I

The Colonial Service envisaged in 1945 was intended to be very different from its 1930s counterpart, both in ideological mission and scale.Footnote ²² Impetus to shift the Service's central role from one of law-and-order provision to a dynamic participation in the economic, social, and political development of colonial societies emerged during the late 1930s. Under the stewardship of Malcolm MacDonald at the Colonial Office and through the growing influence of left-leaning metropolitan think-tanks, a constructive alternative to the laissez-faire imperialism of the 1930s was articulated.Footnote ²³ Making ready use of Lord Hailey's detailed research into conditions in Africa to inform its new development agenda, the Colonial Office advocated centrally planned and carefully targeted welfare schemes as the surest means of alleviating the worst of colonial poverty, whilst at the same time encouraging the emergence of an educated elite capable of becoming partners in the progress towards self-government.Footnote ²⁴ Crucially, it demanded a forthright disavowal of the orthodoxy of indirect rule. Even though the first Colonial Welfare and Development Act (1940) failed to deliver the level of investment initially hoped for, it represented a seminal change in colonial policy. For the first time, the British government acknowledged direct responsibility for funding colonial development and in so doing signalled the abandonment of the assumption that the colonies should be self-supporting.Footnote ²⁵

Supported by all parties, the Colonial Office convulsed with new purpose during the war years.Footnote ²⁶ Fears over a haemorrhaging of morale amongst serving officers combined with determination to outmanoeuvre emerging nationalist opposition to fire intent.Footnote ²⁷ Under Conservative Colonial Secretary Oliver Stanley, MacDonald's plans crystallized into a clear strategy aimed at reinvigorating the Service and offering a new basis of legitimacy to colonial rule; it stated unequivocally Britain's commitment to a policy of partnership with colonial peoples that would lead naturally to self-government as a part of the Commonwealth. With the advent of the 1945 Labour government and the ascendency of Arthur Creech Jones to colonial secretary in 1946, the project took on even greater impetus.Footnote ²⁸ Building upon an expanded Colonial Welfare and Development Act (1945) and supported by a rising generation of Colonial Office officials, including Andrew Cohen, Creech Jones promised radical new initiatives.Footnote ²⁹ Shrewdly characterized by Joanna Lewis as a process of ‘Empire state-building’, it was understood that the architects of this development project would be the civil servants, academics, and expert advisers at the Colonial Office, and the agents of its implementation the officers of the Colonial Service.

Not only would the Service require vastly expanded levels of manpower to achieve these aims but also a radical new philosophy.Footnote ³⁰ If the revised mission was to find success beyond the corridors of Whitehall, the Colonial Office had to convince a new generation of recruits that prospects for a colonial career remained as secure as in the 1930s but the Service's new raison d’être – essentially the working towards the dissolution of their position – was a worthwhile and attractive ambition.Footnote ³¹ Post-war recruitment literature echoed successive governments’ public declarations. Opening with a stirring call to action from the secretary of state for the colonies – although written by Newbolt – a 1945 recruitment pamphlet vigorously proclaimed:

Unlike in the years following the First World War, the response proved enthusiastic, with total applications soaring to over 44,300 between 1945 and 1946 (compared to roughly 500 annual applications during the early 1930s).Footnote ³³ Benefiting massively from the flood of decommissioned officers, Furse was conscious that this war-hardened cadre represented prime recruitment fodder.Footnote ³⁴ Many had fought alongside colonial troops across the globe, with the exposure to the realities of life in empire proving a better advertisement for the Colonial Service than any propaganda handed out in college common rooms.Footnote ³⁵ This tactic proved eminently successful, with over 98 per cent of recruits during the period 1945 to 1949 having had active military experience.Footnote ³⁶ In the following years, recruitment reached unprecedented levels; by 1952, the Colonial Service had made 8,800 appointments to all departments, at an annual average of 1,350 compared to fewer than 250 during the interwar period.Footnote ³⁷ Contrasting 1938 (325 appointments) with the peak in 1947 (1,715 appointments) underlines the Colonial Service's broadened scope.Footnote ³⁸ A Service that had totalled about 7,000 European officers in 1936 (just 4 per cent of a total 200,000 officers) grew to 11,000 in 1947 (of a total 300,000) and reached its peak in 1957 with about 18,000 European officers.Footnote ³⁹ The CAS in particular reflected this expansion with the equivalent of eleven years’ pre-war appointments being made in the first two years of post-war recruitment alone (Table 1).Footnote ⁴⁰

Table 1 Analysis of CAS appointments, 1947–56

Note: Total for universities and degree do not match – presumably because some men attended more than one institution. Universities – 995 (1,305 total including no degree); Degree – 1,255; Married – 1,278.

Source: Analysis of CAS appointments, 1947–56, CUA, CDEV/4/7.

Nevertheless, despite persistent claims from within the Colonial Office that the Service remained popular amongst elite university graduates, the post-war application rate never kept pace with the demand for recruits. The number of appointments made directly after the war may have been substantially higher, but still remained some way short of the required total, and once the surge of ex-service personnel calmed, this dearth became even more acute. By 1951, only 50 per cent of available positions were filled, a shortfall that persisted for much of the decade and was more severe in the technical services.Footnote ⁴¹ Recruitment difficulties intensified through the insistence that vacancies should be left unfilled rather than appoint the ‘wrong type of man’.Footnote ⁴² Openly refusing to place advertisements in the national press, the Colonial Office remained wary of undertaking too aggressive a recruitment drive for fear of appearing desperate.Footnote ⁴³ This attitude necessitated the development of alternative strategies to restore the cachet of a Colonial Service appointment and meant Sanders, as the most recognizable representation of an African administrator, became a focal but nonetheless controversial recruiting aid amongst the post-war generation.

