Introduction
On August 2, 2017, Legia Warsaw was facing FK Astana in the qualification round of UEFA (Union of European Football Associations) Champions League. The day before was the 73rd anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising. Legia ultras used the opportunity of an international cup game to present their provocative choreography and commemorate the Warsaw Uprising. They displayed a huge banner showing a soldier in a Nazi uniform holding a gun to the head of a crying child that wore a military hat with the Polish flag on it. The image was accompanied with a caption: “During the Warsaw Uprising, Germans killed 160,000 people. Thousands of them were children.” The choreography was echoed in the media worldwide. The message was clear: the executioner can be clearly defined in terms of ethnic criteria—the German nation. The aim of the choreography was to make this voice heard in the international discourse on historical policy.
However, the choreography was not only an attempt to make an impact on the international discourse on historical policy. It was also a manifestation of national ideology. Spectacular choreographies of this kind, which show symbols, historical figures, and values that are associated with ultras’ vision of the nation, are frequently presented at football stadiums. Considering that local cultures of ultras internalize national ideologies present in public discourses and transform them into ideologies distinctive for this social environment (Spaaij and Viñas Reference Spaaij and Viñas2005; Testa and Armstrong Reference Testa and Armstrong2008; Djordjević and Pekić Reference Djordjević and Pekić2018; Faje Reference Faje, de Waele, Gibril, Glorizova and Spaaij2018; Perasović and Mustapić Reference Perasović and Mustapić2018), it can be argued that ultras use football games to articulate their national ideology.
This study draws on a post-structuralist, post-Marxist discursive approach to nation (Laclau and Mouffe Reference Laclau and Mouffel1985; Sutherland Reference Sutherland2005). In this view, nation is defined as a form of discourse which is fluid in nature. It is a result of a struggle of national ideologies which compete for conceptual hegemony. Gaining conceptual hegemony means that a vision of the nation connected with the hegemonic ideology is embedded in a cultural context and is therefore perceived as obvious. In this study, ultras are viewed as one of the actors who struggle for the conceptual hegemony of their national ideology through discourse. To do this, they use football stadiums as a space where they introduce constitutive elements of their nationalism. This article aims to explore the current character of the national ideology of Polish ultras and the tools that they use in their ideological struggle by (1) revealing the constitutive elements of the national ideology of the ultras, (2) studying what means of expression are used in their choreographies to disseminate their vision of the nation, and (3) mapping the processes and events that stimulate the production of choreographies related to national issues.
Defining nation as a discourse and approaching it through the analysis of practices of articulation of ideology makes it possible to explore different perspectives of everyday (banal) nationalism, which is concerned with how (what social constructs are connected with the nation), where, and by whom the nation is (re)produced (Hearn and Antonisch Reference Hearn and Antonsich2018, 602). Moreover, it gives the opportunity to study two additional dimensions of banal nationalism: when (defined as an institutional context) and how often manifestations of national ideology occur (in comparison with manifestations of other identities). The study introduces the concept of occasional nationalism, which can be a useful analytical tool to map and quantify the presence of nation in practices of articulation of a particular community.
The case of Poland was selected for two reasons. Firstly, since Polish ultras’ culture is homogenous in terms of the character of national ideology, Polish ultras groups—contrary to most European countries—do not compete with one another in order to achieve the conceptual hegemony of their national ideology. This ideological cohesion creates a unique environment, which makes the community of Polish ultras (and the field of stadium discourse which they use) more efficient in competing with other actors for the hegemony of their nationalism in the public sphere. This provides an opportunity to examine the issue of ultras’ nationalism from a wider perspective than that of a case study of a particular group, and therefore it is possible to reveal more general mechanisms in the (re)production of national ideology. Secondly, football is the most popular sport in Poland, and their choreographies therefore appear in TV coverage and images diffused by the media and social media for wider audience. The circulation of stadium discourse means that Polish ultras are actors with some influence on the field of national discourse.Footnote 1
The article opens with an overview of up-to-date studies on the nationalism of ultras groups, followed by the conceptualization of discourse, national ideology, and nationalism applied in this study. The next sections are devoted to the methods of data gathering and the results of discourse analysis, leading to their discussion and final conclusions.
National Ideologies in Ultras’ Culture
Sociologists have long noticed that sport is an effective carrier of nationalism (e.g., Hobsbawm Reference Hobsbawm2012), as it reproduces national identity by the virtue of international competition (Billig Reference Billig1995) and is thus used as a tool in state identity policies (Houlihan Reference Houlihan1997). Football, as one of the most popular sports in the world, naturally fits in the frame (e.g., Archetti Reference Archetti, Giulianotti and Williams1994; Duke and Crolley Reference Duke and Crolley2014). Nationalism is reproduced by sport institutions that set out the rules of international competition and define the means by which the nationality of competitors is expressed (national colours, anthems, etc.). The national ideology of ultras’ culture, however, is not only a product of football institutions. It stems from wider processes and is reproduced using different means. As a result, it often takes different forms.
