INTRODUCTION
A new cultural framework, dignity, face, and honor (Leung & Cohen, Reference Leung and Cohen2011) is receiving increasing attention in the literature (e.g., Aslani, Ramirez-Marin, Semnani-Azad, Brett, & Tinsley, Reference Aslani, Ramirez-Marin, Semnani-Azad, Brett, Tinsley, Olekalns and Adair2013; Aslani et al., Reference Aslani, Ramirez-Marin, Brett, Yao, Semnani-Azad, Zhang and Adair2016; Chiu, Chow, McBride, & Mol, Reference Chiu, Chow, McBride and Mol2016; Friedrichs, Reference Friedrichs2016). This framework extends cultural theorizing beyond the traditional East-West distinctions that have dominated cultural psychology since Hofstede's (Reference Hofstede1980) seminal work. Several theoretical works have described, compared, and contrasted these three cultural prototypes (e.g., Aslani et al., Reference Aslani, Ramirez-Marin, Semnani-Azad, Brett, Tinsley, Olekalns and Adair2013; Friedrichs, Reference Friedrichs2016), and some empirical studies have measured one or another of them, e.g., honor (Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, Reference Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead and Fischer2002). However, as yet, this new cultural framework lacks a validated measurement model. In this work, we develop a measurement model of this new framework of culture. We also assess the model's content validity, construct validity, predictive validity, and measurement invariance. Our work contributes to the culture literature by introducing a reliable and valid model for measuring and distinguishing dignity, face, and honor cultures that can be used to explain cultural differences in interdependent social interactions.
There are several well-established cultural frameworks (e.g., Hofstede, Reference Hofstede1980; Schwartz, Reference Schwartz1994; Trompenaars, Reference Trompenaars1993), so it is reasonable to ask, why develop a measurement model for this relatively new one? There are several reasons. First, the dignity, face, and honor framework is grounded in the motivational theory of self-worth, which is relevant in explaining how people interact in social contexts. Second, although the dignity, face, and honor framework is consistent with the core cultural psychological theory of interdependence-independence (Markus & Kitayama, Reference Markus and Kitayama1991), it extends that theory by introducing honor as a unique form of social motivation. Third, by introducing and distinguishing honor from dignity and face, the framework provides a cultural explanation for behavior in broad swaths of the world beyond the classic East-West comparisons that dominate cultural psychology.
It is worth noting that our approach diverges conceptually and empirically from research using existing cultural frameworks (e.g., Hofstede, Reference Hofstede1980; Schwartz, Reference Schwartz1994). First, prior research emphasizes national or individual values – what is more or less important to people (Brett & Crotty, Reference Brett, Crotty, Smith, Peterson and Thomas2008). Our approach focuses on people's perceived norms regarding social interaction behaviors (Shteynberg, Gelfand, & Kim, Reference Shteynberg, Gelfand and Kim2009; Zou, Tam, Morris, Lee, Lau, & Chiu, Reference Zou, Tam, Morris, Lee, Lau and Chiu2009). Second, prior research using measures based on Hofstede's (Reference Hofstede1980) or Schwartz's (Reference Schwartz1994) cultural dimensions generally has failed to show that cultural values can account for cultural differences in social interactions, for example, negotiation (see a review in Brett & Crotty, Reference Brett, Crotty, Smith, Peterson and Thomas2007). Our research shows that norms distinguishing dignity, face, and honor cultures also account for cultural differences in norms for social interaction, such as use of negotiation strategy, which is the goal directed behaviors that negotiators use to reach agreements (Weingart, Thompson, Bazerman, & Carroll, Reference Weingart, Thompson, Bazerman and Carroll1990).
We chose to test the predictive validity of the dignity, face, honor measurement model in the context of negotiation, because it is an important type of social interaction in which parties are interdependent. Raiffa (Reference Raiffa1982) suggests that negotiation is like a dance in which two parties initiate moves and respond to their counterparts’ moves interdependently. Although some existing studies have documented systematic cultural differences in use of negotiation strategy (e.g., Adair et al. Reference Adair, Brett, Lempereur, Okumura, Shikhirev, Tinsley and Lytle2004; Aslani et al., Reference Aslani, Ramirez-Marin, Semnani-Azad, Brett, Tinsley, Olekalns and Adair2013; Gunia, Brett, Nandkeolyar, & Kamdar, Reference Gunia, Brett, Nandkeolyar and Kamdar2011), few studies show empirically what it is about culture that accounts for those differences (e.g., Brett et al., Reference Brett, Adair, Lempereur, Okumura, Shikhirev, Tinsley and Lytle1998; Brett & Okumura, Reference Brett and Okumura1998; Liu, Friedman, Barry, Gelfand, & Zhang, Reference Liu, Friedman, Barry, Gelfand and Zhang2012). Van de Vijver and Leung (Reference Van de Vijver, Leung, Berry, Poortinga and Pandey1997b: 260) point out that ‘the use of culture as an explanatory variable is not satisfactory, and culture must be decomposed into a set of meaningful psychological constructs, which are then used to explain the cultural differences observed’. Following Van de Vijver and Leung's (Reference Van de Vijver and Leung1997a, Reference Van de Vijver, Leung, Berry, Poortinga and Pandey1997b) advice, we developed a measurement model of dignity, face, and honor culture and validated it by showing that it could account for cultural differences in norms for use of negotiation strategy.
In two studies, we establish the content validity, construct validity, predictive validity, and measurement invariance of our measurement model of dignity, face, and honor cultures. In Study 1 we synthesize items originally developed by Severance and Gelfand (Reference Severance and Gelfand2015) and Rodriguez Mosquera et al. (Reference Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead and Fischer2002) into an integrated three-factor model. We use content validity ratios to assess the content validity of the items, use confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to show items’ convergent and discriminant construct validity, and use correlations to position the ensuing scales in a nomological network including measurements of normative constructs of extrinsic self-worth, manhood ideology, individualism, and collectivism. In Study 2 we use this measurement model to collect data from a sample of participants from 26 cultures. We show that the model is culturally invariant, that the model distinguishes three cultural prototypes, and that the model can account for cultural differences in norms for use of negotiation strategy.
Overall, this research makes several important contributions to the literature. It is the first to provide confirmatory empirical evidence for a measurement model based on the dignity, face, and honor cultural framework. Second, by validating the measurement model in a culturally diverse sample, this research demonstrates the model's generalizability. Third, by showing that dignity, face, and honor cultural norms account for cultural differences in norms for use of negotiation strategy, this research demonstrates the utility of the measurement model of cultural norms for explaning cultural differences in norms for social interaction in negotiation (Van de Vijver & Leung, Reference Van de Vijver, Leung, Berry, Poortinga and Pandey1997b).