II

Although never a member of the Colonial Service himself, Edgar Wallace drew on his military service in South Africa and experience as a journalist in the Belgian Congo to produce a character that ‘distilled the essence of the ideal District Officer’.Footnote ⁴⁴ Reputedly based on Sir Robert Bower, a soldier and administrator in Nigeria from 1893 to 1897,Footnote ⁴⁵ Sanders should be viewed as one of many similar figures who appeared in Edwardian literature on empire.Footnote ⁴⁶ However, the sheer volume of Wallace's output established him as an enduring stereotype. Perhaps more importantly for the post-war generation of applicants, this image was reinforced through Zoltan Korda's 1935 film, which received extremely positive reviews from the conservative press.Footnote ⁴⁷The Sunday Times exulted that the film gave ‘a grand insight into the special English difficulties in the governing of savage races and…the terrors and delights of contact and conjunction between the civilization and savagery, the white man's burden and the Englishman's rule’.Footnote ⁴⁸ The film was so successful that it was re-released in 1938, 1943, and 1947. It should be noted, however, that an Ealing Comedy lampoon entitled Old Bones of the River appeared in 1938, suggesting that not all appreciated the empire in such reverential terms, and that when Sanders was first shown on the BBC in 1957, The Times printed a letter of complaint from the Nigerian high commissioner angered that a film depicting ‘Nigeria as a country of half-naked barbarians’ was being screened.Footnote ⁴⁹

Oscillating between father to his district and summary executioner, Sanders oozed the cultural, racial, and moral arrogance that has made the DO such a controversial figure within the ‘new imperial histories’.Footnote ⁵⁰ In his world, the authority of the DO was absolute. No one knew his district as intimately, whilst scrutiny from superiors remained several days away. Dressed in the obligatory pith helmet (‘worn at a rakish angle’) and a pristine white safari suit, and articulating his orders in a ‘razor cold voice’, Sanders personified the unbending gentlemanly poise that underpinned imperial rule.Footnote ⁵¹ As representative of the ‘Great White King’, ‘Lord Sandi’ commanded both respect and fear from those under his authority.Footnote ⁵² Even though he was never slow to draw his revolver, Sanders was appreciated as the bringer of law, order, and justice.Footnote ⁵³ Interestingly, in the film version, Sanders's moral authority eclipses his more brutal instincts, although the threat of the military force always loiters menacingly at hand. Reflecting the shift in tone of British imperial rule after the First World War, the film depicts a largely quiescent empire where force of character is far more persuasive than force of arms. Sanders's air of calm, detached authority and innate ability to ‘handle natives’, combined with his life of adventure, independence, and responsibility, ensured he remained a popular character throughout the first half of the twentieth century and the standard by which many potential Colonial Service recruits initially judged the attractions of a career in colonial administration.Footnote ⁵⁴

Scholarship aimed at exposing the centrality of the empire in British domestic culture consistently emphasizes the importance of film and literature in inculcating support for the imperial mission.Footnote ⁵⁵ The qualities embodied by characters such as Sanders reflected the ideals of public school education and late Victorian manliness.Footnote ⁵⁶ The self-sufficiency, integrity, and patriotism of these figures became crucial facets in creating a vision of empire that resonated with the professional middle-class, public schoolboy.Footnote ⁵⁷ Such assertions have not gone unchallenged and caution should be urged when generalizing about the nature of children's responses to books and films.Footnote ⁵⁸ With this in mind, it is important to note that for many applicants after the Second World War Sanders was a character who never entered into their vision of empire.Footnote ⁵⁹ Some serving officers writing in the 1950s even displayed a palpable desire to distance the modern Colonial Service from traditional stereotypes.Footnote ⁶⁰ Nonetheless, in the recollections of recruits from throughout the interwar and post-war periods, references to Sanders as an early formative influence are recurrent. In both published memoirs and more focused surveys into motivation, Sanders repeatedly appears as a character that fired youthful imagination. For instance, A. V. Arthur first became inclined towards a career in imperial administration when ‘[i]n my second year at Cambridge in 1935, I saw the film “Sanders of the River”…The film enthralled me and I decided there and then that this was the life for me.’Footnote ⁶¹ Similar references are to be found for those entering after the Second World War.Footnote ⁶² D. D. Yonge was explicit in his assessment ‘Sanders was all I had to base my expectations upon.’Footnote ⁶³ Even into the 1960s, recruits recalled his enduring influence, as R. B. Eberlie remembered: ‘I was brought up on the film of “Sanders of the River”.’Footnote ⁶⁴

The continuing popularity of Sanders as a symbol of British colonial rule and the Colonial Office's willingness to use him as a recruiting tool suggest a paradox at the heart of post-war Colonial Service identity. Why was a character that represented a style of colonialism so publicly decried as entirely unsuited to the post-war colonial aims of partnership, progress, and friendship still allowed to hold such cultural sway over popular and especially youthful perceptions of the Colonial Service?

III

Reconceptualizing the colonial mission created a dilemma that went to the heart of the CAS's identity. If the ambition of partnership and progress was to be achieved, there would be little room for the racial, paternalistic attitudes Sanders embodied and it was explicitly demanded that any recruit

Unlike his predecessors, the post-war officer would need to appreciate educated Africans as partners in progress rather than agitators.Footnote ⁶⁶ Contact between the DO and potential opponents was identified as essential to engendering a spirit of co-operation and heading off extremism.Footnote ⁶⁷ However, it had never before been questioned that the district administration should form the foundation of colonial authority, nor whether the DO should be the principal actor in the colonial cast. While public pronouncements were unequivocal, there remained reluctance amongst some senior officers to abandon fully the traditional conception of the DO. In consequence, the Colonial Office's message to potential recruits became confused as deep-rooted contradictions emerged between policy-makers in Whitehall and attitudes on the ground.Footnote ⁶⁸

For all his innate conservatism, Furse had been quick to seize the reforming initiative, producing a lengthy memorandum in 1943 outlining his vision for the role, composition, and training of the post-war service.Footnote ⁶⁹ Furse's focus fell upon the Administrative Service, observing ‘[t]he Service will have to deal with a new type of coloured man and acclimatize a new type of white officer’.Footnote ⁷⁰ Poor terms of service were again emphasized as a real hindrance in attracting the best men, with the lack of guarantees on long-term security a palpable cause for concern.Footnote ⁷¹ Furse stressed the necessity for improved training and closer liaisons between the Colonial Office and universities to ensure new officers arrived in post fully cognizant of the transformed policy goals. Although a Tropical Administrative Services training course had been initiated in 1924, by 1945, the Colonial Office recognized that a more exacting programme was required.Footnote ⁷² Instead, Furse proposed a sandwich programme combining a taxing year of initial training followed by a second year at the conclusion of an officer's first tour. Such a system would rectify the problem of men arriving in the colonies with virtually no practical knowledge, and provide what Furse described as ‘a piece of practical meat between two slices of theoretical bread’.Footnote ⁷³ Post-war conditions would present complex challenges that necessitated the pre-war ‘talented all-rounder’ evolve into a technocratic administrator capable of working as a part of a team of experts engaged in the task of colonial development.Footnote ⁷⁴