The term ultras refers to a specific type of an organized football fan groups. Being ultras means emotional attachment to a particular club, constructing identity in reference to it, supporting it from the stands, and often engaging in physical confrontations with supporters of rival teams (Guschwan Reference Guschwan2007, 254). However, the most characteristic of ultras’ activities are spectacular choreographies that are presented during games and refer to different topics (praising own group or club, insulting or ridiculing the opponents, manifesting political, national ideologies, etc.). Born in the late 1960s in Italy, the ultras’ culture arrived in Poland at the turn of the century and was internalized in the culture of Polish football supporters during that period. As physical confrontations became monopolized by hooligan groups, Polish ultras focused on competition with their rivals in terms of the size and scale of choreographies (Grodecki Reference Grodecki2018, 117).
The emergence of nationalist ideology in ultras’ cultures relates to several broader processes that differ depending on local (national) history. In Italy, the rise of nationalist and even xenophobic attitudes of ultras groups is viewed as reflecting a more general sentiment in Italian society in the 1980s, when it was struggling with an increasingly inefficient economy and consequently started to become more reluctant toward the rising waves of immigrants (Guschwan Reference Guschwan2007, 254–257). In post-communist countries like Russia and Serbia it stems from the dominance of nationalism in public discourse at the time of transformation. The nationalism of this period stigmatized all leftist ideologies as connected with communism (see Djordjević and Pekić Reference Djordjević and Pekić2018; Gloriozova Reference Gloriozova, de Waele, Gibril, Glorizova and Spaaij2018). In some countries, the emergence of nationalism in ultras’ culture is also related to the advent of the skinhead subculture (Spaaij and Viñas Reference Spaaij and Viñas2005; Zaimakis Reference Zaimakis2018; Gloriozova Reference Gloriozova, de Waele, Gibril, Glorizova and Spaaij2018). “By osmosis rather than as a result of ideological formation’ (Spaaij and Viñas Reference Spaaij and Viñas2005, 86), ultras began to identify with ideologies calling for the revival of historical nationalisms. In Russia, football supporters adopted some nationalist symbols of this subculture, such as swastikas, Celtic crosses, and skulls (Gloriozova Reference Gloriozova, de Waele, Gibril, Glorizova and Spaaij2018). In other countries—Grecce (Zaimakis Reference Zaimakis2018), Romania (Faje Reference Faje, de Waele, Gibril, Glorizova and Spaaij2018), and Turkey (Battini Reference Battini2012)—the presence of nationalism on the terraces, to some extent, resulted from the intentional, political implementation of national ideologies in the field of football.
The nationalism of ultras can also differ in character. On the one hand, at the stadiums in such countries as Cyprus (e.g., APOEL FC; see Maniou Reference Maniou2019), Greece (Zaimakis Reference Zaimakis2018), and Italy (e.g., S.S. Lazio and AS Roma; see Testa and Armstrong Reference Testa and Armstrong2010) ethnic nationalism can be seen in choreographies and banners containing neofascist and xenophobic slogans. AS Roma and S.S. Lazio ultras groups even describe themselves as neofascist. Their ideology is based on faith in the unique character of each nation, the critique of multiculturalism, and historical sentiments expressed in the nostalgia for a strong Italy and idealization of national heroes (Testa and Armstrong Reference Testa and Armstrong2010). In Serbia, the national ideology of ultras is marked by religious orthodoxy because religion is one of the main lines of ethnic divisions in the Balkans (Dojrdjević and Pekić Reference Djordjević and Pekić2018).
It needs to be stressed, however, that the presence of certain nationalist elements does not always translate into wider attitudes. In Turkey, for instance, despite a strong presence of national symbols and slogans concerning ethnic conflicts, ultras groups have a quite inclusive membership policy when it comes to political and national ideologies (but not necessarily when it comes to the distribution of power in such groups) (Battini Reference Battini2012). In Serbia, nationalist ideology does not translate into current political behaviors, as football supporters tend to describe themselves as antisystem and apolitical. Rather, this ideology serves as a kind of identity strategy situating them in opposition to wider left-wing attitudes, which Serbian football supporters identified with communism (Djordjević and Pekić Reference Djordjević and Pekić2018, 357–360). In Italy, the nationalism of Lazio and Roma ultras has the markings of a resistance ideology, which means that they resist other ideologies (in this case liberal and conservative) but do not offer any constructive proposals (Testa and Armstrong Reference Testa and Armstrong2008, 477–478).
