Lead Tablets: τιμήσɛις and Valuation of the Athenian Cavalry Charger

The lead cavalry tablets are well documented and discussed in modern scholarship; there is particularly thorough attention given to the Agora tablets by Kroll, and those from the Kerameikos by Braun.Footnote ³ An exhaustive discussion of the finds is not necessary for the present study; but some explanation as to their relationship to the cavalry, as well as their nature and purpose, is necessary. Found alongside the Agora tablets were 25 clay symbola of the hipparch Pheidon – likely the same Pheidon mentioned training cavalrymen in the Agora.Footnote ⁴ Also recovered were nine lead armour tokens, often assumed to be associated with the cavalry.Footnote ⁵ In both sets of finds, the tablets were found either rolled or folded with a name in the genitive on the outside.Footnote ⁶ Inside, the rolled / folded tablets usually listed a colour, a symbol (or the term ἄσημος, ‘unmarked’) and a sum in hundreds of drachmas. This sum was often prefaced on third-century tablets with the term τίμημα (‘evaluation’) or an abbreviation of it (τίμη, τίμ, τί), perhaps referring to ‘value’ (from the word ‘price’).Footnote ⁷ Not all tablets followed this exact protocol; some had the proper name inscribed on the inside and others, particularly in the third century, had all information on the outside excepting the sum.Footnote ⁸ The specialised vocabulary used for colours such as πυρρός (‘red’ or ‘chestnut’), παρῴας (‘brown’ or ‘bay’), ποικίλος (‘dappled’) and the wide variety of symbols from ox heads, to serpents, eagles and even Nike, were initially recognised by Braun as indicating the colours and brands of horses.Footnote ⁹ Kroll has suggested that the use of the term τίμημα must relate to the τιμήσɛις τῶν ἵππων, which – other than these tablets – are only mentioned in two decrees passed by the ἱππɛῖς (‘cavalry’). These decrees date to 282/1 and 188/7 BCE. They both honour the phylarchs and hipparchs.Footnote ¹⁰ In the earlier inscription the phylarchs are praised because ἐπιμɛμέληνται δὲ καὶ τῶν [τι]μήσɛων καὶ τῶν δοκιμασιῶν, ἐποίησαν δὲ καὶ τὴν τῶν σωμάτων δοκιμασίαν κατὰ τὸν νόμον μɛτὰ τῆς βουλῆς καλῶς (‘They oversee the τιμήσɛις and the δοκιμασία and they audit the bodies under the law properly by the Boule’).Footnote ¹¹ An even more explicit reference to these ‘evaluations of the horses’ occurs in the second inscription: […ἐποι]ήσατο δὲ καὶ τὰς τιμήσɛις τῶν ἵππων μɛτὰ τῆς βουλῆς (‘…and he made the τιμήσɛις of the horses together with the Boule’).Footnote ¹² Following Kroll's argument, in these inscriptions the τιμήσɛις (hereafter, timēseis) should be seen as separate to the δοκιμασία (hereafter, dokimasia) of cavalrymen which assessed the rider's physical fitness (Arist. Ath. Pol. 49.2) and the dokimasia of horses, to check the physical fitness and ability of the horses before the Boule (Arist. Ath. Pol. 49.1 and Xen. Eq. Mag. 3.1 and 9).Footnote ¹³ These timēseis, attested only in the above inscriptions and the lead tablets, were not assessments of physical fitness as in the dokimasia of either horse or rider, but rather a valuation of the horse. This valuation of the horse is further supported by the repetition of some horses with their riders; no less than six pairs repeat over time and show the depreciation of the horse as it ages.Footnote ¹⁴ As Kroll explains, these records would have likely been used to settle an insurance claim in a satisfactory manner.Footnote ¹⁵ If the horse was to be lost on duty, this is the value the state agreed to return to the cavalryman, in all likelihood so that he could then afford another charger. It would also encourage men to bring a horse to war to begin with. This assertion by Kroll has yet to be convincingly contested, and there is no other substantial argument – nor can I propose one – which better explains the purpose of these tablets.Footnote ¹⁶ The difficulty for modern scholars, is keeping this scheme separate from the katastasis subsidy.