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
Perceived Cultural Norms
Cultural values and norms have been used widely to try to explain cultural differences in behaviors (e.g., Leung & Bond, Reference Leung and Bond2009). Most recently, Leung and Morris (Reference Leung and Morris2015) distinguished between the subjective approach centered on values and schemas and the intersubjective approach centered on norms. The intersubjective approach locates the source of cultural influence in the cultural group and the individual's perceptions of it. The intersubjective approach focuses on measuring norms rather than individual values. A value is a belief about what is good, right, and desirable in a society (Hofstede, Reference Hofstede1980). A norm refers to cognitions about the typical beliefs, values, and behaviors of one's group (Shteynberg et al., Reference Shteynberg, Gelfand and Kim2009). The central difference is that while values emphasize ‘what is important’, norms focus on ‘what is appropriate’. Acknowledging the importance of cultural differences in values, scholars suggest that there are limitations of the value approach: ‘if cultural patterns were carried by broad inner values, one would expect them to manifest generally across task conditions and social contexts’ but they do not (Morris, Hong, Chiu, & Liu, Reference Morris, Hong, Chiu and Liu2015: 2). One key reason is that people are highly sensitive to the social context when they are interacting socially.
Our measurement model of dignity, face, and honor cultural norms is grounded in the intersubjective approach. In social interaction, individuals use norms to interpret the context and guide their actions. For example, people automatically become silent when they enter a library, because people possess situational norms that associate specific environments and normative behaviors (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, Reference Aarts and Dijksterhuis2003). There is mounting evidence in cultural psychology that people act on beliefs about what is ‘common sense’ in their societies and groups and that cultural beliefs account for cultural differences in judgments and behaviors better than individual values (Leung & Morris Reference Leung and Morris2015; Morris et al., Reference Morris, Hong, Chiu and Liu2015; Shteynberg et al., Reference Shteynberg, Gelfand and Kim2009; Zou et al., Reference Zou, Tam, Morris, Lee, Lau and Chiu2009). We conceptualize and operationalize our measurement model to capture people's perceived norms. Perceived norms are people's perceptions of attitudes and behaviors that are common in their cultures (e.g., Cialdini & Trost, Reference Cialdini, Trost, Gilbert, Fiske and Lindzey1998; Morris et al., Reference Morris, Hong, Chiu and Liu2015). Social cognition theory suggests that people's cognitions and behaviors are shaped at least in part by how they think their social groups will behave (Hardin & Higgins, Reference Hardin, Higgins, Higgins and Sorrentino1996; Hogg & Abrams, Reference Hogg, Abrams, Hogg and Abrams1993).
Theory also distinguishes between two different types of norms: descriptive norms and injunctive norms. Perceived descriptive norms highlight what the individual thinks is prevalent socially; perceived injunctive norms highlight what the individual thinks is approved of socially (Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, Reference Cialdini, Kallgren and Reno1991). However, in practice prescriptive and injunctive norms are not so easily distinguished. For example, these two norms have similar effects when the collective level of self is activated (e.g., White & Simpson, Reference White and Simpson2013). Also, when information about one type of norm is absent people search for and apply the other type (Leung & Morris, Reference Leung and Morris2015). As our purpose is not to do research on types of norms, but to develop a measurement model of perceived norms, we do not distinguish between descriptive and injunctive norms in the study.
In sum, perceived cultural norms measure what people view as the cultural consensus. Our perceived norms approach to measurement builds on evidence throughout the history of social psychology that perceived normative beliefs predict a wide range of behaviors (Ajzen & Fishbein, Reference Ajzen and Fishbein1977). Following this theorizing, we conceptualize perceived cultural norms as peoples’ perceptions of the culturally social consensus, what everyone is doing and/or what everyone ought to do. As such, a perceived norm is not what the individual thinks is appropriate behavior in the culture, but what the individual thinks is the consensus for appropriate behavior in the culture. In all of our studies, we cue cultural consensus, and measure and analyze perceived norms at the individual level.
Dignity, Face, and Honor Cultures
The framework of interdependence-independence (Markus & Kitayama, Reference Markus and Kitayama1991) has provided substantial insight into the underlying causes of cultural differences in many types of social judgment and social interaction. However, the interdependence-independence framework has not provided a very satisfactory account for cultural differences in aggressive behavior and positive and negative reciprocity (Leung & Cohen, Reference Leung and Cohen2011). In an effort to bridge this gap and synthesize knowledge in cultural psychology, Leung and Cohen (Reference Leung and Cohen2011) proposed the dignity, face, and honor cultural framework. This framework distinguishes these three types of culture primarily, though not exclusively, in terms of their different conceptualizations of the source of socially conferred worth of the individuals. Self-worth is the way a person views him/herself in relation to others (Ayers, Reference Ayers1984). Dignity, face, and honor are synonyms for self-worth, but, according to Leung and Cohen (Reference Leung and Cohen2011), each reflects a unique motivational system. Each motivational system, in turn creates clusters of behavior particular to that culture. Friedrichs (Reference Friedrichs2016) extends the reasoning even further proposing that the nature of the pursuit of self-worth affects not just interpersonal and intergroup behavior, but also the relations between states and nations. Neither Leung and Cohen (Reference Leung and Cohen2011) nor Friedrichs (Reference Friedrichs2016) propose that this framework portends cultural monoliths or rules out cultural change, but both recognize that individuals act and interact within social and cultural systems of meaning and that those systems change slowly. Our purpose in developing a measurement model of dignity, face, and honor culture is to capture that the meaning of these three different cultural systems.
In dignity culture self-worth is primarily based on an intrinsic self-assessment, because in dignity culture ‘each individual at birth possesses intrinsic value that, at least theoretically, is equal to that of every other person’ (Ayers, Reference Ayers1984: 19). This follows the logic of modern Western societies that are traditionally viewed as individualistic and egalitarian cultures (Leung & Cohen, Reference Leung and Cohen2011). In dignity culture self-worth is a birthright and so inalienable – meaning that it is not defined, conferred, or taken away by others. Our conceptualization views dignity as grounded in social independence. A dignity culture gives individuals considerable autonomy in defining themselves in terms of their individual achievements.