Furse's recommendations, along with those of a Nuffield Foundation sponsored report into the requirements of the Nigerian colonial government, were considered by the Devonshire Committee (1944–5).Footnote ⁷⁵ It was decided that prior to departure all cadets would undergo a year of carefully planned training at Oxford, Cambridge, or London, culminating in examinations, which if failed may have led to the withdrawal of appointment. Although a sandwich course was considered impractical, a second course was established for some officers to return on a sabbatical year.Footnote ⁷⁶ Post-war administrators were thus expected to carry with them far more than a sense of cultural superiority alone, with their legitimacy resting, like their colleagues in the technical departments, upon specialized training and professional expertise.Footnote ⁷⁷ While anxieties over the lack of co-operation between the Administrative Service and other departments formed the basis of much discussion, the committee stopped short of endorsing a fundamental reordering of the established hierarchy.Footnote ⁷⁸

The discussions did, however, trigger a serious re-evaluation of the ideal make-up of a colonial official. Alongside the pressing need for expansion in 1945 was a growing consensus amongst advocates of reform that the CAS's narrow demographic base undermined both its domestic appeal and ability to realize the new goals of welfare and development. A. M. Carr-Saunders (director of the LSE and member of the Devonshire Committee) evoked widespread frustration with the DO-cum-prefect stereotype, writing ‘[r]unning all through Furse's memorandum there is a feeling of dissatisfaction about the Service as it is…what is wrong is the absence of any serious professional interest in their job among Colonial Civil Servants. They are rather empty-headed, though when on the spot conscientious and honourable officials.’ He emphasized the deficiencies of the selection process in favouring public school/Oxbridge recruits, a background he felt ‘tends to artificially prolong adolescence’.Footnote ⁷⁹ Fellow members of the committee were equally adamant over the need for greater social diversity in recruitment. Sir Christopher Cox argued that although a public school training in character and ‘the habit of mind of the prefect’ had been ideal during the ‘law and order period,’ a modified approach was now required: ‘The justice of a ruling class was no longer enough. We must train a body of men who could welcome and direct the coming changes.’Footnote ⁸⁰ Lord Hailey similarly lamented that ‘improvement was overdue’ and ‘a broader base’ to recruitment was required.Footnote ⁸¹

Unsurprisingly, Creech Jones proved especially eager to encourage a widening of the Colonial Service's intake and so concerned by Furse's dogmatism that he appointed him a grammar school educated assistant in an effort to mitigate his influence.Footnote ⁸² Early signs were promising. The policy of recruiting direct from the armed services broadened the demographic of appointees by making the Colonial Service a more obtainable ambition for individuals who could compensate the lack of a public school or university education with wartime service.Footnote ⁸³ In 1947, Creech Jones announced in the Commons his pleasure at

Nonetheless, for all the focus on pre-deployment training, few senior officers surrendered the belief that success would continue to rely upon innate qualities of character.Footnote ⁸⁵ Subsequently, Furse's suggestion of a specialized colonial staff college based on the French model never found favour.Footnote ⁸⁶ Although the Colonial Office remained unequivocal that there was no longer any place for racial prejudice in a recruit's outlook, they were less clear on what qualities were desirable. The resulting compromise reflected an ambiguous mixture of enlightened idealist and stereotypical empire-builder:

Opinion was resolute amongst the governors – and tacitly endorsed by Furse – that no amount of training could possibly overcome an absence of these human virtues. Post-war expansion not only led to a diversification of backgrounds but also an increase in the average age of recruits. Far more officers arrived in post well into their twenties, if not thirties, often with families. Governors across East Africa vehemently criticized these men, lamenting their lack of adaptability, preoccupation with conditions of service, and inability to integrate their family and official duties.Footnote ⁸⁸ All were unanimous on the desired alternative: younger men, not necessarily even of degree age as academic success remained overrated, who would embrace the privations of life in the bush, be flexible in approach, and accept the low starting salary without complaint.Footnote ⁸⁹

The resulting compromise awkwardly sought to preserve the fundamental prestige of the DO whilst simultaneously elevating the standing of technical officers.Footnote ⁹⁰ Little effort was made to distinguish between the relative attractions of each role, leaving the path to the ultimate ambition of self-government opaque. All officers were appealed to on the basis of service to Britain and her colonies. All were told that they were making history in contributing to the development of self-sufficient states in the framework of a multi-racial Commonwealth; but the modernizing, scientific expertise of the technical departments remained elided with the traditional authority of the DO.Footnote ⁹¹ Senior officers argued that an official's strength of character remained central to his ability to win the respect of local communities and thus achieve Britain's wider goals. Ultimately, no one could suggest where these qualities could be found in greater concentration than in the public schools and Oxbridge. Thus, despite the wider challenge to the Sanders stereotype, the Colonial Office quickly slipped back into the pre-war habit of focusing their recruiting efforts upon a tried and tested audience.Footnote ⁹²

In spite of proclamations on the need to modernize, this ambition was consistently stifled by the difficulty of attracting sufficient applicants. General feeling blamed a lack of knowledge of the Colonial Service's work amongst likely recruits, combined with negativity on the part of parents and teachers who feared a lack of long-term prospects.Footnote ⁹³ However, entrenched attitudes meant little actually changed. Despite the grand hopes of some for the new training, others were more ambivalent, asserting that the job of a DO could only be learnt in the bush and that the prime function of the course should be to serve as an advertisement for the Service amongst the group whose applications they most coveted.Footnote ⁹⁴ No effort was made to reform the recruitment process or to reduce the reliance upon Oxbridge. Newbolt's guidance to interviewers intimated that the criteria upon which to judge an applicant still held more in common with the values eulogized by his father in the late nineteenth century than the technocratic revolution envisaged by Creech Jones:

A brief concession to egalitarianism appearing in the final paragraph did little to ameliorate the prevailing sense that the Colonial Office's priorities still favoured a robust manliness and nebulous qualities of character over more professional attributes.Footnote ⁹⁶

Annual tours were made of provincial universities and National Service officer training colleges, but it was only at Oxford, Cambridge, and London (until 1955) that the Colonial Service retained a permanent presence. The Colonial Office continued to rely on close personal relationships with the Oxford and Cambridge Appointments Boards and college tutors to publicize opportunities and spot potential candidates. These informal recommendations emphasized many of the same qualities that had dominated recruitment in the 1930s. Even in the face of certain reservations, interviewers still recommended such individuals for an appointment, as one report from 1961 illustrates:

The second interviewer was even more candid in his assessment:

The unreformed recruitment process ensured the perpetuation of the Sanders-character until the very end of permanent recruitment. Even though modernizing voices warned of the dangers of trying to recapture the glory days of the interwar years, few workable alternatives were suggested.Footnote ⁹⁸

Subsequently, this left the recruitment strategy compromised. At no point was a viable scheme put in place rapidly to augment recruitment to the higher grades of the Service with an elite local staff or radically expand the recruitment base in Britain, nor was the option of appointing women to the senior ranks of the district administration ever seriously considered, for fear of creating, in Charles Jeffries's words, ‘a petticoat government’. Although growing numbers of women were appointed to various other branches of the Colonial Service, the CAS remained until its dissolution an overwhelmingly male institution.Footnote ⁹⁹ Rather than radically reappraise the figure of the DO, the Colonial Service retained faith in a reformed version of Sanders.Footnote ¹⁰⁰ While this made elements of their recruitment message troublingly incompatible with the new ideological goals, it did offer practical benefits in the efforts to stimulate applications and address fears over the long-term prospects of a colonial career.