Lead Tablets: Insurance of the Cavalry Charger

Although the purpose of the lead tablets, as records of cavalry horse valuations, seems clear, there has long been a desire to see what these drachma ‘valuations’ can tell us beyond insurance values arbitrarily imposed by the state. Indeed, scholars often seek to elide these valuations with the cavalry katastasis (‘establishment loan’), implying that the amounts shown on the tablets were the same as the amounts given for this establishment loan. Bugh tells us, ‘…the timēsis procedure [seen on the lead tablets] guaranteed fair reimbursement for loss to a cavalryman while engaged in cavalry service; it was related to the katastasis only in its initial and maximum amount.’Footnote ¹⁷ Put simply, the lead tablets are seen to reflect the amount given as katastasis to each cavalryman or that these are at least relative or connected amounts. However, whilst Bugh uses the lead tablets as a gauge for a katastasis figure, he also grapples with whether this figure would have been a set amount and how this may have fluctuated. He postulates that the sum of 1200d may have only be set around the middle of the fourth century, and later that this figure was only reached after the battle of Chaironeia.Footnote ¹⁸ The difficulty here seems to lie in connecting the insurance scheme of the tablets and the katastasis loan as this would base the loan entirely on the value of the horse, which fluctuates massively. If we are to remove this connection, seeing the insurance scheme as a recorded value of chargers and the establishment loan as a set amount given to each rider for his ‘establishment’, it removes the need to try and find the mean value loaned. However, this does not leave us without questions, as the value of the establishment loan given to riders is not made clear, just that a loan was given.

Spence offers a similar sentiment in his more recent work: ‘The katastasis was a loan designed to assist members of the cavalry class to purchase a cavalry mount … the loan could be as high as 1,200 drachmas’, the amount here being taken from the lead tablets/timēsis. Footnote ¹⁹ This assumption of a 1,200 drachma cost can only be given if we are to assume that the tablets reflect the katastasis amount – as this was the highest amount they record – and that the katastasis was based only on the value of the horse. Bugh stipulates that the highest amount offered, 1,200 drachmas, was the amount allowed as a katastasis/establishment loan to each cavalryman so that he could purchase his steed, equating to an outlay of 200 talents by the state for the 1,000 strong cavalry.Footnote ²⁰ Spence disputes this amount, deeming it too large for a state loan, instead arguing ‘…that each cavalryman was loaned either a fixed amount (lower than 1,200 drachmas) or, alternatively, all or part of what his horse actually cost – perhaps up to a maximum of 1,200 drachmas’. This calculation is also, evidently, a reflection of the data from the lead tablets.Footnote ²¹ The evidence does agree with Spence in part, as it shows that that the katastasis was likely a fixed amount. It also seems reasonable that the amount was lower than 1,200 drachmas. However, the question needs to be posed as to why the lead tablets/timēsis must reflect the katastasis. Further, it has to be asked why the katastasis loan needs to be based only on the value of the horse. There is no ancient evidence that links the two – this connection is modern conjecture. Assuming the lead tablets show us the value of the katastasis is appealing, because it gives us some concrete numbers to work with. However, the evidence does not support this assumption.

The katastasis: A Separate Establishment Loan

The most significant point to raise in disconnecting the katastasis and the insurance is that scholars are making a large assumption in suggesting that the katastasis was primarily to cover the cost of the cavalryman's horse.Footnote ²² This demonstrates the danger of the traditional connection between the katastasis and timēsis/valuation of the horse as shown on the insurance tablets – if we are to assume the value of the horse on the tablets was the amount of katastasis, then it can only cover the cost of the horse. Kroll follows this line of thought when he states that this [katastasis] ‘was a loan made by the state to each recruit when he was formally enrolled (“established”) in the cavalry primarily to assist him in the purchase of his mount’ (emphasis mine).Footnote ²³

However, this assumption is not supported by the ancient evidence. We have three extracts of ancient evidence which explicitly comment on the katastasis, and none directly mentions covering the cost of a cavalry horse. Harpokration tells us:

The original Lysias passage runs as follows:

Aristophanes describes in the Knights (225f) how the cavalry ‘detested’ Cleon. The scholiast gives an explanation for this feeling at verse 226 by pointing to Theopompus; προπηλακισθɛὶς γὰρ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν καὶ παροξυνθɛὶς ἐπɛτέθη τῇ πολιτɛίᾳ καὶ διɛτέλɛσɛν ɛἰς αὐτοὺς κακὰ μηχανώμɛνος (‘Having been insulted by them, and worked up into a rage, he made an attack against the constitution and continuously devised evil against them’).Footnote ²⁶ The curious phrasing of ἐπɛτέθη τῇ πολιτɛίᾳ has been explained by early translators as Cleon's entry into the Boule in 428/7 to prosecute the cavalry or that he attacked the constitution.Footnote ²⁷ Others may read it as ‘the people’. However, these both come across awkwardly. It makes little sense for Cleon to ‘attack the constitution’, so the attack needs to be on something else in relation to the cavalry. Fornara has instead argued that the scholiasts’ recollection of Theopompus’ words in this extract actually refers to Cleon attacking the katastasis of the cavalry, not the ‘constitution’.Footnote ²⁸ He asserts that a swapping of the words πολιτɛία for κατάστασις was likely a misunderstanding of the word katastasis and its special meaning, with the scholiast assuming politeia as a suitable equivalent. That the scholiast is in error here seems reasonable; it is far more likely that Cleon would attack a government subsidy rather than the ‘constitution’. This would instead have Theopompus’ words as, ‘Having been insulted by them, and worked up into a rage, he made an attack against the payment of their equipment-money and continuously devised evil against them’, which fits far better to the context and reality of the cavalry. This extract thus gives us a final example of the katastasis in ancient evidence. It also gives insight into the view some politicians held of the katastasis (Cleon viewed it as worthy of removal or adjustment), and how vehemently the cavalry guarded it as a necessity to soften the high cost of their military service. Beyond this evidence, however, we have very little on the katastasis in ancient texts.

Scholars suggest the katastasis began around the time of Pericles and his expansion of the cavalry to 1,000 (445–438 BCE); however, this is only a hypothetical connection between these two phenomena – we cannot be certain.Footnote ²⁹ In an opposing view, Bugh has suggested dating the katastasis to the institution of the 300-strong cavalry corps after the battle of Tanagra in 457 BCE.Footnote ³⁰ It would seem more plausible to accept the later date of 445–438 BCE under Pericles, as by this time the cavalry was a more intrinsic part of the Athenian army, and citizen service and state payments such as these were more widely accepted.Footnote ³¹

When considering the above ancient evidence it becomes clear that the katastasis was not meant to be spent on the cavalryman's horse alone. Although this does not mean that it would be for more than the cost of a horse, it does mean that the connection to the cost of a horse cannot be established. All we can know for sure is that an establishment loan was given to cavalrymen and was most likely – if we are to follow Harpokration – a loan rather than a gift.Footnote ³² Beyond that is pure conjecture.

The katastasis: Not Based on the Value of the Charger

To begin with, if the katastasis was to be directed solely towards the value of a cavalryman's horse, this would imply that the loan had to be decided in two scenarios: either it was given before the horse was purchased (but its value already determined), or after the horse was purchased – and the money already spent by the cavalryman. The former arrangement would mean valuing horses before purchase. This could lead to a bureaucratic nightmare, for which we have no evidence, and be open to inequality and dispute. The latter option would mean the loan was almost irrelevant to the cavalryman; he has already acquired his horse and thus no longer needed financial support for it (although it is unlikely he would turn down ‘free money’!). The loan would be far better put towards feed, tack, stabling, pasturage and the like. Further to this, this assumption does not take into consideration those who already owned horses. No doubt many cavalry recruits would have already owned suitable mounts: does this then mean they did not receive a loan? Perhaps we need to consider that this loan was not directly connected to the values of the horses on the tablets, as the loan was not aimed at paying for a cavalryman's horse. Instead, the katastasis loan was – as the evidence tells us – a fixed loan given to cavalrymen to use in establishing himself once he joined the corps. That it would be only used for his horse, or somehow dictated by his horse's value, would only be a modern inference.