The above findings provide some evidence of connections between the national ideologies of football supporters and wider social and political changes, emphasize the role of resistance ideology against communism and left-wing attitudes more broadly, and point out the impact of the skinhead subculture. All these factors are also highlighted in the analyses of nationalism in Polish ultras’ culture, where it is characterized as far right-wing, conservative, and anti-liberal (Chwedoruk Reference Chwedoruk2015), or antisystem in general (Kossakowski Reference Kossakowski2017; Grodecki Reference Grodecki2018), with the important role of Catholicism (Mazurkiewicz Reference Mazurkiewicz2018). Contemporary research on Polish football fans also reveal an identity overlap between self and the country (Kossakowski and Besta Reference Kossakowski and Besta2018, 877), which indicates the dominance of national identity over other identities, including local ones built by the attachment to a local football club.
These general characteristics of nationalism in Polish ultras’ culture mostly go back to the period of emergence and institutionalization of football fandom culture in Poland at the turn of the 1970s and 1980s. At that time, during anti-communist protests in the country, it began to develop its anti-state (anti-communist state) attitudes and pronational identity (Kossakowski Reference Kossakowski2017, 83–91). The right-wing, pronational characteristics of fandom culture in Poland were also strengthened by the advent of the skinhead subculture in the country in the late 1980s and its close connections with far-right nationalist ideology (Grodecki Reference Grodecki2018). Consolidation of conservative values, on the other hand, stems from the government’s actions against football supporters before EURO 2012. These values became ideological figures that enabled supporters to position themselves against the neoliberal logic guiding the government and UEFA (Antonowicz and Grodecki Reference Antonowicz and Grodecki2018). This process was interpreted in terms of Mannheim’s instinctive traditionalism, which implies the emergence of attachment to traditional lifestyles in response to the ongoing social changes (Chwedoruk Reference Chwedoruk2015). In this regard, conservative performances of Polish supporters are also explained as a reconstruction and reaffirmation of manhood and masculinity, which was criticized by liberal elites (Kossakowski, Szlendak, and Antonowicz Reference Kossakowski, Szlendak and Antonowicz2018, 10).
As can be seen, the culture of Polish ultras is homogenous in terms of the general nature of their nationalism (conservative, antisystem, and anti-communist). Although it would be interesting to examine why there is no diversity in this respect between major Polish ultras groups, this is not the aim of the article.Footnote 2 This situation is unique in Europe, where different ultras groups promote different national and political ideologies. This ideological cohesion means that particular ultras groups in Poland do not compete with one another for conceptual hegemony. As a result, they are more efficient in competing with other actors for the hegemony of their nationalism in the public sphere. This provides an opportunity to examine the issue of ultras’ nationalism from a perspective wider than a case study of a particular group, therefore making it possible to reveal more general mechanisms in the (re)production of national ideology.
Theoretical Approach: Discourse and National Ideology
This article draws on a post-structuralist, post-Marxist discourse theory (Laclau and Mouffe Reference Laclau and Mouffel1985; Sutherland Reference Sutherland2005) that considers the nation as a form of discourse continuously reshaped and redefined. In this view, discourse is a field of (national) ideologies in which they compete for conceptual hegemony (Sutherland Reference Sutherland2005, 186). Hegemony is defined as the Gramscian concept of cultural hegemony (Gramsci Reference Gramsci1992). Achieving hegemony in discourse means that the vision of the social world—with its norms, values, and their definitions—that is provided by an ideology is perceived as taken for granted.
Nationalism is approached here as a (national) ideology (e.g., Minogue Reference Minogue1967; Verdery Reference Verdery1995; Łuczewski Reference Łuczewski2012; Dumitrica Reference Dumitrica2019)—“a set of statements, images and symbols concerning a nation” that are changeable and processual in nature, and which “nationalise social reality by defining its particular elements as national […] and, on the other hand, by giving meaning to nation as such” (Łuczewski Reference Łuczewski2012, 65, 68). National ideologies connect a nation with different social objects and constructs, such as religion or class. Above all, they connect a nation to a community, territory, and history defining who and what belongs to a nation as well as who and what does not belong (Łuczewski Reference Łuczewski2012, 65–70).
By its presence in discourse, national ideology (1) creates an “imagined community” (Anderson Reference Anderson1983) by embedding images of the nation in a particular community, enclosing them in one category of nation; (2) connects nation with different social constructs (national symbols, religion, territory, history, behaviours, etc.) (Łuczewski Reference Łuczewski2012; Fox Reference Fox2017); (3) reproduces images of the nation and social constructs related to it (Sutherland Reference Sutherland2005; Dumitrica Reference Dumitrica2019); (4) builds a sense of belonging of individuals to their own nation (Smith Reference Smith2008); (5) enables political mobilization (Brubaker Reference Brubaker1996) and mobilization of members of the nation at the time of a potential threat (Billig Reference Billig1995; Skey Reference Skey2010). In general, nationalist ideology emphasizes an overlap between political representation and the nation (nation=state) (Gellner Reference Gellner1983; Hobsbawm Reference Hobsbawm2012); and builds a sense that the world is naturally divided into nations and hence that nationality is inscribed in human nature (Jaskułowski Reference Jaskułowski2012, 183–184), cultivating a sense that nations are something obvious (Billig Reference Billig1995).