In face culture, it is society that bestows self-worth on the individual (Leung & Cohen, Reference Leung and Cohen2011). Face is an individual's claimed sense of positive image in the context of social interactions (Oetzel & Ting-Toomey, Reference Oetzel and Ting-Toomey2003). In face cultures self-worth is primarily based on an extrinsic self-assessment – what do others think of me? This implies that people in face cultures commonly acquire and confirm their self-worth from the recognition of others. Face culture follows the logic in East Asian societies where self-worth is conferred extrinsically and collectivist values are widely held. In face cultures, self-worth is primarily dependent on people's relative positions in a stable social hierarchy, and on the extent to which they fulfill their role obligations in that hierarchy (Heine, Reference Heine2001). Leung and Cohen (Reference Leung and Cohen2011) suggest that hierarchy, humility, and harmony are the three central logics of face culture. Our conceptualization views face culture as grounded in social interdependence, which motivates people to adhere the omnipresent principal of social harmony in order to enhance their face and to avoid losing their face (Leung, Reference Leung, Earley and Erez1997).
Honor culture depicts the logic in Middle Eastern and North African cultures, Latin American cultures, some Mediterranean cultures, and Russian culture (Aslani et al., Reference Aslani, Ramirez-Marin, Semnani-Azad, Brett, Tinsley, Olekalns and Adair2013; Friedrichs, Reference Friedrichs2016). Honor is an individual's reputation, what he thinks others think of him, so it has both an external and internal quality. Pitt-Rivers (Reference Pitt-Rivers and Sills1968: 21) suggests that honor is ‘the value of a person in his own eyes, but also in the eyes of his society’. Honor is a person's estimation of his own worth, claim to pride, but it is also the acknowledgment of that claim by the society. Honor manifests in a reputation for toughness in protecting self and family and for not being taken advantage of by others (Cohen & Nisbett, Reference Cohen and Nisbett1997), but also in trustworthiness and warmth and hospitality toward others (Nisbett & Cohen, Reference Nisbett and Cohen1996; Pitt-Rivers, Reference Pitt-Rivers and Sills1968; Rodriguez Mosquera, Fischer, Manstead, & Zaalberg, Reference Rodriguez Mosquera, Fischer, Manstead and Zaalberg2008). Thus, honor norms encourage people to claim reputation for self and for ingroups, in particular family (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., Reference Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead and Fischer2002).
Comparatively, self-worth is primarily based on an internal analysis in dignity cultures, on an external analysis in face cultures, and on both an internal and external analysis in honor cultures (Leung & Cohen, Reference Leung and Cohen2011). In the current world, Western European, North American, and Oceanian cultures can be characterized as dignity cultures; East Asian cultures can be characterized as face cultures; Middle Eastern, North African, South Asian, Latin American, and Russian cultures can be characterized as honor cultures.
Normative Negotiation Strategy
Walton and McKersie (1965) identified integrative and distributive as two distinct types of negotiation strategy. Integrative strategy consists primarily of an exchange of questions and answers about negotiators’ interests and priorities, while distributive strategy consists primarily of arguments, threats, comparisons, pleas for sympathy, chosen in an attempt to influence the counterpart to make concessions (Brett, Weingart, & Olekalns, Reference Brett, Weingart, Olekalns, Lyons and Mannix2003; Gunia et al., Reference Gunia, Brett, Nandkeolyar and Kamdar2011). There has been extensive research on these two strategies both within Western culture (Olekalns & Smith, Reference Olekalns and Smith2003; Weingart et al., Reference Weingart, Thompson, Bazerman and Carroll1990) and between cultures (Gunia et al., Reference Gunia, Brett, Nandkeolyar and Kamdar2011; Lügger, Geiger, Neun, & Backhaus, Reference Lügger, Geiger, Neun and Backhaus2015).
Culture and negotiation research documents national cultural differences in the use of negotiation strategy (Gunia, Brett, & Gelfand, Reference Gunia, Brett and Gelfand2016). Cultural explanations for these differences vary widely – individualism vs. collectivism, high context vs. low context communication, hierarchical vs. egalitarian social structures, relational vs. transactional motivational orientations, to name a few (Lügger et al., Reference Lügger, Geiger, Neun and Backhaus2015). To develop hypotheses about cultural differences in the use of normative negotiation strategy, we turn to the theorizing about the nature of self-worth in dignity, face, and honor cultures (Leung & Cohen, Reference Leung and Cohen2011) and how people in these different types of culture address conflicts (Aslani et al., Reference Aslani, Ramirez-Marin, Semnani-Azad, Brett, Tinsley, Olekalns and Adair2013).
We propose that the dignity norm will account for cultural differences in normative use of integrative negotiation strategy. Specifically, we expect that negotiators from dignity compared to those from face or honor cultures will be more likely to perceive stronger dignity norms and use more integrative negotiation strategy. From a self-worth perspective, integrative strategy is a socially risky strategy. Negotiators using it assume that the counterpart will not take advantage of them by using the information they shared about their interests and priorities against them. We expect that living in a culture in which the dignity norm predominates will encourage negotiators to take that risk. Dignity norm signifies the inalienability nature of self-worth. In other words, in dignity cultures negotiators’ self-worth is not threatened, if their bet on benevolence and information reciprocity is wrong. In contrast, in face or honor cultures negotiators’ self-worth is more dependent on what others think than in dignity cultures. Losing the bet on others’ benevolence and information reciprocity is likely to cause loss of face and honor in those cultures. The dignity norm allows negotiators to interpret negotiation as a problem to be solved, not a threat to face or honor if it is not successfully solved. To solve the negotiation problem, dignity culture negotiators are likely to engage in direct information sharing about interests and priorities, namely integrative strategy.
We propose that the honor norm will account for cultural differences in normative use of distributive negotiation strategy. Our reasoning is based on the defensive and aggressive behaviors that manifest in situations of social conflict in honor cultures (Rodriguez Mosquera, Reference Rodriguez Mosquera2013). The explanation for this behavior is the impermanence of self-worth based on honor. Aslani and colleagues (Reference Aslani, Ramirez-Marin, Semnani-Azad, Brett, Tinsley, Olekalns and Adair2013: 260) suggest that ‘the dynamic and competitive social environments of honor cultures encourage individuals to act assertively and even aggressively in the face of conflict – to maintain self-worth and gain honor’. From a self-worth perspective, distributive strategy is a socially defensive strategy. Using distributive strategy is consistent with the logic of honor norms – defending and promoting self-worth in social interactions. We expect that negotiators from honor cultures will be motivated to protect their honor, and therefore engage in distributive strategy more than negotiators from face and dignity cultures.
We do not propose that the face norm will mediate cultural differences in use of negotiation strategy. Maintaining face means maintaining social harmony (Adam, Shirako, & Maddux, Reference Adam, Shirako and Maddux2010). As the face norm is antithetical to conflict, there is no reason to propose such mediation.
Hypothesis 1: The dignity norm will mediate the relationship between dignity culture and face and honor cultures and normative integrative negotiation strategy.