Connecting the tablets with the katastasis has also led to some scholars arguing that it was ‘…a loan made by the state against the value of the charger and not repayable if the beast were lost on active service’ (emphasis mine).Footnote ³³ This view once again considers the amount recorded on each tablet to be the amount of the katastasis and suggests that this loan was defaulted in the event of the horse's demise. To begin with, the view that the katastasis was an amount ‘against the value of the charger’ has difficulties. Most importantly, the evidence does not support this theory of adjustable loans. If we consider the valuations given on the tablets, as Spence has done (Table 1), we see that the average valuation was around 500 drachmas with 1,200 drachmas as the ceiling.Footnote ³⁴

Table 1. Horse Prices on the Kerameikos and Agora Tablets. After Table 7 in Spence (Reference Spence1993: 276)

Valuing cavalry horses also remains an issue. Horse values naturally varied. No doubt the Athenians faced hot debate as to any horse's market price. The state may consider a horse to have a certain value, while the owner or breeder may consider breeding, gender, age, colouring, experience or certain training to make the horse more or less valuable. The only way around this would be to give each man a different amount for his katastasis relative to his horse. Subjective katastasis loans for each cavalryman seem unlikely, as this would no doubt have led to disparity and dispute within the ranks. More importantly, our ancient sources above support that this was a fixed amount – a point which creates a tension with the variable amounts listed on the tablets.

In response to this problem some scholars have attempted to gauge the most likely fixed amount for the katastasis using the tablets as indicators of average cost. As argued above, Bugh's hypothesis of 1,200d each would cost the state 200 talents, making this amount dubious. Furthermore, if every cavalryman was given 1,200d towards his horse, what if the horse was only worth 300d? Or alternatively over 1,200d? In either case there are issues for both state and cavalryman. Realistically, therefore, to assume any amount remains pure conjecture. Attempting to measure a katastasis amount from the tablets’ valuations, or assuming that the most common or highest was likely the amount given, is again trying to join two unconnected items. Nowhere does the evidence tell us that the katastasis was based on a horse's value, nor can we assume the tablets might tell us what the amount was. The insurance tablets were a separate entity, with the purpose of insuring horses to a value the state could afford if the horse were maimed or killed in war. As the katastasis was not primarily directed at paying for a cavalryman's horse, there is no plausible reason for using the tablets as a measure of it – one might just as easily use the cost of grain or stabling.