The struggle for ideological hegemony occurs between hegemonic (majority) and counterhegemonic (minority) nationalisms. Hegemonic nationalism is defined as an ideology whose postulates are embedded in society and thus are perceived by the actors as obvious. The aim of counterhegemonic nationalist movements “is to rearticulate social reality using an alternative national construct” (Sutherland Reference Sutherland2005, 194). They try to achieve this by undermining the existing, hegemonic social order and creating an identity crisis.
In view of the findings of other studies on ultras and nationalism—which indicate that ultras groups internalize national ideologies present in public discourses at some historical point and transform them into ideologies distinctive for their social environment—ultras can be viewed as one of the actors creating national ideology. Exploiting the spectrum of football audiences, they use football stadiums as a space where they introduce their national ideology to the public sphere by means of various displays and performances (choreographies, banners, etc.) and therefore aim to struggle with other national ideologies.
Moreover, several studies show that ultras’ nationalism takes the form of resistance ideology against hegemonic national ideologies. Considering these findings, it can be assumed that Polish ultras will present counterhegemonic ideology by expressing their resistance against hegemonic Polish national ideologies. In the Polish context, sociologists distinguish at least a few major (hegemonic) national ideologies which compete with one another in several aspects (Łuczewski Reference Łuczewski2012, 470–471). On the one hand, there are anti-communist and post-communist (anti anti-communist) ideologies. The former includes a positive assessment of the 1989 systemic transformation, right-wing views, and a high level of Catholic religiosity. Anti-communist ideology derives from anti-communist nationalism of the 1989 systemic transformation, which was a resistance ideology against communism. Apart from offering national identity and being anti-individualistic, it did not contain any normative postulates (Budyta-Budzyńska Reference Budyta-Budzyńska2010). The latter is characterized by a negative assessment of the transformation, a milder assessment of the period of the People’s Republic of Poland (PRL), and left-wing views (Grabowska Reference Grabowska2004). On the other hand, there is a division into liberal and anti-liberal ideology (Kennedy Reference Kennedy2002). Liberal ideology is more conducive to effective transformation from socialism to capitalism. Its assessment of the communist past is negative, as it views the old system as an essential negation of the liberal democratic order. It also edifies supporters of the new order and simultaneously stigmatizes its opponents as backward people who are frustrated and unable to cope with the new reality. Liberal ideology defines Europe and civil society as values opposite to religion and nation (modern and inclusive versus anachronistic and exclusive). Both ideologies (liberal and anti-liberal) were transformed in the Polish context into two major political visions of the nation (Łuczewski Reference Łuczewski2012, 472), which can be described as the Polish-Catholic ideology and the Polish-European ideology.
The methodological approach adopted here fits the aims of the study as it allows to examine which constructs of social life ultras connect with the nation by analyzing their practices of articulation. The practice of articulation is “any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result” (Laclau and Mouffe Reference Laclau and Mouffel1985, 105). Practices of articulation of national ideology will be approached here in two dimensions. Firstly, the analysis of texts (and symbols) aims to reveal which social constructs Polish ultras connect with the nation. Secondly, I map when these practices occur, what relations are created between the nation and the social context in which it is manifested. Moreover, considering the findings of other studies showing that ultras’ nationalism takes the form of resistance ideology against hegemonic national ideologies, applied discourse theory reveals how ultras attempt to undermine hegemonic meanings. The logic of the study follows an analytical postulate of a discursive approach to nation which advocates “looking at a nationalist ideology’s articulation […] before putting this in the context of a quest for conceptual hegemony” (Sutherland Reference Sutherland2005, 199).
Methods of Data Gathering
In this study, content analysis was applied to deliver data on the constitutive elements and forms of expression of ultras’ nationalism as articulated at football stadiums. It involved the investigation of the content and message of (1) choreographies, (2) occasional banners, and (3) large flags in club colors regularly displayed at matches that included national symbols or made references to images of the nation (when analyzed in conjunction, all three forms are hereafter referred to as displays.) They are the main source of articulation of constitutive elements of national ideology in stadiums. Moreover, information about them is gathered systematically by a print fanzine devoted to football fandom culture in Poland called To My Kibice (It’s Us, the Fans; TMK), which makes them the only forms of articulation that can be analyzed comprehensively.
The analysis focuses only on stadium space and does not consider other public spaces where ultras’ national ideology can be presented, like graffiti and murals (see Gibril Reference Gibril2018). The analysis of stadium discourse makes it possible to capture the messages presented in the discourse intentionally. These messages are built for the purpose of ideological struggle for hegemony, as the content of displays is a result of group consensus and approval by the leaders (see Grodecki Reference Grodecki2019). These features allow to treat ultas’ displays at stadiums (choreographies, occasional banners, large flags) as a representation of their nationalism.
