The field of state repression/human rights violation has developed into what could positively be described as a vibrant, ever-expanding, and creative body of research with scholars constantly pushing in new directions, or negatively as a somewhat sprawling, fragmented, and unwieldy body of research. Whichever characterization you prefer, the outcome is clear. Some scholars focus on specific explanatory factors (e.g., an aspect of democracy and military intervention) while giving limited attention to the other variables within the model (e.g., economic development or inequality and naming/shaming). Some focus on specific forms of state repression (e.g., personal integrity violations) while giving limited attention to other forms (e.g., civil liberties). Some focus on specific sides of the contentious interaction, favoring either governments or challengers in their discussions. More recently, some have focused on specific geographic locales (e.g., China), whereas others have focused on global patterns. As a result, we have generally lost a sense of comprehensiveness, thoroughness, and context. It is not quite clear what we know because examinations of new species of bushes and trees have been favored over evaluations of the forest.
Enter Courtenay Conrad and Emily Ritter’s Contentious Compliance: Dissent and Repression under International Human Rights Law. In many ways, this book represents a groundbreaking intersection of previously isolated strands of research presented with a highly sophisticated, thorough, approachable, and often innovative analysis. For example, earlier research tended to highlight either domestic factors (such as judicial independence) or international factors (such as international law/treaties), but Conrad and Ritter persuasively argue that this is problematic, because the two reinforce one another. Similarly, prior research tended to highlight either factors concerning the government (e.g., repression) or behavioral challengers (e.g., dissent, terrorism, and civil war), but Conrad and Ritter maintain (invoking one of the many valuable lessons taught us by the late, great Will Moore) that one should never consider one without the other. Earlier research also tended to highlight either formal theory or quantitative evaluations of some type of repression/human rights data, but Conrad and Ritter bring these two worlds together. Although the combination is unique in the literature, the foundation of the theory is not: the authors adopt a variant of the cost-benefit model that has predominated in this body of research since (almost) its inception.
The outcome of this effort is compelling. If one is focused on international treaties having an impact on repression/human rights violation, then one might be either disappointed with or extremely excited by the book, because this is only part of the story and potentially the less interesting half. Domestic judicial institutions play an important role, because they can exact significant costs on political leaders. Indeed, if they are functioning, there is very little value added to international treaties. If one is used to discussing either repression or dissent, then one might be disappointed with or extremely excited by the book, because the behavior of the two not only influences each other but they are both influenced by international and domestic law. To understand repression, one has to place the behavior into this complex context. Finally, if one is used to reading formal theory with no empirical test or reading quantitative articles with little to no developed theory, then one might be disappointed with or extremely excited by the book, because the authors draw on the strengths of both approaches.
Conrad and Ritter’s most interesting theoretical punchline is not arrived at easily, but it is important. On the one hand, if a leader is believed to be staying in power and would lose a great deal by losing this position in power, and domestic courts are not very strong, then this is the context within which international law can have a potentially big impact. On the other hand, if a leader is on the way out and is transitioning to something after office that is quite lucrative, and domestic courts are fairly strong, then this is the context within which international law will not have much effect. After investigating specific repression/human rights data from 1981 to 2011 for 195 countries that correspond to three international treaties—the CAT, ICCPR, and CEDAW—along with data on mobilized dissent, the authors’ main theoretical arguments are supported. However, although I praise the effort to bring together the different strands noted earlier, I would also note that there is somewhat uneven treatment of the strands.
For example, attention is paid to international treaties and law but less to international coercive/forceful power and hegemony. In line with many, Conrad and Ritter assume that individual nations are sovereign and largely determine their own security policies. This assumption elides those circumstances where external actors largely influence what domestic political leaders decide to do and how they do it. Some governments are overtly placed in office by foreign powers and are supported by the latter to such an extent that they are essentially beholden to them. In these contexts, there might be less attention to domestic costs (either courts or mobilized populations), and repression could continue indefinitely. There is very little discussion of how the judiciary fits with other aspects of democracy—that is, whether the judiciary leads or follows other components of democracy—and as Will Moore would often mention, it is not quite clear “why individuals with weapons would listen to individuals without them.” Additionally, it might be important to explore how domestic legal institutions arise and if there is any connection to international legal or political influence. It might also be important to consider whether governments finish what they set out to do when they repress as mobilization and treaty effects are considered.
Similarly, although Conrad and Ritter note that repression increases dissent and dissent increases repression, they fail to consider more nuanced work that shows that not all repression increases dissent. There are circumstances (e.g., large-scale mass atrocities and selective violence) when dissent is limited or completely destroyed. Given how much time the authors spend discussing government vulnerability, it seems odd not to discuss how dissidents are vulnerable. Somewhat problematic is the fact that Conrad and Ritter do not pay attention to precisely what dissidents are pursuing. This should influence the perception of threat.
Finally, although Conrad and Ritter use formal theory to structure their empirical investigation, there are some issues that could use some more attention. For example, it is not quite clear whether it is reasonable to say that all leaders equally benefit from office while variability in vulnerability is what matters. Dependency literature and world systems theory are very clear about the importance of differential benefits, but from a different perspective the work of Robert Bates also sensitizes us to the lack of value for citizens within certain economies and hence the lack of attentiveness to them as political actors. Although formal and quantitative research are brought together (and well), qualitative-historical work is generally left out. I do not fault Conrad and Ritter for this. This literature is immense, but a review of this work would help us figure out what is there, as well as how it reinforces/challenges the work under discussion. Last but not least, it seems that, given the importance of leaders’ perceptions to the main argument some attention should have been provided to the voluminous and prominent work on this phenomenon developed in behavioral economics.
By way of conclusion, Conrad and Ritter have entered a fragmented, somewhat divisive, but thriving field and have made it a bit more coherent and whole. The book moves us closer to pulling together insights from international as well as domestic, and formal as well as quantitative orientations. The next step is ours.