The second argument, that the loan could be dismissed if the horse was killed in action, also presents issues. This theory should perhaps be considered alongside that of trierarchs who were not held responsible if their ship were lost in service. The cost differential was enormous, with the average ship costing multiple talents and a horse perhaps around 500d. Considering the ancient evidence above, the idea that a cavalryman was freed of this loan if his horse were to perish during service is not alluded to – primarily because the loan is never evidenced purely to cover the cost of the horse.Footnote ³⁵ However, even if we are to entertain this idea of dismissing the loan in the event of the horse's death in war, we come against a myriad of issues. Bugh argues that if his 1,200d per cavalryman theory is correct, by the time a cavalryman retired his horse would have likely depreciated to a value of, or close to, zero. He would then repay his loan in full.Footnote ³⁶ This is possible, but it is unlikely that many warhorses would last long enough to reach this point. A cavalryman's service, normally lasting 10–15 years, would in most cases outlast his horse during their military careers; meaning that most cavalrymen would lose their horses at some time in their military service.Footnote ³⁷ Horses, even in peaceful situations, would have struggled to make it to 18 years of age in classical Athens (assuming at least two years for growth and one more for training) in a time of limited veterinary care, harsh winters, and the difficult terrain of Attica.Footnote ³⁸ An old warhorse becomes even less likely, if we then include the potential for loss in battle. Most cavalrymen would have needed to swap their horses at least once, to ensure they had a steed worthy of passing the physical evaluations overseen by the Boule. Importantly, our tablets tracing the insurance of warhorses indicate that cavalrymen often had many horses.Footnote ³⁹ This then raises further complications for a ‘horse-centred loan’ which is dismissed if the horse dies in battle. Is the loan only dismissed if the horse is lost in war? What if an old war injury later made the horse unfit for war? What if the horse was to be ‘retired’? Would the cavalryman now repay the loan or be free of it? What if the horse failed the dokimasia and was branded unfit for service due to neglect? Would he get a new loan for a new horse, if his first was made inactive early in his career and he was unable to afford a new mount? As the horse loses value and as the loan is tied to the horse, does the loan decrease, or does he have to make up the difference for the original loan cost from his own funds?Footnote ⁴⁰ The latter, a cavalryman only repaying the depreciation of his horse when he retired, has been put forward recently by scholars as plausible. Spence tells us, ‘For longer serving members of the cavalry whose horses had fully depreciated in value, repaying the katastasis could therefore involve them in covering the entire cost of their horse … shorter serving members who were able to sell their horses would be liable only for the cost of the depreciation of their mount during their cavalry service’.Footnote ⁴¹ Spence gives no evidence for this conjecture, and it seems to raise too many issues to make it realistic – in particular a consistent measurement of depreciation and the ability to sell off the horse for what was felt as a fair price. As with the modern world, a fair price and the reality of what one can get can be vastly different depending on a multitude of market and item factors. It is clear that there are many problems with this scenario as it is too closely tied to the horse, bringing in variables. If we are to separate the tablets – and thus the horse – from the katastasis, these problems are alleviated.

Beyond these issues, if a cavalryman was to renege on his loan, there is the financial burden on the state. If a cavalryman simply needed to lose his horse in war to be free of debt, due to the nature of warfare and the likelihood that many cavalrymen would lose their horse – whether unintentionally or otherwise – the state risked losing a considerable sum. It is also not unlikely a man would entertain the idea of ‘intentionally’ losing his horse in battle, especially if it meant saving himself a considerable sum. Theoretically, if the cavalry was wiped out during service it could lead to a potential loss of 200 talents (if each of the 1,000 cavalrymen was given 1,200 drachmas as Bugh proposes), or if we are to assume the lower amount of 500 drachmas per rider, a loss of 83 talents.Footnote ⁴² There is also, of course, the next 200/83 talents needed to then pay the next group. Such issues are not illuminated in our evidence, nor do they seem logical. It would be more plausible to argue that the katastasis was – as Harpokration tells us – a set amount, given to the cavalryman to spend as he wished and to be repaid when asked for by the phylarchs. This could mean repayment occurred once the cavalryman retired, or was financially able to do so. We can gather from our evidence that each man was given an establishment loan to establish himself, in whichever way best suited his needs. Once he was able to, or retired, he would be required to return the loan in full, so that another could take it up with minimal impact to the state. In this context, separate from the tablets, which show insurable values, the katastasis makes sense. Only when we attempt to connect the two do they become confusing.

A Classical Athenian Cavalry Supported by the Dēmos

Financial support of the Athenian cavalry in the classical era was exceptional. Unlike hoplites or sailors, a cavalryman could expect two separate financial supports during their military service. These two measures, the katastasis and the insurance scheme, were given on top of the usual σῖτος or ‘grain allowance’ (hereafter, sītos) offered to those who served in the Athenian military corps.Footnote ⁴³ They reflect what seems to be a system of support; one that is indeed far beyond that offered to other soldiers. The implications of this financial outlay, particularly for a comparatively small military unit, has wide-reaching implications.