IV

In 1953, Furse feared the Colonial Service ‘threatened with disintegration’ and warned of the imperative need to reassure potential applicants and serving officers alike over its future prospects.Footnote ¹⁰¹ The failure to formulate a clear conception of what the modern colonial official should represent left the recruitment message both confused and confusing. Central to the Colonial Office's strategy was the need to convince applicants a colonial career still offered a combination of romance and adventure coupled with long-term prospects and prestige. Despite troubling inconsistencies with the new ethos, deploying Sanders as a means of achieving this goal remained expedient until the mid-1950s. Yet, the persistence of this character also exposed the ambiguous and perplexed attitude of some senior officers to the changing position of the DO and the rapidly accelerating decolonization process.

Many agreed that the solution to the recruitment problems of the 1950s lay in increasing awareness of Colonial Service opportunities amongst school and Oxbridge audiences. Reflecting the Colonial Office's natural inclination towards the public schools, suggestions such as utilizing school magazines to keep boys informed of their alumni's progress up the Colonial Service ladder were initially mooted as sufficient to attract ‘aspiring colonial governors’.Footnote ¹⁰² However, following questions in parliament in 1949 more care was taken to include grammar and state schools, with the Colonial Office acknowledging it wanted to contact ‘all schools capable of producing potential candidates for the Service’.Footnote ¹⁰³ This necessitated a more direct engagement with schoolboy audiences and the cultivation of contacts with headmasters and careers masters who could encourage boys towards the Service.Footnote ¹⁰⁴ Subsequently, by 1953, over 400 schools had received lectures from colonial officers.Footnote ¹⁰⁵

The Colonial Office quickly realized the limited effectiveness, not to mention interest to seventeen-year-old boys, of sending retired agricultural officers into schools.Footnote ¹⁰⁶ Instead, they utilized young DOs, home for further training, to ‘preach the gospel’ to sixth-form audiences with anecdotal tales of their life that emphasized the Sanders appeal.Footnote ¹⁰⁷ If this failed, officers were advised to stimulate interest by showing one of the big-budget films located in Africa, such as Where no vultures fly and King Solomon's mines.Footnote ¹⁰⁸ Officials hoped Africa's quixotic draw would override more practical concerns amongst schoolboys who ‘are not usually concerned about the security of the career they may be thinking of’.Footnote ¹⁰⁹ Rather than offering detailed descriptions of a DO's administrative routine, recruitment publicity aimed to engender a romantic fascination with the colonies through the promise of adventure and the wonder of the African landscape.Footnote ¹¹⁰ A lengthy report, undertaken in 1956, into the problems of recruiting to Northern Nigeria highlighted the enduring appeal of ‘the cowboy side of colonial life’ and the threat denying it posed to applicant numbers.Footnote ¹¹¹ Even as younger members of the Service warned of the problems inherent within this contradiction, they remained equivocal over how to reconcile the paradox:

A significant number of officers appointed after 1945 did increasingly endorse the revised mission but few had advanced to senior positions by the mid-1950s, whilst the rising rate of resignations amongst serving officers further undermined the Colonial Service's reputation in Britain.Footnote ¹¹³ Appointing senior officers to run the training courses and assess applicants and cadets alike provided much continuity in the type of men appointed. Serving officers acted as fastidious gatekeepers when endorsing as their ‘heirs’ and they remained loathe to jettison the Sanders image completely.

Even if promises of adventure were enough to stimulate adolescent curiosity, more was needed to convince sceptical parents and teachers not to curb youthful exuberance.Footnote ¹¹⁴ In the 1920s, Furse appreciated the necessity of improving the Colonial Service's reputation if parents were to be convinced it was preferable to alternative opportunities at home.Footnote ¹¹⁵ However, following the signing of the Atlantic Charter, the fall of Singapore, and the post-war focus on self-government, there developed a perceptible fear inside the Colonial Office that the young were increasingly being advised to look elsewhere.Footnote ¹¹⁶ In the 1950s, such concerns only intensified; independence for the Sudan, Gold Coast, and Malaya and the cessation of Nigerian recruitment in 1957, combined with the negative publicity created by the Malayan Emergency and Mau Mau, convinced an ever growing number it was irresponsible to recommend a career in the Colonial Service.Footnote ¹¹⁷ Although internal correspondence acknowledged the inability to any longer guarantee career security, the Colonial Office's public pronouncements conspicuously lacked such candour. Even when recruiters warned applicants of the unlikelihood of a full career, they still often suggested it would last for at least another fifteen or so years.Footnote ¹¹⁸ Not until 1959, just three years before the cessation of recruitment, was the word ‘career’ removed from recruitment posters.Footnote ¹¹⁹ Even at this late stage, the decision infuriated H. H. McCleery, officer in charge of the Cambridge Colonial Service training course, who remained adamant that any public acknowledgement the Colonial Service could no longer offer career security would wreck its reputation amongst the Oxbridge undergraduate community.Footnote ¹²⁰

As morale dropped amongst serving officers, the dangers of relying on such limited recruitment networks were exposed. This proved acutely problematic when trying to enlist volunteers to return to their former schools to encourage recruitment. Fearful he would be misleading boys over their long-term career prospects, one DO wrote to the Colonial Office:

Without a positive endorsement, or more damagingly an indictment, from those with personal experience, confidence and interest amongst traditional recruitment sources rapidly waned. Of great anxiety was the sense that families steeped in the tradition of imperial service were actively discouraging their sons from following family precedent because they feared the position of DO had forfeited its former prestige.Footnote ¹²² Such concerns were well founded. Although ignoring paternal advice, H. J. B. Allen remembered:

Parents thus needed to be convinced, even though the ideological mission might be changing, that the Colonial Service still implicitly appreciated that the Sanders role remained imperative.