The source of data for content analysis was the TMK fanzine. The analysis of fanzines in sport sociology has already developed some research tradition (Haynes Reference Haynes1995; Millward Reference Millward2008; Antonowicz, Jakubowska, and Kossakowski Reference Antonowicz, Jakubowska and Kossakowski2020) and thus formed some methodological approaches which focus on capturing the meanings and interpretations ascribed by fans, mainly in their articles. In this study, however, the TMK fanzine was only used as a reliable source of regular data on stadium discourse, and the substance of articles was not analysed. The aim here is to reveal those elements of national ideology of ultras that are intentionally introduced in their displays as a means to compete with other ideologies. The circulation of TMK discourse is limited to the fan environment and therefore does not have an impact on public discourse.
As written on the cover of the magazine, TMK is “a chronicle of the supporters’ scene.” Published monthly since 2001, it is the most popular and influential fanzine in Poland, describing football games in the highest Polish leagues from the ultras’ perspectives. The TMK is the only source that regularly collects data on ultras’ displays and thus enables analysis of constitutive elements and means of expression of ultras’ nationalism articulated at the stadiums in regular manner. The study analyzed TMK reports from football matches of Polish clubs. The reports in question contain descriptions and photos of choreographies and occasional banners. In the case of matches that are more interesting in terms of ultras’ rivalries, TMK also provides more detailed descriptions and photo galleries.
The analysis considered 12 consecutive issues of TMK, from February 2018 to January 2019, featuring ultras’ reports covering all Ekstraklasa games in 2018 and containing descriptions of choreographies and occasional banners. Ekstraklasa games were selected due to their higher viewership and the fact that the ultras’ choreographies from this league are described in TMK on a regular basis. The time range of the analysis was chosen for two reasons: (1) the aim of the study was to provide the most recent characteristics and expressions of the national ideology of ultras’ culture, and so the data had to be the most current; (2) 2018 was the centennial year of Poland’s independence (November 11, 1918), which presumably would increase presence of different elements of national ideology (also those presented by ultras) in public discourse.
In 2018, the Ekstraklasa calendar included 16 fixtures of the 2017/18 season and 20 fixtures of the 2018/19 season–288 games in total played by 18 clubs. Apart from those, the analysis also covered 13 ultras’ reports from the games of Polish clubs in the European cups, as international rivalry tends to be conducive to manifesting national identity. The number of reports from international competitions was relatively low due to the fact that in the 2017/18 season there were no Polish clubs playing in European cups in spring, and in the 2018/19 season all of them were eliminated in the first qualification rounds of UEFA European League and UEFA Champions League.
The results of the analysis are presented in three main categories: (1) a quantitative analysis showing how many choreographies, occasional banners, and flags addressing national issues were displayed in ultras sectors, which is connected with examination of their contexts and the number of choreographies addressing nonnationalism issues; (2) an analysis of constitutive elements of ultras’ national ideology; (3) the characteristics of ultras’ choreographies, occasional banners, and flags in terms their means of expression.
Occasional Nationalists
The 288 reports from Ekstraklasa games and the 13 reports from matches in European cups played in 2018 provide information on nine choreographies and 18 occasional banners related to national issues presented in ultras sectors. It follows that special displays related to national issues appeared on average in every eleventh analyzed match. What is more, the examination of pictures of ultras sectors published in TMK reports revealed 18 large flags making reference to national issues or containing national symbols.
The sheer numbers, however, do not reflect the full context of displays related to national issues. The analysis revealed that they had been mainly displayed around important local anniversaries (the outbreak of the Warsaw Uprising, the Greater Poland Uprising, and deathdays of historical figures), national history anniversaries (the centenary of Poland’s independence, the Cursed Soldiers Day, the outbreak of the Second World War), and a political campaign #GermanDeathCamps, initiated by the Polish government.Footnote 3 In total, eight out of nine choreographies and 16 out of 18 occasional banners making reference to national issues were presented in ultras sectors during the games played around the historical event anniversaries and the #GermanDeathCamps campaign. In the context of performative public sphere, then, Polish ultras are occasional nationalists–elements of national ideology only appear in stadium discourse around important anniversaries and socio-political unrest.
Their occasional nationalism is further confirmed by the frequency of addressing different issues in choreographies. The data presented in Table 1 indicates that the vast majority of choreographies refer to ultras and their culture (34 and a further 6 referring to rival groups of supporters) and to their own clubs (20).Footnote 4 Those containing elements of national ideology rank third, which means that they appeared almost four times less often than choreographies on ultras’ culture two times less often than those devoted to ultras’ clubs. As stated above, the issue of nation appears in ultras’ choreographies only occasionally—during national holidays, important events in local history, and in situations seen as threatening to Polish national interests. What tends to dominate stadium discourse is the elements of intergroup rivalry. The focus of choreographies is issues related to ultras’ culture, football fan rivalry, and their own clubs, which can be interpreted as a manifestation of ultras’ identity and local identity, respectively. National identity is manifested only occasionally.