Hypothesis 2: The honor norm will mediate the relationship between honor culture and dignity and face cultures and normative distributive negotiation strategy.
OVERVIEW
In Study 1 we develop our measures of dignity, face, and honor norms on a US sample. We also test our measures’ content validity, convergent and discriminant construct validity, and their positioning in a nomological network of traditional measures of cultural constructs, including norms of self-worth, manhood ideology, individualism, and collectivism. In Study 2 we use our measures to account for cultural differences in the prototypical norms for use of negotiation strategy. Empirical research shows systematic cultural differences in the reliance on integrative versus distributive negotiation strategy. As people engage in the process of negotiating social interaction in everyday life, they develop knowledge about how to communicate and coordinate in their own culture. It is this knowledge that we tap into when measuring cultural norms for use of negotiation strategy.
Study 1
Study 1 has two major purposes. First, it develops and tests a measurement model of perceived cultural norms of dignity, face, and honor, synthesizing items from prior work measuring these constructs (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., Reference Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead and Fischer2002; Severance & Gelfand, Reference Severance and Gelfand2015). Second, it examines the positioning of dignity, face, and honor norms in a nomological network with perceived norms of self-worth and other traditional measures of culture.
Scale development
We began the process of developing our measurement model following established practice (Liden, Wayne, Zhao, & Henderson, Reference Liden, Wayne, Zhao and Henderson2008). We discussed and defined the constructs of dignity, face, and honor, and then reviewed the literature identifying Severance and Gelfand (Reference Severance and Gelfand2015) and Rodriguez Mosquera (2002) prior operationalizations of these constructs. Next, we evaluated the face and content validity of the Severance and Gelfand (Reference Severance and Gelfand2015) and Rodriguez Mosquera (2002) items. We based our measurement of dignity and face norms on items originally developed by Severance and Gelfand (Reference Severance and Gelfand2015). There were six items each for dignity norm and face norm. The dignity items had strong face validity, focusing on independent self-worth. The face items also had strong face validity as they focused on maintaining social harmony. We chose the Rodriguez Mosquera et al. (Reference Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead and Fischer2002) honor items because of their face validity and the empirical evidence of reliability. We dropped one item (people feel shame if a close female relative has the reputation of immodesty) from Rodriguez Mosquera et al. (Reference Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead and Fischer2002), because it did not have the face validity of the other four items. The dignity items focus on the intrinsic and inalienable nature of self-worth in dignity cultures; the face items focus on the extrinsic and alienable nature of self-worth in face cultures; the honor items focus on the competing logics and impermanent nature of self-worth in honor cultures. All items are in Table 1 and Appendix I.
Table 1. Rotated component matrix of exploratory factor analysis in Study 1
Notes: All participants were asked to report ‘how frequently do people in your culture think, feel, or act in the ways described in each question’. Each item begins with ‘In the US’ in Study 1 and ‘In your culture’ in Study 2.
We followed Lawshe's (Reference Lawshe1975) method to evaluate all items’ content validity ratios. We gave 11 independent raters the definitions of each construct and had them sort each of the 16 items into one of the three categories: essential, essential but not useful, and not essential, with respect to each construct. For each item, at least eight raters sorted it into the category essential, associated with its underlying theoretical construct. This ratio exceeds the fifty percent ratio recommended by Lawshe (Reference Lawshe1975) to establish content validity. The critical value of the content validity ratio for 11 raters is 0.59, and the ratio of dignity norm (0.91), face norm (0.88), and honor norm (0.73) were all substantially greater than this critical value. Thus, we concluded that the items had reasonable content validity.
We followed the practice of Shteynberg et al. (Reference Shteynberg, Gelfand and Kim2009) for measuring norms. We asked participants to report ‘how frequently do people in your culture think, feel, or act in the ways described in each question’. Participants read items framed: ‘In the U.S., people . . .’. They responded on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = very strongly disagree to 7 = very strongly agree). Thus, all the items were measured as perceived norms, although we do not repeat ‘perceived norm’ each time we mention a measured construct.
Sample
Study 1 involved 384 Caucasian American participants from Amazon Mechanic Turk. We intentionally limited Study 1 to participants from a single culture in order to avoid contamination of the results by translation or response tendencies and to focus on the convergent and discriminant construct validity of the items. Originally, there were 506 respondents, but we dropped 30 participants due to their incorrect answers on attention filter questions, and 92 participants because they reported that their nationality did not reflect their dominant culture. Average age was 32.99 years (SD = 9.96); 46 percent were female.
Measures Extrinsic self-worth norm
A five-item scale was adapted from Crocker, Luhtanen, Cooper, and Bouvrette (Reference Crocker, Luhtanen, Cooper and Bouvrette2003). A higher score on this measure indicates more extrinsic than intrinsic self-worth. The reliability was 0.82.
Manhood ideology norm. The scale was from Barnes, Brown, and Osterman (Reference Barnes, Brown and Osterman2012). The reliability was 0.94.
Individualism norm and collectivism norm. We selected items from existing measures of individualism and collectivism (Moorman & Blakely, Reference Moorman and Blakely1995; Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, Reference Oyserman, Coon and Kemmelmeier2002; Wagner, Reference Wagner1995). There were seven individualism items with reliability 0.89 and six collectivism items with reliability 0.86.
Results
We began the process of evaluating the convergent and discriminant validity of the items by randomly splitting the sample into two subsamples. We used the first subsample (n = 181) to do an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and the second subsample (n = 203) to do the CFA. Statistics associated with the EFA analysis including KMO = 0.78 and Bartlett test result (χ2 = 1239.86, df = 120, p < 0.001) indicating a sound basis for the three-factor solution. All 16 items loaded as our theory predicted, explaining 58.70% of the total variance. Table 1 reports the EFA factor loadings of each item and eigenvalues of each factor.
Using the model developed in the exploratory factor analysis, we ran a CFA using the second subsample (n = 203). Results reported in Table 2 show that the three-factor model fit the data better than any other alternative model. We conclude that the results of CFA show convergent validity within and discriminate validity between factors measuring dignity, face, and honor perceived norms. We developed scale scores for dignity, face, and honor norms by averaging the items loading on each factor. The reliabilities of dignity, face, and honor norms were 0.78, 0.82, and 0.86, respectively.