Deployed thus, Sanders created an illusion of permanence around British imperialism, connecting the traditional image of the DO with the new. Assessing the imagery of Sanders the film, Jeffrey Richards asserts that it created a ‘lofty view of Britain's world role…as long as Britain regarded it as her God-given duty to ensure fair play for all the world, the maintenance of the Empire was inescapable…timeless and eternal’.Footnote ¹²⁴ This is equally pertinent to the underlying message of post-war recruitment literature. Aware of the popularity amongst post-war recruits of Kenneth Bradley's Diary of a district officer (1943) and Sir Arthur Grimble's Pattern of islands (1952), the Colonial Office eagerly commissioned further ‘recruitment propaganda’ to encourage applications.Footnote ¹²⁵ Bradley, a man steeped in the Colonial Service's identity, was approached to produce a booklet capturing the essence of a modern colonial career.Footnote ¹²⁶ The resulting The Colonial Service as a career (1950) and its second edition A career in the Oversea Civil Service (1955) sought to supplement the drier annual information booklet Appointments in Her Majesty's Colonial Service by offering ‘a more general and inspirational character than the pamphlet, more imaginative in treatment, and intended to appeal especially to the schoolboy and undergraduate’.Footnote ¹²⁷ In the foreword, Newbolt was definite over the Service's revised goals but continued to articulate these in a language laced with public school amateurism:

Bradley's message was more ambiguous still. Regardless of promises of teamwork and progress, the photos of DOs at work suggested a different dynamic, whilst the front cover showed an image of the DO as the very model of Sanders (Figure 1). References to the DO being ‘king of all he surveyed’ directly evoked Wallace, whilst a chapter entitled ‘Empire building’ reinforced the contradictory impression. Not only did the Sanders-figure reaffirm the primacy of the DO but in doing so cast Africa in a perpetual state of backwardness.Footnote ¹²⁹ Bradley's own recollections of the moment he joined reinforced Africa's traditional stereotype:

The impression painted evoked a primitive simplicity that left little room for the more sophisticated forces pushing for self-government. In the early 1950s, the Colonial Office utilized Sanders because they were confident he would resonate culturally with their target audience and in doing so conveyed their conviction in the longevity of the colonial mission.

In Bradley's 1955 second edition, the contradictions were again clearly evident. On the one hand, there was a more explicit focus on partnership and the inexorable progress towards independence. ‘Empire building’ had been rechristened ‘Nation building’ and it was now declared that the Colonial Service worked for the benefit of ‘colonial peoples’ rather than the ‘colonial empire’.Footnote ¹³¹ The new tone was most visibly captured in a revised set of illustrative photos (Figure 2). Yet, at the same time, Bradley's guide still sought unequivocally to reassure readers that career prospects were safe. In the foreword, Colonial Office Director of Recruitment, A. R. Thomas, praised a book ‘which should appeal to the hearts and heads of all young people interested in an oversea career of service. It should also be read by all those older people who are presumptuous or dutiful enough to advise young people on the choice of a career.’Footnote ¹³² Even though Bradley included the caveat: ‘I would not be so foolish as to prophesy for all newcomers security of career for a full span of thirty years or more, because no such security is counted upon by any young man in an age dominated by power-politics and the hydrogen bomb’, he was confident ‘the long-term future of the Oversea Civil Service’ was not so ‘hazardous as to deter any young man of spirit who wants to take a hand in the immensely important work which it is doing’.Footnote ¹³³ No mention was made of what would become of officials upon independence, but explicit reassurances were made that their ‘interests would be looked after’.Footnote ¹³⁴

Fig. 1. Front cover, Kenneth Bradley, The Colonial Service as a career (London, 1950). Front cover image: ‘“The District Officer goes on Tour in his Canoe” is the work of Mr Thomas Ona of Ijebu-Ode, Nigeria. The figures, which are about nine inches high, were carved in soft whitewood and gaily painted.’

Fig. 2. Front cover, Kenneth Bradley, A career in the Oversea Civil Service (London, 1955).

Reluctance to abandon the Sanders-figure amongst senior members of the Service highlights the confused and ambiguous attitude of many serving officers towards the prospect of rapid modernization. Sanders became not simply a marketing tool but an affirmation of the recruiters’ perception of their Service's identity.Footnote ¹³⁵ Well into the 1950s, the character of Sanders remained an important benchmark by which new recruits were assessed. Regular references in cadets’ training reports raised concerns that they would not be able to live up to the ‘Sanders-role’, with one being dismissed as ‘rather more Lord Peter Wimsey than Sanders of the River’.Footnote ¹³⁶ This ambivalence was patent when the colonial government of Tanganyika drafted a recruitment guide in 1956 but remained uncertain how to pitch its message:

The notion that anyone would be attracted to the Colonial Service for reasons other than life in the district seemed an anathema to some officers recruited in a more paternalistic era. The essence of the life of the district officer lay in the bush, with the secretariat a poor bureaucratic imitation of real colonial governance. As one Nigeria official wrote in a letter of complaint to the Colonial Office ‘[f]or my sins I have been posted to the Secretariat, to half-sexed work for which I have no training and no inclination’.Footnote ¹³⁸

In cadets’ reports, ‘Secretariat type’ never lost its negative connotation, just as a ‘good bush officer’ remained a badge of honour, with McCleery writing of one Kenya-bound recruit: ‘Born Secretariat type in my opinion able to clog the machine with reams of paper…Send him to Northern Frontier District.’Footnote ¹³⁹ In contrast, those who lacked any particular intellectual engagement with the problems of colonial administration but displayed the makings of an effective bush DO were treated with greater sympathy if not admiration.Footnote ¹⁴⁰ Recruiters continued to value common sense, good manners, and discipline far higher than imagination, whilst a sense of humour and personal charm remained essential to a job that revolved around human interaction.Footnote ¹⁴¹ Cadets attracted by the hope of making a tangible difference to the lives of Africans were unequivocally informed that their job would be in the district implementing their seniors’ policy decisions.Footnote ¹⁴² Even in the last years of recruitment, accounts of applicants’ interviews emphasize a latent suspicion of ‘do-gooding idealism’. As one training report warned: ‘He is a shade starry eyed in his political views, it would be well to send him to a tough realistic DC’ – one who would presumably quickly dispel any unwelcome idealism.Footnote ¹⁴³

Despite the expansion of university education, particularly in the sciences, during the 1950s, the Colonial Service remained traditional in its academic base.Footnote ¹⁴⁴ By the time recruiting ceased in 1962, only one recruit had a degree in African Studies, whilst second-class Oxbridge Arts graduates continued to predominate.Footnote ¹⁴⁵ Although the hope was consistently to attract top graduates, it appears the popular reputation of the Colonial Service as a sanctuary for the healthy but intellectually limited public schoolboy was not shaken. A. G. M. Gardner-Brown's advice to potential recruits in 1951 was that ‘I always allow guts and experience to outweigh academic shortcomings provided the latter are not such as to indicate abnormal stupidity.’Footnote ¹⁴⁶ Sentiments that would have been appreciated by C. P. Snow, who in the same year wryly noted in The masters:

