This an important work, not least because of the existing stereotypes about “Arabs” being incapable of cultivating and maintaining free and democratic social systems. It provides scholarly analysis of the multicultural, ideologically diverse, and politically complex region and its modern struggles. In addressing the lacuna in scholarship on the “idea” and “ideologies” of freedom (al-ḥurriyya), Abu-ʿUksa makes a seminal contribution to 19th-century Arabic and Middle Eastern studies. In it, he consults and interrogates key medieval philosophical sources to contextualize the discussion as well as to describe what he calls the “internal aspects of the emergence of modern ideologies” as they relate to the notion of “freedom” and “liberty” (p. 3). He discusses how and under what circumstances freedom and liberty entered the discourse in the Arabic language and thought. Even though Egypt figures prominently because of its importance as the center for knowledge and learning in the Arab world, the book traces the political history of freedom in many of the Ottoman Arabic-speaking provinces within the period ranging from the “French invasion of Egypt in 1798 through the British invasion” in 1882 (p. 2). The notion of freedom became heavily politicized during this period, influenced, as it was, by European thinking (p. 13). It underwent a major change in the “formation period” from 1820 to 1860 when the colonial influence began to increase on the “political entities of the region . . . where the Ottoman control was nominal” (p. 84). Muslims scholars who visited Europe during this time, returned with reformist zeal. Among them the author names Rifaʿa al-Tahtawi whose writings and translations helped transform Arabic into a “practical” language having borrowed many words from European languages. The transition from ideas to ideologies of freedom was on track even as al-Tahtawi's appeal to European culture was being resisted in some circles. Towards the end of the 19th century the modern concepts of ḥurriyya (freedom) and ishtirākiyya (socialism), were frequently used in political discourse; the word “liberalism” (Arabized as librāl, p. 174) appeared soon thereafter as part of the emerging trends in some Arab countries. The influence of French ideas is particularly noted by the author, Abu-ʿUksa, who argues that as a result, many Arabic words that had simpler meanings received politically suggestive connotations. For example, jumhūr, which previously meant “crowd” or “people,” gradually came to mean “republic.” Similarly, two terms that figured prominently among intellectuals in earlier centuries, tamaddun (civilization) and taqaddum (“being first”), were revived and invested with a renewed understanding for envisioning a new polity. If taqaddum previously referred to the past (as mutaqaddimun meant “predecessors” and those who were “honorable”), in the newly infused meaning it came to mean the future, and more precisely, toward an imagined future that was to be significantly better socially, politically, and otherwise, and hence “most advanced” and civilized (tamaddun) (pp. 69–70). The notion of freedom not only transformed the political discourse, it allowed for the increasing use of related concepts such as reason, equality, secularism, and progress (p. 157). The reformist ideas empowered scholars to speak of freedom as a “utopian ideal” necessary for progress. The social and political reforms that began in the city centers of intellectual learning in the Arab world were largely fueled by the desire to rekindle the spirit of taqaddum (progress) and were believed to be measured by the presence of justice and economic prosperity as well as civil rights (al-ḥuqūq al-jumhūriyya) (p. 74).

Freedom in the Arab World fills a need, because apart from a handful of studies (by Franz Rosenthal, Bernard Lewis, and a few others), the modern concept of freedom has not received much attention in scholarship on the Arab world. The author notes the criticism leveled against Rosenthal's study The Muslim Concept of Freedom prior to the Nineteenth Century (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1960) which, it was suggested, missed the mark because it isolated “the word from its historical context” (p. 17). The present work expands on the scope that Rosenthal pursued by consulting the historical, literary, sociopolitical, and to an extent, philosophical trajectory of the notion of freedom. Abu-ʿUksa is thorough; he analyzes original sources (in Arabic) on political and personal freedom, and on socialism, secularism, and the emergence of modern nation-states. He juxtaposes the political and the religious aspects of the notion of freedom in a time when these appeared to be somewhat amalgamated to defend against colonial influences in many Arab societies. And yet it may be said that the present work is incomplete because it does not thoroughly investigate the sources on freedom in a religious context. Religious figures and their writings are noted and discussed in this book but the focus remains on the political dimension of their thought. The questions that the author explores here are not insignificant; in fact they are vital for our understanding of the history of ideological and ideational trends regarding personal, cultural, and institutional freedoms, and the civilizational forces that nurtured them over the last two centuries. However, the picture it paints is limited.

Freedom is central to any belief system, and Islam is no exception. For example, the tafsīr (exegesis) literature would have been helpful in analyzing the development of the notion by examining relevant scriptural passages that deal with personal moral agency. Even though this work aims to be an in-depth analysis of the political meanings of freedom, it is nevertheless important to show the “organic” connections that exist between the religious and the political. It may be argued that the notion of personal freedom or agency is central in any civilizational matrix, especially one that engenders a transnational religion such as Islam or Christianity. The Qurʾan proclaims “there is no compulsion in religion,” pointing to the necessity of freedom to choose to believe or not to believe. Of course, for the Qurʾan the choice is presented as one between “right” and “wrong.” Nevertheless, the choice is there and so is the inherent notion of freedom. Despite this missing piece, Abu ʿUksa's work makes an important contribution to the field by showing the processes (and stages within these) that were instrumental in the transformation of Arabic thought with respect to the concept of freedom.