Table 2. Goodness of fit of confirmatory factor analysis in Study 1
Our next step was to evaluate the position of three cultural norms in a nomological network of self-worth and traditional measures of cultural constructs. We expected that dignity norm would be associated with individualism but not collectivism, and that face and honor norms would be associated with collectivism but not individualism, because dignity, face, and honor framework is consistent with the core cultural psychological theory of interdependence-independence (Markus & Kitayama, Reference Markus and Kitayama1991). Second, we expected the dignity norm to be correlated with intrinsic self-worth while face and honor norms would be correlated with extrinsic self-worth, since Leung and Cohen (Reference Leung and Cohen2011) suggested that self-worth is internal for dignity cultures, mostly external for face cultures, and both internal and external for honor cultures. Third, we expected the manhood ideology norm to distinguish face norm and honor norm, because how people respond to insults, yieldingly or aggressively, is a major difference between face and honor cultures (Aslani et al., Reference Aslani, Ramirez-Marin, Semnani-Azad, Brett, Tinsley, Olekalns and Adair2013).
Table 3 reports the correlations. As expected the dignity norm was negatively correlated with extrinsic self-worth (r = −0.16, p = 0.002), and positively correlated with individualism (r = 0.26, p < 0.001). The face norm was positively correlated with extrinsic self-worth (r = 0.14, p = 0.007) and collectivism (r = 0.32, p < 0.001). In addition, the honor norm was positively correlated with extrinsic self-worth (r = 0.14, p = 0.006), collectivism (r = 0.27, p < 0.001), and manhood ideology (r = 0.28, p < 0.001). In sum, the correlations of the dignity, face, and honor norms with self-worth and traditional measures of culture were consistent with followed the pattern expected. These results demonstrate the convergent and discriminant validity of our measurement model of dignity, face and honor cultures.
Table 3. Descriptive statistics and correlations in Study 1
Notes: *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; two-tailed test.
Discussion
The results of Study 1 show of the measurement model's content validity as well as its convergent and discriminant construct validity. The items measuring dignity, face, and honor norms were discriminant; however, the correlation between the face and honor norms was relatively high, possibly due to the fact that Study 1’s sample was from a single culture, the US, also arguably a dignity culture. In spite of this limitation, the results of the CFA and pattern of correlations between dignity, face and honor norms and normative measures of self-worth, individualism, collectivism, and manhood ideology point to a reliable conclusion that dignity, face and honor are distinct constructs.
Study 2
The purpose of Study 2 was to test via H1 and H2 the predictive validity of the measurement model developed in Study 1 by accounting for cultural difference in norms for use of integrative and distributive negotiation strategy. Study 2 also extended the generalizability of the measurement model into a multicultural sample.
Sample
Participants in Study 2 were 237 MBA students (32 percent were female) from a university in the US. Their mean age was 30.48 years (SD = 4.70). They came from 26 different countries: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Korea, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, United States, and Vietnam. Originally, 274 students actively participated in this study, but we ruled out 37 participants who reported that their nationality did not reflect their dominant culture.
We sorted all remaining participants by their nationalities into three cultural categories – dignity, face, and honor. The criteria for sorting were based on previous theoretical (e.g., Aslani et al., Reference Aslani, Ramirez-Marin, Semnani-Azad, Brett, Tinsley, Olekalns and Adair2013; Friedrichs, Reference Friedrichs2016) and empirical (e.g., Lee, Leung, & Kim, Reference Lee, Leung and Kim2014; Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, Reference Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead and Fischer2000) studies. We followed this classification with a few exceptions. Spain and Portugal have been shown as typical honor cultures (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., Reference Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead and Fischer2000; Vandello & Cohen, Reference Vandello and Cohen2003), so we classified participants from those nations into honor not dignity culture, even though they are Western European nations. This classification resulted in 144 dignity culture participants (Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Switzerland, and United States), 38 face culture participants (China, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Vietnam), and 55 honor culture participants (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Mexico, Morocco, Spain, Portugal, Pakistan). Neither age nor gender composition varied among the three cultural groups. In classifying participants into our cultural framework based on their nationalities, we do not ‘deny internal variation, as between Middle East and Africa for honor cultures, China and Japan for face cultures, or the US and Europe for dignity cultures’ (Friedrichs, Reference Friedrichs2016: 75). However, we recognize that internal variation will make it more difficult to detect cultural differences in norms for use of negotiation strategy and to account for those differences using dignity, face, and honor cultural norms.
Measures Perceived cultural norms
We used the measures of perceived dignity, face, and honor norms developed and used in Study 1. We asked participants to report ‘how frequently do people in your culture think, feel, or act in the ways described in each question’. They read items like ‘In your culture, people . . .’. Reliability of dignity, face, and honor norms was 0.83, 0.85, and 0.85, respectively.
Normative negotiation strategies. We measured norms for use of integrative strategy and distributive strategy with measures adopted from Gunia et al. (Reference Gunia, Brett, Nandkeolyar and Kamdar2011). We used the norm stem ‘How much do people in your primary culture negotiate in the ways described. . .’ with every item. The response scale was a seven-point Likert scale (1 = very strongly disagree to 7 = very strongly agree). Nine items measured integrative strategy with a reliability of 0.83; six items measured distributive strategy with a reliability of 0.76. All items are reported in the Appendix A.
Measurement invariance. We conducted a measurement invariance/equivalence (ME/I) test prior to hypothesis testing, because participants were from different cultural backgrounds (i.e., three different cultural groups), and we intended to compare and contrast the three cultural groups with our norm measures. Passing this statistical test implies that participants from different cultures perceived and understood the measures in the same manner so the comparison is meaningful. We followed Vandenberg and Lance's (Reference Vandenberg and Lance2000) step-by-step directions to evaluate configural invariance, metric invariance, and scalar invariance of our measurement model. Each of the three steps builds upon the previous one by introducing additional constraints on model parameters.
In the first step, we tested the measurement model's configural invariance to ensure that same items measure the same constructs across multiple groups. The model to test configural invariance is called a baseline model, and we assessed the overall model fit to test whether configural invariance holds. The results of CFA show that this baseline model of three factors had a good model fit: χ2 = 557.75, df = 303, RMSEA = 0.060, CFI = 0.92, CMIN/DF = 1.84. Thus, we could conclude that the configural invariance holds.
In the second step, we investigated the measurement model's metric invariance, which means that the construct has the same meaning to participants from different cultural groups. Metric invariance builds upon configural invariance by requiring not only that constructs are measured by the same items, but that the factor loadings of those items also are equivalent across groups. Many previous empirical studies have suggested that at least partial metric invariance is required to ensure meaningful comparisons across groups (Byrne, Shavelson, & Muthen, Reference Byrne, Shavelson and Muthén1989; Rensvold & Cheung, Reference Rensvold, Cheung, Schriesheim and Neider2001). We first tested full metric invariance. The Chi square difference test shows that there was a significant difference between the baseline model and the full metric invariance model (χ2 = 616.98, df = 329), ∆χ2 = 59.23, ∆df = 26, p < 0.001). This result implies that the full metric invariance model does not hold. Next we examined partial metric invariance, by constraining the regression weights of both face and honor norm items as equal. We found that the Chi square difference test between the baseline model and this partial metric invariance model was not significant (χ2 = 579.79, df = 319), ∆χ2 = 22.04, ∆df = 16, p = 0.14). Thus, we could safely conclude that the partial metric invariance holds.