Table 1. Frequency of Choreographies.
Source: The author’s own study.
Elements of Supporters’ National Ideology
Analysis of displays related to national issues revealed some constitutive elements of national ideology in ultras’ culture, which have been categorized into four analytical frames: permanent struggle of nations, nationalization of locality, national heroes and their attitudes, and anti-communism.
A Permanent Struggle of Nations
A permanent struggle of nations is the ontological foundation of traditional nationalism, namely, the assumption that the world is naturally divided into nations that have different interests and compete with one another in pursuing them. This element of national ideology can be noticed mainly in the choreographies and occasional banners commemorating the anniversaries of armed conflicts involving Poland: the outbreak of the Second World War, the Warsaw Uprising (1944), and the Greater Poland Uprising (1918). The form of commemorating those events emphasizes the fight for the nation as the highest value, such as by defining the people fallen in battle as national heroes.Footnote 5 This highlights that ultras glorify the attitudes connected with the defence of one’s own nation against another. By glorifying such attitudes ultras groups reproduce the vision of the world where a permanent struggle of nations takes place and giving one’s life for one’s own nation is the highest value. A more aggressive form of this nationalism can be seen on one of the flags of Lech Poznań ultras, bearing the slogan “Death to the enemies of the homeland” (Śmierć Wrogom Ojczyzny). Apart from stressing the homeland as a fundamental value, this slogan also disseminates the vision of a permanent struggle in the homeland with other groups, portraying them as a constant threat to the interest of the nation.
A permanent struggle of nations is also apparent in occasional banners related to the #GermanDeathCamps campaign. In this case, the field of struggle between nations was historical policy. The Polish national interest was perceived by ultras to be threatened by the interest of Western countries, which, in their view, exonerated Germany from the responsibility for World War Two genocide by referring to concentration camps located in Nazi-occupied Poland as “Polish.” The ultras interpreted the narrative of “Polish death camps” as an intentional attack of other nations. In response, many ultras groups presented the slogan #GermanDeathCamps to defend the interest of their nation. The fact that they joined this campaign also confirms that the occasional nature of national identity is activated in moments of symbolic threat to the nation.
Nationalization of Locality
The next element of the performative national ideology of ultras is the nationalization of locality. This process is visible in two dimensions: banal nationalism and the historical. In the dimension of banal nationalism, local symbols—such as the name of the town, city, or region, or the name and crest of the club—appear in conjunction with and are framed by national colors and symbols. One typical example of this mechanism is the Legia Warsaw’s flag, with the coat of arms of the city on the left, the crest of the club on the right, and the name Legia in the middle; all three elements appear on the white-and-red Polish national flag.
In the historical dimension, events from local history are connected to the wider historical context of national history and symbols. Manifestation of Polishness in this kind of displays clearly indicates that local historical events provide an opportunity to fit local identity into national identity. However, accounting for the frequency of issues in ultras’ choreographies (see Table 1), what cannot be overlooked is the occasional character of this process. In the context of the nationalization of locality it means that the domination of national identity is only observed during commemoration of local historical event anniversaries, wherein ultras connect the history of their local community with that of the nation.
National Heroes and Their Attitudes
Another element of the national ideology of ultras’ culture is apparent in the displays commemorating certain historical figures, both individuals (e.g., the choreography of Korona Kielce ultras commemorating Wojciech Szczepaniak, a courier of the Home Army) and groups (e.g., the Warsaw insurgents and the Cursed Soldiers).Footnote 6 These figures are presented as heroes in view of their attitudes toward the nation, which gained them recognition among ultras. Such attitudes are most often summed up as slogans presented during choreographies and on occasional banners. Consequently, they can be interpreted as projections of virtues and attitudes that Poles should have according to ultra’s national ideology.
In this approach, the Cursed Soldiers (Żołnierze Wyklęci) symbolize both the constant struggle for the nation as the greatest value and the resistant nature of the ultras movement, which identifies itself with the heroes of the Second World War who were persecuted by communist authorities.Footnote 7 The commemoration of Wojciech Szczepaniak—a young courier of the Home Army captured by Nazi soldiers with documents of the resistance movement—by Korona Kielce ultras comes as an example of the glorification of both loyalty toward compatriots and resistant attitudes. Subjected to weeks of torture, Szczepaniak did not reveal any names of his fellow conspirators, which led to his execution. It is quite apparent, then, that ultras’ national ideology nationalizes the attitudes of historical figures: resistance against the occupant (enemy of the nation), putting national interests first, and collectivism. Therefore, by nationalizing these attitudes ultras groups disseminate and reproduce the vison of a nation as the highest value for its members.
