In After Hegel: German Philosophy 1840-1900, Frederick C. Beiser, a professor of philosophy at Syracuse University and one of the leading scholars of German Idealism, argues that, despite the growth of idealism and romanticism in the first three decades of the 19^th century, the second half of the century constituted one of the most revolutionary periods in the history of modern philosophy. Accordingly, he associates the first half of the 19^th century with “consolidation and consensus” and the second with “disorder, confusion,” “crisis and controversies” (2, 3). Beiser focuses on these “crises and controversies” in his book, with an emphasis on the contributions that many relatively unknown German thinkers made towards creating, analysing, and resolving them.

In Chapter One, Beiser identifies the key causes of the identity crisis in philosophy that essentially began in the 1840s. Before then, philosophers generally agreed that the goal of philosophy was “to provide a foundation for all the sciences” (15); after the 1840s, however, intellectuals lost their belief in this notion (16). As such, they attempted to redefine the goals of philosophy and distinguish it from the “empirical sciences” (3).

Beiser claims that the identity crisis led to the emergence of two different views of philosophy. The first was Eduard von Hartmann’s defence of philosophy as “metaphysics,” which separates philosophy from the natural sciences (46). The second was Wilhelm Dilthey’s “worldviews” that regarded philosophy as “an ethical function” (48, 49). Beiser also mentions the importance of the young Hegelians and the neo-Kantian ideal to the identity crisis. In the end, however, Beiser admits that none of these new views of philosophy were able to resolve the identity crisis because of key weaknesses that were associated with each of them. For example, neo-Kantism was “too narrow,” Hartmann’s concept was “too subject to obsolescence,” and Dilthey’s proposal was “too prone to relativism” (51). Beiser further argues that a key reason behind the failure of each of these conceptions was that they sought to provide a definition for philosophy, a discipline which is, in fact, “indefinable” (51).

In Chapter Two, Beiser examines “the materialism controversy,” which refers to the conflict between “reason and faith” (4). Specifically, Beiser discusses the views of Rudolph Wagner, Carl Vogt, Hermann Lotze, Ludwig Bϋchner, and Friedrich Lange with respect to this matter. For example, Wagner argued that the results of recent scientific research were unable to refute “immortality” or the notion that “all human beings” originated from Adam and Eve (57). However, Vogt countered by stating that enough “evidence from geography anatomy” existed to demonstrate that all of humanity did not actually originate from Adam and Eve (60). Vogt further claimed that the religious beliefs defended by Wagner constituted “superstitions” (61). Meanwhile, Lotze reconciled “science and faith,” by explicitly pointing out “the limits of science” and “limits of faith” (63, 64). Bϋchner, on the other hand, did not “reconcile faith with reason,” as he believed that reason was “diminishing the domain of faith” (74).

In the third chapter, Beiser explores the discussion on the limits of the natural sciences. In doing so, he explains the opinions of Emil Du Bois-Reymond, Bϋchner, Carl von Nägeli, Dilthey, W. Hartenau, Ernst Haeckel, and Hartmann on this subject. He primarily focuses his attention on the views of Du Bois-Reymond, who opined that “the limits of natural scientific knowledge are the limits of knowledge” (104, 105). To the contrary, Nägeli argued that the boundaries of knowledge can be constantly pushed forward. Meanwhile, Dilthey argued that Du Bois-Reymond’s argument failed because the limits of natural scientific knowledge do not represent the limits of knowledge (123).

In Chapter Four, Beiser examines the issue of whether history is a science. Beiser briefly examines the views of Johann Droysen, Leopold von Ranke, Wilhelm Dilthey, and Wilhelm Windelband with regards to “historical objectivity” and whether history is observable and experimental (145).

In the final chapter, Beiser discusses Schopenhauer’s pessimistic view that life is not worth living. Beiser examines the pessimist controversy by analyzing Eugen Dühring’s positivism, which states that “since there is no life beyond this one, we have to prove that there is value and meaning here and now” (179). He also mentions Hartmann’s pessimism, which, “unlike Schopenhauer’s pessimism, includes social and political programs for the improvement of the human condition” (189). Agnes Taubert’s and Johannes Volkelt’s views on social benefits and the problems associated with modern economics also feature prominently in this chapter. In the end, Beiser maintains that “the value of life … deserves … [and] demands re-examination” in contemporary times (215). Thus, he concludes that Schopenhauer’s pessimism has yet to be “unrefuted” and that philosophers should return to the question of what makes life worth living (215).

It appears that Beiser adopted Thomas Kuhn’s views with respect to the structure of scientific revolution as a model by which to analyse German philosophy in the second half of the 19^th century. In fact, his discussions regarding subjects like crises, controversies, and conflicting concepts gives the impression that Beiser was very familiar with Kuhn’s views. As a result, he provides readers with an original, broad, rich and complex view of 19^th century German philosophy. He also emphasises important contributions made by some lesser-known, obscure, or forgotten thinkers, who played significant roles in the most revolutionary period of modern philosophy. In doing so, he references the original sources of certain philosophers that can, in some cases, be traced all the way back to Plato, Aristotle, and the Epicurean and Stoic traditions, which makes his arguments stronger and more credible.

This book makes a significant contribution to German philosophy because it demonstrates that the second half of the 19^th century represented an important period of creativity and revolutionary spirit for this discipline. Its main weakness, however, is that Beiser’s examination of the views of each author or thinker is often too brief, more appropriate for an encyclopedia entry as opposed to a description in a book, which can sometimes be confusing and difficult to follow for readers. Beiser appears to be aware of this problem as, in the introduction of his book, he makes the point of noting that any attempt to explain the many contributions made to the development of German philosophy in the second half of the 19^th century in any great detail amounted to an impossible task. Nevertheless, this book represents an important contribution to the development of modern philosophy, as it provides an inédit introduction to the German philosophy of the second half of the 19^th century that could motivate more fruitful and insightful academic research on this subject.