The third step suggested by Vandenberg and Lance (Reference Vandenberg and Lance2000) is to ensure scalar invariance. Scalar invariance means that intercepts for observed variables loading on the same latent variable are invariant across groups. Simply put, scalar invariance implies that participants from different groups do not rate items systematically higher or lower. Scalar invariance ensures unbiased mean comparison, but in our study it is not reasonable to assume scalar invariance because culturally diverse participants by nature have different preferences of scoring. Thus, to ensure a meaningful mean comparison, we adopted a slightly different strategy. We followed Leung and Bond's (Reference Leung and Bond1989) method to transform the data before analyzing it. We calculated each participant's grand mean across all 16 norm items and then subtracted each participant's grand mean from their scores on each item prior to summing items into scales. This transformation means that even if participants in different cultural groups have different scoring preferences, we can still use the transformed data to ensure a meaningful mean comparison. Accordingly, we have demonstrated full configural invariance and partial metric invariance by using Vandenberg and Lance's (Reference Vandenberg and Lance2000) tests, and ensured scalar equivalence by applying Leung and Bond's (Reference Leung and Bond1989) transformation.
Hypothesis testing
We did two tests before formally testing H1 and H2. First, we ran a CFA to ensure that all participants conceptually distinguished dignity, face, and honor norms. Second, we calculated the within group agreement to ensure that participants in each cultural group perceived the norms homogenously. The CFA showed that the three-factor model had a better goodness of fit statistic (χ2 = 259.92, df = 101, RMSEA = 0.082, CFI = 0.91, IFI = 0.90) than alternative two-factor models that combined face and dignity (χ2 = 575.59, df = 103, RMSEA = 0.139, CFI = 0.71, IFI = 0.71), or combined face and honor (χ2 = 539.94, df = 103, RMSEA = 0.134, CFI = 0.73, IFI = 0.74), or combined dignity and face (χ2 = 556.16, df = 103, RMSEA = 0.137, CFI = 0.72, IFI = 0.73). The three-factor model also fit better than the one-factor model combining all three factors (χ2 = 814.58, df = 104, RMSEA = 0.170, CFI = 0.56, IFI = 0.57). Next, we used the indicator of rwg to assess the within group agreement, which refers to the extent to which group members have high agreement regarding their scores (James, Demaree, & Wolf, Reference James, Demaree and Wolf1984). The rwg of dignity norm (0.92, 0.93, and 0.91), face norm (0.91, 0.96, and 0.86), and honor norm (0.91, 0.88, and 0.86) in each of the three cultural groups all exceed the critical value 0.70, indicating high within group agreement (Klein & Kozlowski, Reference Klein and Kozlowski2000).
Finally, ANOVA results indicated significant differences on cultural norms across groups. The results were consistent between transformed and untransformed data. We report results based on transformed data, and illustrate the pattern of cultural norms in Figure 2. For the dignity norm, F (2, 236) = 164.25, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.46, post-hoc tests indicate that participants from the nations classified as dignity culture (M = 0.45, SD = 0.67), face culture (M = -1.47, SD = 0.65), and honor culture (M = -1.04, SD = 0.80) were significantly different from each other (p < 0.001). For the face norm, F (2, 236) = 101.65, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.46, post-hoc tests indicate that participants from the nations classified as dignity culture (M = -0.33, SD = 0.66), face culture (M = 1.22, SD = 0.45), and honor culture (M = 0.42, SD = 0.60) were significantly different (p < 0.001). For the honor norm, F (2, 236) = 39.03, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.25, post-hoc tests again indicate that participants from the nations classified as dignity culture (M = -0.18, SD = 0.80), face culture (M = 0.37, SD = 0.82), and honor culture (M = 0.94, SD = 0.86) were significantly different (p < 0.001).
To test H1 and H2, which predicted that dignity and honor norms would account for cultural differences in normative use of negotiation strategy, we followed Hayes and Preacher's (Reference Hayes and Preacher2014) mediation analysis with a multi-categorical independent variable with unweighted contrast coding method. As our independent variable was categorical, we coded two contrasts (D1 = dignity culture versus face and honor cultures combined, 0.667, -0.333, -0.333; D2 = face culture versus honor culture, 0, 0.5, -0.5) and used the PROCESS macro (Hayes, Reference Hayes2012). We also used a randomly selected balanced subsample from the dignity culture (Ndignity = 45, Nface = 38, Nhonor = 55). However, all results remained the same when we ran PROCESS with the whole dignity culture sample. We controlled for participants’ gender and age in all models, and all results remained the same if we did not do so.
H1 predicted that the dignity norm would mediate the relationship between cultural group and normative integrative strategy. Results showed that there was a positive effect of D1 on the dignity norm (b = 1.64, p < 0.001), and there was a negative effect of D2 on the dignity norm (b = -0.44, p = 0.004). The effect of D1 on integrative strategy was indirect (b = 0.46, s.e. = 0.18, 95% CI [0.14, 0.84]) rather than direct (b = -0.23, p = 0.36), and the effect of D2 on integrative strategy was also indirect (b = -0.12, s.e. = 0.07, 95% CI [-0.32, -0.03]) rather than direct (b = 0.26, s.e. = 0.20, p = 0.21). These results indicate that the dignity norm mediated the relationship between cultural group (dignity versus face and honor) and between cultural group (face versus honor) and the norm of integrative negotiation strategy. These results supported H1. We illustrate this mediation effect in Figure 3.
H2 predicted that honor norm would mediate the relationship between cultural group and normative distributive negotiation strategy. Results showed a negative effect of D1 on the honor norm (b = -0.83, p < 0.001), and a negative effect of D2 on the honor norm (b = -0.55, p = 0.002). In addition, there was a positive direct effect of the honor norm on distributive strategy (b = 0.19, p = 0.02). Testing the model in Figure 1, there was a direct effect of D1 on the distributive negotiation strategy (b = -0.35, p = 0.02) as well as an indirect effect of D1 on distributive strategy via the honor norm (b = -0.16, s.e. = 0.08, 95% CI [-0.34, -0.02]). There was also a direct effect of D2 on distributive negotiation strategy (b = -0.91, p < 0.001) as well as an indirect effect of D2 on distributive strategy via the honor norm (b = -0.10, s.e. = 0.17, 95% CI [-0.25, -0.02]). These results indicate that the honor norm mediated the relationship between cultural group (dignity versus face and honor), as well as between cultural group (face versus honor) and the norm of distributive negotiation strategy. These results supported H2. They are illustrated in Figure 4.