Reflecting wider cultural changes in attitude towards empire and the rapidly evolving political situation in the colonies, by the end of the decade, the tone of recruitment propaganda better echoed the language of partnership and progress towards a Commonwealth of self-governing nations. Upon the Gold Coast gaining independence in 1957, the Daily Express again invoked Sanders proclaiming: ‘It's Demotion for Sanders-of-the-River.’Footnote ¹⁴⁸ In stark contrast to the tone six years earlier, readers were now informed ‘Sanders of the River got bad news today: No longer is his sun-tanned figure in white, open-neck shirt and blue shorts to be the centre of authority over wide regions full of cocoa trees and brick-red huts.’Footnote ¹⁴⁹ Any sense that Sanders still represented a worthwhile example for young Brits considering their career options had vanished; instead, he cut rather an absurd, clichéd, and anachronistic figure bereft of his role in Africa but still distant from the fast-changing climate in Britain.Footnote ¹⁵⁰ Two years later, McCleery wrote of his concern that only fifty-five undergraduates attended the annual recruitment evening, half as many as 1958, most of whom were not career-seekers but rather those ‘who will clutter the evening up with questions about Dr Banda’.Footnote ¹⁵¹ And yet despite these difficulties between 1957 and the cessation of recruitment in 1961, 330 new appointments were made to the CAS alone, to add to the roughly 18,000 colonial officials still serving across empire.Footnote ¹⁵²

V

For those trying to drum-up interest in a Colonial Service career, the Sanders-figure served both a practical and ideological utility. It accommodated enough ambiguity to reassure a traditional governing elite but also conjured a quixotic exoticism to appeal to young men whose social contours had been drastically reshaped by the upheavals of the war, as well as to the public schoolboy who came of age in the post-war world. Subsequently, the Colonial Service's mission of modernization was not entirely undermined by recourse to a character who seemingly personified the paternalism apparently so insistently being thrust aside. Certainly, some continued to be attracted by a conventional understanding of Africa, a DO's role, and the objectives of colonial administration; yet, many explanations of career motivation catalogue a wide, complex, and frequently contradictory range of traditional and more progressive expectations that shaped the decision to apply. Frustratingly, surviving contemporary explanations of the decision to embark upon a Colonial Service career are few and fragmentary. Nonetheless, by reading interview and training reports alongside retrospective accounts – memoir, survey, and personal interview – one can start to build a picture of the dominant influences motivating recruits to join. Although all premised upon individual concerns and specific circumstances, these explanations offer an insight into the appeal of a Colonial Service career, the effectiveness or otherwise of the Colonial Office's recruitment campaign, and the changing life priorities amongst elite graduates during the period of decolonization.

In all of its post-war recruitment propaganda, the Colonial Office demanded men driven by altruism and committed to the service of others. As the 1955 advert for the Cambridge recruitment evening made clear, ‘[t]he Overseas Civil Service (formerly known as the Colonial Service) provides a worthwhile career for a man who is not entirely self-seeking’.Footnote ¹⁵³ Reflecting the rhetoric of a public school chapel, a 1955 Colonial Office recruitment circular adopted a similarly portentous tone: ‘It is a task which requires men of high character and ability. The Overseas Service is worthwhile as a career not on account of the rewards it may bring, but on account of the life that is led and of the opportunity it offers for service.’Footnote ¹⁵⁴ Although the reasons why men settled on the career were often more pragmatic or incidental than the Colonial Office publicly recognized, applicants continued to respond enthusiastically to attempts to harness youthful idealism. In the immediate aftermath of the war, the rhetoric of paternalistic guidance remained prominent. John Duthie, who entered in 1946, observed ‘[a]lthough it might now be regarded as an extreme form of cultural bias, I was brought up to believe that the British Empire was essentially a beneficial institution, a beacon of progress, touched by greatness’.Footnote ¹⁵⁵ As the 1950s progressed, recruits’ paternalistic vision of empire was gradually supplanted by a more inclusive focus on the Commonwealth, with a growing number echoing the tone of contemporary recruitment literature by emphasizing the opportunity to participate in delivering self-government – although often with the caveat that it remained some years away.Footnote ¹⁵⁶

Such idealism was not simply formulated in hindsight. Contemporary interview summaries consistently testify to applicants’ ambitions for a ‘worthwhile job’ or ‘useful career’ in the ‘service’ of those less fortunate. During the decade following 1945, the inference of this language started to shift. In the late 1940s, ‘worthwhile’ tended to equate with service to crown, country, and empire but by the early 1960s, a growing number were telling interviewers their desire to work in Africa was based upon an interest in ‘emergent nations’ or humanity in general. Looking back upon his career from the early twenty-first century, one 1962 recruit recalled that despite his desire to travel, he never considered the Colonial Service as he was not ‘politically attracted to it’. However, having been convinced that he could achieve more good from the ‘inside’, he joined to ‘be a part of the action’ in helping the colonies towards ‘political, economic and cultural independence whether this was what I was meant to be doing or not’.Footnote ¹⁵⁷ Forty years earlier, this fervour elicited a hesitant response during his selection interview: ‘I do not doubt that he has a sincere, if rather woolly, desire to do something in life which is of benefit to his fellow men…His reasons for wanting to go overseas were, I think, grounded in his desire to do good for other people.’Footnote ¹⁵⁸ After his year-long training course, McCleery praised his ‘easy manner with Africans on the Course, who appreciate his attitude of unforced friendliness’.Footnote ¹⁵⁹ The Colonial Office marketed the colonial project in idealistic terms precisely because it believed an appeal to youthful instincts to help others remained an effective strategy to attract applicants.Footnote ¹⁶⁰ In response, many applied with the expectation that they could ‘make a real difference’.