That the Athenian government financially supported the cavalry is clear. What is more important to ask here is why such support was given to an already wealthy group which was apparently eclipsed by the traditional hoplite ethos in Athens. One might consider a government loan system similar to another which was directed towards building the navy. Aristotle tells us (emphasis below is mine):

This is similar to the katastasis in that it is a loan: however, this is a ‘one off’ and not specific to a military unit. What it does illuminate for us is the desire of the state to encourage others to wisely spend money towards state needs. In essence, getting their wealthiest to work their money for them. The katastasis loan would have been an impressive cost at its creation. Financing a 1000-strong cavalry would have cost a similar amount as financing a number of triremes. It can be imagined that this cost will have lessened over time as cavalrymen repaid their loans to be handed down to the next batch of riders. However, that loans were always repaid cannot be guaranteed, and as the cavalry grew in size costings will have shifted. As we are yet to uncover where the financing for the cavalry originated, we can postulate that it may have originated from a similar process as the triremes above – but we are left only with conjecture. Perhaps the cavalry katastasis can be considered in a similar light as the triremes, but only so far in that it is a loan for the benefit of the military machine.

Infantry received no similar insurance scheme or katastasis for their upkeep. Arguably, cavalrymen had a larger financial outlay than that of a hoplite when considering the cost of horse(s), feed, tack, vet care, stabling and the like.Footnote ⁴⁵ However, the higher sītos afforded to cavalrymen was likely put in place to cover this cost. The cavalryman's sītos, paid from at least 410/9 BCE, as indicated by an inscription of the accounts of the Treasurers of Athena (IG I3 375), is evidenced to have been 4 obols a day.Footnote ⁴⁶ This on top of their μισθός (‘pay’, hereafter misthos) of 1 drachma a day, equivalent to that of a hoplite.Footnote ⁴⁷

There has been debate considering this amount, particularly around an apparent pay cut targeted at the Athenian cavalry's misthos. In short, a fragment from Lysias’ speech Against Theozotides (PHib.1.14) dated to 403/2 BCE, displays what can be read as a pay cut for the ἱπποτοξόται (‘mounted archers’) and cavalry. This fragment is intriguing as it has been classed for the better part of the 20^th century as one which proves a manifestation of class warfare against the cavalry due to their actions in 411 and 404 BCE.Footnote ⁴⁸ The fragment is most commonly read as, ‘with regard to war Theozotides here advocates the motion that the knights should be paid four obols instead of a drachma, and the mounted archers eight obols instead of two, and this motion … he carried in the assembly of the people’.Footnote ⁴⁹ However, modern reflection has come to understand the fragment instead reading as a 33 percent pay cut for both the cavalry and mounted archers, from 1 drachma to 4 obols and 2 drachma to 8 obols respectively.Footnote ⁵⁰ This reading better reflects the financial stress which Athens was under during this time, rather than a ‘vengeance tax’ driven at the cavalry for their involvement in the oligarchic coups. Either way, this fragment does indeed show a drop in cavalry pay, alongside the mercenary mounted archers, but should not be seen as one driven by Athenians who ‘…loathed their cavalry corps…’,Footnote ⁵¹ but rather one in which ‘No one would be singled out for egregiously favourable treatment at a time of public financial emergency … [T]hese reductions would be part of a broader economy program…’.Footnote ⁵² Furthermore, the insurance scheme and katastasis are strong evidence for a dēmos that financially supported their cavalry.

There are other motives to consider. The reasoning for giving this unique support, as explained by Spence, could be put down to two factors: to foster socio-political cohesion by allowing the upper class to benefit from the wealth of the empire, or, more likely, to ensure Athens had a substantial citizen cavalry ready for action at all times.

It seems unlikely that a main purpose of the katastasis and insurance scheme would have been to keep the wealthy happy. Not only did the liturgical system expect the wealthy to support the state financially through military or civic (χορηγία or γυμνασιαρχία) Footnote ⁵³ means, but financial support for the wealthy in the fifth and fourth centuries was deemed unnecessary.Footnote ⁵⁴ Private spending on military liturgies could range from 74 to 184 talents per year.Footnote ⁵⁵ Further to the former liturgical system, the elite were also expected to give a war tax (ɛἰσφορά) to the tune of 200 talents annually from 428–426 BCEFootnote ⁵⁶ and ‘donations’ (ἐπιδόσɛις) to the war effort during times of hardship. These donations were apparently solicited by the assembly, and as with most aspects of Athenian life this donation giving could be competitive: Plutarch (Alc. 10) tells of how Alcibiades was enticed to emulate the actions of other donors by the applause of the assembly, resulting in even louder applause for himself.Footnote ⁵⁷ The latter argument can be based on the lack of real opposition to the democracy, and the ability for the aristocracy to show off their excellence in positions held solely for them (ἵππαρχος, στρατηγός) and in public spectacles, funerary monuments and more.Footnote ⁵⁸ Notably, there was indeed a marked rise in lavish cavalry-based funerary stelai from the mid-5^th century onwards, no doubt as a response to the rise of cavalry use under Perikles during the Peloponnesian War. These impressive stelai became yet another avenue for the wealthy, particularly cavalrymen, to display their wealth and status on their most lasting monument. It also demonstrates the acceptance by the dēmos for them to show off their elite status as cavalrymen in the public sphere. We see this furthered in public monuments such as the Parthenon frieze, which in no small part is comprised of Athenian cavalry riders.