Figure 1. Theoretical model of culture, norms, and negotiation strategies in Study 2
Figure 2. Dignity, face, and honor norms in three culture groups in Study 2
Figure 3. The mediating role of dignity norm in the relationship between cultural groups and integrative strategy in Study 2
Figure 4. The mediating role of honor norm in the relationship between cultural groups and distributive strategy in Study 2
We performed several additional analyses to explore relationships that the model in Figure 1 does not predict. First, we tested the face norm as a mediator of culture on the two norms of negotiation strategy. We did not expect the face norm to be relevant to negotiation strategy and it was not. The indirect effect of D1 on integrative strategy via face norm was not significant (b = -0.04, 95% CI [-0.41, 0.28]); the indirect effect of D1 on distributive strategy via face norm was not significant either (b = 0.27, 95% CI [-0.00, 0.55]). Second, we separated the honor culture sample into Latin America and Middle East-South Asian subgroups. As there were no significant differences between these two subgroups on perceived norms or negotiation strategy, we did not continue this exploratory analysis.
Discussion
Study 2 extends Study 1’s findings in three ways. First, it shows that perceived dignity and honor norms account for cultural differences in norms for use of negotiation strategy. Second, it provides empirical evidence for the categorization of nations into dignity, face, and honor cultural groups. Third, it provides empirical evidence supporting Leung and Cohen's (Reference Leung and Cohen2011) cultural framework, in particular their distinction between face and honor cultures.
Study 2 demonstrates the utility of our measurement model of dignity, face, and honor cultural norms in explaining cultural differences in norms for use of negotiation strategy. We found that perceived cultural norms could explain the effects of culture on norms for use of both integrative and distributive negotiation strategy, indirectly, thereby providing further evidence for the validity of our measurement model.
Study 2 also illustrates the validity of classifying nations by the Chen and Leung's (2011) dignity, face, and honor cultural framework. In Study 2, we classified 237 participants from 26 different nations into three cultural groups. The results showed that one cultural norm emerged as dominant in each cultural group. In North America and Western European nations, the dominant cultural norm is dignity; in East Asian nations, face is the dominant cultural norm; in Spain, Portugal, Middle Eastern, North African, Latin American, and South Asian nations, honor is the dominant cultural norm. Importantly, the results do not support separating Latin American cultures from other honor cultures of the Middle East and South Asia.
Finally, Study 2 provides several different types of empirical evidence supporting Leung and Cohen's (Reference Leung and Cohen2011) conceptual distinction between face and honor cultures. Participants in Study 2 from face cultures endorsed the face norm more strongly than participants from honor cultures and participants from honor cultures endorsed the honor norm more strongly than participants from face cultures. In addition, there were differences between participants from face and honor cultures in their endorsement of integrative strategy. Participants from face cultures reported that integrative strategy was more normative in their culture than participants from honor cultures, but it is the honor norm, but not the face norm, that mediated differences between face versus honor cultures on distributive strategy.
DISCUSSION
In two studies, we developed and validated a measurement model of dignity, face, and honor cultural norms. We showed that our measurement model distinguished three types of culture: dignity, face, and honor. It also provided an explanation for cultural differences in norms for use of negotiation strategy. There are theoretical implications of this research for cultural psychology and negotiation scholarship, as well as applied implications for cultural researchers studying topics in social psychology or negotiations.
Theoretical Contributions
The research contributes to the theory in cultural psychology in that it provides empirical evidence to support Leung and Cohen's (Reference Leung and Cohen2011) dignity, face, and honor cultural framework. This support comes from two separate studies: Study 1 with a culturally homogeneous sample; Study 2 with a culturally heterogeneous sample categorized into the three cultural groups. In the two studies, items manifesting self-worth as dignity, face, and honor showed content validity, convergent and discriminant construct validity, predictive validity, and measurement invariance. In addition, correlations between dignity, face, and honor norms and norms of self-worth, manhood ideology, individualism, and collectivism, showed the expected nomological network pattern of results: dignity cultures are also individualistic and self-worth is intrinsic; face cultures are collectivistic and self-worth is extrinsic; honor cultures are collectivistic and self-worth is extrinsic. The current research provides strong empirical evidence for using this measurement model of dignity, face, and honor cultural norms in cross-cultural studies.
Importantly, this research also provides a variety of evidence to justify distinguishing between face and honor cultures. For example, Study 1 showed that manhood ideology was related to the honor norm but not the face norm. Study 2 showed that the honor norm mediated the relationship between dignity versus face and honor cultures on the norm of use distributive negotiation strategy. This provides additional, empirical evidence that the cultural difference in norms for use of negotiation strategy are deeply embedded in the different underlying ideologies of these two types of culture.
The major finding of these studies that has implications for future culture and negotiation research is that cultural norms associated with self-worth defined as dignity and as honor can account for cultural differences in behavioral norms for social interaction. As a result, this research provides new insights for the cultural and negotiation literature. In short, mechanisms associated with self-worth can explain cultural differences in negotiators’ normative behaviors. It seems likely that if cultural differences in negotiation norms can be explained using this framework and measurement model, then cultural differences in other types of social interaction are also likely to be explained by this framework and measurement model.
Culture research has not always met the standard recommended by Van de Vijver and Leung (Reference Van de Vijver, Leung, Berry, Poortinga and Pandey1997b) to account for cultural differences with psychological constructs. Part of the reason may be lack of an underlying theoretical connection between cultural values, for example, independence-interdependence or individualism-collectivism, and how people act in situations of conflict. As shown by this research, the self-worth based dignity, face, and honor cultural framework, in contrast, does relate to how people act in social situations, like negotiation, that may threaten their self-worth. The dignity, face, and honor framework may not be the only cultural explanation for cultural differences in use of negotiation strategy, but Study 2 suggests that it is one.
This study's applied contribution to researchers in cultural psychology and negotiations is its validated measures of cultural norms of dignity, face, and honor based on the theory of self-worth. These measures not only show excellent validity, they can account for cultural differences in norms for use of negotiation strategy. It seems likely that this measurement model can be used to account for cultural differences in many other types of social interaction and of social cognition beyond negotiation.
