the older “art of political economy.” This was what Smith himself called “the science of a statesman or legislator” (1776, p. 428), a body of regulations concerning not only the commerce and public finance, but also every other branch of public administration, from security to health, transports, poor management and defense. However, as the trajectory from the Lectures on Jurisprudence to The Wealth of Nations reveals, Smith's reformation of the economic discourse resulted, inter alia, in a substantial narrowing of its scope to what con-cerns commerce and economic development, although book 5 of The Wealth of Nations also dealt with problems of public works, education, defense, and taxation. Bentham, for his part, took a slightly different path. As the parts of the Pannomium that addressed the principles of political economy and finance reveal, on the one hand he focused more on the redefinition of the normative principles that should preside to the work of the legislator than on the positive side of the analysis. The Greatest Happiness Principle and the doctrine of the “subordinate ends of legislation” (security, abundance, subsistence, and equality) provided the guidelines to such a reformation. On the other hand, Bentham's study concentrated on the instruments that the legislator should employ to foster these goals. This part of his analysis had many points in common with what was developed in the sections of the Pannomium on punishment and reward. It was in these sections—and especially in the theory of reward—that he discussed some questions concerning the organization of public establishments, public works, education, and the encouragement of the arts and sciences—some of the topics that were included in the “old” political-economic doctrines. In a way, Dumont's decision to publish Bentham's reflections on economics as book 4 of Théorie des récompenses (1811)Footnote ⁴ mirrored this unity of discourse and its common origin in Bentham's “reformation” of political economy (see Guidi Reference Guidi2002).

Some fundamental principles of such an “economic” theory are also at work in Political Tactics. And they are crucial to the understanding of this work. A first application concerns the role of incentives and penalties in a procedure aimed at promoting the general interest. An example is represented by Bentham's analysis of the duty of attendance, which according to him is decisive for the correct functioning of representative assemblies. Bentham considers first the evils deriving from absence. Among them there are what in modern terms we might call adverse incentives and adverse selection: the main adverse incentive created by a right of absence from debates is the encouragement of negligence. But there are also important adverse selection effects: “So soon as an employment becomes a source of consideration and of power, without imposing any restraint, it will be sought after—will be bought and sold, by men who have neither inclination nor power to render themselves useful in it” (Bentham Reference Bentham, James, Blamires and Pease-Watkin1843, p. 58). Therefore, Bentham adds: “Such places will often become the apanage of fortune and dignity” (1843, p. 58).

As a “[m]eans of insuring attendance,” Bentham suggests a combination of incentives and penalties. Each member of Parliament should make a deposit “at the commencement of each quarter, of a certain sum for each day of sitting in the quarter; this deposit to be returned to him at the end of the term, deduction being made of the amount deposited for each day for every day he was absent” (1843, p. 58). Alternatively, if a salary is attached to his function, a corresponding portion of this salary should be deposited for the same purpose. This taxation mechanism is very similar to what was suggested in Panopticon (1791, pp. 53-54) to avoid the death of convicts. Both systems belong to the class of self-executing laws (Bentham Reference Bentham, James, Blamires and Pease-Watkin1843, p. 59) analyzed in the Rationale of Reward (Bentham Reference Bentham and Bowring1825, p. 198), and differ from other methods, such as fines, which require a (costly) procedure of inquiry and accusation.

These contrivances introduce the price mechanism into the core of political representation. On the one hand, when members of parliament receive a payment for their functions, their salaries are seen as the price of the public services they render. Bentham considers piece-work and payment by the job as the best wage system, since it is one of those “self-executing” mechanisms that he always recommends (Bentham Reference Bentham and Bowring1825, book 1, chapter 4). The deposit system he proposes to apply to parliamentary activities is similar in essence to this mechanism: “Emoluments are the price of service,—Is there any ground of complaint, if they are attached to the rendering of service?” (Bentham Reference Bentham, James, Blamires and Pease-Watkin1843, p. 59). On the other hand, if members of the Assembly do not receive a salary, the deposit is interpreted as the price of places, which is paid for the pure pleasure of obtaining them. The incentive consists in the fact that if the “service” of attendance is guaranteed, no sum must be disbursed (more exactly: the deposit is returned). In the end, a member of parliament pays this price only if he does not render the required service: “If the employment be of the kind to be undertaken without salary, the chance of losing a part of the deposit ought to be regarded as the price of the place” (1843, p. 59).