The most likely purpose of these subsidies must then lie in military need. Beyond this, whether as a cause or an effect, there is also a noticeable shift in the Athenian psyche towards their cavalry. At the end of the fifth century as the Peloponnesian War drew to a close, the landscape of battle had changed, creating theatres of war which insisted more upon the use of cavalry-style tactics. By battles moving closer to home, the Spartans taking Decelea, for example, the cavalry became an invaluable unit in reconnaissance, lightning attacks and withdrawal, and most importantly the protection of the χώρα. These were actions which the hoplite simply could not match due to their comparative lack of manoeuvrability and speed. From this, the aforementioned growth in public (consider the Parthenon) and private monuments sees the cavalryman rapidly taking position as a hero archetype within Athens. If we consider the dating on the lead tablets of the Kerameikos and Agora, the financial measures discussed here were brought in circa mid-fourth century, perhaps sooner. It could be argued that these measures came into effect under Perikles as part of his cavalry overhaul which saw the number of riders swell to 1000 (and 200 mounted archers). Disappointingly, as yet we have no evidence to support this theory, even if it is logically placed. Whether during Perikles’ leadership, or more likely just after his time, the events show a logical progression; the growing acceptance and use of the cavalry during the Peloponnesian War, a positive shift in the Athenian psyche as evidenced in increased use and public celebration of cavalry in funerary relief and public spectacle, swiftly followed by unique financial support. It is also worth noting the oligarchic coups which occurred right at the time these financial measures may have come into place (411 and 404 BCE). Even though the cavalry was no doubt tarnished by their involvement, their pedestrian peers still saw fit to support them in public display and financial backing. The systemic support of the cavalry, borne of their increased use and acceptance, was put in place by the dēmos to ensure a citizen body of riders could continue to be an effective component of the Athenian war machine.

The decision of the Athenians to support their cavalry in both public display and financial support shows a shift away from the usually dominant ‘hoplite ethos’ in Athens towards a broader understanding of military strategy inclusive of cavalry. Indeed, we can see a growth in Athenian cavalry use during this period.Footnote ⁵⁹ Furthermore, the tripling of cavalry numbers and considerable financial support must have been debated, discussed, and eventually approved by vote in the Ekklesia.Footnote ⁶⁰ For this reason, these changes need to be considered as not only state support but dēmos support. Although the hoplite no doubt still dominated literature and art, the dēmos recognised the need for a citizen cavalry they could trust. As Spence aptly puts it, the dēmos was not ‘driven by either narrow hoplite-centric or narrow navy-centric perspectives’.Footnote ⁶¹ The threat of the Boeotian cavalry during the Peloponnesian War, the lack of allied cavalry support in times of need (for example, the Thessalian cavalry against Sparta in 446 BCE), and finally the betrayal of the allied Thessalian cavalry in 457 BCE at Tanagra were further reminders of the importance of a trustworthy, citizen cavalry.Footnote ⁶² The dēmos understood the need for their own cavalry to ‘future-proof’ themselves against cavalry-strong opponents and offer cavalry advantages of reconnaissance, flank protection, march-security and home defence.Footnote ⁶³ The exceptional financial supports, the katastasis and insurance scheme, are just two reflections of this.