Limitations and Future Directions
This research opens a new door for cultural psychologists and negotiation researchers to walk through to better understand how culture affects social interaction. Scholars could continue to test of the validity of the measurement model with different samples, with different cultural constructs, and different dependent variables as well as consider even more nuanced approach to asking about norms.
The measurement model should maintain its validity when used with different samples. Our Study 2 sample provided a conservative test. Although this sample was culturally heterogeneous, all participants answered the measurement items in English and all were studying in the US. Nevertheless, Study 2 validated the measurement model's power to distinguish cultural group differences based on classifying participants according to their nationality. We also note that participants in Study 2 were not random samples from nations within the dignity, face, and honor regions. With larger and more representative samples, nuances are likely to emerge. For example, we would be particularly interested in developing and testing a theory about differences between Latin American and Middle Eastern and South Asian honor cultures. There are also regions as yet unstudied, in particular Russia and sub-Saharan Africa. What norms account for self-worth and govern social interaction and negotiations in these regions? This is unresolved by the current empirical literature.
Study 1 showed that our measures of dignity, face, and honor cultural norms had the expected relationships with self-worth and with individualism collectivism and manhood ideology. There are many other explanatory cultural constructs, however, and future research has the opportunity to evaluate how dignity, face, and honor cultural norms correlate with them. What other cultural differences in behavior, besides negotiation strategy might the dignity, face, honor measurement model explain? A major opportunity for negotiation researchers is to begin to conceptualize and test is whether dignity, honor, but especially face norms can explain cultural differences in direct versus indirect confrontation of conflict (Brett, Reference Brett2014). A limitation of the current research is that the dependent variable in Study 2 was negotiation strategy used in confronting conflict directly. We did not hypothesize on face norm in the current research, but maybe it could serve as an important mechanism in accounting for some other cultural differences in confrontation of conflict.
Another opportunity for future research is to see if a more nuanced wording of cultural norm items may capture meaning with greater validity and so explain more variance in cultural differences than we were able to in our study. Some of the items we used featured ‘should’, which highlights injunctive norms, while other items featured ‘do’, which highlights descriptive norms. They are different to some extent because the former is based on social reactions to one's behaviors, while the latter is based on the observed behaviors of others and social learning (Cialdini et al., 1991). This is one limitation of our study because it may cause confusion from participants, but a supplementary analysis based on Mturk alleviates our concerns. We randomly assigned 100 American participants into two groups: 50 read the ‘should’ version (e.g., In the US, people should be concerned about their family having a bad reputation) and 50 read the ‘do’ version (e.g., In the US, people are concerned about their family having a bad reputation). Results of t-test showed there are no significant difference in terms of each honor item (p = 0.22, 0.17, 0.09, and 0.69) as well as the overall honor norm construct (p = 0.13). Thus, we conclude that the ‘should’ ‘do’ wording does not cause significant difference in the current research.
Finally, we recognize that dignity, face, and honor elements of self-worth exist in all people and in all cultures. Although this research suggests that dignity, face, and honor norms are dominant in different regions of the world, their pattern of dominance may depend on the stability of those regions’ societies, their politics, and their economies. Threats due to political upheaval, environmental change, and from the interdependence of the global economy may change the pattern of dominance of dignity, face, and honor norms, and in doing so impact people's sense of self-worth and the nature of their social interactions.
APPENDIX I
Extrinsic Self-worth Norm
1. In the U.S., people don't care what others think of them. (R)
2. In the U.S., what others think of people has no effect on what people think about themselves. (R)
3. In the U.S., people don't care if other people have a negative opinion about them. (R)
4. In the U.S., people's self-esteem depends on the opinions others hold of them.
5. In the U.S., people can't respect themselves if others don't respect them.
Manhood Ideology Norm:
1. In the U.S., a man has the right to act with physical aggression toward another man who calls him an insulting name.
2. In the U.S., a man doesn't let other people push him around.
3. In the U.S., a man has the right to act with physical aggression toward another man who slanders his family.
4. In the U.S., a man can always take care of himself.
5. In the U.S., a man has the right to act with physical aggression toward another man who openly flirts with his wife.
6. In the U.S., a man never lets himself be a ‘door mat’ to other people.
7. In the U.S., a man has the right to act with physical aggression toward another man who trespasses on his personal property.
8. In the U.S., a man can ‘pull himself up by his bootstraps’; when the going gets tough.
9. In the U.S., a man has the right to act with physical aggression toward another man who mistreats his children.
10. In the U.S., a man will never back down from a fight.
11. In the U.S., a man has the right to act with physical aggression toward another man who steals from him.
12. In the U.S., a man never leaves a score unsettled.
13. In the U.S., a man has the right to act with physical aggression toward another man who vandalizes his home.
14. In the U.S., a man doesn't take any crap from anybody.
15. In the U.S., a man has the right to act with physical aggression toward another man who insults his mother.
16. In the U.S., a man is seen as a tough in the eyes of his peers.
Individualism Norm:
1. In the U.S., people's personal identity, independent of others is very important.
2. In the U.S., people set their aspirations independent from others.
3. In the U.S., people want to be judged on their own merit.
4. In the U.S., people like to decide their futures themselves.
5. In the U.S., people like to choose their own goals.
6. In the U.S., people enjoy being unique and different from other Americans.
7. In the U.S., people like to set goals by themselves.
Collectivism Norm:
1. In the U.S., people try to avoid arguments even when strongly disagreeing with group members.
2. In the U.S., people try to maintain agreement among group members.
3. In the U.S., people enjoy cooperating with others in groups.
4. In the U.S., people want to avoid dissention in their groups.
5. In the U.S., people want their groups to be congenial.
6. In the U.S., people try to maintain harmony in any group they belong to.
Integrative Strategy Norm:
1. In negotiation, most people in my culture ask counterparts what their needs are.
2. In negotiation, most people in my culture ask counterpart about their priorities.
3. In negotiation, most people in my culture share information about own interests.
4. In negotiation, most people in my culture ask counterparts about their underlying motivations.
5. In negotiation, most people in my culture ask counterparts about what is more and what is less important in the negotiation.
6. In negotiation, most people in my culture ask counterparts about their interests.
7. In negotiation, most people in my culture tell counterparts about their own interests.
8. In negotiation, most people in my culture reveal their interests.
9. In negotiation, most people in my culture talk about their own needs.
Distributive Strategy Norm:
1. In negotiation, most people in my culture use persuasion to justify their positions.
2. In negotiation, most people in my culture appeal to emotions.
3. In negotiation, most people in my culture try to put pressure on their counterpart.
4. In negotiation, most people in my culture argue to support their positions.
5. In negotiation, most people in my culture make threats.
6. In negotiation, most people in my culture exaggerate their positions.
