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Artistic misunderstandings: The emotional significance of historical learning in the arts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 November 2017

Nicolas J. Bullot
Affiliation:
School of Creative Arts and Humanities, Casuarina Campus, Charles Darwin University, Darwin, Northern Territory 0909, Australia. nicolas.bullot@cdu.edu.auhttp://www.cdu.edu.au/creative-arts-humanities/staff-profiles/nicolas-bullot
Rolf Reber
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Oslo, NO-0317 Oslo, Norway. rolf.reber@psykologi.uio.nohttp://www.sv.uio.no/psi/english/people/aca/rolfreb/

Abstract

The Distancing-Embracing model does not have the conceptual resources to explain artistic misunderstandings and the emotional consequences of historical learning in the arts. Specifically, it suggests implausible predictions about emotional distancing caused by art schemata (e.g., misunderstandings of artistic intentions and contexts). These problems show the need for further inquiries into how historical contextualization modulates negative emotions in the arts.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 

Although the Distancing-Embracing model makes important contributions to our understanding of the enjoyment of negative emotions in art, it lacks resources to explain how misunderstandings in artistic communication modulate both negative and positive emotions. Specifically, the model misrepresents how artistic misunderstandings occur in several art forms. The Distancing-Embracing model and several other theories (e.g., Bullot et al., Reference Bullot, Seeley and Daviesin press; Goodman Reference Goodman1968; Takahashi Reference Takahashi1995) assume that artistic expression is a process of communication in which a sender (e.g., the artist) sends a signal (e.g., the work) to recipients, who interpret and respond to the work. Comprehension errors occur in this process. For example, receivers may misunderstand the artist's intention. More generally, recipients may err in comprehending the causal context of the work, which may lead to misunderstandings of artistic sources, provenance, and historical situations (Bullot & Reber Reference Bullot and Reber2013a).

According to the Distancing-Embracing model, aesthetic appreciation of art forms that unfold in time, such as literature, film, and music, are interpreted by a two-step mechanism combining distancing and embracing processes. The model states that distancing is caused by the activation of schemata (Abelson Reference Abelson1981; Mandler Reference Mandler1984), including art schemata. Remarkably, the model posits that activation of an art schema necessarily causes a distancing effect. Most scholars would agree that activation of art schemata is critical in shaping responses to works of art. However, the model's description of art schemata fails to consider the roles of these schemata (1) in artistic misunderstandings and (2) in the contextualization of emotions.

First, by positing that art schemata are necessary conditions to distancing, the Distancing-Embracing model implies that artworks devised to prevent distancing are either systematically misunderstood as prescribing distancing (misunderstanding of an artistic intention) or systematically denied their art status (misunderstanding of an artistic context). However, there is no evidence for such systematic misunderstandings. This dubious prediction can be avoided by emphasizing the historical diversity of art schemata and by contextualizing the norms associated with these schemata.

Consider distancing. The model does not consider how the normative aspects of some art schemata aim to minimize emotional distancing. At least three categories of work customarily classified as art aim to minimize distancing and maximize emotional engagement: ceremonial and ritualistic artworks in first arts, edifying artworks in the religious arts, and works devised to cause social change by means of political activism or governmental propaganda. In these art forms, the classifications via art schemata are socially normative processes that operate by means of contextualization mechanisms (e.g., Bullot & Reber Reference Bullot and Reber2013a; Kirk et al. Reference Kirk, Skov, Hulme, Christensen and Zeki2009b; Swami Reference Swami2013; Walton Reference Walton1970). This normativity is noticeable in the social effects of these works.

Take the example of schemata associated with first arts, such as the ornaments on warring shields and ceremonials aimed at daunting enemies. Aboriginal warriors did not intend to trigger their enemies' mental distancing from the fright caused by the perceptual experience of shields and war ceremonials. In addition to providing personal defense against blows, aboriginal shields functioned to express power and group identity and frighten foes (Jones Reference Jones2007). Consequently, the normative functions of art schemata associated with these works were not aimed at the distancing of negative emotions.

Similarly, Christian art that depicted Jesus on the cross or the suffering of martyrs aimed at an immediate compassion unmediated by distancing; works of propaganda art aim at social persuasion unmediated by distancing.

A converse example of art intended to prevent embracing by eliciting disgust might be Damien Hirst's A Thousand Years, featuring a cow head infested with maggots. Danto (Reference Danto2003) commented on this piece: “someone told me that she found beauty in the maggots infesting the severed and seemingly putrescent head of a cow, set in a glass display case by the British artist Damien Hirst. It gives me a certain wicked pleasure to imagine Hirst's frustration if hers were the received view” (Danto Reference Danto2003, p. 49). On Danto's account, because the artist intended the work to exclude aesthetic enjoyment, finding beauty in this work misunderstands Hirst's artistic intention. Although Hirst's artwork might show beauty despite its disgusting content (Menninghaus Reference Menninghaus, Eiland and Golb2003), it is nonetheless possible in principle to devise an artwork that is intended to prevent or at least inhibit embracing. It would be a misclassification to exclude this work from the realm of art.

Second, the Distancing-Embracing model does not consider how understanding art is driven by sensitivity to cultural contexts and how this sensitivity modulates responses such as positive and negative emotions. Take the example of the film Triumph of the Will (1935) by Leni Riefenstahl. Triumph of the Will was devised to elicit embracing responses and, therefore, to minimize emotional distancing. Triumph of the Will first acquired cult status, but later became reviled as a piece of Nazi propaganda during the postwar period, a status that arouses negative emotions associated with distancing and lack of embracing. As noted earlier, the Distancing-Embracing model does not have the theoretical resources to predict and explain the historical variations in normative or emotional significance of this and other artworks.

In sum, several omissions prevent the Distancing-Embracing model from making robust predictions about artistic comprehension and the misunderstandings of emotions elicited by works of art. This problem is intensified by the authors' assumption that all artworks aim to produce aesthetic pleasure and enjoyment. This claim is contested in the philosophy of art (Carroll Reference Carroll2001; Davies Reference Davies2006), and can be characterized as the aesthetic-artistic confound in the science of art (Bullot & Reber Reference Bullot and Reber2013b). However, even from the standpoint of the authors' aesthetic theory of art, aesthetic valuation of an artwork ought not be the same when emotions are elicited by misunderstandings or by genuine historical comprehension. Taken together, these reasons suggest that the model would be strengthened by taking into consideration contextualization and historical change in the theory of (negative) emotions in the arts.

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