Anti-communism
Historical figures also appear in ultras’ displays owing to their anti-communist attitudes. This category includes occasional banners and choreographies featuring the Cursed Soldiers, Janusz Waluś, and a choreography commemorating the introduction of martial law to Poland (December 13, 1981) presented by Lechia Gdańsk ultras.Footnote 8 The choreography featured the white eagle (the national symbol of Poland) holding the heads of two Polish generals responsible for the decision—General Jaruzelski and General Kiszczak—in its claws. The accompanying inscription read, “The crow will not beat the eagle.” (WRONa Orła nie pokona—WRON is the Polish acronym for the Military Council of National Salvation, Pol. Wojskowa Rada Ocalenia Narodowego, which introduced martial law; adding the letter a turned WRON into the Polish word wrona, “a crow.”) The message here is clear: the eagle, symbolizing true Poles, tears apart two traitors of the nation. It needs to be stressed that anti-communism is a very important element of Polish ultras’ national ideology. Over a quarter of choreographies and occasional banners related to national issues (seven out of 27) included anti-communist content.
Anti-communism’s centrality in Polish ultras’ national ideology may also reveal its origins. Nationalism is often identified as an ideological response to the vacuum left by communism (Brubaker Reference Brubaker1996). Although in general terms the two ideologies are opposites—they postulate different solutions to the same problems (see Gellner Reference Gellner1964)—both of them have some common characteristics, including anti-individualism and a binary vision of the world. In ethnically homogeneous countries nationalism is considered a remedy for social anomie from systemic transformation. The nationalism of the transformation period is also characterized as a resistance ideology—it was against communism, but apart from offering a national identity it did not provide any normative postulates (Budyta-Budzyńska Reference Budyta-Budzyńska2010, 247, 265).
The demise of communism coincided with the institutionalization of the subculture of football supporters in Poland. What is more, in the period few stadiums were used as a venue of collective protests against communist authorities. Opposition against communism involved manifesting Polishness and the use of national symbols. (One great example is the emblem of the Solidarity movement embedded into the Polish national flag.) Anti-communism attitudes expressed in language of national symbols thus established practices of articulation that linked nation with collective resistance.
Means of Expression
As demonstrated in the previous sections, ultras use different means of ideological expression in stadium spaces: they define actors whom they view as a threat to national interests in terms of their nationality; they fit local symbols and local historical events to national frames and thus nationalize elements of their locality; and they use historical figures, on the one hand, as a personalization of desirable attitudes toward the nation of Poles (war heroes, the Cursed Soldiers) and, on the other hand, as a metaphor of anti-national features.
However, traditional national symbols (e.g., the national colors, flag, and coat of arms) are the most common means of expressing ultra’s national ideology. They appear in the form of white-and-red strips of cloth, white-and-red colors of the flares, drawings of the national coat of arms, and banners painted onto Poland’s flag. Such elements appeared in eight out of nine choreographies. In one case, the presentation of a choreography that did not contain any national symbols was accompanied by the singing of the national anthem (TMK 2018, 25), which is a standard practice on such occasions. National symbols were also used on 10 out of 18 occasional banners. It must be stressed, however, that five out of eight remaining banners were related to the #GermanDeathCamps campaign—which was connected with German national colors—and two others showed the figures connected with anti-communist attitudes. This means that only one out of 18 banners were not directly related to the issue of nation. Still, it was surrounded by the national colors on large flags. As for such flags, 17 out of 18 included national symbols. These flags typically contained the same elements: the name of the club, the crest of the club or the coat of arms of the city, and the national coat of arms, all of which are drawn onto the Polish flag.
Interestingly, no symbols expressly connected with the skinhead subculture were observed. Only one flag of Lech Poznań supporters can be interpreted in these categories. (Legion Piła ultras wrote, “Legion Piła. The blood of our race” [Legion Piła. Krew naszej rasy].) However, it did not include any slogans or symbols directly related to the nation.
Discussion and Final Conclusions
The analysis of ultras’ displays revealed some constitutive elements of their contemporary nationalism: permanent struggle of nations, nationalization of locality, glorification of national heroes, and anti-communism. Based on these constitutive elements, some characteristics of contemporary nation building processes by ultras groups can be captured.
Firstly, a permanent struggle of nations suggests that ultras define the world as naturally divided into nations—themselves defined on the basis of ethnicity—that compete with one another. In this view, then, the interests of their own nation are under constant threat from other nations, and they need to be defended. The study also shows that ultras engage in this struggle using stadium space and that by doing this they try to support and defend national interests.
Secondly, the strong presence of anti-communism in described form suggests that supporters have internalized anti-communist national ideology from the period of collapse of the communist system (Budyta-Budzyńska Reference Budyta-Budzyńska2010). This confirms findings of existing studies (Kossakowski Reference Kossakowski2017) and in other post-communist countries (Djordjević and Pekić Reference Djordjević and Pekić2018; Gloriozova Reference Gloriozova, de Waele, Gibril, Glorizova and Spaaij2018), which point out that nationalism of the transformation period was adopted by organized groups of football supporters emerging at the time.