By no means were all (or even the majority) motivated by a desire to participate in the dismantling of empire. For officials retrospectively explaining their career choice, altruistic idealism has certainly served an expedient role in helping them justify their career to often more cynical post-colonial audiences; however, rarely is it prioritized to the exclusion of all else. The contradictions that characterized the Colonial Office's 1950s recruitment strategies were similarly apparent in recruits’ motivations, with few failing to acknowledge more self-serving and egoistic attractions. Joining in 1948, P. Mawhood captures evocatively the multi-faceted blend of attractions:

The dominant perception remained that empire represented a force for human improvement and its true value lay in fulfilling an on-going – and, for some, never-ending – development role. Partly, this interpretation depended upon the territory to which a cadet was posted, but even amongst the last cohort some understood their role as revolving around a paternalistic delivery of good government and would continue to do so for some time to come.Footnote ¹⁶² A minority retained unapologetic and unreconstructed attitudes better suited to the 1930s than early 1960s, which recruiters, despite certain misgivings, still found room to accommodate. As one 1960 training course report captured, ‘character’ in its most traditional sense – sporty, amateurish, and conservative – still counted for much: ‘A good cricketer and hockey player he should be most acceptable to the settler element in N. Rhodesia; about the Africans I am not so sure…I find it depressing that so young a man should be as reactionary as I am even at my age.’Footnote ¹⁶³ The need for recruits combined with falling application rates meant it was not always possible for the CAS to be as discerning as the recruitment propaganda proclaimed.

Despite fears that sons of Colonial Service families were increasingly eschewing family precedent, the Service continued to rely heavily upon those hailing from imperial backgrounds.Footnote ¹⁶⁴ No shortage of appointees cited the guiding example of a father, brother, or uncle, whilst others recalled a vague sense that ‘imperial service was in the genes’.Footnote ¹⁶⁵ Family tradition impelled them to seek out opportunities that were central to a personal identity – even if these did fly counter to parental advice.Footnote ¹⁶⁶ Most were aware to the dangers of a short-lived career but, as in the case of Tim Tawney, remained determined to realize childhood ambition by following in his father's footsteps: ‘I joined the Colonial Service because I was brought up in Tanganyika; my father was in the service; I served in the KAR prior to joining; I never wanted any other career.’Footnote ¹⁶⁷ The personal nature of the recruitment process meant a reference from a serving provincial commissioner or a young DO who had played in the same college rugby team counted for much. Regardless of the promise of meritocracy, it is patent that professional patronage remained vital to Colonial Service recruitment. The homogeneity and compact size of the upper middle classes meant such advantages were not to be ignored, as J. Daniell acknowledged of the Sudan Political Service, ‘it was not what you knew, but who you knew that was important’.Footnote ¹⁶⁸

Nonetheless, disruption brought about by the war did open new vistas to many who would never have considered the Colonial Service in the 1930s.Footnote ¹⁶⁹ Frequently, military service overseas offered a taste of foreign climes that otherwise may have remained unfamiliar. S. Richardson's acknowledgement that had it not been for the Second World War he would most likely never have left England ‘and would probably have eked out an uninspired but comfortable life as a school teacher or public servant’ rang true for many recruits during the immediate post-war years.Footnote ¹⁷⁰ As Creech Jones observed, the cohort appointed in the immediate aftermath of the war included a far larger proportion of grammar school men who had embarked on other careers in the 1930s, when not only would it have been unlikely for them to gain entry but some had not even heard of the Colonial Service. M. Dorey left school at fifteen and worked for a colliery insurance company. After first hearing of the Colonial Service during his war service, he returned to the UK but ‘no longer found the work congenial…My overseas experience in the RN convinced me that the British Empire was a force for good in the colonies where the Colonial Service was needed and provided a worthwhile job.’Footnote ¹⁷¹

Interview summaries made frequent mention of the ‘suitability’ of a candidate's background. Although working-class origins were not the barrier they had been, interviewers found it hard to ignore entirely: ‘[C]omes, in his own words, from a “working class family”, Lancashire stock…I think that he could find a niche in the Service…not a “natural” for the top of the ladder but would be a very useful stay on the rung.’Footnote ¹⁷² A latent fear that the Service would be infiltrated by ‘Angry Young Men’ quickly developed during the late 1950s, perhaps partly incited by John Osborne's swipe at the empire caste.Footnote ¹⁷³ The prevailing assumption appeared that the average working-class, grammar schoolboy would arrive with a ‘chip on his shoulder’ in the mould of an ‘angry young man’.Footnote ¹⁷⁴ Similarly, appearance still counted for much. A strong physique and steely gaze continued to hold pride of place in a DO's repertoire, whilst those who dared cultivate a less fastidious façade were quickly identified as potential trouble-makers.Footnote ¹⁷⁵ The fear of a vociferous left-wing student challenge to empire made recruiters wary of any who appeared to betray such sympathies in their appearance: ‘X is not at first sight good “officer material”. He wears a beard, is leftish in politics and one would expect him to find a niche in the LSE.’Footnote ¹⁷⁶ Serving officers were clear that the Service needed pragmatic, unsentimental recruits, not young idealists wanting to bring down the colonial system from the inside.

While the generation recruited after the early 1950s had largely missed war service, their experience of National Service often proved as pivotal in defining career trajectories. Figures for National Service are hard to be precise over; however, at least 25 per cent of CAS recruits had been based in the colonies, principally Malaya and Kenya. A posting to the King's African Rifles or Royal West African Frontier Force frequently precipitated an application after individuals ‘fell in love with Africa’.Footnote ¹⁷⁷ The positive – albeit often mildly patronizing – reaction to colonial troops frequently appears as a deciding factor in many career choices. One applicant wrote to McCleery during his degree: ‘During my time as a National Serviceman I served a year in the Middle East, mainly at Khartoum. I found that I always got on well with the Sudanese and before leaving had become quite attached to them. They were in many ways admirable people, with a fine sense of humour. It is for that reason that I have long considered the Colonial Service as a career.’Footnote ¹⁷⁸

Although not always coherently articulated, the cohort appointed following the gradual cessation of National Service after 1957 exhibited shifting attitudes towards the idea of a career compared to their predecessors. The generation leaving school in the mid-1950s had access to far wider and more sophisticated provision of careers advice than ever before. New career patterns undermined the appeal of the Colonial Service in a job market that favoured the seeker over employer. Amongst the Colonial Service's core demographic of public school and Oxbridge graduates career patterns showed a marked shift during the 1950s and 1960s, with public service careers receding in popularity to be overwhelmingly replaced by scientific jobs and engineering.Footnote ¹⁷⁹ At the rapidly expanding Redbrick universities, the Colonial Service failed to make major inroads due to a lack of publicity and its enduring association with the public schools and Oxbridge. The growing sense of alienation amongst the 1950s generation towards the well-trodden colonial career paths of their predecessors was forcefully drawn in Andrew Sinclair's My friend Judas, whose protagonist's visit to his University Appointments Board, flicking through ‘endless booklets about why didn't I become a Somaliland Policeman or a minor Protector of Aden’ only reinforced his determination ‘not to sweat it out, watching the last kicks of an ailing Empire’.Footnote ¹⁸⁰