In the Rationale of Reward Bentham also argues that in most cases incentives must be combined with punishment. In the management of labor, for example, the positive effect created by the hope of receiving a wage must be strengthened by the fear of being dismissed or fined if minimum conditions are not respected or if damages are caused (Bentham Reference Bentham and Bowring1825, pp. 207–208). In the case of parliamentary procedure the penalty consists in “one day of arrest for each contravention” (Bentham Reference Bentham, James, Blamires and Pease-Watkin1843, p. 59). Such a penalty is necessary for constraining the rich, who would not suffer from the loss of the deposit, to attend sessions. It is also a measure of equality, since otherwise “there would perhaps be formed two classes in the assembly—those who were paid for their functions, and those who paid for not fulfilling them” (1843, p. 59).

A second crucial element of Tactics is represented by the pervasive role of emulation and competition as efficiency-generating mechanisms. This is another subject that in Bentham's view is at the edge between the theory of reward and political economy. In French local parlements and in the Estates-General, representation by orders entailed some rules of precedence that fixed the order in which the members of these bodies were allowed to speak. Bentham was convinced that such a “fixed order of pre-audience” was contrary to general utility (1843, p. 101). The main reason was that a fixed order discourages emulation, considered as an incentive to the industrious exercise of intelligence: “a fixed order is unfavourable to the growth of that intelligence on which rectitude of decision in great measure depends; to wit, in as far as intelligence is the fruit of industry, excited by emulation” (1843, p. 101). In Manual of Political Economy, Bentham bases his case for free trade on the same role that competition plays in stimulating agents to develop the knowledge and motives which lead to their own success and indirectly to general welfare (1793–95, pp. 228–31; see Guidi Reference Guidi and Moggridge1990b). The role of emulation is equally crucial: the lower an intelligent man is in the order of precedence, “the less will it appear to be worth his while to be at the pains of studying the subject, for so small a chance of distinguishing himself, or being of use” (1843, p. 101). More than that: “Should superior ability or perseverance now and then get the better of this obstacle, still it is an inconvenience in itself, and a disheartening circumstance to reflect on, that his arguments cannot be produced till after the attention of the hearers may have been exhausted, and their appetite palled” (1843, p. 101). Finally, there is also a dynamic negative effect: “In this line, as in every other, the less a man's faculties seem likely to be worth, either to himself or others, the less labour will be bestowed in cultivating them” (1843, p. 101).Footnote ⁵

The conclusion is obviously that free competition in registering for speaking maximizes the static and dynamic efficacy of emulation. Bentham also examines the comparative efficiency of different criteria for ordering interventions. He ranges hierarchically two methods: (i) first-come-first-served; (ii) lottery (1843, p. 78).

Both are better than a fixed order since they give to those who are most eager to speak a fair chance of being among the first speakers. They leave people free to register or not for debates and ensure equality of treatment. However, Bentham's prefers the first method for the static and dynamic effects on emulation that it produces: the most motivated rush to the presidency desk at the opening of registration, and if a lottery places them at the end of debates, they could be frustrated. But there is a second reason to prefer this criterion: Bentham is aware that a fixed order “tends to waste time by increasing the quantity of useless discourse” (1843, p. 101). Those who rank higher in precedence feel themselves obliged to speak, whereas they would have been silent in a free competition. Bentham does not emphasize enough that this is an additional argument against lotteries. Third, free order and free competition maximize the benefits of cooperation and division of labor: an orator who is able in description and narration speaks first, followed by a rhetorician who emphasizes the most important aspects of the motion, then by another speaker who is talented in suggesting amendments and improvements, and finally by another who is specialized in synthesis (1843, p. 102). The probability that this order is respected under the system of precedence is minimal, and it is low in lotteries. Finally, precedence, if based on social hierarchy, strengthens the “seductive influence” of the higher ranks on the lower (1843, p. 102).

Considering these arguments together we can conclude that:

1. (i) precedence destroys emulation, minimizes the division of labor, and maximizes waste of time, useless discourse, and aristocratic privilege;

2. (ii) lotteries allow limited emulation and reduce waste of time, but there is a strictly positive probability that the negative effects of precedence are maintained;

3. (iii) free competition on a first-come-first-served basis excites emulation, maximizes efficacy, useful discourse, division of labor, and destroys aristocratic privilege.

That Bentham's ranking depends on the value he attributes to emulation is demonstrated by another case: that of the admission of visitors attending the sessions of parliament. In this case the first-come-first-served criterion is not optimal. Bentham suggests that visitors ought to pay a ticket for each day of attendance. As he comments: “This arrangement is most favourable to equality, in a case where equality is justice” (1843, p. 63).Footnote ⁶ His argument is that in this case the price mechanism maximizes welfare. We have again a hierarchy of alternatives:

1. (i) The first-come-first-served criterion, in a large public, is analogous to lotteries, and lotteries do not maximize welfare since there is a strict positive probability that they favor those who profit less from attendance. Bentham intermingles reasons of equality with reasons of welfare: “The strongest and the rudest will have all the advantage in the struggle. The gallery would be filled with spectators, who would be the least profited by the debates, and who have the most to lose by the cessation of their labours” (1843, p. 63).

