All societies undergo periods of stress from time to time, whether caused by internal factors or by radical changes in their economic, political or other environments. Why do some make the necessary adjustments by peaceful political means with relatively little disruption of their underlying social order while others spiral into violence, social disorder and (not infrequently) inter-communal warfare? This is a question that has long engaged political theorists and in this short book Robert Layton reflects upon it from the perspective of an anthropologist. His subject is nothing less than the role of violence in human evolution.

The natural human condition, he argues, is not a Hobbesian state of perpetual war but rather one in which, given the right conditions, social order can be maintained in self-regulating local communities. His sympathies clearly lie with John Locke and, more particularly, the Scottish social philosopher Adam Ferguson, both of whom stressed the intrinsically social nature of humans, which supposedly endows them with a capacity to organize their affairs in an orderly fashion through rational self-interest. When social order breaks down, Layton suggests, the causes are to be found not in some primordial human proclivity for violence but in externally imposed alterations in the economic or physical environment of the communities in question. Drawing on the neo-Darwinian theories of Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens, he argues that changes in the “fitness landscape” may undermine co-operative strategies for survival and encourage competitive (and possibly violent) behaviour. Two analytical models that specifically explain such a shift may be derived from game theory: “firstly the transition from a non-zero-sum game to a zero-sum game, and secondly the inability to generate mutual trust when faced with the Prisoner's Dilemma” (94–95).

A central concern of the author is to refute the notion, as famously theorized by Ernest Gellner, that civil society is a uniquely modern and rational phenomenon that arose out of the European Enlightenment and is essentially related to the development of a market economy. Layton maintains to the contrary that individuals act on the basis of rational self-interest in all human societies and he cites numerous studies of pre-Enlightenment European and non-Western communities that support this general conclusion. Political scientists will find nothing here that is particularly new or interesting. Indeed, the whole discussion of civil society would have benefited from a closer acquaintance with the extensive political science literature on the subject. For example, Robert Putnam's discussion of “social capital” in Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993) would seem especially relevant. Yet it is not mentioned in the text or included in the bibliography.

This is a work of theoretical analysis rather than case-based empirical research. At key points, however, the author relates his general or abstract conclusions to actual cases, drawing on a wide array of historical studies and the fieldwork of anthropologists, sociologists, ethnographers, geographers and others on subjects ranging from the contemporary British nightclub scene (for a discussion of bouncers and violence) to Anglo-Saxon agricultural villages (for a discussion of the implications of land enclosure) to Inuit communities to Somali clans to Amazon tribes. The author's selection of case materials is eclectic and his treatment of them is anecdotal but his interpretations are deft and often fascinating. For example, his thumbnail reviews of socio-biological studies of inter-group violence among chimpanzees and “small-scale” (i.e., primitive) human societies, are sharply critical but also offer hypothetical non-biological explanations, such as an aggressors' calculation of “the specific costs and benefits of defending a resource in a particular environment” (139). In wading into the controversy surrounding the research of Napoleon Chagnon on the Yanomami tribe of the upper Amazon, he observes that Chagnon's tactic of winning over suspicious warriors by giving them “machetes and other metal goods” (164) may have helped to prompt the very behaviour on which he based his portrayal of the Yanomami as an “fierce people” innately predisposed to live in a Hobbesian state of nature.

The author's discussions of modern cases of ethnonational conflict, such as those in Bosnia and Kosovo, are less successful. The synopses are not unsound but they offer only a superficial account of complex political developments and are obviously thinly researched. Even basic works, such as Susan L. Woodward's Balkan Tragedy (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1995), whose attention to economic factors and rejection of primordialist interpretations largely support Layton's general thesis about the causes of wars, are entirely omitted.

In sum, this is a rather idiosyncratic monograph that is difficult to fit into any conventional category. Political scientists who are interested in civil society, human nature, conflict and theories of evolution, and who are curious about how an anthropologist views these matters, will find it a thought-provoking and rewarding read.