Yet, while declining application rates signify job security retained importance in shaping career choices, amongst those who did apply, there were clear indications that flexibility was prioritized over ‘a gold-watch’ career trajectory.Footnote ¹⁸¹ By the late 1950s, few were misled by the Colonial Office's rhetoric; long-term prospects were accepted as poor.Footnote ¹⁸² Much of this confidence emerged from the buoyant employment situation in the UK, which left many convinced they would have little trouble finding a new job and eager to seize opportunities when available rather than miss out.Footnote ¹⁸³ This represented a stark contrast to the attitude displayed by men of the same age contemplating the same life choices in the 1930s when the pressures of the economic slump placed secure, long-term jobs at a premium. Unlike the immediate post-war generation, the late 1950s intake expressed little concern over long-term prospects. Repeated mentions in candidates’ interview summaries acknowledged the relaxed attitude towards a premature termination of career and even when interviewers stressed this insecurity it was rarely enough to dissuade:

Ignoring underlying insecurity in favour of liberating opportunities to see the world, enjoy new experiences, and soothe ‘itchy-feet’, the last cohort of recruits adopted an attitude to career selection that became more common a generation later.

Once school leavers became exempted from National Service, the pressure to find a career and settle down diminished. By the early 1960s, the Oxford University Appointments Board regularly commented on an increasing reluctance amongst undergraduates to commit to a career position immediately, as they preferred instead to bide their time undertaking voluntary work, further study, or a gap year. It was felt ‘[t]his lack of enthusiasm for a career appointment…so sharply differentiates the ex-schoolboy from the ex-national serviceman’.Footnote ¹⁸⁵ Meanwhile, senior officers expressed concern that ‘the pride of becoming a member of the Colonial Service is not what it was. The spirit of the Service is being allowed to run down’ as ‘temporary careerism seems to be gradually replacing the ideal of a lifetime's service’.Footnote ¹⁸⁶

Many recruits articulated their desire to gain life experience before settling down.Footnote ¹⁸⁷ As marriage patterns stabilized after the disruptions of the 1940s, fewer recruits joined already married – much to the relief of McCleery – and several consciously saw a posting to Africa as an ideal way to delay this moment.Footnote ¹⁸⁸ In contrast to the make-up of colonial society before 1939, the empire of the 1950s was far from a space of male sociability alone. Air-travel made Colonial Service appear less remote and more accessible for those with families.Footnote ¹⁸⁹ The rapid increase in the numbers of women appointed after the war meant that many recruits of both sexes who joined the Service single soon met their future spouse, whilst the tendency for families to remain longer because of improved transport and health infrastructure allowed the prospect of a brief sojourn in the colonies to be easily reconciled with long-term life plans.

For some, the colonies never lost their romantic magnetism. The Colonial Service fully appreciated this allure and when recruitment stagnated in the 1950s specifically targeted university mountaineering and adventure societies in the hope of drumming up intrepid types.Footnote ¹⁹⁰ Many recruits had been keen sportsmen throughout their education and like their predecessors continued to view life overseas as an appealing alternative to the drudgery of a daily commute and sedate office existence.Footnote ¹⁹¹ The juxtaposition of Africa against the privations of austerity Britain proved particularly effective in drawing many towards an application.Footnote ¹⁹² As the Sanders trope highlights, children's literature and cinema could be powerful influences, with the vision they created of Africa often enduring into adulthood. Adventure remained an important element for P. Wass, but alone cannot explain his career choice:

This last remark is interesting and frequently appears in memoirs and interviews. Recruits show a tendency to cast their career choice in a romantic tone; abandoning the security and comfort of home to embark upon the exotic unknown.

Yet, the obvious paradox remains that little else in these men's backgrounds marked them out as strident nonconformists. In this sense, the Colonial Service offered a form of sanitized nonconformity, which, although perhaps signalling slight eccentricity compared to peers entering the City or Law, did not exclude them from the closely knit and regulated social group from which they emerged. Although rarely a simple choice, it is clear that much of the Colonial Service's appeal lay in the manner in which it legitimized and counterbalanced the urge to escape the stultifying climate of post-war Britain with the promise of patriotic duty and altruistic service. By the mid-1950s the transition from the frontier-adventurer towards the adventurous-bureaucrat, which had been initiated by Furse during the interwar years, was largely complete. The Service picked those who best conformed to its understanding of itself, but it was shared formative conditioning that ensured these individuals remained the most likely to be attracted. Compared to alternative opportunities favoured by this group, a Colonial Service career uniquely reconciled a variety of conflicting ambitions. However, once developments in the colonies undermined long-term career prospects, the Service's popularity plummeted amongst the group upon which it had always most relied.Footnote ¹⁹⁴ Africa may have retained its promise of adventure, romance, and altruistic service, but without the assurance of a stable career this was not enough to perpetuate the recruitment cycle.

VI

In conclusion, there were pragmatic but also ideological factors that led to the Sanders-figure being employed to boost post-1945 recruitment. The Colonial Office exploited Sanders's cultural resonance to market a vision of empire to an increasingly sceptical domestic audience that emphasized romance, adventure, and continuity at the expense of the complicated political reality. The symbolic use of Sanders highlights the enduring incongruities between the Colonial Service's espoused and operative ideology during this period. At a time when the Service's traditional appeal within wider culture was diminishing, Sanders became a tool to suggest that its prestige and prospects remained as bright as they had been in the 1930s – but one that also indicates a marked scepticism within the Service to the new post-war idealism.

Some undoubtedly did respond to this traditional call; however, it is too easy and far too simplistic to condemn all post-war recruits as remnants of a patronizing tradition, and the reasons why men chose to enter the Service proved by no means uncomplicated. By moving beyond a purely institutional account of high policy to consider recruits within their formative cultural context, this article has sought to offer fresh insight into both the challenges faced by the colonial state during the period of decolonization, as well as a clearer sense of empire's shifting resonance amongst the group expected to undertake its day-to-day administration. Drawing together historiographical currents that have often run separate courses provides new perspectives on how changes in policy intersected with evolving understandings of imperial manliness and career ambition amongst the British professional middle classes. After 1950, the Colonial Service was never able to fill all of its annual vacancies with its traditional recruitment strategy increasingly shown to be ineffective and anachronistic. Ultimately, the Colonial Office's refusal radically to reimagine the profile of the ideal administrator to reflect the changing ambitions of the colonial project meant it struggled to develop a message that appealed to its core demographic and fulfilled its new ideological promises.