2. (ii) Discretionary allocation reserved to government generates “partiality and dangerous intention” (1843, p. 63): “it would restrict the prerogative of publicity, instead of extending it, by making a common right degenerate into a personal favour, and thus opposing the principle of equality without any advantage” (1843, p. 63).

3. (iii) Pricing is the best alternative, since it generates a favorable selection in terms of “consumer” surplus. Bentham is aware, however, that this measure is neither “perfect” nor “noble,”Footnote ⁷ “but the employment of the produce may ennoble it” (1843, pp. 63–64). The justification is made according to an implicit notion of willingness to pay: “A price of admission unites all the conditions. It is an imperfect measure, it is true, but it is the only possible one, of the value attached to this enjoyment. It is also a proof of a condition in life which guarantees a respectable class of spectators” (1843, p. 63).

Similar arguments in favor of competition are advanced concerning the right to initiative, which, according to Bentham, should be extended to all members of parliament and not only to the government or the majority:

It is clear from this passage that Bentham is arguing that monopoly creates adverse incentives and adverse selection.

These examples reveal that the use of economic notions is far from being metaphorical. There is a firm economic belief in the virtues of competition and emulation that migrates from Bentham's “enlarged” conception of economic discourse as formulated in Rationale of Reward into constitutional and political analysis. The examples above also show that the economic calculus, associated to the utilitarian criterion, has the advantage of providing flexible and adaptable solutions with problems of efficiency and efficacy arising within organizations.

In conclusion, although Political Tactics is a work in constitutional law, there is a strong economic analysis of many crucial aspects of the theory of parliamentary procedure. Therefore, the answer to the question contained in the title of this section is that, yes, there is an economics of agenda in Bentham's thought, although his analysis of procedure belongs to a broader area of social and legal theory.

IV. PUBLICITY, GENERAL UTILITY AND THE NEUTRAL PROCEDURE

According to Bentham, publicity is a central characteristic of parliamentary procedure. He devotes chapter 2 and most of chapter 14 of Tactics to this issue, and under this heading he discusses the underpinnings of the utilitarian analysis of procedure.

Publicity in parliamentary procedure has two main goals: securing the union of interest and duty among governors on the one hand, and the confidence in government among the public on the other hand. Again, the issue of the “junction” of interest and duty derives from Bentham's theory of reward. Bentham maintains that the private interest of governors and the public interest at which they ought to aim might be opposed (in the works of his maturity, and especially in Constitutional Code (1830b), Bentham argued that they are constantly opposed).Footnote ⁸ A combination of incentives and penalties could reduce this conflict.

It is at this point that publicity makes its entry. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Tactics is represented by a detailed discussion of the connection between the principle of the union of interest and duty and the role of transparency in securing the control of the “tribunal” of public opinion on the activities of government, an issue that was later to be developed in Constitutional Code. In Bentham's words:

Arguing in favor of open vote, Bentham explains that: “This supposes that publicity is in accordance with the public welfare.” And he comments: “In general, this supposition is well founded. The opinion formed by the public is always conformable to what appears to be its interest; and in the ordinary course of things it sees its interest, whatever it may be” (1843, p. 144). Answering the objection that publicity creates a “system of distrust,” Bentham argues that:

The only safeguard against what Bentham later defined as “sinister interest” is then “an interest of superior force,” and this interest is “respect for public opinion—dread of its judgments—desire of glory” (1843, p. 37).

It is important to observe that Bentham does not naively think that public opinion is the depository of truth in every circumstance. However, he argues that “An individual may pretend to disregard its decrees—to represent them as formed of fluctuating and opposite opinions, which destroy one another; but every one feels, that though this tribunal may err, it is incorruptible, that it continually tends to become enlightened, that it unites all the wisdom and all the justice of the nation” (1843, p. 29).

This passage shows that the objectivity of public opinion is an effect of self-emendation in the long run. There is an opposition between short-run “opinion of to-day,” which may err, and long-term enlightened wisdom (1843, p. 144). Therefore, “the man of virtue, in resisting the opinion of to-day—in rising above general clamour, counts and weights in secret the suffrages of those who resemble himself” (1843, p. 30). He has only to consult his reason and general utility: public opinion will certainly tend towards the latter. Obviously, self-emendation is possible only with publicity and an open debate:

Bentham also considers demagogic eloquence transmitted through publicity and the manipulative effects that it generates. However, he argues that in a representative democracy this danger is minimized: the opinions of members of parliament arrive to the public mediated by the press. There, they are accompanied by the comments of the opposition so that the public is not left under the direct influence of demagogues. “The publicity of debates has ruined more demagogues than it has made. A popular favourite has only to enter parliament, and he ceases to be mischievous. Placed amidst his equals or his superiors in talent, he can assert nothing which will not be combated” (1843, p. 36).