The anti-communist nationalism of the transformation period was a resistance ideology: apart from offering national identity as a social construct against communism, it did not provide any ontological postulates. The resistant character of contemporary ultras’ displays is apparent with regard to both of these aspects: resistance against historical communism is one of the most visible issues (7 out of 27), and there are no ontological postulates in the analyzed content. Their resistant character can also be seen in two additional dimensions: glorification of resistance attitudes (11 out of 27; the Cursed Soldiers [4]; insurgents [6]; Wojciech Szczepaniak [1]) and supporting resistance campaign (#GermanDeathCamps [5]). As it is today, then, the national ideology of Polish ultras can be still viewed as a resistance ideology. All these dimensions of resistance in ultras’ displays have one common feature: they refer to historical events, historical ideologies, historical figures, and historical policy. It seems that the nation is being perpetuated as a construct of resistance by displays commemorating these historical events and used as a resistance construct in the moment when national interest is perceived to be threatened.
The strong presence of historical events and historical figures in the displays (17 out of 27) also suggest the small nation type of collective memory, in which the history of a nation is viewed as dependent on the actions of external actors. In the case of Poland, this involves a conviction that the Polish nation has the misfortune of being located between Germany and Russia (Kilias Reference Kilias2004, 211). Indeed, ultras’ historical displays referred mostly to the Second World War (military aggression and the occupation of the country by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union) and the communist period (political dependence on the Soviet Union), as well as to the #GermanDeathCamps campaign.
Surprisingly, no content expressing resistance against hegemonic Polish national ideologies has been recorded. It needs to be stressed, however, that this only applies to the shape of Polish ultras’ national ideology as it is today—liberal politics have been attacked by ultras in Poland many times in the past (see Chwedoruk Reference Chwedoruk2015; Kossakowski, Szlendak, and Antonowicz Reference Kossakowski, Szlendak and Antonowicz2018). Also, in the period under examination there were no choreographies or occasional banners connecting nation with religious slogans or symbols. Only two flags (presented by ultras of Miedź Legnica and Termalica Nieciecza) featured a slogan related to religion: “God, Honor, Homeland” (Bóg, Honor, Ojczyzna). This is another startling outcome of the study, as the anti-communist national ideology of the period of systemic transformation was strongly connected with the Catholic religion (Łuczewski Reference Łuczewski2012), and choreographies using religious symbols were presented on many occasions in the past (Mazurkiewicz Reference Mazurkiewicz2018).
As shown in the analysis, ultras use almost exclusively traditional national symbols as their means of expression of national ideology. These symbols are also used in the process of nationalization of locality. What is more, ultras use historical figures (mostly related to armed conflicts) as projections of particular attitudes. Historical figures presented by the ultras in their choreographies are not unambiguously recognized as national heroes by hegemonic nationalisms. (The national status of Cursed Soldiers is still a debated issue, both in historical and political terms, and Wojciech Szczepaniak is a local historical figure without national recognition; only the Warsaw insurgents are considered national heroes by all national ideologies.) This can be viewed as a counterhegemonic strategy that aims to redefine national discourse by creating alternative meanings (Sutherland Reference Sutherland2005, 194).
Connections with nation are also created by the social contexts in which national discourse and ideologies appear. The study shows that manifestations related to national issues in ultras’ displays are presented only in particular contexts. These can be categorized as follows: (1) national holidays and anniversaries of historical events important for the nation; (2) anniversaries of local historical events connected with national history; and (3) moments of symbolic threat to the nation. All three are predetermined cultural contexts, ones in which other national ideologies are used in public discourse. The reason for this is probably that these particular contexts have been connected with articulations of nationalism by the nation-state, the institution of hegemonic nationalism. Therefore, they are predetermined and widely recognized occasions to articulate national ideology. Ultras’ displays of nationalism are also occasional in the sense that they are not the dominant issue. Football and ultras rivalry dominate here. However, the dominance of issues related to ultras’ culture and local animosities can be a result of the ideological cohesion of Polish ultras’ culture. Therefore, in the everyday routine of league games the ultras focus on the intergroup, symbolic rivalry, which stresses differences between groups rather than a common vision of the nation.
Occasional nationalism is a form of banal nationalism, understood as practices of everyday nationalism that are driven by structural, institutional, and cultural patterns of expression (Knott Reference Knott2015). It combines two dimensions: when (defined as an institutional context in which ideology is manifested) and how often manifestations of national ideology occur (in comparison with manifestations of other identities). Combining these two dimensions and analyzing them using a discursive approach, emphasizing the analysis of practices of articulation of the nation, can reveal in what contexts these practices occur—what relations are created between the nation and the social context in which it is manifested—and what the level of intensity of these contexts in everyday social life is. Thus, occasional nationalism can be a useful analytical tool to map and quantify the presence of the nation in practices of articulation of a particular community.
Financial Support
This work was supported by the National Science Centre, Poland (grant number 2018/31/B/HS6/00148).
Disclosure
Author has nothing to disclose.