Bentham adds that party opposition cannot entirely replace the tribunal of public opinion in this controlling function. The members of opposition:

As to the second function of publicity, that of securing public confidence, Bentham states that: “Suspicion always attaches to mystery. It thinks it sees a crime where it beholds an affectation of secresy; and it is rarely deceived” (1843, p. 30). The long-term logic is still at work here: “That a secret policy saves itself from some inconveniences I will not deny; but I believe, that in the long run it creates more than it avoids” (1843, p. 31). Public debate strengthens virtuous governments: “Objections have been refuted,—false reports confounded; the necessity for the sacrifices required of the people have been clearly proved . . . It is in this sense that it has been well said, that he who resists, strengthens” (1843, p. 31). The style of these passages, partly due to Dumont's re-writing, has something utopian in it. It recalls the descriptions of public virtue and public honor contained in L'an 2440 by Louis-Sébastien Mercier, a novel that Bentham (or perhaps Dumont) quotes in the Rationale of Reward (Bentham 1811, p. 141). Both authors share the same confidence in the long-term spread of enlightened opinion in public life. The basic idea is that liberal democracy is self-educating and self-restraining; and that this form of government is the only security against manipulation and tyranny. Conversely, unsocial passions are the fruit of the absence of liberty:

This passage contains a key argument of Bentham's political thought, which was first formulated in the Fragment on Government (Bentham Reference Bentham, Bentham, Burns and Hart1776): the power of a sovereign is constantly limited by the habit to obey of the governed. Publicity creates a culture of legal opposition. Bentham reasons here in probabilistic terms: the larger the majority, the higher the probability that the decision taken will promote the general interest of the community. The narrower the majority, the higher the probability that it may be overturned by a larger majority supporting the decision that maximizes welfare:

This passage highlights an important connection between majority vote and public opinion: a majority decision, in a representative body, is the best “probabilistic” approximation to the general utility of those who have elected this assembly, although it may require the sacrifice of minorities. These however have still access to public opinion to express their needs and try to form a new majority in which their interests are better represented.

Finally, a connected advantage of publicity is that it favors communication, especially that concerning the needs of the governed (1843, p. 32). Bentham develops here an analysis of the use of knowledge in society that has a distinctive Hayekian flavor. Without publicity, the parliament and the government have insufficient information:

It is worth noting that in Manual of Political Economy this argument is turned into a powerful reason in favor of laissez-faire (Bentham Reference Bentham and Stark1793-95, pp. 229–30).

In conclusion, Bentham's discussion of publicity highlights his attitude vis-à-vis the theory of agenda. An optimal procedure should minimize the strategic use of agenda for fostering private or “sinister” interests. The majority decision of a representative assembly should reflect the best approximation to the greatest happiness of society, and every use of procedure that avoids this outcome should be interpreted as the expression of private “sinister” interests. Publicity is a crucial instrument to this end, since it submits every act of a representative body to the control of the “tribunal of public opinion” and unveils manipulations.

V. OPTIMAL PROCEDURE AND MANIPULATION

Even though public opinion is omnipotent, “the devil is in the details.” A badly arranged procedure multiplies the cases that meet the censure of the “tribunal” of public opinion and render its work more difficult. The control of public opinion is therefore insufficient without an appropriate regulation of procedure.

In chapter 1 of Tactics, after defining tactics as “the art of setting in order” (Bentham Reference Bentham, James, Blamires and Pease-Watkin1843, p. 15), Bentham claims that the general end of an optimal procedure is the greatest happiness of the community. “But its particular object is to obviate the inconveniences to which a political assembly is exposed in the exercise of its functions” (1843, p. 17). These inconveniences can be defined as “[d]ecisions opposed to what ought to be, in order to promote the welfare of the society” (1843, p. 19). An “improper or hurtful decision” supposes therefore that this decision “incorrectly represents its wishes” (1843, p. 19), and a “system of tactics will the more nearly approach perfection, the more completely it tends to prevent [improper decisions], or to minimize or reduce them to their lowest term” (1843, p. 20).

Most of Political Tactics is devoted to this search for an optimal procedure. In Chapter 6, Bentham examines six fundamental rules that should be observed in parliamentary procedure. The first two rules state that acts of parliament are only those expressed by its members and that they must be written exactly in terminis (1843, pp. 78-82). This reveals a concern about forgery that can be found also in Bentham's monetary writings (Bentham Reference Bentham and Stark1795-96, pp. 191-96). Forgery threatens confidence and consequently the political stability of representative democracy.

A more interesting case is that considered by rule 3: “Unity of the subject of debate kept inviolate” (1843, p. 92). This rule states that a new subject cannot be introduced until a former has been disposed of. This rule is necessary to prevent indecision and confusion, with or without design: “And the endeavour to produce such an effect by design, is one of the most effectual plans that individual fraud or conspiracy can pursue” (1843, p. 92). The evil of confusion is evaluated in utilitarian terms:

Equally appealing is rule 4: “The process of debating distinct from, and prior to, that of voting” (1843, p. 93). Again, there were many instances in French parlements in which this rule was not applied. One after another, members of the clergy, of the aristocracy and of the third estate spoke and voted immediately after their speech. A rigid distinction of the processes of debating and voting was instead observed in the British Parliament (1843, p. 95). According to Bentham, two reasons contribute to recommending the British practice. The first reason is “[t]hat the decision given may not prove an improper one, on the score of having been built upon insufficient and partial grounds” (1843, p. 93). Debating and voting are two qualitatively distinct functions:

Two intertwined arguments support this view: first, “no general rule can take cognizance” of the “differences in point of talent between individuals,” and second, the quality of speeches, in probabilistic terms, is equally distributed along time: “every man's speech presents just the same probability of affording useful lights, as that of every other” (1843, p. 94).

But there is a second, more important, reason that recommends a rigid distinction between debating and voting: leaving aside party commitment, pride, and other rigidities, preferences can be reversed as a result of discussion. The collective will of an assembly before and during discussion may be different from what it is after discussion. Bentham expresses this argument in vivid terms. The reason for separating discussion and voting is:

We have already discussed rule 5 (“In debating, no fixed order of pre-audience”) (1843, pp. 101–106). Rule 6 states that votes must be simultaneous (1843, pp. 106–109), in order “[t]o save time” and “[t]o lessen the efficacy of undue influence” (1843, p. 106).

Other sources of manipulation are examined in chapter 10, which is devoted to the “Drawing up of Laws.” “Simplicity of propositions” is, according to Bentham, “the principal point” to be observed in drawing up laws: “Every article ought to be reduced to a pure and simple proposition; or at least, an article ought never to include two complete and independent propositions, of such nature that the same individual may approve one and reject the other” (1843, p. 119). The reason for this rule is that complex propositions allow manipulation: “a good law may be used as an instrument to compel the passing of a bad one” (1843, p. 120). This “Machiavellism,” Bentham explains, was typical of ancient republics, where the initiative of laws belonged only to the senate: “the people had no other alternative than that of approving or rejecting the whole together; the liberty of choice was not left to them;—their chiefs made them purchase a desired law, a necessary law, at the price of some other law unfavourable to their interests” (1843, p. 121).Footnote ¹⁰

Another source of manipulation consists in the addition of eulogistic or dyslogistic qualifications to the pure expression of the will. This is a special case of complex proposition of the kind examined above: the expression of blame or approbation is added to the pure expression of will contained in the proposed law. In this case, the consequence might be that “the measure may be exposed to rejection, although conformable to the general wish of the assembly” (1843, p. 122). Bentham provides a vivid example: “Let us imagine the following proposition: ‘Considering that there is no God, all penal laws relative to the divinity are abolished’” (1843, p. 122). This just measure, which might be unanimously approved by all members of the assembly, would be rejected on account of that preamble, which a few members, if any, are disposed to approve.

Finally, the possibility of manipulation is often concealed in amendments.Footnote ¹¹ As Bentham remarks: “One rule which ought to be absolute with respect to amendments, is—not to admit any which are insidious” (1843, p. 140). Amendments are insidious when, “instead of improving the motion, [they] represent it as ridiculous or absurd, and . . . cannot be adopted without making the motion fall by means of the amendment itself” (1843, p. 140). Bentham mentions a famous vote of the House of Commons in 1782, on a motion stating that: “It is declared, that the influence of the crown has increased, is increasing, and that it ought to be diminished” (1843, p. 140):

The rules Bentham suggests aim at avoiding these manipulations of which the “spirit of party” (1843, p. 122) and the “seductive influence” of the aristocracy and other powerful minorities are principally accused. Manipulations purposefully modify the will of an assembly and by so doing they promote the interest of the smallest number at the expense of the greatest number.